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THE

WORKS

OF

SAMUEL PARR, LL.D.

PREBENDARY OF ST. PAUL'S, CURATE OF HATTON, &c.

WITH

MEMOIRS OF HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS,

AND

A SELECTION FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE,

BY

JOHN JOHNSTONE, M.D.

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, AND OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, &c.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

LONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, AND GREEN,

PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1828.

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TWO SERMONS,

PREACHED AT NORWICH.

TO

THE RIGHT WORSHIPFUL

JOHN THURLOW, ESQ.

MAYOR OF NORWICH,

REV. RICHARD TAPPS, A.M.

REV. JOHN GREENE, A.M.

THE FOLLOWING

SERMONS

ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED,

BY THEIR MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT,

SAMUEL PARR.

Norwich, May 24, 1780.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The following Sermons are sent to the press precisely in the same form in which they were prepared for the pulpit. Their unusual length obliged the author to omit, in the delivery, some parts, which he thought the least interesting. He hopes, however, that to serious and impartial readers he need make no apology for directing the whole to be printed. Conscious as he is of his own defects in the arts of reasoning, and in the graces of style, he does not presume to set up any claim to literary reputation from these Discourses. They were written with a sincere desire of doing justice to the subjects which the author had occasion to treat in the presence of two *very respectable* congregations; and they are now submitted to the candour of the public, partly in deference to the judgment of some learned friends, and partly for the sake of the Charity-schools in this City, to the support of which such profits as may arise from the sale will be applied.

SERMON I.

PREACHED IN NORWICH CATHEDRAL,

December 25, 1779.

GALATIANS, iv. 4.

When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son.

IT may be ranked among the distinguishing characteristics of the present age, that the authority of prescription is openly disavowed, and that inquiry is carried on with a spirit of incredulity, which, in respect to the subjects upon which it has been sometimes employed, may be called rigorous to excess. That Christianity, by the singularity of its pretensions, by the dignity of its professed origin, and the importance of its end, should, in such an age, attract the notice of speculative men, cannot, I think, surprise any judicious believer; and it ought not to alarm even the most pious, since the abilities displayed in the defence of the Gospel bear no dishonourable proportion to the exertions of those by whom it has been secretly undermined, or openly assaulted.

When the controversy turns either upon facts which sacred history has recorded, or upon doctrines which the Gospel has delivered, it is seldom

difficult to reach the true point of decision. But the words of my text direct our thoughts towards a series of very different topics; such, I mean, as have been hitherto discussed by the aid of abstract reasonings, or by the consideration of circumstances, which, however minute, when separately viewed, are, in their collective force, neither uninstructive nor uninteresting. Among these topics we may place the late appearance of Christianity—its partial propagation—its imperfect efficacy.

If the cavils that have been started upon these points had no other tendency than to let loose the illiberal exultations of the enemies to our Religion, it would be our duty to encounter them with the most accumulated strength of evidence, and the most vigorous efforts of reasoning. But when they become the occasions of embarrassment and extreme dejection to those who wish to support a better cause; when they damp the ardour of piety, or unhinge the steadiness of faith, they cannot be passed over without all the disgraceful appearance, and all the fatal effects, of tacit approbation; without danger to the innocence of other men, and invidious suspicions concerning our own sincerity. In the present discourse, therefore, I shall first endeavour to establish the validity of those principles, by which objections of the kind just mentioned to you may be proved unphilosophical as well as irreligious; and secondly, by a more distinct examination of the objections themselves, I shall hope to expose their real futility, and to coun-

their malignant operation.

Whether our researches be employed upon the physical or the moral constitution of the world, the schemes of God are ever found progressive in their execution; and however they may sometimes unfold themselves to an accurate and humble observer of what has been done, they often clash with the hypotheses of men who affect to penetrate into the counsels of their Maker, and who presume to dictate what it becomes him to do. Now the redemption of mankind, in its various proofs, and its various uses, extends back to the first design of God in creating this system, and stretches forward to the eternal interests of many beings who are ordained to act in it. We may presume, therefore, that all the causes, whether ordinary or extraordinary, mediate or immediate, which might be requisite to its completion, were arranged with the nicest exactness in the general order of things.

But, in a scheme so wide and so complicated, it is by no means surprising that some parts should totally escape our observation, or that others should be imperfectly understood, from their connection with facts either forgotten or undiscovered, with many past events which influence the present, with more that are yet to come, and are themselves relative to a long succession of causes and effects, where the least are essential to the greatest, and the most remote affect the most near.

From this intricate and almost boundless chain that links together the works of God, it becomes impossible for us to catch more than a faint and scanty glimmering of his purposes. For as the most

common and uncommon phenomena may alike be traced up to questions which we cannot solve, so the solution of them would probably open to us new prospects, where our reasoning would be again perplexed, and conjecture itself at a stand.

By those who seriously recollect the limited strength of human reason, the foregoing observations will not be hastily controverted. They prove, doubtless, the existence of the most important facts to be compatible with our ignorance of all their real causes, and all their possible consequences. They point out to us the method in which God is pleased to act, where the noblest interests of his creatures are deeply concerned. They may teach us not only to acquiesce in the reality of that method, but even to infer the propriety of it, from the relation that subsists between our intellectual powers and our moral agency.

Whether the Deity manifest himself to us by his word or his works, the design is not to amuse but to improve us; not to gratify our curiosity but to exercise our faith; not to communicate, with a wild and useless prodigality, the knowledge of times and seasons, which is justly reserved to him who alone can regulate them, but to put us into a state of probationary discipline. That state, too, invariably exists at the very moment in which the will of God is proposed to us, be it attended by many proofs, or by few, be it consonant to our preconceived notions or repugnant to them, be it ultimately admitted or rejected. Hence it is, that the Christian Revelation seldom addresses us but in a tone of authority.

Without bewildering our minds in curious and profound speculations concerning the modes of the divine government, and the abstract fitnesses of things, it plainly records facts, which we are at liberty to believe or disbelieve, just as it inculcates precepts which we may obey or violate. When the fulness of the time was come, God, says the apostle concisely and peremptorily, sent forth his Son.

But if Christianity be attended with difficulties which baffle our reason, it is also supported by evidences on the force of which that reason may decide. If it be the property of the former to impede our assent, it is equally the property of the latter, when clear and apposite, to engage it. If our conviction be built upon dispassionate and laborious inquiry into that which can be known, it ought not to be shaken by imaginary and unknown possibilities. Much less will it be staggered by the arguments of those who would disprove the truth of the Christian Revelation, because the circumstances of it do not coincide with their ideas, either of the proofs that are necessary to authenticate, or of the occasion that is sufficient to produce, a divine interposition. For while there is any proof, we have no right to presume that it is impertinent—if there be any occasion, we see too little of the proportion between means and ends to pronounce it utterly inadequate.

Many of the objections which are made against the time and the manner in which the Gospel was revealed, are rested upon those arguments à priori, which usually require no other qualification in

those who employ them, than the habit of torturing invention and of wresting facts. But such arguments are as delusive in matters of religion as in science. They are unsatisfactory to every inquirer who wishes to be guided by his judgment rather than transported by his imagination; they are impertinent and highly unbecoming, whether they be employed by the friend or the adversary of revelation. The former, in consequence of internal and of external proofs, may admit the excellence of Christianity in the reasonableness of its precepts, the forcibleness of its sanctions, and the miraculous circumstances of its publication. The latter has an unquestionable right to examine any evidences upon which a revelation professedly founds its pretensions. But when either of them, from the stores of his own observation, draws forth criteria by which all revelations, howsoever circumstanced, and whensoever made, must be tried, he treads, surely, upon treacherous ground. The Christian injudiciously assumes in all cases, what he may properly urge in the form of an inferenee from evidences actually existing in a particular case. The infidel as injudiciously endeavours to destroy those evidences by general assumptions, which are not supported by any direct proof in the cause where he decides, and which may be opposed by many indirect proofs drawn from the works of God.

Upon the topics of religion the opinions of men take a colouring from their wishes, from their prepossessions, from settled habits of thought and action, and from peculiar casts of temper. But from

whatsoever source those opinions are derived, and to whatsoever consequences they may lead, the conduct of God, as we know from experience, is in many respects far different from what we should in theory suppose it likely to be. While the world is under a moral government, we might suppose it just, because we feel it desirable, that, amidst the devastations of the sword and the pestilence, some distinction should be made between the righteous and the wicked. Under a wise and kind Providence we might expect that the order of time would be coincident with the order of dignity in the communication of temporal blessings.* We might hope that the arts by which the evils of life are mitigated, or its comforts are heightened, would be cultivated more successfully and more diligently than those, which flatter our vanity and contribute to our amusement. It would perhaps be more beneficial, and therefore we conclude that it should have been more easy, for us to understand and draw out into use all the productions of the earth, than to ascertain the essential properties of matter, or speculate upon the excentric motions of comets. But if the procedures of God be not analogous to our notions of fitness, even in the ordinary course of things that are seen, there is a still greater probability of error in our conjectures upon those extraordinary appoint-

* See Butler's Analogy;—some of the arguments employed by that learned prelate naturally occurred to me in the course of these observations, and I readily adopted them, because I knew them to be just and apposite.

ments which more immediately respect the things that are not seen.

To reason, I mean the very limited and wayward reason of man, it has seemed expedient that God should accompany the revelation of his will with evidences so illustrious that no carelessness could overlook, so peremptory that no sophistry could confound, so forcible that no perverseness could resist them; and thus too, in respect to the commands and prohibitions of the Gospel, they might be expected to have worked a reformation almost instantaneous; to have roused the supine; to have softened the obdurate; to have extirpated every vice, and cherished every virtue to its utmost maturity. In the career of hypothesis we might venture one step farther, and contend that Redemption would be necessary for no man, or be conferred indiscriminately upon all men who are capable of being redeemed. But God's ways are not our ways; and if the reverse of these flattering suppositions appear upon the first appeal to facts, what course must a believer take? His course is plain and safe. He must retire to the appropriate and professed evidences of his religion, which form, as it were, a bulwark to his faith. Here he must take his stand, though a host of collateral objections should start up, just as in the daily intercourse of life he is compelled to chuse and to act, where the difficulties from the opposite side may be infinitely multiplied by a prolific imagination, and where many of them are real and unanswerable.

But will not such behaviour be exposed to the

just imputation of weakness and partiality? No surely. You do not allow the providence and moral government of God to be disproved or disgraced by the difference that subsists between incontrovertible facts, and the conceptions of fitness which you have formed independently of those facts. Why then should the reality of any religious dispensation be called in question; and why should its utility be depreciated, because the same difference exists? The charge of partiality will, I think, rather recoil upon those who, when the means of information are in both cases equal, and the chances of mistake in all reasonings antecedent to that information are also equal, yet decide with more confidence in one case than in the other; and admit the rules, when applied to natural religion, which they reject, when applied to such circumstances in revealed religion as are perfectly similar.

In this train may the thoughts of an unprejudiced and cautious examiner proceed. That a revelation is not shocking to the common sense of mankind is certain, because many systems of false religion are derived from pretended revelations; because the wisest and best heathen expressed his wishes to be instructed, in points of the highest moment, by a teacher* from Heaven; because legislators, those to whom Christianity was quite unknown, and those by whom it has been partially renounced, a Numa and a Mahomet, found it expedient to support the authority of their own laws

* Vide Plat. Alcibiad, 2, page 45. Ninth edit. Ficin.

by claims to a preternatural inspiration. That God should hold out to some of his creatures that information which he does not bestow upon others, is by no means incredible, since, in the daily and visible course of human affairs, we find an inexhaustible variety in the uses, in the measures, and the kinds of those gifts which flow from one common Author, and are conferred upon beings of one common species. Life is valuable to all men—the desire of retaining it is implanted in all. But the means of preserving it, whether by the materials which nature supplies, or by the expedients which art suggests, are not equally dispensed. Reason is necessary to our well being. But the faculty itself is different in different men. The opportunities of cultivating it are more different; and yet a wider difference subsists in the advantages that are eventually produced by its theoretic improvement, and practical application.

When we consider the general constitution of things, we shall no longer be surprised that the Christian Dispensation was not immediately followed up by, what we may be induced to consider as, numerous and signal consequences. For reasons which the short line of our understanding cannot fathom, evil advances with a more apparent rapidity than good. In the natural world a sudden, and, in our apprehensions, an inconsiderable shock will often do violence to that order of things which we call regular. But the works of the creation are not restored to their symmetry or their use, so far as either of them can be measured by our conceptions, without slow and almost impercep-

tible gradations. Equally silent is the progression of moral improvement. When the seminal principles of vice have been dropped into the mind by some accidental cause, or industriously sown there by the impious hand of the corrupter, they quickly shoot up in a wild and rank luxuriance. But the malignity of the soil must be corrected, and its stubbornness subdued by long and patient culture, before it can cherish the seeds of virtue to their fullest vigour. The same observation may be extended to the manners of mankind. The rust of barbarism must be worn off by repeated attritions; nor without the concurrence of many domestic and foreign causes, without the use of arts and of arms, without laws and religion, has any lasting polish ever been fixed upon the exterior behaviour of a people. In the same manner Christianity, designed as it was to struggle with the most rooted prejudices and the fiercest passions of the human mind, did not produce its beneficial effects completely and at once; and we may, without impropriety, compare it to the mustard seed, in the slowness as well as the height of its growth.

That the religious schemes of God bear so striking a resemblance to his natural and his moral dispensations, it were folly to deny; and that resemblance, instead of supplying any objection to the truth of the Gospel, constitutes a presumptive proof in favour of it, as proceeding from the same Author, as intended, together with the same dispensations, for wise purposes, and co-operating with them in the same plan of final and universal good.

It were foreign to my present purpose to examine that solid mass of historical and prophetical evidences upon which, as upon its firmest basis, the great fabric of Christianity is erected. The subject before us rather demanded the aid which analogy supplies for the defence of Revelation; and against the arguments which I have now employed, I know not that reason can furnish any one direct proof, or series of indirect proofs, equally clear and well connected. Those arguments are, indeed, fastened by the closest ties to principles which may, in the most exact acceptation of the word, be said to be founded upon experience. They are intended to shew, that in judging of the Divine Attributes, as they respect our own system, we have no measure for determining their effects to be too little or too great, in any case which falls under our notice; that the imperfections so incautiously imputed to the counsels of heaven, properly belong to the nature of man; and that upon the more abstruse points of religion, as well as of philosophy, there will ever be found more room for modest acquiescence than for captious opposition. Possessed of such strength, and applied to such ends, they will not be easily overthrown, either by unauthorized conjectures that God should have introduced Christianity at a more early period, or by peevish complaints, that he has confined it within too narrow boundaries. Instead, therefore, of wandering in mazes, where men are often pushed on, by their pride, to reason from what "they do not know," our enemies would do well to examine, whether

or no, the Christian Religion contain within itself the seeds of its own destruction. We readily confess that no deduction from analogy, no testimony from history can, in the nature of things, be so decisive as these plain suggestions of our reason, that God cannot patronize a lie; cannot reveal an absurdity; cannot command the perpetration of a crime. But accusations of this formidable aspect are not to be thrown out rashly, or insinuated insidiously. 'Till they be fairly proved, many refined and subtle arguments that have been employed against the credibility of the Gospel, amount to no more than the hardy and disputable suppositions of finite creatures, concerning the means which a Creator of infinite wisdom ought to employ. On the other hand, the honest and humble enquirer, who considers the religious dispensations of God as forming a part of that incomprehensible scheme by which the various interests of mankind are promoted, will be induced to expect not fewer difficulties than those which throw themselves in his way, when he balances the proofs upon which the advocates of revelation would rest their cause. He will not pronounce those proofs unsatisfactory to his judgment, because they are inadequate to all the licentious claims which his prepossessions or his wishes may suggest. He will believe that upon these, as well as upon other points, God has in his wisdom bestowed upon man "a due degree of ignorance."* Every seeming defect in his own

* Vide Pope's Essay on Man, Book the First, line 283.

knowledge, he will look upon as a limitation of his moral responsibility, and every kind of real information that is vouchsafed to him, he will accept with thankfulness, and improve with diligence.

From these general remarks I proceed to examine more particularly the objections against which they are pointed. Those objections I shall bring forward according to the order in which they were arranged in the opening of this discourse. The first of them was directed against the late publication of Christianity.

To speak concerning the agency or the intelligence of God, at once with perspicuity and with precision, is extremely difficult. His works are unquestionably connected together by the relation of cause and effect, and viewed by any finite capacity, they exist in a successive series. But to the Deity himself, who is properly infinite, no duration, compounded of divisible parts, no distinctions of past, present, and future, can, perhaps, be * strictly

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* A different representation of God's knowledge has been maintained, with great originality of thought, and great acuteness of reasoning, by a writer in the Theological Repository who signs himself Clemens. He there unfolds those principles of association, by which a mind that is engaged in the pursuit of ultimate good, quickly passes over every intermediate step; and, in proportion to the efficacy of this associating faculty, he estimates the intellectual and moral excellence of all beings. From the operations of the human understanding we know that, as it is more frequently and vigorously exerted, it gradually acquires a kind of atificial intuition, and traverses a wider compass by a swifter progress. In a degree, therefore,

applied. He, indeed, perceives with equal distinctness, the most distant events and the most near. He directs with equal facility the causes necessary to accomplish them; and while short-sighted, impatient men complain of lingering, of interruption, and of incoherence in the designs of their Maker, he is, in fact, executing the best purposes by the best methods.

Now, in respect to a being, whose comprehension thus pervades all possibilities in all points of duration, I see not the force of any conclusion which may be drawn from the mere consideration of time, so as to justify us in denying the reality, or arraigning the expediency of his measures. I am confident, at least, that the objection we are now considering is indecisive and even fallacious, so far as it affects the cause of Christianity; for, had the Gospel been published a thousand years earlier, those who were then living might have rejected it, because it was not published a thousand years before.

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that surpasses our conception, beings of superior natures may be supposed to reach the most distant point of contemplation by a process rapid without irregularity, and complex without confusion. Some property of this sort he would, in its highest perfection, ascribe to the Deity. While this mode of conceiving the Divine counsels is acknowledged to be not wholly adequate to the subject, it may be usefully employed in explaining the clearness and extent of the Divine Prescience, and in repressing that confidence which ill becomes our dark and circumscribed apprehensions. Even upon the hypothesis of Clemens, we may perceive the incompetency of man, and the competency of God, to determine concerning the fulness of time.

Since creation is equally the work of God with redemption, we might as well complain, that we were not made, as that we were not redeemed, just at the time we imagined most fit; and were the objection removed as to ourselves, it might be, in perpetual succession, adopted by our posterity. In what proof then does this argument, if it be well founded, terminate? A certain portion of time must have existed before either event, and therefore the proper inference *à priori* is, that we should never have been created or redeemed at all.

But Christianity, exclaims the objector, is, in the splendid language of its panegyrists, described as a system, perfect in itself, and essentially necessary to the salvation of mankind. How then can that be necessary to the everlasting welfare of God's creatures, which was not known till the probationary state of many amongst them was at end? And how can that scheme be called perfect, which does not include the spiritual interests of all the world? To this specious reasoning it may be replied, that necessity and perfection are relative terms, and are to be understood with restrictions, when applied to any part of the Divine Government. As God is possessed of wisdom to choose all ends, and of power to controul all means, whatever is expedient in the eyes of such a being is, upon that account, necessary—or, in other words, because it ought to be done, it cannot but be done. The proof of the fact, in such cases, always involves the proof of necessity, in the sense just explained to you, and the actual use of any means is a sufficient warrant for us to

pronounce them perfect, or accommodated to their respective ends. We do not, however, say, for we are neither required nor authorized to say, that Christianity is indispensably necessary to the salvation of those persons to whom it was not communicated. They may have been capable of arriving at a less degree of happiness, by the assistance of less instruction; and they will, assuredly, be judged according to their use of one talent, where it was not the will of God to entrust them with five. But, so far as our information reaches, the particular virtues which Christianity inculcates could not have been practised, the particular recompence which it proposes could not have been obtained, but by the declaration of a law circumstanced as the Gospel was. Consequently, if God intended to save us by that Gospel, to guide us by a better law than others were directed to obey, to qualify us for a greater share of felicity than others were permitted to reach, it is, in respect to us, who are the objects of it, both necessary and perfect. It is so necessary that the same degree of happiness could not be attained under any other system of religion, that has hitherto been known. It is so perfect, that the same happiness certainly will be attained under the system we have embraced.

Christianity, it should ever be considered, professes to be designed for fallen creatures, or, in the language of the Scriptures, Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners. Why, indeed, evil exists, from what fountain it sprung, and through what channels it is conveyed, are questions where we are

more forward to enquire, than able to decide. Yet, surely, if the attributes of God can be vindicated in the permission of vice, that vindication will extend even to the gradual removal of it.

In the nature of things, some interval must have elapsed between the first existence of the evil, and the first application of the remedy. Concerning the proper duration of that evil, we may dogmatize much, but can demonstrate nothing. Equally wise in themselves, though unknown to us, are most of the reasons for which sin was either suffered to enter the world at any time, or was checked in its course at one time rather than another.

But whatever opinions we may form concerning the origin of evil, the expediency of Christianity is chiefly concerned in this fact, that we are, indeed, sinful. We may therefore ask, is it possible that God should suffer his creatures to sink into a state of wickedness? Is it not consistent with the attributes of God to deliver them from it? Has the Gospel a tendency to effect such deliverance? As to the first question, we must acknowledge the heathen world to have been immersed in the most deplorable corruption, both of manners and opinion. Concerning the second, the most abandoned unbeliever can scarce entertain a momentary doubt. The last it will not be easy to prove in the negative, if the genuine doctrines of the Gospel, the encouragement it gives to virtue, and the restraint it lays upon vice, be seriously and impartially considered.

That God winked at,* or (as the word may be

* ὑπεριδεῖν.

less offensively translated) that he overlooked the errors and the degeneracy of former ages, is a point where many unbelievers are agreed with us. But the Christian maintains that, in the fulness of time, God published a Law, for the sake of rectifying those errors, and of reforming that degeneracy. The infidel, who professes a regard equally delicate, and a zeal equally sincere, for the honour of his Maker, asserts the contrary. Whose hypothesis, think ye, redounds most to the glory of God? According to the tenets of the Christian, the depravity of mankind, and the long train of miseries attendant on it, have in some measure been lessened, and will be lessened yet further. If the infidel be right, the remedy of an acknowledged evil has not yet been applied; and though, according to the natural descent of things from bad to worse, the longer any salutary expedient is delayed the more urgent becomes the occasion for it; that very delay constitutes a presumption that no such expedient ever will be applied. I will not insult your understandings by entering into any superfluous comparison between hypotheses so notoriously disproportionate in point both of good sense and of piety.

I mean not to speak with intemperate indignation of those arrogant and almost exclusive claims which some champions of infidelity have set up, to a correct and enlarged way of thinking. But I wish them to consider whether the invectives which they have thrown out against the late publication of the Gospel be not the result of reasonings as

narrow as they are erroneous. Near and remote, great and little, are relative expressions; and each of them may be applied to the same object, as it is viewed through different mediums. Thus the four thousand years which preceded the appearance of the Gospel may swell, in our imaginations, to a stupendous bulk, on the supposition that the world were to continue in its redeemed state for twice or three times that space. But, if the world be ordained to continue forty thousand years after the coming of Christ, the time that preceded it will shrink into a less formidable compass; and, as there is no apparent absurdity in supposing the duration of our present system to be extended indefinitely, the proportion of the definite time that passed before the mission of Christ may, by gradual diminutions, be reduced to a very trifling, and, as it were, a fugitive quantity.

If the progress which mankind have lately made in the arts of social life, if the important enquiries in which philosophy has been engaged, if the unexplored paths it has opened for new investigation, be brought into one point of view, we may be led to imagine, that the world has not yet reached more than a state of comparative infancy. Should this be the case, and should our future improvements flow on with an equal, or an increasing tide of success, posterity may reverse the argument. Tracing back the growing excellence of their fellow-creatures through the stages it shall have already passed, they may look up with admiration and thankfulness to that Being who, according to

their estimate of things, interposed so speedily in behalf of his creatures. But without having recourse to such descriptions of succeeding ages, as are neither unpleasing nor incredible, we may find, upon a retrospective view of the condition in which mankind has been placed, many probable arguments for the truth of St. Paul's assertion, that in the fulness of time God sent forth his Son.

Had the Almighty ordained a more early period for the Gospel, we might have lost much of that evidence which arises from Prophecy.

The Son of God appeared at a season when the propagation of his religion was much facilitated by the extent of the Roman empire, and the popularity of the Greek language. But, if he had lived in the days of Moses, the little intercourse that prevailed between nation and nation, the very inconsiderable proficiency of mankind in arts and language, the total want of concurrent historical testimony, and a variety of other circumstances, which were not unfriendly to the Jewish Law, intended as it was to operate for a short time, and among an obscure people, might have proved very powerful impediments to the establishment and the diffusion of the Christian Law.

The Gospel, upon its first publication, was in many instances affected by the religious and the political state of Judea. But the spirit of the Mosaic institutions was quite exhausted, and the observance of many precepts was scarce practicable, during the subjection of the Jews to the Roman yoke. Deprived, therefore, as was this people, of the advantages which had resulted from ceremonial duties, it

was likely, or at least it was proper for them, to have turned their attention more readily towards a ritual less irksome, and a scheme of morality far more adapted to their intellectual and social improvements. As prophecy had long ceased among them, they might have been induced to consider the miracles of Christ as a renewal of those divine interpositions with which their forefathers had been honoured. The opinions concerning a future state, which they had caught up during their captivity at Babylon, and their intercourse with the Romans, should have prepared them to welcome a religion which throws the clearest and fullest light* upon the comfortable doctrines of life and immortality. Had the arrival of the Messiah been hastened, the expectations of the Jew would not have been excited to a sufficient pitch of solicitude. Had it been longer delayed, those expectations, which eventually induced many persons to examine the claims of Christ, and some to admit them, might have languished after repeated disappointments.

In this question concerning the fulness of time, the state of the heathen world deserves our consideration. If the Gospel had been preached in a very barbarous age, the reception of it would, probably, have been ascribed to the want of ability or the want of inclination to detect imposture, to the artifices of priests, or the credulity of the vulgar. But it challenged the attention of mankind at a most enlightened æra, when the jealous wisdom of

* φωτίσαντος ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν. Tim. Epist. 2. cap. i. v. 10.

politicians, and the no less jealous pride of philosophers, were leagued against religious innovation. The same causes which harrassed Christianity during its growth, must, if its vital principle had not been sound, have stifled it in its very birth. The same opposition that had been roused in the reign of Augustus against false miracles, must have hunted down the credit of the Christian miracles, had they not been really performed. The same vigilance, which afterwards dragged to light all the childish fallacies of Apollonius Tyanæus, would have been more fatally employed in crushing the firmer and more interesting pretensions of Christ, if they had not been founded upon a rock.

The ceremonies prescribed by the religions of antiquity tended to debase the spirit, and even to deprave the morals of the people. As to the doctrines of philosophy, they were seldom employed, as, in truth, they were seldom qualified, to remedy the evil. It must, however, be confessed, that the more important truths of Religion, such, I mean, as relate to a providence and a future state, though intermixed with many errors, yet retained a feeble hold upon the minds of the multitude, and produced, too, a partial effect upon their behaviour. To arraign and to ridicule such truths was a distinction reserved for those presumptuous sophists whom their infatuated admirers affect to exalt as the guides of life, though they speculated for the sake of victory, not of truth; though they confounded the received notions of right and wrong, without substituting others more intelligible and more useful; though they veiled the being and at-

tributes of the Deity in artificial obscurity, and often thrust out his wretched creatures from the verge of his protection.

It were unjust to extend these severe accusations to all the philosophers of antiquity. Sacred, in the bosom of every friend to learning and virtue, be the memory of the illustrious few among them who endeavoured to connect their more abstruse researches with the improvement of morality, and the dearest interests of mankind. But their success generally fell short of their hopes. Tully, whose veneration for Plato bordered upon idolatry, yet confesses that the most ingenious arguments of that writer upon the immortality of the soul impressed only a precarious momentary conviction, even upon a mind that wished them true; and Brutus, in his dying moments, lamented, that virtue itself was but an empty name.

Thus in the gross mistakes and abject superstition of the vulgar, in the uncertainty of the best philosophers, and the impiety of the worst, we have most convincing proofs that a Divine Revelation was not entirely unseasonable. In reality, all the instances of what reason did not do are more satisfactory evidences of its comparative insufficiency than the romantic suppositions and confident assertions of some men concerning what it might have done. The world, it is true, has been amused by many subtle distinctions between the "energies" and the "capacities" of reason among the ancients. At all events, however, if the defects imputed to them had a real existence, the expediency of Reve-

lation to supply those defects is nearly the same, whether they arose from inability or inaction, from unfavourable circumstances, or injudicious exertion.

For the purpose of depreciating revelation indirectly, magnificent encomiums have, I know, been lavished upon the law of nature,* and upon the light of nature. The utility of both has been impertinently exaggerated, and their distinct properties have been imprudently, not to say insidiously, confounded. The law of nature, abstractedly considered, is, I say not, eternal and immutable, but co-extended and co-eval with all the works of nature. It comprehends the moral fitness of things, arising from their specific qualities and mutual relations,

* The law of nature is, I know, usually understood in the sense of a law not revealed. But this acceptation is, I believe, too confined in itself, and has been the cause of many difficulties to the advocates of the Gospel in their disputes with Infidels. Nature includes all the works of God. Revelation is intimately connected with those works; it holds a distinguished place among them; and the precepts and evidences of it are included in the law of nature, according to that sense of the word which is at once the most proper and most comprehensive. Revelation, therefore, is to be distinguished from the law of nature, as a part from the whole. The Bp. of Carlisle [Dr. Law], in his admirable considerations on the theory of religion, has laid open the absurd and fallacious significations which have been assigned to the law of nature. The same excellent prelate has also rescued the word reason from the narrow and erroneous sense in which it is often employed by controversial writers. He has enumerated with great accuracy all the various "talents which together make up our portion of reason, and severally contribute to the forming our understanding, and improving our nature." Vide page 4. edit. 3.

and, as such, is, in its full magnitude, known only by the Being who ordained it. On the other hand, the light of nature * implies a limited, and, in man, a very limited and very fluctuating knowledge of that law, together with the obligations resulting from such knowledge, and increasing in proportion to it. This light was, moreover, in the heathen world, faint and unsteady, as we may discover from the numerous imperfections both of the learned and the unlearned. But, amidst the melancholy state of things in which they were placed, what can be conceived more desirable to a well-disposed mind than an authoritative and unequivocal declaration of the Divine will? How absurdly should we suppose any man to have reasoned, how perversely should we pronounce him to have acted, if he had spurned away the aids, which revelation offers, from himself, only, because they had not been tendered to his forefathers?

As an experimental sense of calamity quickens the exercise of compassion to others, so the consciousness of past imperfections may have been very efficacious in producing that humble docility of mind, which, in the first ages of the Gospel, was eminently and peculiarly a requisite qualification

* I am here speaking of the light of nature, as it exists, where no revelation is known. But, according to the principles I have laid down in the foregoing note, the light of nature in a Christian, includes all the knowledge he has acquired of the laws of nature, whether revealed or unrevealed. When my meaning is impartially considered, the propriety of my language will, I hope, atone for its singularity.

for conversion. It disposed, no doubt, many impartial persons to welcome the glad tidings of Salvation, after the disadvantages they had long suffered, from that restless uncertainty, from those wavering hopes, from those tormenting fears, which seem to have been the lot of the best men, to whom reason was their only guide.

I do not insist upon these circumstances as absolutely decisive; and yet they carry with them the weight of probability, till they be counter-balanced by opposite arguments founded upon the known condition of mankind. I dare not hold them out as the sole or the principal reasons which constituted the fulness of time, in the sight of God. But, in the sight of man, they shew the period assigned for the birth of Christ not to have been totally unfit for the professed purposes of his mission; and with this conclusion we may be satisfied, till our adversaries produce equal proofs for some other period that was more fit.

I now proceed to obviate the second objection, which, as you may remember, was levelled against the partial propagation of the Gospel. We may observe both of this and of the preceding complaint, that they pre-suppose the excellence of the Christian scheme, even while they depreciate its credibility; for, if it be not calculated to correct the morals, and promote the well-being of mankind, why should we be offended, either that it was not more early published, or more widely disseminated?

It wears, surely, the most offensive aspect of parodox, that the very property which ought to

endear the Gospel to those by whom it is known, should prejudice them against it; and that the acknowledged utility of that Gospel should be distorted into an argument against its truth.

In the daily course of human affairs, the dignity of the benefactor is generally supposed to throw a new lustre around his gifts. But, lest the claims of Christianity to a divine original should procure too much reverence, the warm spirit of religious gratitude must, it seems, be chilled by, I know not what, cold distinctions of scepticism, and that honest prejudice, which, with the happiest consequences, measures things by persons, is to be controled by the sternest severities of, perhaps, misapplied investigation. I say misapplied, because the unworthiness of man to demand a preternatural interposition at the hands of his Maker, has been sometimes misconstrued into an incapacity to become the object of such interposition; and because the partial improbability that God would interpose, has been alleged as an evidence of the actual impossibility that he should interpose.

Particular distinctions are usually looked upon as the ground of particular obligation. As men excel each other in affluence of fortune, in splendour of situation, or in vigour of intellect, new means of happiness are supposed to be conferred upon them, and new returns of gratitude are expected from them, upon every principle of common sense and common justice. But when Revelation is concerned, the rules which induce us more readily to accept, and more highly to value, the inferior blessings,

which God bestows, are, in the opinion of some men, suddenly suspended, and by an inverted mode of argumentation, we are taught to reject the greater blessing, though it be said to proceed from the same gracious Author. Instead of acknowledging and applying the assistances that are offered to ourselves, we endeavour to conceal the pride of false philosophy under the specious colouring of a false philanthropy: we turn away our attention from our own abundance, to the wants of others: we affect to be offended at the difference between them and ourselves, though it neither increase nor lessen our own power of being happy; and we curiously pry into the causes of that difference, which are, for the most part, treasured up in the depths of Omniscience, and which, if they were declared to us, might neither relax nor enforce our obligation to be virtuous. To what point, then, does the objection before us ultimately tend? If it be not absolutely designed to alienate us from Christianity, it is surely imprudent in those who employ it, to excite a spirit of discontent against the usefulness of that law, by which we should be governed here, and must be judged hereafter. If it be designed to alienate us from that law, let us apply the touchstone of analogy to an argument which is thought of sufficient moment to warrant our deliberate apostacy.

Suppose now, that any people guided by the counsels, and animated under the auspices, of a Numa or a Lycurgus, were emerging from barbarism. Would it be a just reason for them to re-

lapse voluntarily into the evils from which they were beginning to escape, because neighbouring countries were yet exposed to the same evils, and unhappily were not provided with the same means of alleviation? Would it not be a reason for self-congratulation, if they exclusively possessed the power of making further advances in civilization, and for self-applause, if they used that power faithfully and diligently?

But the Deity, it seems, who is the common parent of us all, will not suffer any of his creatures to perish, while he has amply furnished others with the means of safety. This is a very common, and it is a very erroneous method of stating the question. For, it should not be asked, will God be kind to you, and unkind to another—but, will he be more kind to you than he has been to another?

Has not the Deity made a difference between brutes and men? Yet he is the wise Creator and Preserver of both. Has he not bestowed upon men the external materials of earthly good, and, probably, the internal capacity of using them, in different degrees? Yet he is the just Governor of all. If then, intending some of his moral agents for less felicity in another life, he leave them to reason, and at the same time confer the aids of Revelation upon those who are intended for greater felicity, he is still the righteous Judge of all. And shall our eye be evil, because the eye of our Maker is good—not, as in the case of the labourers in the vineyard, to others, but to ourselves, to our friends, to our country, and to our posterity? Far be such

shocking presumption, such black ingratitude, from those among whom God has sent forth his Son!

If limitation in point of time be no solid objection to the rectitude of the Divine Government, as we have seen under the former head, limitation in point of place may be equally consistent with it. The truth is, that God dispenses or withholds his gifts, that he deals them out in various measures, and assigns to them various uses, quite regardless of all our churlish discontent, and all our captious sophisms, and ever intent upon the execution of that plan which himself has formed, by the methods of which himself approves.

But, could not the Deity, when Christ appeared upon earth, have commissioned other teachers to publish the same law? In speaking of this question, I will not rigorously insist upon some peculiarities, which are said to characterize the person of Christ, and which, in the opinion of many wise and good men, are incommunicable. I will confess that God could have appointed other instructors, capable of working miracles, and of preaching morality, in the same manner as he could have sent Jesus Christ into Judea long before. But the possibility of such a proceeding, which, after all, is only hypothetical, by no means establishes the propriety of it. On the contrary, if the state of mankind be accurately examined, it is scarce conceivable that Christianity should have been spread with any considerable effect through the various nations which fill up the immense chasm lying between the sum-

mit of refinement and the extreme point of savage life.

Thus, many of the rules that were adapted to the polished Roman would have been useless to the rugged Scythian. The same doctrines that were intelligible in one country, would, in another, have been totally unintelligible. The same system, which to the Greek was offensively simple, would to the Barbarian have been as offensively complex. By some men, the preaching of the Apostles would have been heard, at first, with cold indifference, and afterwards assented to with confused and undigested sentiments of approbation. By others, it would have been eagerly embraced in the tumultuous phrenzy of admiration, and abandoned as eagerly upon a sudden sally of caprice. The fact is, that some previous discipline, both of the understanding and of the temper, was necessary to prepare men for the admission of the Gospel; and that discipline was scarce to be found in the unsettled plans of living, and the unsocial cast of manners which prevailed almost over the whole face of the earth when Christ appeared.

I do not take upon myself to affirm, that no persons, under the disadvantages here alluded to, would have been converted. I know that surprising changes are sometimes accomplished by patient perseverance, by dexterity of management, and, above all, by fortunate combinations of circumstances, which human wisdom can neither produce nor foresee. But the number of converts would have been, in all probability, not considerable, if any inference may

be drawn from the slow and interrupted progress which Christianity now makes in very uncivilized nations. We find that the attention of men is there divided between repelling the immediate attacks of war, and procuring a scanty subsistence for peace; that their minds are not easily weaned from hereditary and habitual partialities to established customs and traditional opinions; that their stupidity is as deplorable as their superstition; that their stubbornness becomes more untractable, from the ignorance with which it is associated; and that their actions, unless thrown out of their course by the eccentricities of impetuous passion, roll on with a dull unvaried uniformity approaching to instinct.

Happily for Christianity, these impediments to its propagation in the present age are notorious, and therefore the doctrines of it are not charged with any disgraceful insufficiency. But, if the efficacy of those doctrines had been tried without effect upon nations who, in earlier times, laboured under inconveniences similar to those which I have been here describing, the miscarriage which is now excused because it can be accounted for, would have here imputed to some original defects in the evidence, or some relative impropriety in the precepts of the Gospel; and they who object to us that it was not taught in uncivilized countries, would have been the foremost to scoff at the attempt, and to triumph in the disappointment. I should rather say, that the success of such an attempt would have provoked sharper and more pointed ridicule. The acquisition of a few unenlightened and unpolished converts

would scarce have been sufficient to lift up Christianity to the esteem of such persons as now treat it with contempt. They who expatiate with the most indecent and most unjust severity upon the ignorance, the credulity, and the supersition of the Jews, would have urged the same defects in its professors, to the discredit of the Gospel, if the reception of it among barbarians had been alleged as an argument in favour either of its credibility or its excellence. When, therefore, it is asked why Christianity was not preached in all places at the same time, we may reply, that God accommodates his religious dispensations to the intellectual and social circumstances of his creatures; that those circumstances, in their utmost extent are known to him alone: that the character of the Christian must, in general, be grafted upon the character of the man; and that, if a judgment may be formed of past ages from the present, the stock that was wild would also have frequently been barren.

But do not seventeen hundred years leave sufficient room for the universal diffusion of the Christian law? To our conceptions that space may appear very long; nevertheless to him who counts a thousand years as one day, the same space may be considered as too short for the introduction of so great a change as the objection contends for, or, indeed, of any greater than has been hitherto effected. Between the appearance and the propagation of the Gospel some time must have intervened; and if it had been published in any other age, or in any other country, we have no positive proof that the

reception of it would have been more favourable, or the progress of it more swift. Unknown impediments, far surpassing those with which it has struggled, and over which it has triumphed, might have sprung up, and the causes which we know to have assisted it might have been less efficacious, or might have had no existence.

The subject before us may catch a kind of side light from the manner in which the Gospel has been propagated among Christians, and which, in the utmost strictness of language, may be called partial. While the Apostles attended upon their Master, we should suppose this the most proper season for the fullest communication of religious knowledge; but the Deity, even in giving effect to miraculous interpositions, neglects not the use of moral causes. The prejudices of the Apostles were not totally subdued, nor their mistakes instantaneously rectified. Many things which their Master said not, because their minds were not able to bear them, were, in the fulness of time, conveyed by the supernatural effusions of the Spirit; and even after those effusions had been vouchsafed, their understandings seemed to have been susceptible of continual improvement, as well from the efforts of reason as from the aids of grace. Thus the attachment of the Jews to ceremonial observances was not torn up violently and at once, but gradually lopped away. The whole light of the Gospel did not burst out in a moment upon the minds of the Gentiles. Many truths that were for a time obscured in the gloom of Popery are now brought forth into open day; and from

some errors, which yet keep their ground in Protestant countries, posterity, we trust, will be happily delivered. As, therefore, the goodness of God is not impeached by the progressive communication of his will to those persons by whom his Gospel is known, his wisdom may be vindicated in regard to that entire ignorance of the Gospel in which whole communities of men are now involved.

Let me not be misunderstood. Christianity is a word capable of various acceptations. Sometimes it implies the doctrines of Christ; and in this sense of the expression Christianity can neither be increased nor diminished. Sometimes it signifies all the evidences, effects, and circumstances belonging to the whole scheme of our redemption. But those circumstances are more or less striking; those effects are more or less rapid; aud those circumstances vary, at various times and in various places. The capacity of man to understand and act up to the doctrines of Christ, is, we know, unavoidably affected by many collateral causes, which are in a continual, though it be sometimes an imperceptible, fluctuation. In consequence of these irregularities, which necessarily arise from the present constitution of the world, the cause of the Gospel sometimes appears to be endangered by outward violence, and sometimes to languish with internal decay. Yet, upon the whole, we have reason to pronounce that it is on the advance; and the time will at last arrive when the knowledge of it shall pervade every country where it has not been hitherto taught, and when every country where it

has been taught shall acquire more just and more comprehensive notions concerning the import of its doctrines, the credibility of its proofs, the connection of its various parts, and the utility of its general design.

For this auspicious and extensive improvement in the religious state of man, every philosophical believer must acknowledge a visible, though remote, preparation of causes, in the wide diffusion of commerce, in the successful cultivation of science, in the invention of printing, in the discovery of the Western World, and in a variety of other particulars, which no friend to mankind can contemplate without wonder, or mention without exultation.

Let us not, then, be alarmed at the misplaced sarcasms or the tragical lamentations of those who first exclaim that the Gospel is imprisoned within very narrow boundaries, and then rudely endeavour to banish it from the spot which it already occupies. Rather ought we to reflect upon the numerous and complicated difficulties which it has already encountered with success. More especially are we interested in recollecting that God, having accompanied the first Revelation of his will with miraculous signs, has entrusted the further propagation of it to human agency. This, indeed, is a point intimately connected with our practice as well as our speculations, nor can it, without impropriety, be overlooked in this part of our subject — we may not be able to comprehend the counsels of God; but the enquiry is not altogether fruitless, if in the course of it we discern the duty of man.

The relation in which the Gospel now stands to us, as moral agents, is different, according to the talents with which we are respectively endowed, and the situations in which we are respectively placed. To some men, it forms a part of their trial whether they will believe or reject Christianity — to others, whether they will obstruct or promote the reception of it. When, therefore, the limited diffusion of the Gospel is urged as a proof against its divine authority, we should not forget that the charge is usually alleged by those who have the least right to allege it — by those who multiply artificial obstacles, for the sake of bringing an odium upon such as are inevitable — by those who industriously create the very imperfection against which they clamorously inveigh.

In all religious enquiries, I wish to see zeal tempered by discretion; and as I sometimes lament that the belief of the Gospel is not rooted in the love of virtue, I do not always suspect the disbelief of it to originate in a predilection for vice. But, upon questions of such moment, we cannot be too much upon our guard against endangering the peace and innocence of other men, by the keenness of raillery, by the subtlety of sophistry, and the imposing force of exaggerated description. Whatever sentiments, therefore, it may be the lot of some men to entertain concerning the authority of the extraordinary original ascribed to Christianity, they cannot, I think, have any doubts as to the utility of its ordinary effects. Even in the lowest point of view, it forms an evident and a consider-

able part of that moral government which God has established in the system to which we belong. It cannot discourage us in the practice of our most arduous duties; it cannot impede us in the pursuit of our noblest interests; and, therefore, every indignity wantonly offered to it calls aloud for punishment from that Being in whom the injured rights of morality, by whatever speculative principles it may be promoted, will unquestionably find a most just and terrible avenger. But if the claims of Christianity be, as we trust they are, of a higher order; if prophecies have been vouchsafed, and miracles have been worked, to authenticate and to sanctify it; the influence of such a dispensation can hardly be too extensive, and the use or neglect of every opportunity that is given us of making it more extensive, remains no longer a matter of indifference.

In opposition to this assertion, a question has been asked, to which, though it breathe the spirit of cavil rather than argument, I will not refuse a serious answer. Has a man a right, even where he has the ability, to diffuse the knowledge of the Divine Will among those people whose ignorance of it seems to proceed from Divine appointment? Undoubtedly he is possessed of such a right; he is accountable for the exercise of it; he derives his own acquaintance with Christianity from the exercise of the same right in other men; and he must know, that, as preternatural means are no longer employed, this is the only method by which the Gospel can be propagated. Where any evil what-

ever exists, you have a proof that God did not intend altogether to prevent that evil. Where you have the power of alleviating it, you have an equal proof that God does intend it to be alleviated. The knowledge of the Divine intention is inseparable from the knowledge of the human means by which it may be executed. The consciousness of your power is attended with a proportionate obligation to exert it.

To entangle virtue in unnecessary scruples is always dangerous; and there is reason to suspect that many who indulge those scruples are providing an excuse for their own laziness, in the anticipation of imaginary disappointment. But the line of duty is strait and plain; and from this line he will ever be wandering who abstains from immediate and practicable good, lest evil should indirectly come. We do not counteract the designs of Providence by the communication either of temporal or of spiritual blessings; and most meritorious in the sight of God will be the labours of that Christian who spreads wide the influence of the Gospel, at once vindicated by his arguments and adorned by his example.

We are now arrived at the last objection, which I proposed to consider — namely, the imperfect efficacy of the Gospel. And here, my brethren, while, in well-meant and well-directed zeal for the honour of our religion, we endeavour to defend it from the attacks of its adversaries, we cannot but lament those faults among its friends which give occasion for such defence.

The cause, and, in respect to God, the justification of these faults, are to be found in the freedom of man — in that freedom without which Christianity were useless, and with which its uses, from the unalterable but inexplicable constitution of things, may be impaired. The Gospel is addressed to beings who may overlook the truths it contains from inattention; who may misunderstand them, under the influence of prepossession; who may corrupt it doctrines through the bias of secular interests, and violate its commands in the blind fury of passion. But the same Gospel foretells these evils — it condemns them, and is calculated to alleviate them. Prevented, indeed, they cannot be, till the free agency of man be taken away, and then the wheat would be plucked up with the tares, and every hope of the rising harvest entirely destroyed.

To the right use of God's favours, be they of the natural or of the religious kind, some voluntary efforts, some mental qualifications, are requisite, on the part of those to whom they are offered — the sun will shine, and the rains will descend, with little advantage to the sluggish and the obstinate husbandman. Christianity, in the same manner, though it be fortified by the most pertinent evidences, and inculcate the most important duties, though its menaces be awful and its promises alluring, may not always be efficacious enough to reclaim the licentious or to convince the prejudiced. Upon these occasions, we see plainly that some degree of blame is deserved by man, and we do not see any just cause for extending that blame to his God.

Let us, however, for the sake of hypothesis, allow the practice of Christian virtue to be consistent with the absence of human freedom. Every operation of the understanding, and every deliberation of the will, must then be directed by a supernatural, that is, a miraculous power; and as every day and every hour call forth the exercise both of the understanding and of the will, every day and every hour would require a Divine interposition. Who then are the persons whose wishes of ideal perfection can only be realized by a perpetual series of miracles? They are to be found in that class of men who object to the Gospel, that it was ushered into the world by the miracles of Christ and his Apostles.

If the imperfect efficacy of the Gospel be not insisted upon as a reason for rejecting it, our adversaries ought to declare explicitly that they mean, not to subvert Christianity, but to reform Christians. If it be insisted upon for that fatal purpose, I would combat this argument upon the analogical principles that were before applied to another question. The premises admit that Christianity has been useful in some degree—the conclusion affirms that it ought to be rejected, because it is not in the highest degree useful. Civilization has not reached its utmost perfection, and, therefore, we ought to return in haste to a state of barbarism. The laws of a Solon or a Lycurgus have not prevented all irregularities, and therefore ought to be stripped of that authority by which they have prevented many. A medicine, through some injudicious procedure in

the application, some obstinate symptom in the disorder, or some perverse opposition in the patient, has not been completely efficacious in all cases. Therefore it ought not to be applied in any case whatsoever. He that can leap from such premises to such conclusions has no right to complain of credulity in his opponents. Let it not be said that these instances are drawn from the works of man, whereas Christianity is represented as the more immediate work of God. Though it be the work of God, it relates to man; it supposes him to be invested with powers which he may use or abuse; it is designed to improve his nature gradually, but not to change it essentially.

The edge of the objection we are now examining may be yet more blunted, if we look back upon the positive efficacy of the Gospel. Christianity, then, has softened the horrors of war, not only by preventing its professors from putting their conquered enemies to death, but by inspiring them with sentiments of humanity towards the defenceless captive. In many, would to God I could say in all parts of the Christian world, it has wrested from the hand of the oppressor that power which, in almost every part of the Gentile world, the master had usurped over the life of his slave. It has taught mankind to shrink from the wanton effusion of human blood, which disgraced the gladiatoral shews of a brave and an enlightened people. It has banished the execrable barbarities of human sacrifices, and, rightly understood, it is now beginning to correct in its professors, what, when misunderstood, it was sup-

posed to cherish—the sanguinary rage of persecution. It has sweetened the comforts of domestic life, curbed the licentiousness of polygamy and divorce, and mitigated the rigours of that unsocial and unnatural servitude, to which, among the polite citizens of Athens, as well as the rude foresters of Germany, the fierce and haughty despotism of the stronger sex had condemned the weaker. It has extirpated the hideous custom of exposing children, which the most celebrated states of antiquity openly permitted, and their ablest writers have expressly recommended. In some measure, it has checked that false patriotism which tramples upon the most sacred rights of mankind, and which justifies every artifice however perfidious, every outrage however unprovoked, under the specious pretences of national prosperity and national glory. It has called up a spirit of indignation against those brutal indulgences which nature shudders even to name, but which were practised by the most civilized nations, without a pang and without a blush.

Much, far too much, has been said, in the undistinguishing eagerness of panegyric, concerning the urbanity and politeness of Greece and Rome. The untempered acrimony of their satirists, the scurrilous violence of their orators, and the gross indelicacy of their comic writers, present to an impartial mind no very amiable picture of their manners. He, indeed, that would accept the advantages of all their boasted elegance, in exchange for the endearments and the embellishments of modern life, may be charged almost with the depraved taste of the

Hottentot, who, upon his return to his native land, shook off the European dress, nauseated European food, and wallowed in all the filthy and abominable excesses of his countrymen.

There are, I know, some persons who would derive the improvements of these later ages from our civilization and our laws. But by whom are these laws enacted? By Christians. Among whom is that civilization established? Among Christians. From what source proceed either the equitable and humane spirit of those laws, or the elegancies and comforts of that civilization? They proceed from the silent but real efficacy of the Gospel itself, which corrects every selfish affection, purifies every sensual appetite, and restrains every ferocious passion. Unquestionably, if the great refinements of the antients be justly ascribed to reason alone, the greater refinements of the moderns may with equal justice be ascribed to religion, as a powerful and a constant, though it be not the only cause.

Many errors are yet maintained by believers; they are, however, less offensive to good sense, and less injurious to good morals than the monstrous tenets of those ancient religions, by which their deities were represented in the most degrading employments, and worship was prescribed to the vilest of reptiles, and the most abandoned of men. Many indefensible ceremonies are yet retained in a Church that styles itself Christian. But it were unjust to place the fantastic pageantries of popery upon a level with that mass of Roman superstition, from which many of them were borrowed—with the pue-

rile extravagances of Ægyptian and Zabian idolatry —with the lewd excesses that were practised openly in honour of Venus at Babylon, and secretly in the mysteries of Cotytto at Athens.

Among the rational, and, I am happy to add, not an inconsiderable part of believers, the essentials of religion are no longer confounded with points of subordinate moment or temporary obligation: lines of distinction are drawn between factitious and real difficulties; and mankind are daily learning to rest their hopes of salvation, not upon punctilious attachment to exterior forms, but upon a steady adherence to genuine morality. To these changes in the opinions and the actions of Christians, let me add the blessed spirit of toleration which is widely diffusing itself through all ranks of citizens, and all sects of Christians. That spirit must finally give new dignity and new stability to the cause of truth, as it fosters the freedom of inquiry, as it tempers the zeal which darkens knowledge, and stimulates the industry which acquires it, and, above all, as it enlarges the sphere of Christian charity, that celestial virtue, which, in religious concerns, where it claims the pre-eminence, has been too long cramped and depressed, and of which every solitary instance, in times less enlightened, was lamented as a weakness, or condemned as a crime.

To this favourable representation of our present state the irreligion and luxury of the age will be opposed. In respect to the first charge, the poison of infidelity has, I fear, spread too far. But the progress of it has, in some degree, been stopped, and the virulence of it assuaged by the labours

of those men who have defended with ability the evidences of that Revelation, the doctrines of which they have examined with impartiality. Indeed it well deserves our notice, that the fundamental principles of natural religion have been more accurately investigated, and more consistently explained in those countries, where the sacred authority of revealed religion has been longer established, and oftener attacked.

But our defence is not to be rested only even upon this honourable ground; for if the remote causes of our infidelity be deeply explored, we shall have less room to take the alarm, either in regard to the safety, or the credit of our religion. Those causes are to be found in the peculiar tendency of our studies, and the unwearied activity with which they are pursued; in the profound researches which men are making into the works of nature, and in the clear and correct habits of thinking which they have transferred from philosophy, where those habits were first acquired, to other subjects. Hence the truths of Revelation have been examined with unprecedented, and, in some respects, perhaps an unwarrantable severity; and hence they have been exhibited by the contending parties in such points of view as were unknown to past generations. It has often been observed that the alacrity of infidels is eventually serviceable to the Gospel, by keeping alive the vigilance of Christians. There is equal reason to imagine that the success of Christians has sharpened the eagerness of infidels, and that the vigorous and skilful preparations of our enemies are

to be in part imputed to their apprehensions of our increasing strength.

Investigation, whether of the critical or philosophical kind, when it has been unexpectedly successful, always awakens a spirit of resistance among the indolent, who are unwilling to be disturbed in the repose of opinion long ago adopted; among the envious, who are zealous to crush the growing popularity of discoveries, which themselves have not made; and among the vain, who, in order to display their own sagacity, oppose new errors to new truths. The same motives operate with peculiar intenseness, when any uncommon improvement has been made in religious knowledge. It is, therefore, no mean subject of consolation, and even of triumph, to the friends of the Gospel, that the new arts of opposition employed against it by its adversaries were provoked by the new modes of defence which its advocates had recently found out, and that the seeming danger of Revelation is, in reality, both a sign and a consequence of its safety.

The reasons here assigned for the prevalence of incredulity in an age when there is the surest foundation for a rational faith, will probably bring back to your recollection the remarks I made in the opening of this discourse, concerning the similarity which pervades the whole of the Divine Government, as it is administered in the affairs of this world. In the religious, as well as in the natural and moral parts of that government, every evil is secretly or openly accompanied by some good, which indirectly springs from that specific evil, and

is particularly qualified to mitigate it. In like manner every accession of good leads to the production of evil, and of evil too, which, in its malignity, bears some proportion to the degree of that very good by which that very malignity itself is, in some measure, corrected. Thus by the wonderful and simultaneous operations of opposite causes, the real harmony of this system * is preserved, and the

* I here speak concerning the harmony of our own system; but I presume not to determine concerning the harmony of the universe, though such determinations have been often made by learned philosophers, and by pious divines. Of other systems we have no knowledge, direct or even indirect; for in the application of analogy from what is known, to the unknown, it is necessary that some common property should belong to them, as a foundation for that analogy. But intelligence, capable as it is of infinite modifications, and infinite uses, is, perhaps, not such a property in the present question. We can form no probable conjectures concerning the ends for which other beings are designed, or the faculties with which they are endowed, or the modes in which they think and act. They may possess senses which we want, or they may want those which we possess, or they may think without the aid of any senses, whereas our intellectual operations originate in sensation as their source, and seem to be always dependent upon corporeal organs, though the degree of that dependence cannot be calculated, nor the manner of it explained. We have, therefore, no right to extend to them any conclusions concerning the evil of imperfection, because such conclusions are founded upon facts, which concern ourselves only, and which may with as much propriety be supposed peculiar to one system, as common to all. We are guilty of no absurdity in saying, that the virtue and the happiness of other beings may differ in kind, as well as in measure, from the virtue and happiness of man. We perceive no contradiction in supposing, that amidst the wonderful variety of God's works there may be a train of causes and effects quite unknown to us, by which

real designs of its omniscient Author are carried into complete execution.

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virtue exists entirely unmixed with vice, and happiness with misery. The Scriptures will furnish us with instances, by the aid of which both of these suppositions may be illustrated, though I be not allowed to say, demonstrated. In the life of Christ we see virtue without vice; in the future state of the righteous we are taught to expect happiness without misery. But in our present state, which is probationary, and which, in a particular manner, as well as to a particular degree, is imperfect, the constitution of things is different. Virtue, though it be sometimes choaked by vice, sometimes grows up with it. Vice, though it be, in general, corrected or prevented by virtue, frequently accompanies it, and in some cases even springs from it, as its occasion indeed, rather than its cause: this distinction should ever be kept in view, because it is the property of real good to extend and perpetuate itself, and that tendency is obstructed by collateral causes, some of which operate, chiefly or solely, when good of a particular kind already exists in particular circumstances. In what manner the mixture of good and evil is effected, and to what extent it operates, we cannot always determine with precision. But we know that, according to the present condition of man, the abuse of good is always possible; and there are cases in the moral as well as the natural world, where we may say with the Schoolmen, that the corruption of the greatest good leads to the greatest evil. Yet virtue, among the numerous, and, some of them insuperable impediments which surround it, yet retains its name, its nature, and it use. It claims such superiority over vice, as ought to determine us in every part of our moral agency. It controuls vice in so many visible instances, and with so many beneficial consequences, as form a positive proof in favour of the Divine wisdom and benevolence. The reader has anticipated me in the application of that proof to the Christian system, which, though it directly produce much good, may indirectly produce some evil; and which, as it is more understood and approved, may, for that reason, provoke more obstinate opposition from the frailty and pride of man.

In regard to the second charge of luxury, I acknowledge that in the practice, as well as in the doctrines of Christianity, while some parts are going forward, others are at a stand; and those too, of a kind, which it were for the honour of religion, and the interest of society to keep pace with the rest. I must, however, observe that the Gospel has indirectly lightened the mischiefs which it could not directly obviate; and I would boldly contend that our excesses are of a less alarming nature than the gaudy and effeminate voluptuousness of Persia, or the fouler and more detestable debaucheries of Rome. It should not be forgotten that our virtues, (for even virtue will grow up in the soil where luxury is most apt to thrive,) far exceed those of antiquity in the purity of their motives, and the constancy of their operation. The restraints that are put upon the natural fierceness of our tempers, the decencies observed in the daily intercourse of life, the mitigation of national antipathies and controversial acrimony, the generous and active spirit which animates our charitable institutions, are illustrious proofs of the improvements which I ascribe to my contemporaries.

For their imperfections, indeed, I mean not to stand forth as an apologist, conscious as I am that their conduct falls very short of the standard which Christianity has fixed. But I am not ashamed to appear as an advocate for their real virtues. I am happy to trace up those virtues, through custom and education, to their primary source in the Gospel; and I am solicitous to shelter the reputation of

those who practise them, from the bitter and inconsistent reproaches of our adversaries, who first condemn us because we are not faultless, and would then ensnare us into a disbelief of the very religion which prevents us from being profligate.

It is common to overlook the vices of our forefathers, towards which our abhorrence is naturally softened, when they cease to excite our fears. It is equally common for us to admire those virtues which no longer annoy us by the nearness and excess of their splendour, and which, like material objects viewed in a distant horizon, are enlarged beyond their proper magnitude. But surely, he that does not wish to make mankind better, can have no right to complain that they are bad; and he that does entertain this benevolent wish, will be happy to find that his purposes are, in some measure, anticipated; that the foundations of virtue are already laid, and that for himself is reserved the easier, but not dishonourable task of raising the superstructure.

Upon the whole, then, if Christianity, upon a fair and comprehensive inquiry into its effects, be found to have done much towards the improvement of the world, let us cheerfully pay it that tribute of respect, in consequence of which it will be enabled to do more. If it appear to have done what, in our estimation is too little, let us search for the causes of every defect where alone they are to be discovered, not in the evidences or in the precepts of the religion itself, but in the infirmities of those who defend, without understanding, or who profess

without practising it. At all events, let us not by insulting its authority, and by depreciating its excellence, endeavour to reduce it to a total incapacity of doing any good; for the bulk of mankind will never obey the law which they are taught to despise, and we know from the melancholy experience of men whose attainments and whose native vigour of mind set them far above vulgar prejudice, that, when the reverence for religion is once lost, the love of virtue is seldom retained.

There is a dark side belonging to all the concerns of man. Let us turn from it to the contemplation of those brighter scenes which unfold themselves to every unprejudiced and well-informed Christian. Though God had, for many ages, delayed the appearance of his Son, he, in the fulness of time, sent him forth. Though many obstacles have, in our apprehension of things, impeded the course of Revelation, it has spread itself over no inconsiderable part of the world. Though a variety of causes have obscured its lustre, and counteracted its influence, the effects of it have been sufficiently extensive and sufficiently beneficial to interest our attention, to excite our gratitude, and to warrant our faith. The tide of human affairs which, before and after the publication of the Gospel, has been secretly controlled by the Providence of God, and invariably directed to the known or unknown purposes which he had in view, is, in these later ages, apparently turning in favour of Christianity. Mutually assisting, and assisted by other causes, by the cultivation of polite learning, and of the more

profound sciences; by experiments in natural philosophy, and by researches in moral; by the steady exercise and humane temper of laws; by the liberal and enlarged principles of civil government, the Gospel is making new progress. The expectations of every worthy man may, therefore, be innocently employed upon the prospect of some happy period, when the belief of our holy religion shall be universal, and its efficacy shall be complete. His efforts, at least, may be laudably exerted in accelerating that momentous event, by which the cavils of unbelievers will be effectually put to silence, and by which the knowledge and the love of God will be deeply fixed in the hearts of all Christians, through all ages, and in all nations.

SERMON II.

PREACHED AT ST. PETER'S MANCROFT,

Friday, March 24, 1780.

HEBREWS, xiii. 16.

To do good and to communicate forget not, for with such sacrifices God is well pleased.

THE excellence of religion is never more illustrious than when it inculcates such virtues as are approved, not only by the laborious operations of the understanding, but the finest sensibilities of the heart. In respect to some of those sublime, but abstruse doctrines which Christianity proposes to our faith, they overwhelm the mind with awe, rather than warm it with affection; and their effects even upon the best of men, after beginning in tumultuous admiration, terminate in languid assent. Of many arduous duties that are prescribed to us, we endeavour to explain away the seeming rigour; and though we be compelled to acknowledge the necessity of performing them, our prejudices and our passions throw a cloud over their immediate use. But when we are commanded to do good, and to communicate, the fitness of the command is instantaneously perceived, the beauty of it is universally felt, and deficient as may be the conduct

of some amongst us, in speculation at least, the utmost harmony usually subsists between the generous man, who is anxious to recommend what he practises, and the selfish man, who is ashamed to condemn even what he neglects.

The Epistle from which my text is taken, abounds with allusions to Jewish ceremonies. Hence the exercise of charity is called a sacrifice acceptable to God, with the same propriety as, in a former verse, we are directed to offer up the sacrifice of praise. No terms can, indeed, more strongly paint either the value of charity in the sight of God, or the advantages it produces to mankind; for, as the sacrifices in the temple made atonement for the sins of the people under the Mosaic dispensation, so among those who profess to be guided by the light of Christianity, the habit of doing good will be sufficient to cover a multitude of sins. Revelation, doubtless, when the principles of it are examined without prejudice, and interpreted without enthusiasm, will always be found to set morality far above ritual observances. Thus you have the decisive evidence of the Prophet, "that to obey is better than the fat of rams:" and from authority yet more respectable, we may learn, that "God will have mercy, not sacrifice"—mercy, which involves in it the essence of virtue, not sacrifice, which is only an arbitrary and exterior sign—mercy, where the intention of doing good is ripened into action, not sacrifice, where the act of doing good may never be performed, nor the intention of performing it sincerely felt.

Charity justly claims a distinguished rank in the catalogue of social excellencies; and it well deserves our notice, that in languages both ancient and modern, as in writers both sacred and profane, the expressions which, in their simple state and generic signification, comprehend the whole system of moral rectitude, are, in their compounded state and specific signification, emphatically applied to works of beneficence — εὐεργετεῖν — benefacere — beneficence. What the law of nature required, and the light of nature discovered in the heathen world, Revelation has described with greater exactness, and enforced with greater earnestness. Hence, in the Christian scheme of ethics, charity is delineated, not as an external and solitary act, but as a vital and inward principle of action; and the rewards annexed to it are to be attained, not by any detached and occasional effort of the will, but by a fixed and habitual disposition of the soul. It challenges, moreover, our attention, not only as it engages the approbation of God, but as it enables us to co-operate, as it were, with him in the government of the universe. By the discharge of this duty we become perfect, even as our Father in Heaven is perfect. We at once act up to our profession as Christians, and to our nature as men. We make some approaches to that attribute of goodness, which we are most fond of contemplating amidst the glorious perfections of our Maker, in the existence of which we are most nearly interested in the ordinary course of his providence, and by the display of which he

has more especially distinguished himself in the extraordinary revelations of his will.

Before the venerable and learned audience,* whom I have now the honour to address, it were unnecessary for me to enter upon a formal defence of those Divine appointments from which result the occasions of doing good, and the obligations to do it. That natural evil is productive of moral good; that the internal and external inequalities of mankind are necessary to the existence of every social relation, and the exercise of every social virtue; that they connect the highest and the lowest ranks of the community, furnish correspondent objects to our better affections, and open a wide field for the exertions of our nobler faculties; that all seeming discord in the physical and civil condition of the world leads to harmony imperfectly understood, yet really preserved, are truths, upon which the dictates of philosophy happily fall in with the doctrines of religion. Instead therefore, of tracing through the labyrinths of useless and endless speculation, the reasons for which evil is permitted, you will be more becomingly employed in considering the means which God has supplied, in order to check its devastations, and to correct its malignity. Do you behold a fellow-creature in distress? God has not authorized, nor, perhaps, enabled you to explore all the causes of that distress. But, in giv-

* It is a custom for the Clergy of the City of Norwich to attend the Charity Sermon on Good Friday.

ing you the power of relieving it, he informs you, in the most decisive language, of his intention that relief should be bestowed. Are the minds of the poor bewildered in error and darkened by ignorance? It is your duty to rescue them from the dangers to which ignorance and error are exposed. By performing these kind offices you will support the real dignity of your moral character; you will fulfil the gracious designs of your moral governor; you will vindicate the seeming severity of his dispensations from the complaints of the unfortunate, and the cavils of the impious. By neglecting those offices, you cause all the mischiefs created or perpetuated by your neglect, to be charged upon the attributes of your Maker; and, in the issue, you become responsible for the miseries which your fellow-creatures suffer, and you have not alleviated; for the crimes which they perpetrate, and which you, by not preventing them, have virtually encouraged.

The foregoing observations are applicable to the general duty of charity. But the design of this discourse is to justify and to enforce such particular instances of that duty, as the present occasion more immediately requires.

To speak the harsh language of controversy is always irksome to a candid mind. To me it is particularly unpleasing to assume that language upon a subject, where it were devoutly to be wished that all men were impressed with the same conviction, and actuated by the same spirit. But, as objections to the utility of your charitable design have been

produced by those who wish to obstruct it, they should be answered by those who wish to promote it. The claims of truth may always be opposed with propriety to the usurpations of error; and as rashness or malevolence may have suggested the accusation, let it not be thought an unimportant office of charity itself to engage in the defence.

You are directed in the words of my text to do good and to communicate. In the application of that to the benevolent purpose for which we are now met together, I should be happy to convince your judgment, as well as to interest your feelings; for, if charity-schools be finally injurious to the real tranquillity of the poor, to the well-founded rights of the rich, and to the general order of society, I should encourage you to do what is not good, and you would perform a sacrifice with which a wise and a righteous God will not be well pleased.

In the further prosecution of my subject, I shall first set before you a few preliminary remarks on the importance of education, and then endeavour to break the force of some objections which have been alleged against charity-schools, and which have grown up, I fear, to popularity, among persons of captious tempers and shallow understandings.

It may be proper for me to premise, that an enquiry into the usefulness of charity-schools necessarily leads to the general question concerning the utility of reading and writing to the poor. The difference, indeed, which subsists between those who can scarce provide such learning for them-

selves, and those who solicit your aid for obtaining it, is too inconsiderable to affect our general decision. What is injurious to the latter cannot, without inconsistence, be defended in respect to the former — what is beneficial to the former cannot, without cruelty, be refused to the latter.

The gradations of beings who are of different species open to us the most enlarged and magnificent views of those designs, which our Creator is carrying on for the universal good. Surely, then, a contemplative mind is not unpleasingly exercised in marking the limits by which creatures of the same species are separated from each other: in observing the various degrees of moral and intellectual improvement, of which they are respectively capable: in estimating the effects of such improvement on the general happiness, and in selecting the means, by which those effects may be more efficaciously promoted, and more widely diffused. Justly may we congratulate our contemporaries upon that depth of investigation, and that clearness of reasoning, which have been employed upon the structure of the human understanding. We may commend the industry and admire the ingenuity even of those writers whose opinions we do not entirely adopt; for, in consequence of the zeal with which they have endeavoured to support the claims of their several systems to exclusive belief, large and valuable additions have been made to the general stock of knowledge. The facts to which the contending parties appeal, and by which an unprejudiced reader is determined in the partial rejection, or the partial

admission of what they advance, have been collected in greater abundance and examined with greater accuracy.

In recommending to your protection the understandings and the morals of the poor, I do not think it necessary for me to decide in the controversy that has long been agitated, concerning the comparative force of nature and education. The merits of that controversy, so far as they relate to our present enquiry, I will, however, endeavour to state with conciseness and perspicuity.

That beings, intended, as we certainly are, for different situations in our moral agency should be endowed with different measures of intellectual ability, is, I think, no reproach to the wisdom of our Maker. From the very unequal proficiency of those to whom the means of cultivation, in appearance nearly equal, have been repeatedly offered, we have reason to infer that a real difference subsists in their original capacities. But this difference is, I believe, far less than it has been frequently represented by those who, in magnifying it, have hoped to find, some an excuse for their indolence, and some a gratification for their pride. So dim, however, is our insight into the constituent principles of the thinking faculty, so unsuccessful have ever been our researches into its* primary operations, that we can-

* Helvetius has made many striking remarks upon the importance of education, and has suggested some excellent rules for the method of conducting it: but he has fallen into gross and dangerous errors, when he assigns "physical sensibility, and memory," as the "productive causes of our ideas." Hart-

not precisely fix the degree of efficacy which is to be ascribed to nature alone. On the other hand, our happiness and our misery, our virtues and our vices, many of our propensities, and all our habits, are visibly and immediately dependent on that series of external causes which is distinguished by the name of education. Hence arises the necessity of attending to these causes, which are peculiarly submitted to our inspection and management,—of opening some scope for the exercise of talents which a benevolent Creator has bestowed upon us,—of instilling, by the earliest and most vigorous methods, those notions which preserve the collective interests of this world, and animate the hopes of individuals in their preparations for a better.

But, whatever theory we may adopt concerning the general constitution of the human understanding, our practical obligation to provide for the instruction of the poor will remain in all material points the same. If the original force of genius, and (as some persons imagine) the original bent of the mind, predominate in producing all the mental accomplishments of men, and in fixing their character, we cannot suppose the artificial distinctions of so-

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ley's hypothesis of vibrations has always appeared to me ingenious rather than satisfactory. But I am not acquainted with any writer who inculcates with so much clearness and so much energy the necessity of paying an early, a strict, and constant attention to the operations of the human mind. He has investigated the principles of association more deeply, explained it more accurately, and applied it more usefully, than his great and venerable precursor, Mr. Locke.

ciety to affect the impartiality of nature; and we know that the use of her noblest gifts is connected with exterior and arbitrary circumstances, with opportunities which we may prevent or furnish, and with improvements which we may counteract or promote. On the contrary, if education be most powerful in itself, as it unquestionably is most subject to our control, let us not refuse to any of our fellow-creatures those aids, bereft of which the man is too apt to degenerate into the savage, and directed by which he may be formed into the citizen and the Christian.

We live in enlightened times, which public generosity in some measure rescues from the infamy that is due to private licentiousness; and in which ample relief is provided for the infirmities of age, for the anguish of sickness, and for the distresses of unmerited and unexpected poverty. It pains me, therefore, to reflect that in such times the instruction of the poor should be singled out, even in theory, as an object unworthy of charitable regard, unfit for charitable interposition — that any artificial impediments should be thrown in the way of your judicious and disinterested concern for your fellow-creatures, and any unjust odium industriously cast on this your "labour of love." But the diligence which you employ in the cultivation of the human mind is, we are told, usually lavished upon a stubborn and a barren soil: it is repaid, at the best, by a sickly and uncertain harvest; and in some cases it produces the bitterest and most baleful fruits.

From what source do these objections take their rise? Do they spring from real pity to the poor, whom knowledge is said to quicken to a more poignant sense of their misery? Or from real concern for the well-being of the community, which, as some men affirm, is always injured when the poor presume to feel their wants, to exert the means which they possess of alleviating them, and aspire to a moderate share of those conveniences which a gracious providence has placed within the reach of humble and honest industry? No. They rather proceed from the vanity of some men, who affect to startle at the difficulties which elude common observation: from the hypocrisy of others, who would disguise their own insensibility to the sufferings of individuals, under a mask of solicitude for the public welfare: from the selfish pride of more, who wickedly resent every liberal plan of improvement for their inferiors, as an invasion of those privileges which wealth is too apt to arrogate, and who weakly suppose their own splendour in danger of being eclipsed, unless they can prevent the partial emersion of their fellow-creatures from the lowest and darkest abyss of poverty.

Wide, indeed, is the gulph which the Deity himself has placed between the poor and the rich. But that the passage through it should be for ever hopeless, that all possibility of transition should be cut off, as well to the vigorous enterprizes of genius as to the unwearied exertions of perseverance: that faculties, which God himself has given us, should be shut up within the narrowest boundaries—these are

positions, which cannot be supported without the most extravagant licentiousness of paradox. If, indeed, they could be supported by impartial reasoning, they must wound every finer sensibility of the benevolent man; and therefore, till such reasoning be produced, those positions ought not to be advanced in the form, either of conjecture, which is often rash, or of insinuation, which is always poisonous. Let us, however, bring the evidences by which they have been hitherto defended, to the test, not of that good nature, which sometimes shrinks even from just opposition, but of that good sense, which accurately distinguishes between specious appearance and solid reality.

All superfluous knowledge it seems is hurtful. If superfluous be opposed to necessary, we deny the assertion; and we contend that there is no size of understanding, no rank in life, in which ornamental attainments are, invariably and indiscriminately, incompatible with utility. As the objection is very general, I shall oppose to it a general answer. It is difficult to determine at what point utility ends, and superfluity begins: it is unsafe to assume, even of the poor, that total ignorance is better for them than partial knowledge; and it is absurd to say that sottish stupidity is, in any situation, preferable to a moderate share of sense. A little learning is, no doubt, dangerous to those who presumptuously decide upon arduous and complicated subjects. Does it therefore follow that yet less learning will intoxicate the minds of the poor, whose objects of contemplation are very few and very simple? Because

much ought not to be accomplished, are we to conclude that nothing ought to be attempted?

To fix with exactness what degree of knowledge is too great or too little for the poor in all cases, is neither an easy, nor indeed a necessary task. It is far too little, we may say with confidence, when they are left in a state of profound ignorance concerning their civil rights, their social and religious duties, and their best interests both in this world and the next. It is too great when their minds are swollen up with insolence and vanity—when their curiosity is sent out upon the wing in quest of the very sublime or the very ornamental parts of learning—when their attention steals away from the occupations on which they depend for their livelihood, and is squandered upon points of trifling and unprofitable amusement. But from evils so remotely consequential, so faintly probable, experience leaves us little to dread. The knowledge, which is obtained under your patronage, may not be altogether barren of pleasure, as well as use to the well-disposed —it may check the vicious in the career of their excesses. But our opponents, even upon the severest scrutiny, could scarce stumble upon a single instance where the poor mechanic, in consequence of his education in a charity-school, has been seized with a frantic passion for literary fame, has started aside from the proper employments of his station, has plunged into the deep and trackless paths of metaphysics, or soared into the brighter and more enchanting regions of poetry.

The institutions which you support are, it seems,

adapted with too little precision, to every degree of capacity with which these children may be endowed, and every walk of life for which they may be destined. The imputation is futile and false. There is no walk of life so humble, in which the plain instructions you furnish may not be useful, and no capacity so dull as not to comprehend them. If the objection, however, be yet supposed to retain some force, we should recollect that some imperfection cleaves to every scheme of man, and that the imperfection here specified belongs, in a yet higher degree, to other charitable plans of a more public kind. Many parts of those plans are so untractable in their own nature, so interwoven with collateral matters of great importance, so rivetted by the authority of original and express appointment, that they will bend to no honest expedients of alteration, even when they have ceased to answer their first ends, and when they clog the operations of other wise and salutary rules. But your scheme for instructing children in these schools is flexible to temporary exigencies. It is subject to the immediate inspection of those who are most solicitous for its success. It is controuled by the power, and directed by the prudence, that first established it; every abuse in the management of it is easily discovered and easily restrained, and every new possibility of improvement may be accompanied with speedy and complete execution.

Too much time, some men would persuade us, is wasted in these schools. Can it then be said with truth, either that the loom has stood still, or the plough

been deserted, because the childhood of these little ones is employed in gaining some little acquaintance with their native language? And may not instances be produced in which the knowledge they get, has an immediate and beneficial influence on the labours in which they are afterwards engaged?

But schools, it seems, are very improper places for acquiring this small pittance of learning, because, where numbers are associated the lewd enflame the lewd, and the audacious harden the audacious. If this objection be well founded it equally extends to those seminaries in which our best systems of education are begun and completed, and from which have proceeded the brightest luminaries of our Church and State. To this consequence no honest man will oppose that imaginary "delicacy of sentiment,"* which an ingenious writer has dared to pronounce peculiar to noble birth. Virtue is not, like title and fortune, hereditary. The love of virtue sometimes finds a place in the bosoms of the poor, and it may be encouraged in these schools, where the poor are from their infancy habituated to the desire of praise, and to the dread of infamy. But if there be something coarse in the texture of their minds, something illiberal in their manners, something violent in their tempers, will these evils be eradicated by the mere want of company? May not their excess, at least, be corrected in scenes

* I am sorry to mention with disapprobation the name of Blackstone. See the Introduction to his Commentaries, p. 12. vol. i. edit. 7.

where a decent behaviour meets with applause, and an irregular behaviour with punishment? Schools, therefore, in which many of these children are permitted to meet together, are not always hurtful to their morals upon that account; and, frequently, upon the same account, are useful to their understanding. The powers of the human mind do not often expand in solitude. Emulation is not entirely a stranger to the breasts of these little ones. It may be awakened even amidst the humbler studies which they are directed to pursue; it is to be kept alive only by repeated comparison, and the effects of it are both salutary and permanent.

But what consequences are likely to follow if these children be not allowed to assemble within the reach of instruction, and under the eye of authority? They may infest your streets in crowds of loiterers and vagabonds: under the roof, and in the presence of wicked parents, they may daily and hourly drink in corruption from its worst source: they may form little societies amongst themselves, for purposes of petty mischief: could they, by violent means be driven into solitude, their minds might grow sluggish and unqualified for any future employment; or, impelled by the instinctive and irresistible activity of their tempers, they might plunge at once into criminal pursuits, because no path was opened before them to such as are harmless or beneficial.

It has been urged that, through the unbounded liberty of the press, books of a malignant tendency are promiscuously circulated, and that such books

are particularly dangerous to those persons, whose views are confined, and whose principles are unsettled. This objection is no doubt plausible; and whether it be founded upon a serious regard for the best interests of mankind, or be insidiously employed as a veil for the most pernicious purposes, in either case I shall bestow upon it a very minute examination.

Be it observed, then, that good books are multiplied among us at least in equal proportion with the bad; that the antidote therefore is no less accessible than the poison; and that publications destructive to morals, written, as they are, to gratify the vanity of the idle, or to supply the extravagance of the profligate, are in general too expensive for the bulk of mankind. The interests of virtue, I confess it with sorrow, have in these later ages been endangered by metaphysical subtleties, which sap the foundations of our faith, and, by treacherous misrepresentations of human life, which taint our manners. But books of this kind are chiefly to be found in the hands of those who have much leisure to misemploy upon them. Seldom do they descend to the lower ranks of men, who are perfectly incurious about the intricate speculations in which infidelity would involve the understanding, and who are little affected by those meretricious ornaments in which vice is tricked out, and by the aid of which it steals more successfully into the deepest recesses of the heart. The excursions of vulgar curiosity do not often take a wider range than what is afforded by the trifling incidents of the neighbourhood, and the transient topics of the

day. From these the poor frequently derive innocent amusement in those hours of relaxation which they might otherwise be induced to mis-spend in riotous dissipation or in solitary intemperance.

It must, however, be owned that subjects which affect the public happiness will, in some measure, excite the curiosity of the poor, who form a part of the public; and, if this be the case, I would appeal, not to arbitrary assumption of what will be, but to experience of what has been, the consequence. I would ask, whether candid constructions upon the errors, and just opinions concerning the merits of their governors, be not sometimes formed by the lowest orders of the governed? I would ask, whether to be illiterate, and to be incurious be convertible terms? Whether sedition be not conveyed into the mind as easily and as fatally by the ear as by the eye? Whether persons who are grossly ignorant of the principles by which all political questions should be determined, be totally indifferent about them? Whether the calmness of their passions be always proportionate to the slowness of their apprehension? Whether, in short, men whose minds are quite uninstructed, and quite undisciplined, do not stand in most imminent danger of becoming the blindest and most headstrong followers to the most ignorant or the most perfidious guides? Were the right of judging upon the complex topics of government confined to those, who are really able to take in a comprehensive and an exact view of events, in their causes and effects, whose tempers are ruffled by no passion, and whose understandings are warped

by no prejudice, the objection might recoil upon many among the rich, who are most clamorous in alleging it against the poor. Whether you rank it among the blessings or inconveniences of a free state, upon matters which affect, in their consequences, the happiness of all, the attention of all will be interested. Be the abilities of men naturally strong or weak, be the cultivation of those abilities great or little, they are pushed on by a kind of mechanical impulse to form some judgment, even upon questions which they do not understand in their fullest extent. Unless, therefore, a decision, built upon scanty information, be, in the nature of things, inferior to that which is built upon none, the assistance of education is not employed in vain where it enables the poor to acquire some few materials for knowledge, and to arrange them with some little degree of exactness.

Depth of enquiry and niceness of distinction are not to be expected from the lower orders of men. They are, we know, sometimes ensnared into mistake, and sometimes worked up to outrage, by crafty fanatics or by profligate incendiaries. But they are not altogether without resources against political and religious imposture. There is a native simplicity and clearness of understanding, which conducts them to the truth by a shorter and safer path, than superior minds, when debauched by the affectation of refinement, are accustomed to pursue. There is a pride which prevents them from tamely assenting to opinions which they cannot methodically confute. There is a jealousy which often guards

them from the artifices of those who, by plausible harangues, would beguile them into error. There is a quick sense of honour and of duty, which, interrupted as it may be, by temporary causes, attaches them, in their general habits of thinking, to the government by which they are protected, and to the religion in which they have been educated. While the laws of the twelve tables, and the names of the twelve greater deities were familiarly repeated by the boys of Rome, the antient severity of their manners was unrelaxed, and the sanctity both of their religious and civil institutions continued inviolate. Every citizen was instructed, not only as to the privileges he was to enjoy, but as to the duties he was to perform; and he grew up with a firm persuasion that when the one were neglected the others were forfeited. Let us not, then, be too hasty in adopting the sentiments of those who, without balancing the good with the evil, contend for the necessity of barring up every avenue to knowledge, against the lower and busier orders of the community. For if the wishes of such men were realized, the greater part of our species would be degraded to the most abject and servile condition, where inquietude might prey upon the vitals of morality, or despondence crush every mental power, by which the man is distinguished from the brute. The Scythians,* we are told, put out the eyes of their slaves, lest the attention of the

* Vide Herod. p. 281. Wesseling's edit. and Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 440.

unhappy wretches should be called off from their task. Equally inhuman are the principles of those, who would condemn to hopeless and helpless ignorance the understandings of the poor, in order to check what has been invidiously called their insolence, to secure what is improperly called their fidelity, and to confine all their views and all their efforts within those limits which the caprice, the selfishness, or the timid cruelty of their superiors, may have prescribed.

But in what country, I would ask, are sentiments so degrading to us as men, and so dangerous to us as citizens, openly avowed? In our own; where to the general diffusion of knowledge, and to the general spirit of activity awakened by that knowledge, we are indebted for the gradual improvement and final establishment of our constitution, for the equity of our laws, and for the purity of our religion. But with what justice can we condemn the tyrant who hung up on high his sanguinary edicts written in illegible characters, if the purport and the language of our own laws be studiously kept back from those persons who, from their galling wants and their boisterous passions, are most likely to violate them? To what purpose do we insist upon the liberal principles and the extensive privileges of Protestantism, when, with the meanest and most barbarous mockery, we throw open the Bible to eyes which cannot read it?

It is, I believe, an established maxim with the best writers upon legislation, that the education of all youth should be accommodated to the religion

and the government under which they are to live. The consequences of this maxim, so far as they reach ourselves, are too interesting to be overlooked, and too unequivocal to be explained away. Papal ignorance is yoked, doubtless, by no unnatural union with Papal superstition, the triumphs of which are most inauspicious, when the blind credulity of the many has reduced them to a state of bondage to the ambitious designs of the few. But the Church of England has, I hope, too much confidence in her own strength to muffle up any of her pretensions, or any of her doctrines, in studied obscurity; nor will she refuse to the meanest of her members that freedom of enquiry, to which we are proud to ascribe her existence and her prosperity. We have passed what a great writer (Beccaria) has justly styled "the difficult and terrible transition from error to truth." After this awful crisis, the utility of knowledge becomes, by a constant and growing preparation of causes, proportionate to its extent; and, as it is the boast of the present age, that the speculative part of mankind are making a most uncommon progress in every kind of learning, which is worthy of rational beings, let it not be the reproach of the same age, that the laborious and more numerous ranks of men, whom God has equally endowed with intellectual powers, should be doomed to be quite stationary in the use of them.

It is the lot of the poor to receive, in some measure, their support from the kindness of the rich. But must their own industrious efforts be discouraged, in order to make them wholly dependent

upon that kindness? It is equally the lot of the poor to receive the greater part of their learning from the instructions of those who are more learned. But must they, on that account, be permitted to receive only such a share of information as the mean "avarice of sense," leagued as it is, sometimes with jealousy and sometimes with cruelty, shall be pleased to assign them? Must no check be put on the pride of those who have attained superior wisdom? or does the experience of past ages encourage us to repose an implicit and unlimited confidence in the disinterestedness, the generosity, and the integrity of those by whom that wisdom is to be communicated in speculative, or to be employed in active life? For my part, I have too much respect for the collective happiness of the human species, to wish for a monopoly of knowledge in any one profession, or any one rank of men. So anxious is my concern for the poor, that I would not, without the most urgent necessity, expose them even to the possibility of suffering in their faith, in their morals, or in their rights, from the artifices of men, who, if they did not mean to abuse knowledge, would hardly wish to engross it. Such too is my veneration for the faculty of reason, which our Creator has made the distinguishing mark of man, that I never wish to see it fettered down in a state of inactivity, where the misapplication of it is not almost unavoidable, and where the effects of that misapplication are not big with danger. Justly do we abhor the blind and savage fury of Mahometan conquest, when, by the indiscriminate destruction of all the materials

from which learning could be extracted, it paved the way for the speedier introduction of superstition, and the firmer establishment of despotism. We cannot, therefore, look with indifference upon the false refinements of Christian policy, when, permitting those materials to remain, and encouraging the use of them by the most honourable distinctions among some orders of the community, it condemns the poor to an utter incapacity of reading any one book in any one language.

We have heard of those times, when the little learning that was among our forefathers, shackled the understanding, instead of enlarging it; when the minds of men were suspended in a kind of dubious twilight, between the gloom of barbarism and the dawnings of civilization; when the fierce baron was equally illiterate with his unpolished vassal; and when the haughtiest prelate was content to ratify the fulminations of ecclesiastical vengeance, by the clumsy signature of the Cross. But such times never can return, while the vigilance of the lower ranks to detect wrong, becomes a restraint upon the higher from committing it; while the proficiency they make in the cultivation of their reason, animates their superiors in station to preserve their superiority in intellectual attainments, by greater exertions and higher aims; and thus, by an uninterrupted and lengthening series of causes, a spirit of application is invigorated and diffused, and every kind of learning advances with increasing rapidity.

There is a latent connection, or (if I may be allowed in the use of the expression) a kind of deli-

cate sympathy, which pervades the various parts of knowledge, and in consequence of which, every favourable and every unfavourable event affects the whole. If, therefore, seduced by the suggestions of a narrow and ungenerous caution, we should throw any artificial restraints upon the poor in the cultivation of their understandings, the final, though unsuspected disadvantages of such restraint may far exceed the immediate and momentary conveniences. The general establishment of ignorance among those whom we are too apt to consider as mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, may itself defeat the purposes for which it was promoted. Cut off from every hope of meliorating their condition, and from every opportunity of improving their minds, the poor may begin to relapse by very swift strides into a state of barbarism. They may become more unmanageable in their tempers, more gross in their conceptions, and more licentious in their manners, than they now are. The evil may extend yet farther: for, by some sudden convulsion in the state, or even by the slow and silent course of human affairs, the chains that were forged with success for the lower ranks of society, may be transferred to those who now hold with security a middle station. Upon the whole, therefore, less is to be feared from the continuance than from the annihilation of that power, which the meanest members of the community now have, even of abusing the little knowledge that lies within their reach. Though assisted and encouraged to think for themselves, they may sometimes deviate into error. But if they be permitted

to view only the same objects, revolving through the same tedious succession of manual labour; if they be compelled to linger away their intervals of leisure in the listlessness of inaction, or the insipidity of indifference; if every desire of mental improvement be discouraged, and every attempt to attain it be defeated, their minds will stagnate into an utter insensibility to all useful truth.

Much stress has, I know, been laid upon the perversion, to which even the inconsiderable portion of learning acquired in these schools is unquestionably exposed. But is it not notorious, that in the higher walks of literature some men have wanted activity, and some integrity, to apply their knowledge in the investigation of truth, and in the support of virtue? The study of philosophy, which has produced a Newton and a Boyle, has also given rise to the systems of many petulant Sciolists and impious sceptics; and ought that study, though it be of general use, to be indiscriminately discouraged, because, in particular cases, it has been abused by weak or by wicked men? Why then should these lower branches of instruction, adapted as they are to the situation and the views of the persons employed in them, be entirely neglected, because they have made some men vain, and others idle? The perversion so loudly complained of is not so frequent or so fatal as to justify the wantonness of experiment, when it would extinguish the few glimmerings of knowledge that occasionally break in upon the understandings of the poor, and enliven their spirits amidst the dreary scenes with which they are daily surrounded.

To every real instance of misapplication, we may oppose the numerous examples, where the assistance here furnished has formed peaceable citizens, laborious mechanics, and pious Christians; where it has supplied harmless amusement for their vacant hours, and given new efficacy to the efforts of their industry.

But the phantoms of danger, which disturb the imaginations of those who wish to obstruct our charitable designs, will be in a moment put to flight, when contrasted with the clear and invincible evidences, which may be drawn from the opposite conditions of two neighbouring countries. In Ireland, where the poor are for the most part totally unacquainted with the arts of writing and reading, we are presented with a dismal picture of idleness and intemperance; of the darkest ignorance and the basest superstition; of independence without freedom, or dependence without protection. But, in the southern parts of Scotland, the general cultivation of knowledge has been attended with the happiest consequences; it has humanized the manners of the lower order of men, without relaxing their activity; it is gradually wearing down the austerities of Puritanism, and has facilitated the introduction of those arts by which social life is preserved and adorned.

Many, it is true, who were educated in these schools, have abandoned themselves to immoral courses. But the causes of that immorality are to be found in the inflexible obstinacy of their dispositions, in the wily persuasions of their companions,

and too often, I fear, in the dazzling examples of their superiors, who, perhaps, consider vice as a privilege attached to wealth. They are to be sought for in every quarter, rather than in these seminaries, where sloth and debauchery are checked by many restraints, from which in other situations they are quite exempt.

The controversy respecting Charity-schools has, I think, been carried on with too little precision, or too little impartiality. While the failings of those who misapply the blessings of education have been industriously dragged to view, the faults of those who are entirely uneducated have been over-looked or suppressed. But of these unfortunate wretches it may be truly affirmed, that they are not less susceptible of evil impressions than children who are admitted into schools; that they are not equally familiarized to wholesome instruction; that the growth of every amiable quality among them is slow, and its continuance precarious. In their several callings, they are seldom distinguished by ingenuity in contrivance, or dexterity in execution. Their exertions bear the appearance, not so much of labour voluntarily undertaken, as of drudgery unavoidably performed. Their obedience is the homage of slaves, and their religion, I fear, in too many cases, "the sacrifice of fools." The moments in which they retreat, or rather escape, from their dull unvaried toil, are consumed in cheerless inaction, or outrageous licentiousness. When they are well-disposed, their virtues are cold and unsteady; and if their inclinations be bent strongly towards vice, they are to

be curbed only by the extreme rigours of punishment. They may be terrified, but can seldom be persuaded;—they may be cut off from society, but are not easily qualified for the duties of it.

On the other hand, the instruction communicated in charity-schools, though it be sufficient to prepare men for the humbler stations of life, has no direct tendency to assist them in the artifices of villainy; nor does it usually make them pant for such flattering distinctions as belong to their superiors. That knowledge, therefore, when applied according to your wishes, is salutary—when neglected, it does no harm—when misapplied, it does not enable men to execute more atrocious deeds of wickedness than cunning and audacity are capable of producing in those minds upon which no one ray of useful learning has ever shone from the cradle to the grave.

The poor, if the representations of the rich may be credited, are seldom grateful. But the want of gratitude is not, I hope, remarkable in those who are brought up in charity-schools; and there are circumstances, surely, which may induce a candid man to suppose, that these children may justly claim an honourable exemption from so severe a charge. At present, they are quite unpractised in the corruptions of the world—they are awakened, by frequent and solemn calls, to the recollection of the favours which they receive—their youth gives play to all the ingenuous feelings of the human mind; and their very dependent condition leaves little room for that pride which is impatient of obligation.

Were the unthankfulness of the poor pleaded as a sufficient warrant for the total omission of charity, the plea itself would be unsound, and the consequences of admitting it in all cases, would be most injurious to the community. When it is urged, in the case of these little ones, we are provided with arguments for the clearest and fullest confutation. To withhold the kindness which we may confer with little difficulty, and of which others cannot be deprived without great inconvenience, is cruel. But it is cruelty, aggravated by the most flagrant injustice, to make the punishment peculiar to these suppliants, when they share the offence in common with other objects of charity.

There is always reason to suspect that the popular invectives which have been let loose against the ingratitude of the poor, are either destitute of proof, or mixed with much exaggeration. We may observe too, that the very persons who suffer least from this fault, are the most forward to expatiate upon it. Their judgments are duped by their avarice. They are content to admit the truth of the fact upon the representations of others, without exposing themselves to the conviction which their own experience might bring with it. The generous man will, indeed, deserve much, where he runs the hazard of receiving little. But the selfish man claims too much, and therefore determines to deserve nothing.

For positive and deliberate acts of insolence or of injustice towards a benefactor, no excuse can be offered. But the offences so often blackened with

the name of ingratitude, will, upon a strict examination, appear to be of a more venial nature; to be sometimes involuntary, and sometimes merely negative. The poor do not, perhaps, submit to every capricious humour, comply with every extravagant requisition, or crouch to every oppressive command of those who blend the character of a patron with that of an imperious task-master. They cannot always accommodate the degrees of their gratitude to the various ranks, and the various tempers, of the very persons whom they know to be their friends. Their manners make them unskilful in those nicer forms of compliment, upon which custom has stamped an imaginary value, and which have acquired among their superiors a currency, that rough sincerity cannot always obtain. Their situation prevents them from rendering any signal services towards the numerous protectors, by whose united assistance they are enabled to supply their own daily and pressing wants.

In these schools the poor are encouraged to imbibe those principles, and to exercise those feelings, which have an immediate tendency to cherish in them the virtue of gratitude. If they attend to the instructions that are here offered to them: if they behave with respect to their superiors, and with decency to all ranks of men: if they profess a sincere and general sense of their obligations to those by whose support they are educated; if they acquire and preserve habits of temperance, assiduity, and honesty, they make those returns which are most important to society, and most satisfactory to every humane and judicious benefactor.

The bitterness of accusation has been sometimes exchanged for the insolence of contempt. There are persons who would persuade us, that our attention, however vigilant, and our liberality, however disinterested, are thrown away upon charity-schools, because the persons educated in them are incapable of great exertions, and because the good, which results to the community from the scanty and confined information obtained in them, is very inconsiderable. To this groundless, as well as inconclusive reasoning, I would answer, that the education of youth has, in all ages, engaged the notice of the wisest legislators, and the sincerest patriots; that Christians are furnished with more useful means for the instruction of their children than the heathens were; and that private liberality is among ourselves employed for that excellent purpose, for which resources of a public nature were provided by a celebrated people of antiquity.* Our efforts indeed reach only to the poor. But the poor constitute the majority in every community. Their numbers, of course, bestow importance upon any scheme that is calculated to preserve them from vice, and habituate them to labour; and their extreme inability to provide for their own safety, should become an additional inducement for us to assist them.

Seminaries of this kind cannot boast of the profound philosopher, of the elegant scholar, or of the

* For the proofs that charity-schools were instituted among the Romans, I refer the reader to Jortin's Dissertation on the Truth of the Christian Religion, p. 139, 2d edit.

accomplished statesman. But they qualify young men for entering upon the employments of the husbandman and the mechanic, one of whom may always deserve well of mankind by patient industry, and the other is often entitled to the praise of ingenuity. Such, indeed, was the haughty spirit of an admired democracy, that many lucrative professions were considered by the members of it as dishonourable. The βάναυσοι or "laborious artificers" were ranked in the same despicable herd with the ἄμουσοι and ἀχάριτες, "the unlearned and the unpolished," and we read of an Athenian Law, by which it was proposed that artizans* should become slaves to the Republic. But the superior humanity and the superior wisdom of modern ages disclaim such odious distinctions. In the wide and complicated affairs of the world, agriculture and trade deserve the protection of the laws and the respect of individuals. I speak, too, a momentous, though it be a mortifying truth, when I say, that they are of more direct and extensive use, that they are less exposed to perversion, and less hostile to virtue, than some arts, I might add some sciences, which the vanity of those who cultivate them has dignified with more brilliant appellations.

The pride of man worketh not the righteousness

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* Diophantus proposed this law at Athens, and it seems to have been an established custom among the inhabitants of Dyrrhacium (or as it was formerly called Epidamnus), to treat their artizans as slaves.—Vide Anstet. de Repub. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 324. vol. ii. 8 edit. Du Val.

of God; and under the guidance of his providence, causes in appearance very trifling, are finally productive of effects very interesting. Persons educated in these schools have sometimes become not only irreproachable but extremely useful members of society; they have emerged from sordid indigence to the comforts and even the elegancies of affluence; they have carried into higher stations, and have exercised with more splendid success, those habits of diligence which owed their birth to these humbler forms of instruction. Such instances, however rare, should not be overlooked. But even in the general course of things, the fruits of your benevolence are not inadequate to the expence and the labour of preparation. That Being, who judges of actions, will determine upon your merit by the uprightness of your endeavours. He who controuls events may draw from those endeavours such blessings as, in the aggregate, will be most honourable to yourselves, and most advantageous to your country.

While many coarse and invidious objections are thrown out against the immorality, the ingratitude, and the unimportance of the poor, complaints of a more refined sort are pointed against the measures that are taken to cherish in them any sentiments of Religion: for, the belief of Christianity is, we are told, forced upon their minds, and, therefore, cannot be attended with lasting and beneficial effects. To this romantic, and, I fear, malignant assertion, it may be replied, that, in far the greater part of our best qualifications, compulsion has pre-

ceded choice: and that the pleasures of actual attainment have been experienced before the labour necessary to that attainment had been voluntarily undergone.

The argument I am now considering will affect the more elegant as well as the more simple plans of education. But what, I would ask, are the grounds on which it ought to affect either? If information upon the subjects of history and manners be proper for young men, what inherent peculiarity is there in religion which renders it unworthy of their attention? If Christianity contain doctrines which reason may admit, and inculcate precepts of which the moral sense approves, why should the severities of proscription be levelled against Christian doctrines and Christian precepts alone?

On the other hand, should it be thought expedient to unite religious instruction with the various branches of useful and ornamental learning, in which the higher ranks of men are educated, the poor, who seldom find access to the latter in any great degree, ought not surely to be excluded from the former.

But all opinions derived from the Gospel must, it seems, be branded with the name of prejudice. Yet, while those opinions are consonant to truth, and the actions produced by them are virtuous, it is of little moment from what source streams, confessedly pure, may originally have issued. The Gospel, preached as it was by its Author to the poor, is, I am confident, more calculated to enlighten their understandings, and to purify their

hearts, than all the visionary refinements of honour, or all the subtle distinctions of philosophy.

What is admitted as a prepossession afterwards becomes a rule of action. But this process is not peculiar to religion. The first rudiments of every science are received upon credit; and we are indebted to authority itself for those notions which, confirmed by fresh conviction, and enlarged by new application, enable us to renounce authority, when we no longer stand in need of it, and to adopt or reject the opinions of others only upon the strictest principles of reason.

In these schools, then, the young man is educated in the belief of a religion which is in all respects accommodated to his situation. The doctrines of it will preserve him from the extravagancies of fanaticism and the terrors of superstition, to which the poor are particularly exposed. The precepts of it tend to convert that churlishness of disposition, so frequently imputed to the lower orders of mankind, into an instrument of every sterner virtue, of perseverance in labour, of resolution amidst danger, and of hardiness under adversity. The promises of it will support him under the pressure of many secret afflictions, which the rich seldom discover, and sometimes cannot relieve. Taught by this religion to look up from his earthly benefactor to a more gracious benefactor in heaven, he is often kept steady in the path of virtue; and by that steadiness the interests of the community, and the happiness of the individual, are effectually secured. We must not, however, forget, that in the

same moment, and with the same facility, prejudices on the side of irreligion and immorality may be infused into his mind. If the wheat be not sown, the enemy is generally at hand to scatter the tares.

I am not acquainted with any objection to the utility of charity-schools which has not already been produced in its full strength, and obviated by impartial, and, I hope, satisfactory answers. The sentiments which I have here advanced are, I am conscious, addressed to an audience from whose virtuous attachment to the cause which I have defended they will meet a favourable reception. It is with the sincerest pleasure that I shelter the wishes of that audience, and my own opinions, under the authority of a writer the depth of whose penetration is to be equalled only by the benevolence of his heart. After stating with clearness, and solving with ingenuity, some of the difficulties belonging to the subject now before us, this excellent Moralist thus expresses himself. "I am always afraid of determining on the side of envy or cruelty. The privileges of education may sometimes be improperly bestowed. But I shall always fear to withhold them, lest I should be indulging the suggestions of pride, while I persuade myself that I am following the maxims of policy; and under the appearance of salutary restraints, should be indulging the lust of dominion, and that malevolence which delights in seeing others depressed." *

* See Johnson's Review of Soame Jenyns's Enquiry into the Origin of Evil, p. 12.

To conclude; when objections are made against any measure, the advantages of which are imperfect, it is incumbent, I think, on the objector to point out some other expedients less exceptionable. That virtue is necessary to every member of the community, no speculatist will be hardy enough to deny. But if these children do not derive the first principles of duty, and the first habits of diligence, from education, whence are they to be obtained? Not, surely, from a delicate sense of honour, which can have no place amidst the ruggedness of their tempers, the awkward simplicity of their manners, and the very circumscribed notions they entertain concerning the moral fitness of things—not from the splendor of high example, for they stand very far removed from the more elevated conditions of life, upon which, indeed, they seldom gaze but with stupid admiration, and of which they are far more likely to imitate the vices, than to emulate the virtues—not from the dread of that indigence, the prospect of which ought, I am sure, to be a check upon the extravagance of their superiors, but to the degrading circumstances of which familiarity has rendered the poor almost callous. If they be not supplied with the means of attaining knowledge in these schools, "to whom must they flee for succour?" Will you send them to the cold and haughty eye of the stranger? Will you force them back upon their friends, whom age has, perhaps, benumbed, whom sickness tortures, or whose daily labour scarce procures for them the wretched pittance of daily bread? Even the benefit of that labour may be lost

to the orphan, who stands here before you, an humble and helpless suppliant. He now looks up to you as the guides of his youth, and the guardians of his innocence—he has once wept over the ashes of an affectionate father, whose last moments were, probably, embittered by the dread of leaving a child exposed to ignorance and vice, and whose last prayers were directed to Heaven, for such assistance as your benevolence may furnish this day.

A

DISCOURSE ON EDUCATION,

AND ON THE

PLANS PURSUED IN CHARITY SCHOOLS.

Ταῦτα οὔκ ἐνδοιάσας οὐδὲ μελλήσας, περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων εὐκοσμίας καὶ συμφροσύνης διείλεγμαι.

Plutarch *περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς.*

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD

LEWIS, LORD BISHOP OF THIS DIOCESE;

TO THE RIGHT WORSHIPFUL

ELIAS NORGATE, ESQUIRE,

MAYOR OF NORWICH;

TO ROBERT PARTRIDGE, ESQUIRE,

TREASURER OF THE CHARITY SCHOOLS;

THIS DISCOURSE

IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED,

BY THEIR OBEDIENT FAITHFUL SERVANT,

S. PARR.

PREFACE.

THIS discourse was preached before a very respectable audience; and it is now submitted to the candour of the public, at the request of some persons, the sincerity of whose approbation I cannot distrust, and with the authority of whose judgment I ought not to trifle. I intend it, in some measure, as a sequel to a Sermon which I published in 1780, at the desire of the late Mr. Thurlow. In that Sermon I entered into a full and elaborate vindication of the general principles on which charity schools are supported. But upon the present occasion I have studiously preserved a plainer style, I have chiefly attended to the practical part of the subject, I have enlarged more copiously upon the best methods of religious education for all young persons; and, with a very few exceptions, I profess only to deliver such common and useful observations, as are adapted to the apprehension of common and well-disposed readers.

In consequence of two or three seeming deviations from the direct and beaten track of my subject, I may, in the second part of it, be thought to expatiate too much upon the Perjuria Punici Furoris,

Cum sit lis mihi de tribus Capellis.

This objection I shall endeavour to remove, or at least to weaken, by observing, that enquiries relating to the knowledge which is to be communicated, and the employments which should be assigned to the poor of both sexes, cannot be considered as unimportant; that in tracing the causes, and marking the circumstances of the most familiar events, we often catch involuntarily a glimpse of society in various forms; and that, in the discussion of all moral questions, where theory is closely connected with practice, we find our judgment assisted, as well as our curiosity amused, by incidental remarks and collateral researches.

'Εοίκα (says Socrates) καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ πως ὡς λέγῳ; Phædo. p. 102. edit. Serran.

For the unusual length of this Sermon I am unable to make any satisfactory apology—but as to the passages in which I refer to local circumstances, I hope to alledge a proper and sufficient excuse in their local importance. In respect to the notes, they appear to me necessary, sometimes to explain my opinions, and sometimes to justify my reasoning. They are taken from writers whom I know to be familiar to every man of letters.

A DISCOURSE ON EDUCATION.

PROVERBS, xxii. 6.

Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it.

DEEPLY as must every well-disposed man be impressed with the truth and the importance of these words, considered abstractedly from the authority of the writer, he will at the same time rejoice, that the cause of religious education has found in Solomon a most eloquent advocate, and a most sagacious and dispassionate judge. But as the peculiar manner of a teacher often gives additional force to the doctrines which he inculcates, you will permit me to lay before you some preliminary observations on that species of writing in which the injunction and the promise contained in my text are conveyed to us. It will perhaps be said, that observations of this kind may be affixed to any passage in any part of the book. I allow the fact, but am able to blunt the edge of every objection which may be drawn from it; for, in the first place, it is certainly right, in some form or other, to explain, in the ears of a Christian congregation, the general character of proverbial writings; secondly, no form can be more proper than to make such explanation an appendage to some particular

precepts; and, finally, no precept can be more interesting to us than that which is delivered in the text, whether we consider ourselves as the professors of a pure religion, or the members of a civilized community.

In countries where composition was not embellished by critical refinement, and where the sciences were either totally unknown, or irregularly cultivated, the use of Proverbs has universally prevailed. While the modifications of artificial life were neither considerable in number, nor extensive in their effects, the utility of short and plain directions was universally felt; and as the manners of men were not distorted by affectation, nor their understandings debauched by sophistry, general rules afforded a safe and easy guidance * for those who were neither able nor willing to perplex themselves by cavils, to hunt after exceptions, or trace out all the minuter circumstances, by which particular cases were discriminated. Hence, in the regulation both of private and public concerns, in correcting the vices of individuals, and in curbing the passions of the multitude, proverbs were often employed with distinguished and instantaneous success. They produced, indeed, such consequences as it is extremely diffi-

* My meaning may be illustrated by the following passage in Apostolius: *Ἐτυμολογεῖται ἡ παροιμία ἐκ τῆς παρὰ προθέσεως δὲ τοῦ οἶμος ἡ ὁδος, παραοιμία καὶ παροιμία· ἤτοι τό παροδικὸν τρίμμα τε καὶ διήγημα· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ ἔτι τῶν τρίβων ἀσήμων οὐσῶν, διὰ τὸ τοὺς ὁδεύοντας μὴ ἀποκάμνειν τῷ μὴ γινώσκειν πόσον της ὁδοῦ διήνυσαν, καὶ τί λείπεται, σημεῖα οἱ παλαιοὶ κατὰ τίνας τῆς ὁδοῦ τόπους ἐτίθεσαν· κ. τ. λ.*

cult for us in these later ages of civilization to conceive, and such too, as far surpass what might now be expected from a series of the most cogent reasoning, or from the display of the most brilliant eloquence.

In the peculiar structure of proverbs we may find some of the reasons to which their uncommon efficacy is to be ascribed. They are calculated to awaken attention without effort, and without art to impress conviction. In oral tradition they found a safe vehicle, and by daily experience they were called forth into constant use. The numerosity of the sentence pleased the ear, and the vivacity of the image dazzled the fancy. By their pointedness they were clearly understood, and from their conciseness they were easily retained. Brevity,* indeed, as appears from the practice of every writer, and the decision of every judge, is indispensably necessary. But whether the primary and leading idea should be conveyed by direct terms, or oblique allusion; whether it should be placed in full light or darkened† by a partial shade; whether it should stand prominently in the front of the picture, and assail attention, or gently invite it by being thrown, as it were, in the back ground, will depend wholly

* Quicquid præcipies, esto brevis. A rule which is applicable on more occasions than that to which it is immediately applied by the poet. See also a passage quoted by Lowth from Demetrius: Περὶ ἑρμῆν. Præl. 24.

† Ab aliis hoc finitur modo, παροιμία ἐστὶ λόγος ἐπικαλύπτων τὸ σάφες ἀσαφείᾳ, id est, Proverbium est sermo rem manifestam obscuritate tegens. Prolegom. to Erasm. Adag. Sacra vero

on the taste and choice of the writer. In the former case the mind does eagerly what little it has to do. Where no intricacies are to be unravelled, and no comparisons to be investigated, it is impatient of being detained for a moment in the contemplation of ornament, and presses forwards straightly and impetuously to the main design. Hence the plainness of expression that is frequently to be found in proverbs; though occasions will sometimes arise in which it is proper to bestow upon them a qualified and temperate decoration. But the process, even in this latter case, is short and plain. We must not be called upon to strain our powers by sudden struggles, or to weary them by intense application, but to employ them with such a degree of exertion as, by its alacrity, by its facility, and its sufficiency to the end proposed, excites a pleasing sensation, and throws a more vivid and lasting lustre over all our perceptions.

Thus Solomon, in the nine first chapters,* has admitted into his diction many of the ornaments

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parœmia a Basilio definitur, λόγος ὠφέλιμος μετ' ἐπικρύψεως μετρίας ἐκδεδόμενος.

It is unnecessary for me to enter with critical nicety into the disagreement and similitude between apophthegms, adagies, and moral Γνῶμαι. These points are learnedly discussed by Erasmus, in his Prolegomena to the Adagies; by Lycosthenes, in his Preface to his Collection of Ἀποφθέγματα; by Schottus, in his Preface to the Παροιμίαι Ἑλληνικαι; and by Michael Apostolius, in the Letter prefixed to his Collection of Proverbs.

* Hujusce operis duæ sunt partes: prima quæ est Prœmii cujusdam loco, novem priora capita continet; estque varia, elegans, sublimis, vereque poetica. Lowth, Prælec. 24.

which poetry furnishes, in splendour of metaphor, and in luminousness of description. But in the subsequent part of the work he descends to an humbler style, preserving, however, at the same time, that acuteness of sentiment, and that neatness of phraseology, which are characteristic of proverbial composition.

Of the esteem in which that composition was holden in antient times we shall not think lightly, when we recollect that proverbs were pronounced by the priest at the oracle, and by the legislator in the forum;* that they were ambitiously seized by the Lyric † and by the Epic ‡ muse in their most rapid career and in their sublimest soarings; and that the title of wisdom was eminently appropriated to that kind of instruction, which, in brief and detached sentences, pointed out what the duty of man required him to perform, and his interest to pursue. Hence the Greek writers have carefully preserved to us those moral aphorisms that immortalized the seven sages of Greece; and hence, too, from the same habits of thinking, and in the same form of

* I use this word for the Greek ἀγόρα; as the place in which deliberations were holden upon subjects of law and government. See the Menexenus of Plato, p. 234, tom. ii. edit. Serran. Schol. in Eurip. Hec. l. 288. in V. παρηγόρησον.

† Ζηλωτὸς δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ σεμνότητος εἵνεκα καὶ γνωμολογίας. Dionys. Halicar. τῶν Ἀρχαι: κρισις. p. 173. vol. ii.

‡ See the learned Preface of Duport in Homeri Gnomologiam. Nec inutile solum, sed et jucundum fuerit observare, quam amicè inter se conspirent, atque consentiant Solomon puta, et Homerus, sacrorum ille, hic τῶν ἔξωθεν scriptorum (si doctis credimus) sapientissimus.

expression, Solomon is emphatically described "as the wise man."

He had certainly looked abroad with a piercing and comprehensive eye on the great chain of external causes which determine the happiness or misery of mankind. He had deeply explored the most secret recesses of the human heart. He had surveyed attentively the complicated springs of our actions, and that strange mixture of good and evil, of wisdom and folly, which produces an endless diversity in the human character. With the sagacity, therefore, which marks exalted genius, and with that simplicity which arises from a distinct conception of subjects in themselves both dark and intricate, he lays down many useful regulations for our behaviour; and while his precepts are delivered to us in familiar language, while they lie level to common apprehensions, and seem to arise out of the ordinary occurences of life, they are known by more discerning and more exact enquirers, not only to rest upon the solid basis of experience, but to proceed from those habits of patient and profound observation, without which the most ingenious theory is but a shining trifle.

Over writings in the learned languages both prosaic and poetical, many proverbial passages are scattered, which amuse and interest every judicious reader by the brightness of the expression and the justness of the sentiment. We have indeed no collection made by any Roman writer, * of moral say-

* Schottus, in the Preface before quoted, enumerates the Paræmiographi per saturam; both those which are lost and

ings, at once venerable for their antiquity and celebrated for their popularity. But as to the Greeks,* some collections of this kind have escaped the ravages of time; and whatever imperfections we, who are enlightened by religion and philosophy, may spy out in these rude efforts of antient morality, we may yet find in them many vestiges of good sense, and even of good writing, — many remarks which demand the praise of penetration, — many admonitions which denote an honest and amiable concern for the improvement and welfare of the species. Yet in number, in variety, in profoundness of thought, and in purity of principle, the most excellent of these old moralists is far exceeded by the writer from whom my text is taken.

I lately saw with very high satisfaction a criticism,† which, indeed, had often occurred to my

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those which are come down to us. After mentioning the Greek writers, he proceeds: Latini vero, serius tamen, id argumentum tentârunt verius, quam tractârunt. Lucii Appuleii enim Madaurensis, philosophi Platonici, librum de Proverbiis secundum citat Carisius Sosipater.—Lib. ii. Gramm.

* We now have the Works of Zenobius, Diogenianus, the Collectanea from Suidas, made by modern scholars, and another Collection of Michael Apostolius. I must not wholly omit the Apophthegms of Plutarch, a work which he justly styles κοίνας ἀπαρχὰς ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας.

† I will quote the passage at large: Atque hoc loco non possimus silentio præterire qui nos error diu tenuerit: si forte nostrum exemplum aliis prodesse queat. Ex Ciceronianis libris, omnium primi a nobis lecti sunt illi, qui sunt de Officiis: consuetudine tam perversâ, quam pervulgatâ. Eramus tum pueri; id est, eâ ætate, qua horum librorum vim, ac præstantiam minimè perciperemus, verba verbis redderemus; nec hoc

own mind, and which is now supported by an authority under which I am happy to fortify my opinion against rash contradiction and petulant derision. The writer of that criticism tells us, that having read the Offices of Tully when he was a boy, he had not till it was late in life resumed and examined them: but this neglect he ingenuously condemns, not only for want of curiosity, but for want of judgment. In the composition, which from its supposed plainness was not very attractive to a juvenile mind, he now discovered many graces which had passed before unnoticed. In the thought, which to a superficial and hasty reader once appeared obvious and trite, he perceived marks of a most cultivated and most vigorous understanding. In passages which related to common life, and

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quidem sine summo tædio quod res ipsas non intelligebamus. Itaque factum est postea, ut quo plus suavitatis caperemus legendis Poetis et Historicis, qui sine dubio magis accommodati sunt puerili ingenio, eo minus jucunda nobis accideret recordatio librorum de Officiis.—P. 15. Dutch Review.

Cum Cicerone in gratiam rediimus. At quàm diversus, et longe alius atque antea, tum nobis videbatur. Omnia non tantum suaviter, sed castè, accuratè, et utiliter eum scripsisse intelligebamus. Sed tamen illa præjudicata de officiorum libris opinio ut tenerrimâ ætate suscepta erat, ita difficillimè deponebatur. Nam cùm, post excussos alios adolescentiæ errores, hos libros aliquoties legissemus, semper adhuc aliquid ex veteri errore remanebat; ut non dubitaverimus alicubi concedere reprehensoribus istis, qui dicerent, doctrinam de officiis non accuratè et verè a Cicerone traditam esse. A quâ nunc sententiâ tantum absumus, ut nobis hi libri, cognito eorum consilio atque instituto, omnium maximè diligenter conscripti videantur.—P. 18.

common topics, he found instructions of the very highest importance. These observations you will permit me to apply to the writings of Solomon, which we are ourselves accustomed to read when boys, and which we may continue to read with increasing pleasure and increasing advantage when arrived at those years, or, I should say rather, at that discretion, which can alone entitle us to be considered as men. What is familiar is therefore not respected, because it was, perhaps, at first known without exertion, and is now remembered without praise. Hence it is that those rules which the experience of successive generations has accumulated, and which our own unprejudiced reflections have approved, are yet permitted to have little weight with us, because our vanity has little share in retaining or inculcating them. But to obviate this wide-spread and dangerous infatuation, I have endeavoured to rescue proverbial writings from the obscurity and discredit into which they, in these very polished times, have fallen; and indeed were I to calculate exactly the intellectual merits of Solomon, were I to overcome incredulity and to repel contempt by setting before you a series of all the excellencies which may be found in his writings, I will venture to say, that, in point of correct and profound observation, that for curious description of character and nice evolutions of passion, they would appear worthy of being contrasted with the most laboured and most successful researches of moralists both antient and modern.

They are not ushered in, it may be, after the man-

ner of some late pestilential productions, with loud and arrogant pretensions to discovery. They are not drawn up with the artificial formalities of system. They are not tricked out with a superfluous parade of ornament; nor are they directed by treacherous and subtile management to the purpose of relaxing the obligations of morality, under the imposing pretence of correcting vulgar errors. But they aim at the best ends by the most compendious and honourable way—they lay no dangerous snares for our passions, and present no delusive phantoms to our imagination—they speak at once to our hearts and consciences—they tell us both "our presumptuous sins and our secret faults"—they throw no veil over the deformity of the evil, and they point out the most proper and most radical cure. Of this assertion we shall find a striking instance upon the subject of education, which is treated of in the words of our text, and to the discussion of which the rest of this discourse will be more directly applied.

Upon the topic of education, two writers of considerable, though I by no means conceive of equal powers, have advanced nearly to the same conclusions from principles diametrically opposite. Man devils,* explaining away the most noble parts of

* Detraction, in order to be forcible, should be evidently and comparatively just, and it is yet more the duty of an instructor upon points of morality, than of a critic upon subjects of literature, to commend the excellencies, as well as to point out the imperfections, of those whom he opposes: he has a greater end in view, and therefore he ought to be more solicitous in

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Fictitious representations of what is praiseworthy are useful, I confess, for preparing the mind of man to act in real life. Yet fiction itself has boundaries, which sound and sober sense has a right to prescribe, but which the acuteness of feeling and the vigour of fancy in men of genius are apt to overleap. After repeated, after serious I am sure, and I hope after impartial perusal of his celebrated work, I think the scenes romantic, and the tendency upon the whole very pernicious in the mixed condition of the world, and amidst the mixed characters of those who form the mass of mankind. The readers who cannot discriminate will assuredly be misled; and when admiration overpowers the judgment in persons of a bet-

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times unknown to the world, sometimes unsuspected even by himself, and over which, when they are known, he throws some specious gloss under the hope of sheltering his reputation, or of lulling his conscience asleep. Yet he is a professed enemy to charity schools, lest under the pretence of making children more virtuous, we should instruct them in a more refined sort of vice: lest we should beget pride, where we teach humility; and by enabling children to know their duty better, should ultimately incite them to practise it worse. Rousseau, on the contrary, maintains that all our propensities originally point to what is excellent, and that instruction serves only to cramp the powers of the soul, and to produce artificial rather than real worth. Of education therefore he recommends to the whole species that neglect, the privileges and blessings of which, such as they are, Mandeville would, for different reasons, confine to the poor. He thinks it more eligible for children to find the right way by themselves than to be conducted into it by other men; or, to reduce his maxims to the standard of common sense, they are to love innocence by plunging into guilt, and to provide for their own security by rushing into danger.

In some respects, however, I feel no reluctance in allowing the claims of both to the infamy of

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ter class, the inclination and the power to discriminate are too often lost. Many of the circumstances which he has supposed will rarely exist; and, in those which do exist, his representation of them will flatter the vain, misguide the unwary, and perplex even the virtuous.

consummate and notorious consistency. Mandeville, who was too shameless to disguise his sentiments under an awkward affectation of decorum, and too shallow to support them even by the arts of perverted erudition, scoffs at the whole scheme of Revelation as a despicable and debasing imposture. And as to Rousseau, after all the efforts he has made to array the character of his pupil in a most gorgeous appearance, he was content, at last, to shackle him with a morality of very loose texture. The liveliness of the former writer* has, I know, procured him converts among readers of morose tempers, and contracted views; and with those who indulge self-conceit and self-delusion in sentimental delicacy and paradoxical hypothesis, the latter is not without a very numerous train of admirers. But to the sarcastic raillery of the one, and the deceitful refinements of the other, I shall oppose the sage and simple exhortation of the text; and if it be necessary to strengthen the opinion of Solomon by collateral evidences, we may add, that while the promise he holds out coincides with the sentiments of a writer, who joined the sagacity of a philosopher to the genius of a poet,† the precept he lays down is, also, warranted by the decision of a satirist,‡ whose views were not dim or narrow, when

* Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, part v. sect. ii. acknowledges the pernicious tendency, and detects with great ability the fallacies of Mandeville's system. See from p. 373 to p. 386.

† Vide Georgic. ii. l. 272.

‡ ——— Nunc adbibe puro
Pectore verba, puer: nunc te melioribus offer.

he surveyed the various modes of external life, and developed the most complex structure of the human mind.

From the test of authority, to which I appeal only in condescension to the frivolous and fastidious taste of the age, let us carry the propositions of Solomon to the tribunal of reason. Much as it is the fashion of the times to boast of new and important discoveries, they who judge of knowledge from its effects; they who distinguish between solid and plausible reasonings; they who have marked the progressive operations of the mind in different ages and in different countries, listen to these boasts without credulity and without triumph. They know that many of those discoveries, as they are called, had been anticipated by earlier writers. They feel a just prejudice in favour of established opinions, because, after the controversies which have engaged the passions and talents of men upon topics of morality, what has been long believed has been often examined. They speak not from motives of superstition or of envy, when they say that the general leading principles of ethics are now established upon sure foundations, and that the utmost excellence which our abilities can attain, or to which our pride can aspire, is to produce some partial improvement, to explain collateral and adventitious circumstances, or to separate truth from the adhesion of some undetected and favourite error.

Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem
Testa diu. Horat. Epist. Lib. i. ii. line 67.

I mean not to depreciate* the worth of any man, who by the vigour of his genius, or by the intenseness of his application, performs so much. But I am always provoked at the arrogance, and alarmed about the designs of those who would pretend to more. And thus philosophy, I am persuaded, does not warrant the peremptory assumptions of a Mandeville or a Rousseau; and experience, I am sure, confutes their dangerous deductions.

The different productions of soil, the different temperatures of climate, the different influences of religion and government, the different degrees of national proficiency in arts and sciences, and the different dispositions, or, it may be, talents of individuals, require us to pursue different methods in the instruction of youth. But the general principles of education are the same, or nearly the same, in all ages, and at all times. They are fixed unalterably in the natural and moral constitution of man. They are of the same kind in the fierce African, in the sluggish Greenlander, and in the more enlightened and polished inhabitants of the temperate

* I will express my meaning in the words of Hemsterhusius. Sed nec veterum tam immodestus sum laudator, ut, quicquid humanâ naturâ præcellens atque egregium continet, illis fuisse solis mancipatum mihi persuadeam, neque eximias hujus seculi virtutes prolatis mirum in modum scientiarum pomœriis florentissimas tam malignè interpretor; nec denique tantam rerum molem, nuda de Græcæ linguæ nobilitate disputatio secum trahit: haudquaquam enim, quod illi, qui conterendo vetustatis honorem, sibi principalis ingenii famam eblandiuntur, præ se ferunt, meritæ Græcorum laudes cum nostri temporis dedecore, ac contumeliâ sunt conjunctæ.—Oration, p. 46.

zone. They are to be found in our affections and passions, some of which must be controuled, and some cherished, in every state of manners, and under every form of society. From the right apprehension of them, we discover "the way in which a child ought to go," and by the right use of them "when he is young," we shall qualify him, "when old," for not departing from it.

Upon the topic of education, which has been so frequently and so ingeniously treated, it were unavailing and unmanly to attempt any explanation which may carry with it the grace of novelty. But the most useful truths, blessed be God, are not the most recondite or the most untractable. They lie, for the greater part, within the reach of every honest inquirer, and in order to fill up the measure of that good which they are capable of producing, attention in the hearer is usually more requisite than originality in the preacher. For this reason I shall, in the following discourse, first endeavour to shew the truth of the assertion, that children will generally not depart from the right way in which they have been trained up. Secondly, I shall mention some of the instances in which the greatest care is necessary to educate them virtuously. And thirdly, I shall lay before you my opinion upon the general principle of charity schools, and on the particular plan which is pursued in those over which you preside, for the professed purpose of bringing up children in the way they should go.

It is not necessary for us to make an exact balance of the good and evil dispositions which are

said to be implanted in us; and perhaps it is not possible. Amidst the great diversities of temper, and probably of capacities, which are to be found in individuals, the most cautious and discerning inquirer must acknowledge it extremely difficult to form any general estimate, at once convincing by its clearness, and applicable from its precision. We do, indeed, know, that from the very moment any human creature begins to act, he shews both wrong propensities which may be controled, and right ones which may be confirmed, by the aid of instruction. We also know, that children are incapable of long foresight, or nice discrimination; that they consider what is agreeable, rather than what is useful; that habits of every kind are contracted insensibly; that vicious habits are not subdued without great difficulty; and that virtuous habits require frequent assistance and encouragement.

The same laws seem to pervade the vegetable, the animal, and the moral world. Nature is experimentally found in all of them to ward off exterior danger, and to strengthen every internal capacity of improvement, to prevent untimely blasts, and to secure a lasting and vigorous maturity. We observe, too, that every good quality is alike destroyed by excessive care, or by total neglect;* and that the

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* ἀγαθὴ γῆ πέφυκεν, ἀλλ' ἀμεληθεῖσα χερσεύεται.
Plutarch, de Liber. Educandis, vol. ii. p. 2.

This thought is beautifully pursued in the opening of this treatise. I have often lamented the neglect into which this excellent and useful writer has fallen. Taylor, in his Elements of Civil Law, makes the same complaint. I am happy to quote

same causes give a quicker growth, and a more incurable malignity to such qualities as are bad. To habit,* indeed, may be applied the well-known description of fame. Timorous at first, and puny in its size, it shrinks from the slightest breath of opposition; but disregarded or cherished, it rears aloft its head, it spreads in bulk, it quickens its pace, and in every stage of its progression acquires new strength and new boldness.

The first operation of all our faculties is owing to some inconsiderable impulse. They are called into action by incidents, which we sometimes cannot control, and sometimes do not observe. They produce effects which were at the beginning minute and transient; and when these effects, from their

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two passages in his favour from Gesner. Huc referuntur similitudines: quo in genere excellit Plutarchus: qui per similitudines naturales egregiè solet morales pingere.—Gesner's Isagoge, vol. i. p. 66.

Plutarchus, cujus libri vel soli instar Bibliothecæ esse possint, inter Philosophos occurret. P. 157. See this proposition fully explained, vol. ii. p. 92.

Plutarch's style has peculiar beauty, and his matter is very curious and very interesting. His Lives, indeed, keep their hold upon the curiosity of scholars, but his moral works are too much neglected by men of learning, because they are not sufficiently Attic. Against this objection Plutarch shall be his own apologist: Ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμφυόμενος, ἀλλὰ τὴν λέξιν Ἀττικὴν ἀξιῶν εἶναι καὶ ἰσχνὴν, ὁμοίος ἐστι μὴ βουλομένῳ πιεῖν ἀντίδοτον, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς κωλίαδος ᾖ κεκεραμευμένον, μηδὲ ἱμάτιον περιβάλεσθαι χειμῶνος, εἰ μὴ προβάτων Ἀττικῶν εἴη τὸ ἔριον.—Plutar. vol. ii. p. 42.

* On the power of habit, see the beautiful vision of Theodore, in the Fugitive Pieces by Johnson, &c.

permanence or magnitude, attract our attention, the causes which gave rise to them either elude our efforts to discover them, or, when discovered, they are counteracted only by repeated trials, and after many mortifying disappointments.

We indeed are instinctively led to flee from evil, when we know it to be such, and to pursue good. But through the irregular agitations of the passions, our opinions of both are often erroneous, and our admiration of supposed good, as well as our dread of supposed evil, becomes excessive. Hence arises the necessity of setting before the mind such objects only as will not inflame its desires, or precipitate it into rash and destructive pursuits.

Children are born of the same parents, they live under the same roof, they see, or are supposed to see, the same external scenes.* But when vice or virtue comes before them, the attention of one may be active, and of another sluggish. One reflects on what has passed before him, and another forgets it. One judges exactly, and another erroneously. One is disgusted with the faults of a companion, and another is reconciled to them by some concomitant excellence, by liveliness of temper, by vivacity of conversation, or by proficiency in the little amusements which captivate the minds of the young. But those children, in reality, do not always keep the same company, hear the same language, or meet with the

* Sect. i. chap. ii. and iii. of Helvetius on Man, where this subject is treated with the usual acuteness and penetration of this great writer.

same examples. These circumstances, which frequently are not seen, and more frequently are disregarded, either assist or impede the efficacy of education; and if no attempt therefore be made to correct what is dangerous, or to forward what is beneficial in their tendency, it were vain to imagine that, amidst the snares and temptations of the world, young persons will be led by the customs of that world into a virtuous course.

The powers of men unfold themselves gradually in this progressive state, where the duties we are to perform increase in proportion to our increasing capacity for performing them. Our sensations during infancy are few; but in boyhood they are more numerous and more intense, when the scenes which captivate, and the pursuits which engage us, are multiplied, when their novelty endears them to our curiosity, and when our reason is unable to estimate their comparative merit, and their ultimate tendencies. Much more care than is usually taken, or than vulgar minds think it expedient or even practicable to take, may, indeed, be properly employed upon the influence of objects, which in our most early years solicit the notice of our senses; and whatever difficulty may arise in separating the primary effects of these objects upon our own minds, from those which they now produce from custom and association, it is not impossible to form some idea of the impressions which they immediately fix upon the tender and pliant dispositions of children, and of the power they have to give some bent to their future character. But in boyhood, it is, that the great work

of education can no longer be delayed, when all the avenues of the soul are open to instruction, and when there is an apparent flexibility in our opinions and in our appetites.

Now the justness of Solomon's remark on the use of instruction may be thus elucidated. The moral powers of men, peculiar as the province is where they act, and the effects which they produce, are governed by laws analogous * to those which pervade the intellectual and bodily constitution of our species. By the industrious hand tasks in appearance the most laborious are executed with surprising facility. By understandings which patient and intense study has invigorated, the most complex relations of ideas are, in a moment, unravelled, and the most extensive train of argumentation is connected with accuracy. Thus, too, where persons have been trained up in a constant and sincere regard to their religious and social duties, sensibility, in time, anticipates the suggestions of reason, and passion faintly resists the dictates of conscience: the general course of life is almost mechanically exact, and the embarrassments arising from particular situations are quickly surmounted: our best volitions are formed without anxious deliberation, and our best deeds are performed without painful effort. At first, perhaps, we were led to detached and separate actions, from the con-

* Man is a bundle of habits. There is not a quality or function, either of body or mind, which does not feel the influence of this great law of animated nature.—Paley's Principles of Philosophy, p. 40.

viction that they were either proper, meritorious, or useful: but these ideas become afterwards blended in one bright assemblage, which we do not attempt to distinguish, and with their united force, of which we are instantaneously sensible, they impel us to perform what practice has made easy, and what reflection, when we stood in need of its guidance, had shewn to be right.

Whatever speculative tenets we may have adopted upon the abstract subjects of necessity and free-will, we must perceive both in the moral defects and excellencies of men a degree of uniformity, of which, be the adventitious and concurrent causes what they may, the force of habit alone will afford a clear and complete solution. Upon what occasions, we may ask, does virtue appear advanced to the most exalted point of perfection, or vice sunk into the most hopeless and abject state of degradation? Where the principle of conduct is determined not by deliberate reflection but by sudden and almost irresistible impulse: where opportunity, whether for good or bad, is followed up by such actions as are correspondent to the prevailing bias of our opinions and inclinations: where the dread of punishment is insufficient to deter, and the hope of reward is not necessary to encourage: where the slightest temptation instigates to the most atrocious crimes, and the smallest incentive incites to the most meritorious deeds. Even the exceptions to the general character of individuals are not inconsistent with the general rules relating to the power of custom. For the unexpected frailties we lament in the virtuous, and the partial excellen-

cies we may find even in the vicious, may sometimes be traced up to some early and habitual principles. These considerations evince the urgent necessity of teaching men to enter, as soon as possible, on a right course of action, of planting the firmest barrier against vices which it is so difficult to abandon, and of giving timely assistance to those virtues, in which it is so delightful to persevere, and from which it is so easy not to depart.

That our moral principles are invigorated, and our moral improvement * facilitated by use, is apparent not only from analogy, but from fact. For in what persons do we generally find the least proneness to evil, and the most steady exercise of virtue? In those, most assuredly, who have been trained up to the love of the one, and to an abhorrence of the other. The excellencies of men who have not been so trained up, are desultory and occasional. Their conduct rests upon no fixed principle, and is rarely directed to any noble end. Hence, where education has been entirely neglected, or improperly managed, we see the worst passions ruling with uncontroled and incessant sway. Good sense degenerates into craft, and anger rankles into malignity. Restraint, which is thought most salutary, comes too late, and the most judicious admonitions are urged in vain.

No metaphysical subtilties, no abstruse researches into the mental constitution of man, no enlarged

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* Καὶ τί δεῖ πολλὰ λέγειν; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἠθός ἐστι πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς, ἐθικὰς ἄν τις λέγῃ, οὐκ ἄν τι πλημμελεῖν δόξειν. Plutarch. de Liber. Educ. p. 2.

and accurate acquaintance with the manners of the world, are necessary to inform us of these dismal consequences. They are to be seen in our families and in our streets. Profane swearing, lewd conversation, a contempt of order and decorum, a perverse and pertinacious resistance to authority, shameless debauchery, and tumultuous riot, swell the hateful catalogue. If in thepresence of illiterate and ignorant men we insist on the beauty of a peaceful and innocent behaviour, we speak a language which the stupid cannot understand, nor the obdurate feel. If we expatiate on the sanctions of religion, and the triumphs of an applauding conscience, are we not more than suspected of retailing either the cant of hypocrites, or the jargon of enthusiasts? Coercions of the severest kind are then requisite to keep men back from rushing into the most flagrant crimes, and the seeds of virtue are so choked and overwhelmed, that no reasoning however just, no expostulation however earnest, no acts of kindness however tender, can restore them to their natural vigour.

Instances, I am aware, may be produced, of tempers which seem from the first to be intractable. But they are not numerous enough to impair the general rule; nor am I always sure that they who insist upon them either speak from honest motives, or reason upon sure grounds. While the infant reposed in the cradle, or hung upon its mother's breast, vigilant and well-timed opposition might have prevented many of those evils which are supposed to originate from nature: and, even where that opposition has not been tried at first, we have

have many incontestible examples of the success with which later culture* has been used in gradually removing the rank and rooted weeds. Let us not think, I beseech you, so meanly of ourselves, or so harshly of our Creator, as to imagine that he has made any one creature radically and unalterably disposed to evil; for the greater part of our vices might have been entirely prevented, and the malignity of those which remain would have been greatly diminished, had each of us, sooner or later, been trained up in the way he should go.

When we are young, our instructor has rarely to contend with any inveterate customs, any wayward prejudices, any settled depravation of the understanding or the heart. He can gently draw off our attention from the dazzling to the solid, and habituate us to renounce what is immediately pleasing,† for the sake of something which shall be hereafter beneficial. He can place what is wrong in a point of view where its hideous deformity may excite our disgust, and its pernicious consequences awaken our fears. He can enlarge with the confidence of a superior, and the ardour of a friend, on the near and remote advantages, on the tranquillity of mind and dignity of character,

* Ἀλλ' ἔστι τις γῆ ἀπόκροτος καὶ τραχυτέρα τοῦ δέοντος; ἀλλὰ γεωργηθεῖσα, παραυτίκα γενναίους καρποὺς ἐξήνεγκε.—Plut. de Liber. Educand. vol. ii. p. 2.

† Sufflamen itaque nostræ felicitatis est ex limitatione intellectûs nostri, quod præsens parvum bonum præferimus futuro magno; quod præsens parvum malum nos magis afficit, quàm absens magna felicitas.—Gesner, Isag. vol. ii. p. 495.

which arise from a different course. Young men who are entering life amidst the approbation and favour* of those around them; men of a more advanced age, who are prosperous and honourable; old men, who, reaping the fruits of their virtue, are placed in a state of independence on the joys and sorrows of this sublunary world, may be brought forward to our view.

Here I would particularly insist upon the manner in which instruction is to be given; and I am warranted in what I am going to say not only by my own reflections, but by the positive and repeated declarations of a writer who is to be classed among the first scholars† and the first theologists of this age. It is absurd to exclude restraint and correction indiscriminately and entirely out of education — but the necessity of using them will be less frequent if we attend to the dispositions of young persons; and it is the want of this attention which afterwards makes it requisite to have recourse to

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* Horace gives a judicious specimen of this mode of instruction by example:

——— Sic me
Formabat puerum dictis, et, sive jubebat
Ut facerem quid; Habes auctorem, quo facias hoc,
Unum ex judicibus selectis objiciebat:
Sive vetabat; An hoc inhonestum et inutile factu
Necne sit, addubites; flagret rumore malo cum
Hic atque ille?

Horat. Sat. iv. lib. i. p. 120.

† In primis autem proderit in jubendo et vetando semper adjicere rationes, quare quid fieri velint, aut nolint.—Ernest. Init. Doctrin. p. 608. See also Gesner's Isagog. vol. i. p. 664.

rigour. At this time of life there is a sort of instinctive aversion to force; and, from the mere pleasure which knowledge itself creates, there is an inclination to attend to advice, when it is supported by reason. A boy, therefore, should be informed upon most occasions why this is to be pursued, and why that is to be avoided. The consequences which may at any time have arisen from his ignorance of the tendency of things, or from his inattention to those who pointed it out, should again and again be set before him. His experience of the past being mixed with the remembrance of pain or of pleasure, will excite in him hope or fear that will be useful to him for the future. He will be flattered with some idea of his own importance, when appeals are made to his judgment. His curiosity will be gratified by the connection which is made between his own actions and those of other men. He will be grateful upon the recollection of evils already escaped, and he will listen with affection to the monitor who warns him against danger yet unexperienced, and who informs him of the blessings which are placed within his reach.

Allowances must be made for the levity and for the frowardness of boys: but to instruction, if it be seasonably introduced and seriously enforced, young persons, when they are not yet hardened in wickedness, or accustomed to act without control, will, for the most part, lend an attentive ear. Their observations on their own conduct, and that of their comrades, will convince them that their teacher is neither a merciless tyrant nor a selfish impostor — they

will reflect with pleasure on the rewards which have accompanied a good behaviour; and upon the painful restraints or the severe punishments to which a bad has given occasion, they will look back with a sensibility which brings home almost every case to themselves. Opinions thus formed will grow with their growing years, and when they advance to a larger and more important scene they will be able to enterupon it with seriousness, and to act in it with propriety. The moral sense, sharpened by constant exercise, will fix in them a strong defence against violent temptations, and the habits of reflection which they have acquired will put them upon their guard against such as are most ensnaring. The idea of happiness will be so closely riveted to the idea of duty, that scarcely any effort* will be necessary to make them feel the force of moral obligation. The sense of right, instantaneously excited, will lead them almost irresistibly to the performance of correspondent actions. They will enjoy the praise bestowed upon them without any unbecoming thirst of glory, and though taught by a reflex act of the mind to consider the advantages springing from virtue as a just reward, they will, in the general course of affairs, pursue them as the

* A man shall perform many an act of virtue, without having either the good of mankind, the will of God, or everlasting happiness in his thoughts; but then he must have served for a length of time under the actual direction of these motives to bring it to this—in which service his merit and virtue consist.—Paley's Principles of Philosophy, p. 39.

visible and necessary consequences of sincere resolutions and upright endeavours.

Cases, it is true, may be found, in which education has not preserved men from great vices. But it should be considered that the same vices might probably have existed in the same minds, and with more dreadful aggravations, if no care had been taken of their youth. It should be considered, also, that instruction has not been instrumental in throwing temptation before them, or in giving them the smallest disposition to yield to its attacks. On the contrary, there is one great blessing in education, which, supposing its effects to be less conspicuous and less extensive than they are commonly believed, is yet of the highest moment, and on which, from the peculiar opportunities I have had of observing its efficacy, I always insist with unusual confidence and zeal.

When the immediate restraints of education are taken off, and young men step into the world, they are struck by the gaiety of pleasures hitherto unexperienced. They are impelled by strong desires which burst upon them without the pressure of former control, and they are drawn aside, it may be, by the treacherous seductions of fashionable examples. For a time, therefore, the prospects of virtue and honour, which we have been accustomed to contemplate, are darkened, and nothing is presented to our view but a rank and rapid harvest of vice and folly. The good seed,* however, though it be

* Multa nobis blandimenta natura ipsa genuit, quibus sopita

oppressed and checked, is not totally destroyed — the blossoms are indeed partially nipped, but the soundness of the soil yet remains. Even the first approaches which such persons make to guilt are attended with a shame and compunction to which men of gross ignorance are utterly callous; and when the heat of youth has in some measure spent itself, reason gradually reassumes her seat, and religion, in a voice which cannot but be heard, reasserts her violated rights. Education, therefore, under every possible consideration, deserves our most recollected and serious attention. It is of great consequence, surely, to put off the fatal moment in which the first advance is made to unrighteousness: it is yet of greater consequence to throw even a partial check upon the career of our

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virtus conniveret: et interdum multas vias adolescentiæ lubricas ostendit, quibus illa insistere, aut ingredi sine casu aliquo aut prolapsione vix posset: et multarum rerum jucundissimam varietatem dedit, quâ non modo hæc ætas, sed etiam jam corroborata caperetur.—At multi, et nostrâ et patrum majorumque memoriâ, summi homines et clarissimi cives fuerunt, quorum cum adolescentiæ cupiditates deferbuissent, eximiæ virtutes, firmatâ jam ætate, extiterunt.—Tul. Orat. pro Cœl.

The general truth of these observations is not affected by any particular ends which Cicero might have in view when he produced them in favour of his client. They show the possibility of a young man's recovering from a vicious course: and of the assistance which a virtuous education gives in enabling him to recover from it, we have a most striking proof in the following passage: "I bless God heartily that I had the advantage of a religious education, which is an invaluable blessing, for, even when I minded it least, it still hung about me, and gave me checks."—Lord Russel's Paper delivered to the Sheriffs.

passions: it is of the greatest to implant such principles as shall at last effectually restrain them from completing their ravages, and from laying all that is amiable and venerable in the human character in wild and hopeless ruin. But if no provisions have been made, how can we expect to meet with a willing ear when we endeavour to call off the misguided youth "from the error of his way?"

That the success of a pious education is not perfect, furnishes no argument against our well-meant attempts; for, in case of failure, we are compelled only to lament those evils which would have existed, perhaps sooner, had those attempts not been employed; and, even though present expedients have been tried ineffectually, we may still have recourse to future remedies, with a fairer chance of finding them efficacious.

Wicked, deplorably wicked, as I confess the world to be, wisdom, blessed be God! is yet "justified by her children." Instances of righteous men "who have turned away from their righteousness, and died in evil," are very rare, and from their singularity they are the more striking. Nor, indeed, should it be forgotten that the failings of good men are more rigorously marked, and more industriously proclaimed, than the crimes of the bad; that the inconsistence between the general character and the particular offence staggers even the well meaning; and that by the envious faults which really proceed from accidental inadvertence "are cruelly and despightfully" laid to the account of deliberate depravity. Doubtless we judge not as we shall wish to

"be judged," if we think that to fall into evil is always a proof of a settled inclination to depart from righteousness; and false are the notions which he entertains of human nature, who doubts whether, among those who are trained up in the way they should go, the duty of repentance, as well as that of perseverance, be not more likely to be practised. But the examples of wicked men who have "departed from their wickedness, and saved their souls alive," are far more frequent; and it will generally be found that the seeds of their reformation have been sown in those honest principles which were acquired in the simplicity of youth; which were suspended amidst the pleasures or the bustle of a more advanced life; and which were happily recovered before "the night commences, in which no man can work."

To some extrinsic cause may be generally imputed our good and bad qualities — many of our defects and our excellencies. The attention we gave to the primary impression was slight or fleeting, and it is not easy for the wisest of men to trace the gradual progress of their own thoughts, or to measure the accumulated force of those outward circumstances which acted upon them with increasing, and, perhaps, unsuspected energy. But, surely, when from beginnings in appearance so trivial a long and momentous train of consequences is known to flow, it becomes us to give virtue all the advantages which can be derived "from first possession."

We pant for knowledge * of some kind or other,

* See Gesner's Isag. vol. ii. p. 470.

and eagerly snatch at every information that is offered to us. What we do with the approbation of those whom we love and revere, is done with pleasure, and what we have done often, we, at last, find no difficulty in doing. Hence it is that custom is proverbially represented as a second nature; and indeed all our endeavours to ascertain the real and original powers of the human mind, depend on the knowledge of those actions, which are in various degrees habitual to us, and which it is far more easy to investigate in a descending line, in their ultimate effects and their encreasing force, than to analyze into their primary and more simple causes. Certain, however, it is, that implicit obedience to the directions, and implicit imitation of the examples which others supply, will speedily produce in children what men cannot accomplish without laborious reflection and stubborn effort. If the habit be originally wrong, it is attended to very rarely and very negligently; and where it is neither known nor controuled till it appears in some violent overt act, our endeavours to conquer it must be arduous, and, after all, may not be efficacious. On the other hand, if the first propensity be right, the task of encreasing it will not only be agreeable in itself, but, on every detached occasion, will be accompanied with some useful consequences.*

* In virtute, qui bonam actionem peragit, primum fructum habet animi tranquillitatem, et bonam conscientiam. Etiam externa consequitur, opinionem bonam hominum de se, famam, laudem: confirmat constantiam in virtute, et auget in illâ progressum.—Ipsa actio facit nos aptiores ad rem peragendam.—Ges. Is. tom. ii. p. 598.

There are, as I observed before, some dispositions which seem to proceed from an innate incapacity of intellect or perverseness of will: in other men we, also, see marks of gentleness and goodness, which, in the common language, and the common apprehensions of the world, are owing rather to an happy temperament of the mind than to any external care —but when is it, I would ask, that we form these opinions? When each of these dispositions has grown up to its full size, when the persons possessing them have been placed in various situations, and have performed various and visible actions. Could we, however, have discovered the first dawn of either, we should probably have seen the exterior cause from which they took their rise, and the particular circumstances by which they were at first affected. Could we have marked them during their progress, we should have perceived that the inattention, the example, the ill-judged severity, or the yet more pernicious indulgence of parents, had given a wider scope to what is bad, and that contrary causes had, at different times, and in different degrees, increased the efficacy of that which is good. But supposing these causes already to have operated, education is not without its use,—every wrong propensity may be finally subdued or considerably corrected: every right one may be assisted by additional motives, and carried on to yet higher perfection. Even in the worst characters, some capacity for virtuous improvement, of which no vestige has yet been observed, may be discovered or drawn forth; and upon the best, restraints may be employed against

vicious inclinations, which, from the mere absence of opportunity, have not hitherto been suspected. Of what importance is it then to comply with the precept of my text, and how just is the promise by which we are encouraged to observe it? To our boyhood it gives that sweet simplicity and innocence which melts every serious beholder into affection, and relieves even the most savage heart with a momentary feeling of honest approbation. In our youth it inspires us with such a fine sense of decorum as makes us shrink from folly with scorn, and from vice with loathing; and it animates us, at the same time, with that unwearied activity of mind which struggles with every difficulty and triumphs over every danger. Our manhood it distinguishes by that firmness and dignity of thinking which exalts us from one degree of excellence to another, which causes us to start at the smallest deviation from rectitude, and impels us to recover from the shock by the instantaneous and determined exertion of our whole strength. To old age, which is itself the fruit of a well-spent life, it gives a serenity of mind which the world can neither bestow nor take away — a deep and sincere love of virtue, which finds a pure and perpetual source of pleasure in the effects it has wrought on the tempers and the manners of our friends and our children — a comfortable remembrance of habitual well-doing, which can alone endear to us the days which are past and will no more return, or enable us to look on to the approach of the unknown world without solicitude and without dismay.

Scarcely any propensity of boys, if considered in its reference to the whole extent of their moral agency, can be called indifferent. As in the progress of life they are placed in new situations, as their minds are attracted by new objects, and their opinions are influenced by new combinations of ideas, even the slightest beginnings, and the faintest appearances, are of high importance in the estimation of every correct observer. What is now harmless may hereafter be pregnant with the worst consequences — what is transitory, and the excrescence of mere humour, may intermix itself with the general character, and bring on the most baleful consequences — what would yield to gentle coercion, may require and even prevail over the most severe restraints. If we cherish, says the ghost of Pericles, a lion's whelp,* we must not expect to keep the mastery over it when a full-grown lion. From these observations, I descend to the detail of some plain truths, which are generally admitted by our reason, and generally neglected in our conduct towards those whom we are to instruct.

I proceed, then, in the second place, to mention some of the instances in which the greatest care is

* Aristophanis quoque altioris est prudentiæ preceptum, qui in comœdiâ introduxit remissum ab inferis Atheniensem Periclem vaticinantem non oportere in urbe nutriri leonem ; sin autem sit alitus, obsequi et convenire. Monet enim ut præcipuè nobilitatis et concitati ingenii juvenes refrænentur, nimio vero favore ac profusâ indulgentiâ pasti quo minus potentiam obtineant ne impediantur, quùm stultum et inutile sit eas obtrectare vires quas ipse foveris.—Valer. Maxim. lib. 6.

necessary to educate children virtuously. They consist in the government of their passions, in a sense of shame, in a strict regard to truth, in habits of diligence, and in the love of God, intermixed with a rational and filial reverence.

In children, before a quick sense of decorum is strongly felt, and the distinctions between right and wrong are clearly perceived, there is no artifice or self-restraint. Every thought is fully expressed, and every desire or antipathy is freely indulged; and, if this course of things be not wisely checked, it will be followed by a most untameable violence of temper. To the affection they conceive towards persons who would win their regard by acts of kindness, it is right, perhaps, to fix no limits; for the benevolent affections owe much of their vigour to the frequency with which they are exercised, and to the pleasure by which they are attended. But in their little sallies of resentment, either gentle or coercive means must be used very speedily and very stedfastly. In their feeble state, the fear of evil seems to recur more suddenly, and to operate more intensely, than the desire of good; and in the first efforts of that instinct which aims at self-preservation, we may observe violent and outrageous excesses of anger: to this passion, therefore, before it gains any strong hold upon the temper, a very particular attention should be shewn.

In the mysterious frame of man, no circumstance is, indeed, more wonderful to us as philosophers, or more interesting to us as Christians, than this which I am going to mention. The passion of anger,

which, if it be once let loose from the restraint of reason, rages with the fiercest violence, and hurries us into the most atrocious crimes, is, beyond all others, capable of controul* in its first emotions. One resolute effort of reflection, a little change made in the mere features of the countenance, nay, even a softer tone given to the voice, will stop the rising storm, which, if it be suffered to gather all its strength, bears down before it the authority of every law both divine and human, and makes shipwreck in a fatal moment of our reputation and of our tranquillity for ever.

Another passion arising from the activity of the mind, and from the love of superiority, is cruelty. Now, of the most venerable court † of judicature that ever existed in Greece, it is recorded, that a boy was once condemned by it to the loss of life for mischievously plucking out the eyes of a quail. Common sense and common humanity recoil at such extreme rigour, and yet the principle upon which punishment was appointed is certainly reasonable. Practices of this kind, though viewed by some persons without horror, and even encouraged

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* To this passion in man we may apply what the Poet says of bees:

Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta
Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescent.

Virg. Geor. iv. 86.

† Nec mihi videntur Areopagitæ, cum damnaverunt puerum coturnicum oculos cruentem, aliud judicâsse, quàm id signum esse perniciosissimæ mentis, multisque malo futuræ, si adolevisset.—Quintilian. lib. v. cap. xix. p. 279.

by direct approbation, extinguish, by degrees, compassion, and cherish tyranny; that is, they destroy the noblest,* and strengthen the most detestable part of the human character. He that can look with rapture upon the agonies of an unoffending and unresisting animal will soon learn to view the sufferings of a fellow-creature with indifference; and in time he will acquire the power of viewing them even with triumph, if that fellow-creature should become the victim of his resentment, be it just or unjust. But the minds of children are open to impressions of every sort; and, indeed, wonderful is the facility with which a judicious instructor may habituate them to tender emotions. I have therefore always considered mercy to beings of an inferior species as a virtue which children are very capable of learning, but which is most difficult to be taught, if the heart has been once familiarized to spectacles of distress, and has been permitted either to behold the pangs of any living creature with cold insensibility, or to inflict them with wanton barbarity.

In respect to the desires of children it is hardly possible to lay down any general rule. But the best method of inuring them to disappointments is, perhaps, rather to call off their thoughts to some new gratifications, than to drive them forcibly from

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* —— Mollissima corda
Humano generi dare se natura fatetur,
Quæ lacrymas dedit. Hæc nostri pars optima sensûs.
Juvenal. Sat. xv. 131.

any favourite pursuit. Their inclinations are keen, but fickle, and therefore he gives no mean proof of his skill in the management of the human mind, who makes one weakness the instrument of counteracting another.

There is yet another method of subduing their wrong propensities, which intelligent persons may employ with success. When the minds of young men are eagerly bent upon any improper pursuit, and when they persist in it not only because it is pleasing in itself, but rendered more pleasing from the associated and delusive idea of self-government, we are not always under the necessity of enforcing admonitions which have been perversely disobeyed. It may sometimes be right to enjoin peremptorily what has been peremptorily forbidden, to convert into a toil * what was relished as an amusement, and to make that the result of compulsion which was taken up by a deliberate and froward choice. When we brand instances of omission with the rigour we had before employed against offences of commission, actions continually repeated will produce satiety, and force steadily used will create aversion. Smarting under the mischievous consequences which a wrong pursuit may sometimes bring with it, a boy will exchange contempt for

* Patri cuidam, cujus filius laborabat hoc morbo ut omne tempus perderet conis dejiciendis, suasi, ut ei hoc facere injungeret: quo facto, quùm per tres dies continuos ludere hoc modo coactus esset, illico tantum cepit ludi odium, ut illum nunquam amplius attigerit.—Gesn. Isag. vol. i. p. 61.

dread, and will consider the permission to abstain as a relief, where the command to abstain was at first thought a burden. It will be, however, necessary to shew that we do not approve of the action, considered independently of the circumstances in which it is performed, but that our approbation is founded on the advantages that will arise where obstinacy is counteracted by firmness, and where indulgence is destroyed by the well directed and well intended violence done to the will.

He that has observed the glowing cheeks and the faultering tongue of young persons must know that the sense of propriety grows up in them very soon. They are scared at our frowns, they are cheered by our smiles, they invite us to sympathize in the raptures they feel upon performing what we have been accustomed to praise, and on the detection of any little impropriety they hide their drooping heads. Upon feats which far transcend their own strength they gaze with admiration: they weep at the mere neglect of those whom they have been taught to revere; and if, through heedlessness or curiosity, they have ventured to commit what is forbidden, they either tremble at our approach, or by tears and blushes, by embraces and promises of amendment, and a thousand little winning arts, they strive to regain our esteem. Now the capacity for this sense of shame is given by nature; but the direction of it depends upon the care of others: easily it may be preserved, and easily destroyed. If, therefore, we commit outrageous actions, or utter indecorous words in the presence of the young, a

blind mechanical proneness to imitation leads them to adopt similar practices. But when those practices are afterwards continued from deliberation or from custom, young men will see, not equity, but harshness, when they are corrected for doing that which by their parents * or their superiors they have seen done with impunity. Example on the side of virtue is more powerful than precept. But, in respect to vice, the case is nearly reversed; for our evil actions may be imputed to frailty, but our evil words, implying a renunciation of common opinion, and a defiance of common censure, are supposed to spring from deep and serious conviction. If, therefore, we add the weight of bad precept to bad example in training up our children; if we remark not only with indifference, but even with complacency,† the facility with which oaths and obscenities trip off from their tongues;‡ if we call the sallies of their petulance mere sprightliness, and openly impute

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* Πρὸ πάντων δεῖ τοὺς πατέρας τῷ μηδὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἐναργὲς ἑαυτοὺς παράδειγμα τοῖς τέκνοις παρέχειν, ἵνα πρὸς τὸν τούτων βίον ὥσπερ κάτοπτρον ἀποβλέποντες, ἀποτρέπωνται τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων· ὡς οἵτινες τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν υἱοῖς ἐπιτιμῶντες, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι περιπίπτουσιν, ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων ὀνόματι λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτῶν κατήγοροι γιγνόμενοι.—Plutarch. de liber. Educ. p. 14.

† Gaudemus si quid licentius dixerint. Verba, ne Alexandrinis quidem permittenda deliciis, risu et osculo excipimus. Neç mirum: nos docuimus, ex nobis audierunt.—Fit ex his consuetudo, deinde natura. Discunt hæc miseri, antequam sciant vitia esse.—Quintil. lib. i. cap. 2.

‡ τῆς αἰσχρολογίας ἀπακτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς· λόγοι γὰρ, ἔργου σκιὴ, κατὰ Δημόκριτον.—Plutarch. de lib. Educand. p. 9.

their bursts of anger to high spirit, we have no right to complain of consequences which we ought to have foreseen — we have no right to be surprised or provoked,* when customs which we had ourselves fostered have shot up to their full magnitude, when they annoy us by their vicinity, when they alarm us by their malignity, when they are too sturdy to be resisted, and too inveterate to be eradicated.

As to the love of truth,† I am not acquainted

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* —— Hæc ego nunquam
Mandavi, dices olim, nec talia suasi:
Mentis causa malæ tamen est, et origo penes te:
Nam quisquis magni censûs præcepti amorem,
Et qui per fraudes patrimonia conduplicare
Dat libertatem et totas effundit habenas
Curriculo; quem si revoces, subsistere nescit,
Et te contempto rapitur, metisque relictis.
Nemo satis credit tantum delinquere, quantum
Permittas: adeo indulgent sibi latius ipsi.
Juven. Sat. xiv. 224.

† *Ἀπὸ δὲ πέντε ἐτῶν ἕως τετάρτου καὶ εἴκοσι παιδεύονται τοξεύειν, καὶ ἀκοντίζειν, καὶ ἱππάζεσθαι καὶ ἀληθεύειν.*—Strabo de Persia. lib. xv. p. 504.

Παιδεύουσι δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπὸ πενταέτεος ἀρξάμενοι μέχρι εἰκοσαέτεος, τριὰ μοῦνα, ἱππεύειν, καὶ τοξεύειν, καὶ ἀληθίζεσθαι.—Herodot. Stephan. p. 36.

From the same historian I shall add another passage applicable to the present subject, the truth of which is known to most instructors from bitter experience, and the importance of which cannot be impressed too forcibly upon the minds of their scholars: *αἴσχιστον δὲ αὐτοῖσι τὸ ψεύδεσθαι νενόμισται· δεύτερα δὲ, τὸ ὀφείλειν χρέος· πόλλων μὲν καὶ ἄλλων εἵνεκα, μάλιστα δὲ, ἀναγναίην φασὶ εἶναι τὸν ὀφείλοντα, καὶ τι ψεῦδος λέγειν.*—Page 37.

with any virtue which shines more brightly in the characters of mankind, or which assists us more powerfully in the attainment of every moral and intellectual excellence. On the other hand, we may say most justly of the liar, what is commonly said of the ingrate, *mendacem si dixeris, omnia dixeris.* I have, indeed, a right to be believed, when I tell you, as the result of long and vigilant observation, that if the habit of falsehood be once contracted, the whole moral system is immediately endangered. Truth undoubtedly is congenial to the mind of man; for who is there, not yet advanced to the verge of infatuation and phrensy, that does not wish the representation of things to correspond with their realities? Our selfishness gives us an interest in such representation, our reason approves of its fitness, and, when our feelings have been wrought up to the most exquisite sense of honour, we value the love of truth in preference almost to every other social quality. It is, however, surprising how quickly boys slide into falsehood after the first efforts they have put forth to act for themselves, and after the first connections their minds have formed between actions and their consequences. Shocking, also, is it to see the great proficiency they make in this vice, and the little attention that is paid to it, through the gross stupidity or misplaced fondness of their friends.

Upon one very common and very fatal species of encouragement which parents lend to lying, I will set a mark of reprobation. Under the absurd and preposterous idea of giving scope to the lively and

harmless prate of a boy, they suffer, and even invite him to tell tales.* But the invariable and baleful consequences of such practices are these. The boy will relate, not merely what is known to himself, but what is most agreeable to his hearers. To shape his story into more consistence, or to give it a higher zest, he will rack his invention to supply what has dropped out of his memory, or, perhaps, was never lodged in it. He then joins in the laugh which his petty artifice has raised, and, instead of being condemned for his presumption, is applauded for his ingenuity. Now the habit of lying, thus acquired, extends itself, by a hasty transition, to other subjects, and to other persons. While he gratifies the impertinence or the malice of those who are about him, he himself becomes impertinent almost without design, and malicious without provocation. Of the actions which he is forward to relate, he cannot certainly penetrate the motives or arrange the circumstances; but it is impossible for him to relate them often without sentiments of approbation or dislike, of reverence or contempt, towards the agents themselves. Whether in this situation the love of truth will be a sufficient curb upon the love of prattle, whether his judgments of characters will be impartial or unjust, whether his kind or his harsher affections be most likely to predominate, are questions on which I without hesitation answer on the unfavourable side. I will add,

* Upon this ocasional practice in grown-up persons, the acute and ingenious Mr. Paley, page 39, has made some sensible remarks.

that such a boy is not only disposed to speak what is false, but even incapable of speaking what is true. Tainted by the prejudices of those with whom he converses, he will see with their eyes, he will hear with their ears, and wildly suppose the facts which he has a pleasure in mentioning really to exist. But when the illusions of a roving and undisciplined imagination thus co-operate with the suggestions of a mischievous and distempered heart, what, I beseech you, are you to expect? I take upon myself to inform you what you are not to expect: the gay frankness of a boy, the sturdy magnanimity of a scholar, or the dignified liberality of a gentleman.

In favour of lying, however, no natural propensity can be pleaded, though perhaps it derives its origin from the wrong management of some propensity — from the hopes children have formed of attaining some good, or from the dread they suffer of incurring some evil. Here then the remedy is in our power, by not refusing the good, or by not inflicting the evil: or, should contrary expedients be upon the whole more eligible, we should most earnestly endeavour to convince them why the one ought to be refused, and why the other ought to be inflicted.

I must again and again impress it upon your notice, that over the vice of lying, a vice which takes such deep root and produces such baleful fruits, almost every instructor has a most absolute control, if he chooses to employ it. Besides the rewards which he bestows upon fair dealing, and

the restraints he puts upon mean equivocations, he may call in the aid of those honest and generous sentiments which are implanted in the breasts of others. Boys, who look upon many faults in each other with carelessness, and upon many even with approbation, are uniform in pointing their severest indignation against a liar. They who set pain at defiance are yet susceptible of shame; and however they may disregard the frowns of their teachers, and the menaces of their governors, they are seldom such proficients in iniquity as to be quite unmoved by the just and bitter taunts of their equals. Such are the remedies provided for us, and it well becomes us * to apply them, if we consider the virulence and stubbornness of the disease. Lying supplies those who are addicted to it with a plausible apology for every crime, and with a supposed shelter from every punishment. It tempts them to rush into danger from the mere expectation of impunity, and, when practised with frequent success, it teaches them to confound the gradations of guilt, from the effects of which there is, in their imaginations at least, one sure and common protection. It corrupts the early simplicity of youth: it blasts the fairest blossoms of genius; and will most assuredly counteract every effort by which we may

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* Παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα (ὅπερ ἐστιν ἱεροπρεπέστατον) συνεθιστέον τοὺς παῖδας τἀληθῆ λέγειν, τὸ γὰρ ψεύδεσθαι, δουλόπρεπες, καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μισεῖσθαι ἄξιον.—Plut. de Educand. lib. p. 11.

Vide Ernest. Init. Doctr. Solid. p. 614. & Gesn. Isag. vol. i. p. 656.

hope to improve the talents and mature the virtues of those whom it infects. Against such a vice, then, it is particularly incumbent upon us to use the most unremitted caution, and the most unrelenting opposition.

The next qualification of which I mean to speak is diligence. We read of Draco,* that he made a law by which idleness was punishable with death; and that this punishment was afterwards softened by Solon into a sentence of infamy. In every well-regulated community of later times, some degree of rigour has been employed for the discouragement of idleness; and it is well known among you, that the laws of our own country have properly confined this rigour to persons who have arrived at years of manhood. But in boys there is usually occasion for treatment less harsh. The natural activity of their tempers should be an incentive for us to set before them right objects; and by a judicious administration of rewards and punishments, we shall

* Scripta fuit Athenis lentitudinis Lex,

'Ο ἀργὸς ὑπεύθυνος ἔστω παντὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι.

Plutarchus in Solone (p. 87) meminit τῆς χαλεπότητος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἐπιτιμίων, Legum Draconis, ὥστε, inquit καὶ τοὺς ἀργίας ἁλόντας ἀποθνήσκειν. Pœnam tantùm hominum ἀργῶν lenivit Solon. Videbat autem Senatus Areopagiticus nequis iners desideret et τὴν τῆς ἀργίας δίκην è Solonis lege judicabat. —Petiti Leg. Att. edit. Wess. p. 526.

Solon made idleness a crime, and this, in the infancy of a democracy so well regulated as that of Athens, was not unreasonable. Eden's Penal Law, p. 89.

The punishment, we see, continued longer than the infancy of the republic, and the continuance of it may be ascribed to the commercial pursuits, and the active spirit of the Athenians.

find it possible to overcome the reluctance they sometimes show to labour, to fix the wavering, to rouse the sluggish, and to awe the audacious. Without entering into vague and unprofitable disputes about the different faculties of men, the difference of their inclinations is a proof that they are capable of improvement in some degree, and of some kind. To form the profound philosopher, or the elegant scholar, is not always within our power. But every man will be called upon to discharge some duties to the community, and every man is endowed with talents for the acquisition of some knowledge. It is not necessary for him to feel the beauties of composition, to measure the motion of the planets, to exercise his memory in history, or to invigorate his judgment by logic. But he may become an useful citizen, or a skilful artificer; and in order to become so, he must often turn a deaf ear to the siren song* of indolence.

Youth is eminently the fittest season for establishing habits of industry. Rare indeed are the examples of men who, when their earlier years have been spent in dull inactivity, or trifling amusements, are afterwards animated with the love of glory, or instigated even by the dread of want, to undergo that labour to which they have not been familiarized. They find a state of indolence, indeed, not merely joyless, but tormenting. They are racked with cares which they can neither

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* —— Vitanda est improba *Siren*
Desidia, &c.—Horat. Sat. iii. lib. ii. 14.

explain nor alleviate, and through the mere want of pursuits they are harrassed with more galling solicitude than even disappointment occasions to other men. Not trained up in the way in which they should go when they are young, they have not the inclination, and, when they are old, they have not the power, to depart from idleness. Wearied they are with doing nothing: they form hasty resolutions and vain designs of doing something; and then, starting aside from the very approach of toil, they leave it undone for ever and for ever. Few, indeed, are the instances in which persons, who, when boys, were obstinately and incorrigibly idle, have afterwards excelled in manual arts or intellectual researches, or have distinguished themselves as public-spirited citizens and exemplary Christians. On the other hand, the worst vices springing from the worst principles, the excesses of the libertine, and the outrages of the plunderer, usually take their rise in early and unsubdued idleness. But a spirit of industry, when it has once been excited in the common forms of education, may be transferred to objects of more exalted dignity, and more extensive utility. It qualifies men in all their various classes for the highest and for the lowest employment; it gives perseverance to the workman, enterprize to the warrior, and firmness to the statesman. It blunts the keenest appetite for sensuality, and shuts up the first avenues to dishonesty; it opens a broader field for the display of every talent, and inspires us with new vigour in the performance of every social and every religious duty. For some

kind of religious duty is within the capacity even of boys; and therefore I now proceed to recommend the education of them in that love of God which is intermixed with a rational and filial reverence.

Religion, I say boldly, in opposition to all the delusive and corrupt refinements of the present times, is congenial to the mind of man; and for the justness of this assertion I hardly require any other proof than that some notions of an over-ruling deity have ever prevailed in those barbarous countries, where many powers of the understanding are for ever dormant, and where many virtues are either despised or unknown. But this, like every other perfection of man, comes from without; it needs the aid of precept and example, and it gains new force from constant exercise.

The capacity of boys to form just and useful opinions upon this subject begins much earlier than superficial observers may suppose, or visionary theorists have sometimes affirmed. But the only difficulty lies in the management of that capacity. Now the prevalence of superstition itself is a decisive argument for the readiness of our minds to conceive the existence and agency of some superior invisible cause, and therefore it is of great moment to prevent wrong impressions, by introducing speedily and steadily such as are right. So early, indeed, does the sense of a deity enter into the breast of man, so deeply does it pierce, by such desperate violence only is it thrust out, and it rushes back again with such an irresistible rapidity, that some

men have supposed it to be engraven by the hand of Heaven on what both sacred and profane writers have beautifully called "the tablets of the hearts." * But, without venturing upon this doubtful consequence, we may pronounce the facts stated in the premises to be true; and we may at the same time convert them to very beneficial purposes. Thus we may shew a boy the variegated colours of the rainbow, and the silent progress of vegetation in the trees of the forest and the flowers of the field. We may bid him lift up his eyes to the sun in its meridian glory, and to the stars which sparkle in the high and spacious firmament. From these animating prospects we may easily lead him to the knowledge of that power and wisdom by which the universe is formed and preserved. That God is the moral governor and judge of the world he will soon learn to conceive, if we shew him, not by circuitous and elaborate arguments, but by visible and practical instances, the tendency of virtue to happiness, and of vice to misery. From other men his thoughts will quickly turn toward himself, and he will feel an anxiety to avoid the displeasure, and to conciliate the favour of that gracious Being who is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity." The death of parents to whom he has looked up with fond affection, or of comrades with whom he has sported in harmless amusement, may furnish opportunities for many instructions on the shortness

* Ἢν ἐγγράφον σὺ μνήμοσιν δέλτοις φρενῶν. Prom. Vinct. 788. Prov. xxxiii. Corinth. i. 3.

and uncertainty of this life, and on the necessity of preparation for a better state. All these circumstances show the practicability of impressimg him with religious sentiments; but, at the same time, I confess there is room for great caution in the mode of conveying them.

I wish not religion to be imposed upon young persons as a burthensome task, but recommended as a rational duty. It should never damp their innocent recreations, or break in upon their daily employments. It should be taught at its own stated times, and with its own proper formalities. If you do not embarrass their minds with things "obscure," as a great religious poet of our country calls them, (Milton's Paradise Lost, book viii.) "and subtile and remote from use;" if you give them "that prime wisdom which lies before them in daily life," and prevent them from being "unpractised and unprepared in that which is of most concern;" if you habituate them to believe stedfastly, and gratefully to rejoice in Jesus Christ, as the "way and the truth," they will advance by easy steps as much farther as they ought to go. They will gradually acquire, with their own choice,* so much inquisitiveness upon sacred subjects, and by their own efforts they will obtain so much knowledge upon them, that in future life they will be in

* To the acquisition of religious knowledge, more especially, we may apply this sensible remark of Plutarch: *οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀγγεῖον, ὁ νοῦς ἀποπληρώσεως, ἀλλ' ὑπεκκαύματος μόνον, ὥσπερ ὕλῃ δεῖται, ὁρμὴν ἐμποιοῦντος εὑρετικὴν, καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.*—Tom. ii. p. 48.

no danger of falling either into wanton impiety, or dronish credulity, or grovelling superstition.

I insist upon these matters with a greater zeal, because the captious enemies, or the lukewarm friends of the Gospel, draw very mischievous consequences from a wrong mode of instruction, and contend that it is proper to put off religious advice * to some future day, which in their theories, I perceive, they find it difficult to fix, and which in their practice, I fear, seldom arrives. But in opposition to a sophistry which strikes at the very root of the best principles that can enter the heart of man, I maintain that the defects of children upon religious subjects are owing to our injudicious treatment of them: we either harrass their spirits by the frequent returns of devotion, or we load their memories with doctrines of which their understandings have no distinct ideas,† or we imperceptibly wear away that reverence which ceremonies, merely acting upon their imaginations, would necessarily excite, by permitting them to be performed with languor and inattention. Against some of these evils provision is happily made by the plain and rational explanation which children are taught in your schools to read when they learn the catechism, and

* De religione ita quidam disputant: differendam esse illam institutionem ad usum rationis; sed eâdem etiam ratione efficias, differendum esse honorem et obedientiam parentibus et educatoribus præstandam.—Gesn. tom. ii. p. 668.

† Illud in primis cavendum, quo nihil pestilentius est teneræ huic ætati, ne meros sonos et verba inania memoriæ mandare cogas.—Ernest. Init. Doct. Solid. p. 610.

by the decent manner in which they are accustomed to conduct themselves in the house of God. But there are other impediments of a more general, and, perhaps, more pernicious nature, which, however, are not commonly observed, and which ought to be carefully avoided. From the conscious imbecility of children, there is danger lest the ideas of a judge too powerful to be resisted, too wise to be deceived, and too pure to be entirely satisfied, should degenerate into a servile and depressing fear; for, when this is the case, they either start from every call to serious reflection, or they will agonize under the torments of incurable superstition. I, for this and other reasons, think it more eligible to expatiate, in the presence of boys, upon the mercies than upon the terrors of the Lord. In their minds gratitude is a very active principle; and from the consciousness which they have of their own dependence upon external support, reverence always intermixes itself with love. Fear, on the contrary, when it is excessive, inevitably begets aversion, and in this lamentable state of mind there will be great difficulty in rectifying any improper impressions upon subjects so remote as the attributes of a deity are from our senses, and so unsearchable, in many respects, to our understandings.

It is a common and a just observation, that our apprehensions of the Supreme Being take a tinge from our own dispositions; and it is equally true that our dispositions are themselves corrected or depraved by our religious notions, from whatever source they be drawn; but, in all points of view, I

would thrust back the artificial, and soften even the natural rigours of religion. If boys be of a cheerful and affectionate temper, they may be easily induced to contemplate those illustrious marks of goodness* which the Almighty has scattered in rich profusion over this visible world, and they will feel a sort of sympathetic exultation in all the benevolent attributes of a deity, which correspond to the habitual, the most active, and most pleasing sentiments of their own minds. On the other hand, if they be of a gloomy cast, the darkness which hangs over religious subjects must be dispersed by other methods. We must not let in a strong and sudden tide of brightness. By a judicious mixture of light and shade, and by a gradual, a temperate, and well-disposed increase of the more vivid colouring, we should prepare them for enduring, at last, the fullest and most direct blaze of the divine glories. When this process is followed, they will begin meditating upon God as a long-suffering judge, who "wishes that none should perish;" they will afterwards look up to him as a father, who "correcteth his children because he loveth them;" they will, in the end, acquire the habit of considering him as the being who "openeth his hand, and filleth all things living with plenteousness;" as a creator, who "made man little lower than the angels, that he might crown him with honour;" as the gracious director

* Cultus Dei naturalis inest in admiratione operum divinorum, et attributorum, quæ ex operibus cognoscimus; oritur inde amor, speciatim gratus animus et fiducia.—Gesn. tom. ii. 382.

of the universe, "all whose ways are righteous," and "whose mercy is from eternity to eternity over all his work."

The sagacious and pious Hartley observes, that "the love of God, in its first use, is often tinctured with fondness and familiarity, and leans much towards enthusiasm;" as, on the other hand, "the fear is often at first a slavish superstitious dread." (P. 325. vol. ii.) The former of these observations, however just it may be in regard to grown persons, is not applicable to the young; for, if the love of God be taught judiciously, the idea of an all-wise and almighty being is, in minds of active sensibility, always associated with a most rational and most salutary reverence. The second observation is, I fear, true of the young and of the old; and for this reason I urge most earnestly the propriety of presenting religion in a pleasing and amiable form. It deserves, also, to be remarked, that instruction thus given prevents the bad effects which intermix with the fear of God, in persons of a more advanced time of life; so that upon all accounts it becomes us to exhibit the deity in a character, not harsh and severe, but mild and captivating. Such instructions will, as we advance from the age of boys to that of men, be accompanied by the happy consequences which the same writer has, with a most charming pathos and simplicity, thus described: "By degrees the fear and love qualify each other," and "by uniting the other sympathetic affections, they are together coalesced into a reverential, humble, filial love, attended with a peace,

comfort, and joy, that pass all belief of those who have not experienced it." (P. 325. vol. ii.)

Let us then be careful not to fix the attention of boys upon the darker side. Let us encourage them to thank heaven for blessings, which they have themselves experienced, and which they know how to value—for the food they eat—for the raiment which they wear—for the protection of their parents, and the counsels of their masters. To the goodness of God, let them be encouraged to look up for every advantage they now enjoy, and upon his providence let them be accustomed to depend for every comfort which they hereafter expect. When they are thus enabled to consider God as the gracious preserver of their being, they will be qualified to think more seriously of his judicial character at a time in which the numberless dangers by which they are surrounded, and the strong passions by which they are impelled, will make it requisite for us to represent religion under a more awful aspect. In the mean while, their progress in religious knowledge will be more easy, and their attachment to it more firm, if they be taught to look upon the pure and sublime doctrines of theology as closely connected with practical improvement.*

* As if the great truths of the Gospel had been meant only for our amusement, and had never been intended either for the improvement of our minds or the direction of our conduct. As if it were possible to extract from the Bible, or indeed from any other book, a system of morals which is not built and founded on principles of philosophy! on what are called speculative opinions concerning God and ourselves! These are wild and

Very few,* indeed, and very simple are the truths which we have a right to pronounce necessary to salvation: it will therefore be expedient for us to keep back all those cloudy and perplexing disputations which, at their time of life, it is impossible for them to understand, and which, at every time of life, have a tendency to engender, in the lower orders of mankind, only pharisaical pride or enthusiastic wildness.

To the mercies of God, in the creation and government of the world, must be added the no less wonderful and no less intelligible doctrine of our redemption. We must begin indeed with the Old Testament; which, however prescription may be pleaded in support of the practice, ought not to be read indiscriminately by children. From obscurities in the language, or from peculiarities in the manners of the Jews, even learned men are not without their embarrassments: but in the unlearned and unstable minds of boys, doubts, I know, upon a first or second perusal, have arisen, which, at a later period of life, have terminated in a restless scepticism, or in sullen despondency, or in avowed and hardened unbelief. These terrible evils may however be avoided by a selection of such passages as are most

groundless conceits. Every part, without exception, of the Christian revelation was designed for our improvement in piety and virtue. Empty and barren speculations have no place at all in those divine books.—Balguy's Sermons, p. 189.

* Scripture doctrine lies in a narrow compass. It is confined to a few very general propositions, which give us only just light enough to direct our steps in the way to eternal happiness.—Balguy, Charge ii.

adapted to the apprehensions of boys, most amusing to their curiosity, and most improving to their dispositions.

But of the Gospels, they should read the whole attentively and frequently; and sure I am that the instructions, the miracles, and the heavenly virtues of Christ, are admirably calculated not only to confirm their faith, but to purify their whole souls, to fix in them a sincere detestation of sin, and to inspire them with sentiments of charity to their neighbours, of thankfulness to their benevolent Redeemer, and of veneration toward their God.

In matters of indisputable and supreme importance: in the infusion of sentiments which are to form the good man and the good Christian, which connect piety with virtue, and lead to eternal as well as to temporal happiness, let us not, I beseech you, look after excuses for indolence, and justify it to ourselves under the name of caution. It is true, perhaps, that, in accommodation to the weakness of the understanding, which struggles reluctantly with difficulties, where the advantage of surmounting them is remote, we, in conducting a learned education, are content, for a time, to charge the memory with words to which the judgment very slowly affixes any determinate ideas. But the experiment upon topics of religion is dangerous, and we are fortunately exempted from the necessity of making it; for the knowledge which boys are capable of attaining in respect to their duty toward God, is always proportionate to the degree in which that duty is practicable. If we inculcate that pure and

rational religion, the paths of which are paths of pleasantness and peace, we may always awaken attention, and always reward it. If our method of teaching be earnest without impatience, and solemn without gloominess, we may impress the most sincere and deep conviction. If we indulge no vanity in multiplying technical terms, if we follow the dictates of no prejudice in dogmatizing upon those doctrines which are "hard to be understood," if we unfold "the riches of divine wisdom and grace" in scriptural words, or by the clear testimony of Scripture, "the Father of glory will give unto the least of these our brethren the spirit of revelation in the knowledge of him, that the eyes of their understanding may be enlightened."

In acquiring religious sentiments, and in retaining them, I need not say, that the constant use of prayer* and thanksgiving, and a regular attendance upon divine worship are eminently useful.

I am aware of the plausible, but, let me add, the chimerical and deceitful objections that have been urged against the ritual observances prescribed by our pious fore-fathers. But certain I am that the lower classes of men, who profess themselves the members of our Church, can scarcely find access any other way to the gates of heaven. I will not, however, in stating the importance of external rites,

* Forms of prayer, composed by persons of a devout spirit, are of use to all at certain times, for assisting the invention and exciting fervency; and in the beginning of a religious course, they seem to be necessary, as they certainly are for children.—Hartley's Observations on Man, &c. p. 333.

stop short at this assertion; for, in regard even to men of literary accomplishments and distinguished talents, let them boast as loudly as they will of the strength which is not, and let them varnish over as skilfully as they can the weakness which really is, piety, even in their minds, will languish, and faith will waver, unless reinforced by the aid which stated and exterior acts of devotion can alone supply. "It is dangerous to be of no church," * says one who believed and revered his Bible, and who saw through all the proud and shallow pretences of that which calls itself liberality, and of that which is not genuine philosophy. I am no advocate, be assured, for the abject prostration of the devotee, or the frantic ecstasies of the fanatic. But "there is a superstition," † says the immortal Bacon, "in shunning superstition;" and he that disdains to follow religion in the open and the trodden path, may chance to lose his way in the trackless wilds of experiment, or in the obscure labyrinths of speculation.

The knowledge of religion, so far as it is clear and useful; so far as it is auxiliary to virtue, or essential to salvation, seems to me attainable almost at every age, and ornamental to every condition. But, as I before said, it is extremely unsafe to bewilder the judgments, or to inflame the passions of young men upon those abstruse subjects of controversy, about which the bigot indeed may dogmatize

* See Johnson's Life of Milton.

† See seventeenth of Bacon's Essays.

with fierce and imperious confidence, while they who are scholars without pedantry, and believers without superstition, are content to differ from each other with sentiments of mutual respect and mutual forbearance. The disposition of every young man is, upon almost every subject, irritable. He feels with the same keenness, and judges with the same impetuosity, in his pleasures and his studies, in his politics and his religion. Hence it is of great importance to preserve him from the errors, and even from the crimes to which he stands exposed from the very ardour of his virtues. While, then, we guard against the dangerous levity of youth, by implanting in them some sentiments of religion, we should, by inculcating those which are just, equally guard against that proneness to bigotry, which, in the estimation of the best men, and of the best Christians, is equally dangerous.

In the supposed inattention of others let us not seek after excuses for our own secret unfeelingness, nor let us imagine that young men cannot learn distinctly and advantageously what their superiors are disposed to teach with earnestness and impartiality. Whether, indeed, we consider the strength, or the weakness of the human understanding, it is incumbent upon us to impress those principles which may preserve the minds of youth from the absurdities of vulgar fanaticism, and the delusions of spiritual pride. They will not surely entertain a less sincere reverence for the Christian dispensation because they have been taught to look abroad upon the wisdom and benevolence which pervade the

whole system of God's moral government. Their gratitude toward their Redeemer will not languish into decay, because they pay the tribute of affection and veneration to the Deity, as the kind preserver, and the righteous judge of all his creatures. They will not be less anxious, or less worthy to obtain their own share in the rewards of eternity, when they are told that some portion of those rewards is destined for believers of every denomination, and for honest men in every age, and of every country.* They will not embrace with less eagerness, or retain with less sincerity, the peculiar doctrines of their own Church, because they are persuaded that the great truths of salvation are sufficiently dispensed to those who repeat another creed, and worship at another altar. They cannot find either their faith staggered, or their hope obscured, in proportion as their charity is enlarged, invigorated, and exalted.

Were an attentive and ingenuous youth thus

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* God is gracious and kind to all his creatures, who have rendered themselves capable of his favour: but he may yet be more kind to those who come recommended to him under the special protection of their Redeemer.— Balguy's Sermons, p. 161.

I gladly embrace this opportunity of making my grateful and respectful acknowledgments to Dr. Balguy, whose sermons have been lately published. Upon the truth of our holy Religion, and upon the principles of ecclesiastical establishments, I never met with any discourses from which I either received so much useful information, or to which I have yielded so full an assent. I have not seen any compositions, in which religious and moral subjects are treated with greater precision of language, greater success of reasoning, or a more genuine and consistent liberality of temper.

trained up, he, in the same manner as he adopts just opinions upon other subjects, would cherish without effort, and defend without ostentation those tolerant principles to which some well-disposed and well-informed Christians are now compelled to find their way through a long and severe discipline of study and self-examination. He would be ashamed to insult the mistakes, or depreciate the merits of those who, considering themselves as responsible only to the great Searcher of all hearts, endeavour to follow the dictates of an unprejudiced and unbiassed conscience, and therefore disdain to acknowledge as a favour that power of judging for themselves, which, from the spirit of Christianity, as well as the dictates of reason, they may claim as a right. These opinions are, indeed, so congenial to the clearest suggestions of the human understanding, and the most amiable sensibilities of the human heart, that in youth, when no prejudice lies in their way, they find an easy admission; and if, at a more advanced season, any prejudices have taken root, we are bound to extirpate them by every consideration that can be dear to us either in our rational, in our social, or in our religious capacities.

But while we recommend a reasonable and genuine spirit of liberality, we ought, I readily confess, to strip off the specious disguise of that which is ostentatious or false. The great duty of charity is alike misunderstood, and alike violated, by the surly bigot and the boisterous latitudinarian; by those who arrogantly oppose the rights of private judgment, and by those who mischievously insist

upon them for purposes which they dare not themselves avow: by him who confounds implicit credulity with meritorious faith, and by him who expatiates on the praise of religious liberty, in order to give a sanction to his own favourite, and it may be, doubtful or groundless tenets. It will, therefore, become requisite to put young men upon their guard against the vague and popular use of terms, and to assist them in separating the real motives of mankind from their specious pretensions. We may safely tell them, because we can tell them truly, that the pride of opinion, and the lust of domination, are not peculiar to the members of any church, or the advocates of any hypothesis—That toleration has been ably defended by those, who, in supporting their own speculative sentiments, and in promoting their own worldly interests, have betrayed very suspicious symptoms of a temper quite intolerant—That dissent from tenets generally received, does not always spring from upright motives, nor is always supported by solid arguments—That impatience of subordination sometimes lurks under an haughty and irritable spirit of independence, and the affectation of singularity often usurps the title of an unmixed and unshaken regard to truth.

By persons of narrow views and timorous tempers, it may be thought necessary to guard the authority of religious doctrines by the coarse and thorny fences of intolerance. But if sentiments of this sort be instilled into the minds of young men, equal mischief, I think, is to be apprehended from

their failure and from their success. If they fail, a young man, when he mixes at large with the world, and perceives a great diversity of sentiment among persons of talents equally splendid and of morals equally irreproachable, will find a secret incredulity and disgust growing upon him, and through injudicious haste to escape from the prejudices of education, he may rashly take shelter in an undistinguishing and obstinate infidelity. If they succeed, he will insensibly fall into that want of charity which sullies the genuine lustre of his virtues, and obstructs the salutary efficacy of his faith. I would therefore educate young men in sentiments of the warmest affection, and the highest reverence to the established Religion of this free and enlightened country. I would, at the same time, endeavour to convince them, that, in all the various modes of Christian faith, a serious observer may discover some sound principles, and many worthy men.* I would tell them, that the wise and the good cherish within their own bosom a religion yet more pure and perfect than any formulary of speculation they externally profess: that their agreement upon points of supreme and indisputable moment, is greater, perhaps, than they may themselves suspect; and that upon subjects, the evidence of which is doubtful, and the importance of which is but secondary,† their differences are nominal rather than real, and often deserve to be imputed to the excess

* Vide Balguy's Charge, i. p. 180.

† To support or to oppose an unintelligible doctrine; to

of vanity or zeal in the controversialist, more than to any defect of sagacity or integrity in the enquirer. For whatever station young persons are designed, and in whatever studies they are employed, there is some capacity in all for understanding these lessons of Christian candour, and there also are some happy seasons in which all may be assisted in learning them with the firmest conviction, and the most beneficial consequences. Those lessons will either avert or mitigate many of the evils to which, even with the purest intentions, and in the noblest cause, the young are exposed for want of experience, and the poor for want of information. They will silently infuse that calm and constant, that unfeigned and unaffected moderation, which well supplies the place of the most refined and systematic liberality. In the lower orders of society they require only the aid of common sense, united with common humanity, to produce all the wholesome and generous fruits which, amidst the studious classes of mankind, are often the slow growth of laborious speculation, of comprehensive knowledge, and of strenuous and reiterated struggles against the prepossessions which are sometimes fostered in the course even of a literary education, and against

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retain or to reject an insignificant ceremony: is thought by many an object of such infinite concern that no earthly good must stand in competition with it. Not so the founder of our holy religion; who has plainly taught us to distinguish between things of much and of little importance. Not so the best philosophy; which has drawn the real objects of controversy within a narrow compass.—Balguy's Sermons, p. 107.

the jealousies which too frequently throb in the breasts of zealots, both philosophical and religious.

Here let me, however, frankly acknowledge that I am astonished at the excessive merit, which is vulgarly supposed to accompany the reception of those plain and natural principles which respect toleration; that I am offended at the parade with which they are sometimes avowed and inculcated; and that I cordially wish to see the day in which they may be incorporated into the general mass of public education, pervade the whole circle of public opinion, and find a settled place in every clear head, and in every uncorrupted heart. They would then cease to derive, even in appearance, a precarious and inglorious support from the abilities of individuals, from the activity of sectaries, or from the bare permission of an establishment, which, without the formality of system, or the arrogance of profession, really views them with approbation, and really adopts them in practice. They would no longer be disgraced by the profuse and impertinent boastings of those who contend for them; or by invidious and most unmerited insinuations against those who never meant to dispute them. They would be taught in a manner the most becoming and the most efficacious, — not by a chain of curious and subtile reasoning, not in a tone of impassioned, and, I had almost said, inflammatory declamation — but, by the aid of the same general, comprehensive, and inartificial terms which are usually and successfully employed to convey other moral truths into the minds of attentive Christians.

I hope to be excused for insisting thus largely and thus warmly upon a species of instruction which is unfortunately too much neglected, as being unseasonable, perhaps, to persons who are not arrived at manhood, or as unnecessary to those who are not called upon to any important offices in active life. But if it be seasonable and necessary to instruct men in the great principles of religion, it cannot, I think, be improper to rescue those principles from the clog of errors with which, amidst the conflicts of religious parties, they are unhappily connected.

The province of instructing youth is, in almost every Christian country, chiefly assigned to ecclesiastics; and when we consider the leisure they enjoy, the character they are bound to sustain, the favourable opportunities they possess for the cultivation of knowledge, and the limited but competent degree in which they participate the improvements of national manners, we must acknowledge that, upon principles of a sound and liberal policy, they are not deprived of a trust which perhaps was originally committed to them from motives of necessity. But every form of religion, whether it be established or tolerated, is in every well-regulated State conducive to public utility; and, from the connection which subsists between the happiness of a community and the morals of individuals, it is of importance for the members of all Christian societies to receive early instruction in those principles which are to determine their opinions and to regulate their behaviour.

The teachers in some Roman Catholic countries, the Reformed Clergy in Switzerland, and many excellent Pastors among the Non-conformists in this kingdom, are indefatigable, to their honour be it spoken, in training up the children of their several congregations; and shall the Church of England then, that Church, I say, which in the majestic simplicity of her prayers, and the sober dignity of her ceremonies, acknowledges no superior, remain indifferent and supine? God forbid! When the Clergy in Scotland have distinguished themselves by an uncommon share of diligence and zeal in the education of their children — when the inhabitants of Dublin,* with a noble spirit of emulation which tramples under foot the paltry distinctions of sects and parties, are gathering into the fold of religion those boys who, till within these few years, have been permitted to infest their streets as pilferers and vagabonds, the slaves of premature lewdness and sottish intemperance, the tools of priestcraft, the dupes of fanaticism, rude almost to savage ferocity in their manners, and degraded nearly to a level with brutes in their understandings — when such proofs are at hand to vanquish our scruples, and such precedents to stimulate our activity, shall we, my brethren, be negligent in feeding those

* I am glad that it is in my power to give so favourable an account of the charity schools in Dublin. When I published a former sermon, those schools were in a less flourishing state than they are at present; but the spirit of encouraging them was beginning to diffuse itself, though I had not then been happy enough to hear of it.

lambs, whom Jesus, almost in his last words has committed to our care? Again I say, God forbid!

But why should I deprecate what is most unlikely to happen among those by whom the character of a good citizen is considered as inseparable from that of a good Christian? The schools already established in many great cities give us a comfortable presage of the consequence to be expected from the benevolence of the public; and as to the zeal of the Clergy, who that reads impartially their writings in favour of those schools will presume to deny that it is founded in virtue and directed by wisdom?

Let no man, therefore, call himself the friend of human-nature, who would bereave children of religious instruction, or leave them in a state of bondage to the domination of their lusts. Guilty is he of audacious usurpation who, holding himself out as a philosopher, maintains that resistance to their turbulent passions can be delayed with safety; and vain are the pretensions which he puts up to the name of a Christian, who dreams for a moment that they will yield to any other master less sacred than a Saviour and a God.

I mean not to take notice of many other excellencies which are highly ornamental to young men, and to which it is indisputably proper to train them up early. But the virtues of which I have been speaking are not less attainable than the rest; though from the frowardness and inattention of the world they are less justly esteemed, or less forcibly inculcated. As to honesty and sobriety, and other

moral duties, their utility is universally acknowledged; or, it is only among the weakest and the most wicked of the human species that they are treated with derision. Let me, however, point out one circumstance which is peculiarly favourable to us for bringing up children in the way which my text has prescribed. Morality has, by some writers, been investigated with metaphysical subtilty, and explained with logical precision; by others it has been decorated with all the rich and glowing colours of eloquent declamation and poetical imagery; but, with an exception to those writings only which proceeded immediately from the Spirit of God, I have not seen the moral relations of mankind, and the obligations resulting from them, stated with so much compression in the matter, so much order in the arrangement, or so much luminousness and energy in the style, as in the Catechism of our Church. The account which is there given of our duty toward God and our neighbour is adapted to all ranks and to all ages. The philosopher, when he peruses it, pauses with admiration, and the religionist is enraptured with piety. The young should be encouraged to learn it with the most serious attention, and happy is it for the man of hoary hairs if he continues to read it with growing conviction, growing delight, and growing improvement.

PART THE SECOND.

MANY of the observations delivered under the former heads relate immediately to the general course of education — I proceed, therefore, in the last place, to speak of the plans pursued in Charity-schools, and particularly in your own.

The great and fundamental principle upon which the whole system of penal laws has been erected is, that they are meant not so much to punish as to deter; not merely to lop off the offender, but chiefly to prevent his offences from becoming contagious; not to gratify the malice of individuals, but to secure the public good. Now for purposes of prevention nearly similar we defend the cause of early and religious education. It aims, indeed, at ends far more numerous than law can attain, and it pursues them by methods more generally applicable, and more agreeable to our humanity when they are applied.

In promoting the happiness of our species, much is, in Christian countries, effected by the authority of legal restraint, and much by public instruction from the pulpit. But education, in the large and proper sense* in which I have endeavoured to en-

* By education, I all along mean not merely the act of inculcating moral precepts and religious doctrine, but a series of discipline applied to the hearts and lives of young persons. I contend, however, that good instruction is instrumental in

force it, may boast even of superior usefulness. It comes home directly "to the bosoms and business of" young persons — it rectifies every principle, and controls every action — it prevents their attention from being relaxed by amusement, dissipated by levity, or overwhelmed by vice — it preserves them from falling a prey to the wicked examples of the world when they are in company, and from becoming slaves to their own turbulent appetites when they are in solitude. It is not occasional or desultory in its operation — on the contrary, it heaps

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forming good habits. Upon this principle Gesner reasons: Si homines scirent, quid esset felicitatis suæ, brevis esset disciplina. Quære tuam felicitatem. Sed hoc ipsum est quod nesciunt. Verum si paulatim didicerunt τριβῇ et usu officiis observandis contineri felicitatem: tum eò perveniunt, ut libenter faciant officia; quia sciunt hanc esse felicitatem suam.—Igitur opera danda est primò, ut cognoscat mens, quæ sit felicitas vera: Multum temporis abit antequam præcepta in habitum transeant.—Isag. vol. ii. 582.

Dr. Balguy says, "that the science of morals, with or without a revelation, can only be collected by the greater part of mankind from observation and experience of the common course of events." I admit this; but education will make that observation more just, and consequently more salutary. He allows that the more simple principles may be taught, and that where a good disposition, or a right education has not prevented the use of teaching, some teaching may be necessary. Now education involves that early discipline, and assists that benevolence of nature, which he calls "better guides than all the books of philosophy." It does not instruct the bulk of mankind in the words of the Ten Commandments only; it makes them see and feel such objects as teach them early, properly, and effectually, in what their duty and their happiness consist. —See Balguy's Second Charge.

"line upon line, and precept upon precept," — it binds the commands of religion, for a "sign upon the hands of young men, and frontlets between their eyes," — it is calculated to purify their desires, and to regulate their conduct, when they "sit in the house, and when they walk in the way;" when they "lie down in peace to take their rest," and when they "rise up" to "go forth to their labour."

Now in tracing the progress of society, whether it be collected from the records of Revelation or the deductions of Philosophy, from oral tradition or from historical evidence, we find that men first assembled in small companies, which are generally to be looked upon rather as tribes under a chieftain than as nations under a king.

The arts of policy were then confined to a narrow compass; the concerns of private life were closely interwoven with those of public; and the education of children was subjected not only to the discretionary authority of parents, but to the immediate and frequent interpositions of lawgivers.*

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* Ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἰδία ἑκάστοις παιδαγωγοὺς δούλους ἐφιστάναι, ἄνδρα ἐπέστησε κρατεῖν αὐτῶν ἐξ ὧνπερ αἱ μέγισται ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ὃς δὴ καὶ παιδονόμος καλεῖται· τοῦτον δὲ κύριον ἐποίησε καὶ ἀθροίζειν τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντα εἴ τις ῥαδιουργοίη ἰσχυρῶς κολάζειν· ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἡβάντων μαστιγοφόρους ὅπως τιμωροῖεν ὅτε δεοί· ὥστε πολλὴν μὲν αἰδῶ, πολλὴν δὲ πειθὼ ἐκεῖ συμπαρεῖναι.—Xenoph. de Laud. Reipubl. p. 394. edit. H. Steph.

Μόριον ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἑκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν· ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην.—Aristot tom. ii. p. 450.

A custom which began among tribes continued afterwards in small States; and hence we find that by the laws of Sparta the magistrates often laid down rules for training up children. But in larger kingdoms, as in that of Persia,* the system of instruction which fell under the notice of government, chiefly affected those who were born from noble parents, and intended for elevated stations. In states more civilized than Sparta, and more popular than Persia, the magistrates rather encouraged than directed education; and here we see it flourish with the greatest variety and in the highest perfection. The man of fortune among the Athenians refined his manners by liberal studies, enlarged his understanding in the schools of philosophy, and braced the powers of his body by the rough exercises of the gymnasia.—But the lower citizens were content to acquire the art of reading, and hence among a people so fastidious and so high spirited as the Athenians were,† "to be ignorant of letters," became a proverbial and poignant term of contempt.

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* See Xenophon's first Book of the Cyropædia. After describing the ἀγορὰ ἐλευθέρα καλουμένη, he adds, ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μὲν ὤνια καὶ οἱ ἀγοραῖοι, καὶ αἱ τούτων φωναὶ, καὶ ἀπειροκαλίαι ἀπελήλανται εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, ὡς μὴ μιγνύηται ἡ τούτων τύρβη, τῇ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων εὐκοσμίᾳ.

† The Athenians distinguished sensibly in the education they prescribed to the higher and the lower classes of citizens. Inter præcipuas Solonis curas fuit, liberorum educatio atque institutio, de quâ hæc ejus lex habetur—Τοὺς παῖδας διδάσκεσθαι πρῶτον νεῖν τε καὶ γράμματα· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑποδεέστερον πράττοντας, ἔπειτα περὶ τὰς γεωργίας, καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας, καὶ τὴν τέκνην· τοὺς δὲ βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους περὶ τε μουσικὴν καὶ

In our own country, the various plans * of instruction are well adapted to the various classes of

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ἱππικὴν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ κυνηγέσια, καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατρίβειν. Primum igitur natare et literas docebantur, unde natum Proverbium de quo Diogenianus (Cent. 10. Prov. 11.) μήτε νεῖν, μήτε γράμματα, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀμαθῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκπαίδοθεν ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ἐμάνθανον. Petit. Leg. Att. edit. Wes. p. 239.

It deserves to be remarked, that, in some ancient treatises upon education little or no regard is paid to the lower classes of society. Plutarch's apology is very singular: τί οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι; σὺ δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων παίδων ἀγωγῆς ὑποσχόμενος παραδείγματα δώσειν, ἔπειτα φαίνῃ τῆς μὲν τῶν πενήτων καὶ δημοτικῶν παραμελῶν ἀγωγῆς, μόνοις δὲ τοῖς πλουσίοις ὁμονοεῖς τας ὑποθήκας διδόναι· πρὸς οὓς οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι, ἐγὼ γὰρ μάλιστα ἂν βουλοίμην πᾶσι κοινῇ χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀγωγήν· εἰ δὲ τινες ἐνδεῶς τοῖς ἰδίοις πράττοντες ἀδυνατήσουσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς χρήσασθαι παραγγέλμασι, τὴν τύχην αἰτιάσθωσαν, οὐ τὸν ταῦτα συμβουλεύοντα· πειρατέον μὲν οὖν εἰς δύναμιν, τὴν κρατίστην ἀγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων, καὶ τοῖς πένησιν· εἰ δὲ μή, τῇγε δυνατῇ χρηστέον.—Plutarch. de Liber. Educ. tom. ii. 8.

Aristotle, in his Republic, forms such a plan of education as was

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* Plato, at the beginning of his Republic, says, ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὡμολόγηται, ὦ Γλαύκων, τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν δὴ γυναῖκας, κοινοὺς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν παιδείαν. P. 154. tom. ii. edit. Masley. This plan, for a general and undistinguished method of instructing youth, might be proper enough in the ideal commonwealth of Plato; but in real life the different modes of education should be adapted to the different state of men in society; and of the regulations lately introduced in our Charity-schools we may say justly, that they are strictly conformable to the sentiments of Agesilaus. Ἐπιζητοῦντος δὲ τινὸς τίνα δεῖ μανθάνειν τοὺς παῖδας, ταῦτα (εἶπεν) οἷς καὶ ἄνδρες γενόμενοι χρήσονται.—Plutarch. Lacon. Apophthegmat. tom. ii. p. 213. edit. Xyland.

the community. Our public forms of education supply much of what was done in the larger states of antiquity,* and by the methods taken for training up the children of the poor, we secure many of the benefits that were aimed at in the smaller. Accommodating thus our measures to the different exigencies of different times and places, we are at liberty to employ many expedients, which, in the distant and general view of a legislator, would be imperfectly provided for; and we avoid many inconveniences by which education would certainly be

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was suited only to those whom the Greeks called Ἐλεύθεροι—τῶν ἐργῶν τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν, ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάναυσον. Βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν, καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τάς πράξεις τάς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν· διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας, ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι, βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσκαλον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ταπεινὴν.—De Republ. lib. viii. cap. ii.

This contempt of the βάναυσοι was of very ancient standing, as appears from Herodotus: Ὀρέων καὶ Θρῄκας, καὶ Σκύθας, καὶ Πέρσας, καὶ Λυδοὺς, καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τοὺς βαρβαροὺς, ἀποτιμοτέρους τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεομένους πολῃτέων τοὺς τὰς τέχνας μανθάνοντας, καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτων, τοὺς δὲ ἀπαλλαγμένους τῶν χειρωναξιέων, γενναίους νομίζοντας εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνειμένους· μεμαθήκασι δ' ὧν τοῦτο πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι· ἥκιστα δὲ Κορίνθιοι ὄνονται τοὺς χειροτέχνας.—Herodot. p. 92. edit. H. Steph.

The same contempt seems to have reached even to later times, when the government and manners of Greece were considerably changed. Οἷος γὰρ ἂν ᾖς, βάναυσος, καὶ χειρώναξ, καὶ ἀποχειροβίωτος νομισθήσῃ.—Lucian's Ἐνύπνιον.

* See Smith on the Wealth of Nations, vol. iii. p. 172.

cramped, in consequence of rules indiscriminately prescribed and compulsorily enforced.

In forming useful and worthy subjects of any government, some kind of early instruction is necessary. But the direct interference * of the govern-

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* Aristotle, at the opening of the 8th Book de Republicâ, speaks boldly in the affirmative; *δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην πολιτεύεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον, καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθεν. κ. τ. λ.*

His position, and the reasons he adduces for defending it, might be very just in the forms of government that prevailed in Greece, but are not applicable to modern governments. The general question on the interference of the governing powers has been discussed with great ability by Dr. Priestley, who, in my opinion, has fairly and fully confuted the positions of Dr. Brown. But, while I acknowledge the force of his reasoning, I cannot approve of the unhandsome manner in which he treats the Established Clergy. None of them, I believe, have ever formed, and I am sure none of them have expressed, a wish to superintend the education of Dissenters, or to prevent any parent "from educating his children in his own way." After telling us, however, "that the *friends of liberty would be alarmed* if the direction of the whole business of education should devolve upon the Established Clergy," he adds, "and it were the greatest injustice to the good sense of freeborn Britons to suppose the noble spirit of religious liberty, and a zeal for the rights of free inquiry, confined within the narrow circle of Protestant Dissenters."—Priestley's Principles of Government, p. 109.

This passage, though not immediately applicable to the subject of my notes, is so judicious and liberal, that I think myself justified in quoting it, for the satisfaction of my readers and the credit of Dr. Priestley. The man lives not who has a more sincere veneration for his talents and virtues than I have; but for his sake I must lament, and for the sake of justice I cannot but condemn, the unnecessary and unprovoked attacks which

ing powers in the prosecution of this work, is a subject of very nice speculation; and, perhaps, in the present state of things, it were better to be content with protection, which implies a sort of tacit approbation, than to ask for assistance, which might involve us in unforeseen difficulties.

In the nobler branches of learning, and the higher classes of life, it seems, I confess, not only invidious but dangerous for the legislative powers to prescribe any system of study. But when I state the interposition of government as superfluous in the education of the poor, I would be understood to limit my position. I suppose the charitable contributions of individuals for bringing up these children "in the way they should go," to continue, or even to increase. For, in a contrary state of things, I agree with the great philosophical writer

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he seems ambitious of making upon the Established Clergy, who in learning, in piety, and true moderation, stand, we hope, upon an honourable level with the Dissenting Clergy.

In the Essays on the Spirit of Legislation, published by the Society at Berne, in Switzerland, we read the following passage, which is to be strictly understood only in the peculiar and confined government of that country; "A legislator, occupied, like the father of his country, with the happiness of his people, will watch rational education, to the end that children may suck in with the milk the principles and maxims which may contribute to the public good and the prosperity of individuals. Upon this principle, I do not comprehend how we can abandon the public education to masters that depend not on Government, or are little concerned with the State."—P. 15.

on the Wealth of Nations, that "the education of the common people * would require, in a civilized and commercial society, more attention from the public, than that of people of fortune and rank." I think with him, that "the public should facilitate, encourage, and even impose, almost, upon the whole body of people, the necessity of acquiring the most essential parts of education;" and I, with very few exceptions, approve of the plan which he has laid down for acquiring them. Opposed then, as we are, by petulant witlings, or by chimerical theorists, we have the satisfaction, you see, to know that the principle on which our charity schools are founded, is not without an advocate in a person who stands in the first class of political writers, from his clear and extensive views, from his copious and exact information, from the soundness of his judgement, and from the liberality of his spirit.

To those who complain that charity schools are subjected to the controul of private opinion, and not of public authority, we may make a yet farther reply. Public authority, though it does not patronize every attempt, or dictate every regulation, may, upon the discovery of great abuses, suppress what it does not endeavour to direct. Beyond these limits there seems to be, at present, no solid reason for its

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* See Smith on the Wealth of Nations, vol. iii. p. 185.

Upon the instruction to be given to the lower classes of mankind, and particularly in the art of writing, see the Second Memoir in the Berne Essays.

interference; though opportunities hereafter may arise for taking up the subject more fully, and for giving stability and regularity to those forms of education, which are now planned by the wisdom and supported by the kindness of individuals.—As to private opinion, it is connected, we should remember, with private benevolence. It is the opinion of men who, from local circumstances, have a large and correct view of the business they undertake, who are induced to undertake it from their compassion for the sufferings of the poor; and who execute it successfully, by laying out their time, their wisdom, and their fortunes, in exercising the talents, and in cherishing the virtues of those whom they consider as partakers of the same nature, subjects of the same government, and heirs of the same immortality. Strange therefore it is, that the shafts of ridicule, and the cavils of sophistry, should ever have been employed to depreciate your benevolent exertions, or to discourage you from making them.

Whatever influence it may be right to ascribe to climate or to situation, their effects, we know, are considerably controuled by the operation of laws, of commerce, and science; and much too as these causes have been already instrumental in meliorating the condition, and exalting the aims of mankind, their powers, we trust, are not yet exhausted. The moral world is, indeed, so wisely constituted, that our actual happiness is generally proportionate to the degree, in which we are capable or worthy of being happy. The advantages of men, as social

beings, result chiefly from their progress in knowledge and civilization; and that progress is, in some instances, the cause, and in some the effect, of the government we obtain over our passions, and of the exercise we give to our intellectual and corporeal powers. Arguing, indeed, precipitately from the present to the past, and blending indiscriminately what is now attainable and proper in our own situations, with that which was not placed within the reach, or not adapted to the exigencies of former ages, we lament their seeming defects, and condemn their peculiar practices, without considering the relative use of those defects, and the temporary propriety of those practices. Our own condition is, doubtless, far better than theirs; and yet many circumstances which now conspire to our well-being might, in a different posture of things, have been altogether injurious. For the felicity of man, in a state of society, really depends upon a great variety of causes, which are connected together by the closest ties, and which assist or impede the operations of each other by a force which often is least perceived where it is most exerted.

What a great writer * upon feudal property says of the political world, may be applied to many other relations and interests of men — "societies do not remain long in the same state." And who would expect that they can be stationary among creatures so active as we are in our pursuits, so changeable in our opinions, so determined, too, in the choice,

* Dalrymple, p. 277.

and so affected in the consequences of both, by the opinions and pursuits of other men, whether countrymen or strangers, whether friends or foes? Yet, upon the whole, surely it may be said, that evil, felt and understood to be such, gradually works out its own cure, and that good, on the contrary, is perpetuated by the deliberate counsels of those who do, and even by the involuntary concurrence of those who do not, contemplate its causes, and appreciate its value. Thus, upon comparing the present with the former state of man, we are compelled to acknowledge that his improvements, both in the concerns of private and public life, are solid and numerous: that our imaginations can rarely assign any limits to them; and that our best efforts ought to be employed in giving them new vigour, or new stability. Let us apply this general reasoning to the instruction of the poor.

While the spirit of government was oppressive, and the manners of men were rude, a large share of knowledge was not attainable to the many; and if attained, it would not have been desirable, as it would only have given them a more distinct view of defects that could not be supplied, and a more acute sense of distresses that could not be alleviated. But, from the general diffusion of knowledge which distinguishes our own age, and which has sometimes been promoted by, and sometimes has promoted, their improvements in other respects, there is no reason to apprehend any eventual mischief from communicating a portion of that knowledge to the lowest classes of society. To exclude them

from it deliberately,* were, indeed, illiberal and harsh. The visible tendency of moral causes seems to have prepared them for receiving it; and we are called upon in this, as in similar situations, to assist that tendency by regulating its directions, and by augmenting its force. However humble be the situation, and however pressing be the wants of these little children, all have time, and all have ability, to perform the task which you allot them. That task fills up the busy hours of their youth, not unbecomingly, or unprofitably; and will enable them, when they have reached manhood, to employ their moments of leisure innocently and agreeably. It will render† them less superstitious or less profane; less

* They who would exclude the poor from all knowledge are frequently persons who have experienced the advantages of education, and are placed in very respectable stations. Their reasoning, however, reminds one of the illiterate and brutal Cade's interview with the Clerk of Chatham:

Cade. Let me alone.—Dost thou use to write thy name? Or hast thou a mark to thyself, like an honest, plain-dealing man?

Clerk. Sir, I thank God, I have been so well brought up that I can write my name.

All. He hath confessed: away with him: he's a villain and a traitor.

Cade. Away with him, I say; hang him with his pen and inkhorn about his neck?

King Henry the Sixth, Second Part.

† Adam Smith states most forcibly and fully the advantage of guarding against that gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understanding of all the inferior ranks of people.—"Though the State," says he, "was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its

discontented with their lot, and less ferocious in their passions; less envious, I should hope, of their superiors, and, I am sure, less disobedient to the laws. I say not, that it is impossible to produce instances of men, who, though they have gone through these humble forms of education, have yet fallen into atrocious crimes. But where is the plan pursued by the higher classes of society to which this objection cannot be made? Where is the fairness of arguing against general success from particular examples of failure? Or, what room can there be for the smallest doubt of that success, if we cast our eyes back from the present condition of the poor, to those ages when they were less enlightened and less employed, when they roamed from place to place without any settled means of subsistence, when they plundered with all the shameless and fearless violence of confederated bands, and eagerly flocked to the standard of riot or sedition?

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attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The State, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable are they to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each individually, more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors; and they are, therefore, more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition; and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of Government."—Wealth of Nations, vol. iii. p. 192.

But trained up as the children are in your schools, they will be able to catch the opinions and to emulate the manners of their superiors, so far as may be consistent with their own happiness, or conducive to the public tranquillity. They will entertain a just sense of the blessings which they are not only permitted, but qualified to enjoy. They will strive to secure the enjoyment of them by a meritorious conduct, and they will acquire a sort of claim to draw from the common stock of happiness, in consequence of the share which they contribute to it by their own diligence and regularity. These considerations will, I hope, refute the visionary and dangerous positions of those who, with the same breath, expatiate in the loudest strain of encomium upon that accumulated and increasing mass of knowledge to which the higher ranks have access, and yet inveigh with the utmost bitterness against the propriety of dealing out the smallest pittance of that knowledge for the benefit of the poor. I will not give utterance to the just and indignant reply which might be made to the advocates of such opinions, upon the score of ingratitude towards their Maker, and of cruelty towards their species. But I will, without hesitation, pronounce their reasoning so weak and so impolitic, that no man, who really acquiesces in it, can support his pretensions to the character of a profound philosopher, or of a generous citizen. If artificial means be used to check the natural progress of knowledge, who shall dictate the point at which stagnation is to begin, or who can foresee the mischief in which it may ter-

minate? On the other hand, if it be permitted to take its course, and if it be occasionally assisted in taking it, the advantages which are diffused through the lower orders of men will flow back through a thousand channels, and swell the general tide of happiness and virtue. When, therefore, our theories have pressed on beyond our experience, when our discoveries are too numerous and too complex for immediate use, and when the spirit by which we were actuated to make them has prepared us for seizing every future opportunity of using them effectually, let us call down our thoughts for a moment from these towering subjects, and employ them upon improvements which the humble life of the poor will most assuredly admit. When genius and industry have executed the greater task with distinguished success, let not our pride or our insensibility prevent us from attempting the less.

Just and interesting as these observations may be, there yet are persons by whom the late rise of charity schools has been thought a presumption against them. But why, it may be asked, should the former ignorance of the poor be a reason for them to remain ignorant for the future? In some stages of civilization, knowledge may be attained with greater ease, and used with greater advantage, than in others; and surely, wheresoever such knowledge is placed within our reach, it warrants our pursuit. Happy, indeed, is it for the bulk of mankind, that the intricate and silent energy of those moral causes to which we are indebted for the general happiness of the species, baffles the craft and selfishness of

particular men, and by degrees admits all to a share of that improvement which all have an interest in acquiring, and a capacity to acquire. But I will make my answer to this objection yet more minute and more exact. Let me then ask the objector, whence it is that the education of the poor has been so long neglected? and let me beg his attention, whilst I endeavour to search the question to the bottom. Now the narrow and rigorous system of policy which prevailed in the feudal ages, the extreme depression of the inferior orders of men, and that total want of civil and political importance from which they have been slowly emerging in more enlightened times, will, in some measure, account for the fact throughout Europe. But in our own country there are other circumstances which ought not to be overlooked. Upon the suppression of the religious houses, where youth had been educated before the æra of the Reformation, public schools were raised and supported either by the munificence of opulent individuals, or by the funds of corporate societies. In these schools the attachment to classical and philosophical studies, which had before been cultivated, yet remained. The prejudice in favour of learning has, indeed, even in succeeding ages, operated distinctly from any consideration of its use; and many precious hours have been wasted by a boy in gaining that information which his wants have made unimportant, or his vanity burthensome to him, when he became a man. But, whatever provision was made for the education of scholars, little regard was paid to the

instruction of the poor, The lower classes of citizens were indeed scarcely elevated above the meanness of servitude, or the grossness of barbarism. The roving life of husbandmen seemed not to require the arts even of reading and writing. Manufactures were at too low an ebb, and in too confined a circle, to give daily employment to such multitudes as are now engaged in them, or to draw any general share of attention to the intellectual improvement of those who were trained up to them. It should be observed, too, that as property was divided into smaller shares, and the dependence of the active manufacturer upon the haughty lord was by degrees lessened, they, who grew rich from the success of trade, were able to procure for themselves the scanty share of instruction for which they had immediate occasion. While they neither asked, nor indeed wanted, assistance from those who were above them, they had not leisure, or perhaps the power, to provide for the improvement of persons who were yet below them, and whom, probably, they were in the habit of considering as neither entitled to what they called the privileges of education, nor capable of sharing its advantages. To this external state of things we must add some other causes, which lie deeply in the constitution of the human mind itself.

Our age is distinguished by liberality in hospitals of various kinds, and it may for a moment surprise us that an equal zeal is not displayed in the encouragement of charity-schools. But the actions of men are, we know, influenced not so much by the

real magnitude of evils which may be ascertained by reflection, as by the point of view in which they are presented to us by accident; and even our best sensibilities are excited less powerfully by the calm and correct operations of our reason, than by the strong and vivid colouring in which objects are painted by our imagination. From mutilated limbs, from excruciating diseases, from the squallor of penury, from the feebleness of old age, from the frantic attitudes and convulsive distortions of the lunatic, from the helpless imbecillity of illegitimate infants, and from the complicated miseries of deluded young women, we start back, when they rush upon us unexpectedly, with anguish and horror. There are, however, particular and detached instances, when some even of these spectacles do not raise any violent emotion; and it is only when a voluntary reflex act of the mind has stretched their distresses to others, that the idea of numbers thus distressed either shakes the soul with terror, or melts it into compassion. Occasions also there are, on which we feel not any strong inclination to relieve the sufferings of mere individuals; and yet, when a general scheme is established for succouring the sufferers amply and systematically, we are in a moment acted upon by many and strong impulses from many and different quarters. Our compassion is awakened by a sense of the wide extent in which our fellow-creatures are afflicted—a vigorous spring is given to our benevolence, from the consciousness that we are useful to numbers—a generous and almost instinctive spirit of emulation is

the kindness which many others exercise. We feel a firm and animating persuasion that our own humane exertions will be wisely and effectually employed, and, (as a great moralist says of patriotism,) "independent of pure sympathy* with the happiness of those who are to reap the benefits of" our own charity, "we are pleased with the contemplation of general happiness, and are interested in whatever can tend to advance it."

Now in all the above-mentioned cases, which are pitied as soon as they are known, misery already exists, and in some of them it is prominent to our view in all its collective aggravations. But the loss of education is often considered as implying the absence of good rather than the existence of evil. The calamities and the crimes that hover over the ignorance, the rudeness, and the idleness of the poor, are not yet in being. That ignorance itself is sometimes confounded with simplicity, that rudeness is called vivacity, and that idleness is imputed rather to a wanton and transient love of sport, than to any rooted and dangerous reluctance to labour. It requires, therefore, some firmness of spirit, and some activity of understanding, to draw together all the scattered mischiefs that await the poor, into one assemblage, where each shall appear to our judgment in its proper form, and where the pernicious tendency of all instantaneously carries our imaginations over a long and formidable train of approaching evils.

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* [illegible] Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 274.

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* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 274.

real magnitude of evils which may be ascertained by reflection, as by the point of view in which they are presented to us by accident; and even our best sensibilities are excited less powerfully by the calm and correct operations of our reason, than by the strong and vivid colouring in which objects are painted by our imagination. From mutilated limbs, from excruciating diseases, from the squallor of penury, from the feebleness of old age, from the frantic attitudes and convulsive distortions of the lunatic, from the helpless imbecillity of illegitimate infants, and from the complicated miseries of deluded young women, we start back, when they rush upon us unexpectedly, with anguish and horror. There are, however, particular and detached instances, when some even of these spectacles do not raise any violent emotion; and it is only when a voluntary reflex act of the mind has stretched their distresses to others, that the idea of numbers thus distressed either shakes the soul with terror, or melts it into compassion. Occasions also there are, on which we feel not any strong inclination to relieve the sufferings of mere individuals; and yet, when a general scheme is established for succouring the sufferers amply and systematically, we are in a moment acted upon by many and strong impulses from many and different quarters. Our compassion is awakened by a sense of the wide extent in which our fellow-creatures are afflicted—a vigorous spring is given to our benevolence, from the consciousness that we are useful to numbers—a generous and almost instinctive spirit of emulation is excited by

the kindness which many others exercise. We feel a firm and animating persuasion that our own humane exertions will be wisely and effectually employed, and, (as a great moralist says of patriotism,) "independent of pure sympathy* with the happiness of those who are to reap the benefits of" our own charity, "we are pleased with the contemplation of general happiness, and are interested in whatever can tend to advance it."

Now in all the above-mentioned cases, which are pitied as soon as they are known, misery already exists, and in some of them it is prominent to our view in all its collective aggravations. But the loss of education is often considered as implying the absence of good rather than the existence of evil. The calamities and the crimes that hover over the ignorance, the rudeness, and the idleness of the poor, are not yet in being. That ignorance itself is sometimes confounded with simplicity, that rudeness is called vivacity, and that idleness is imputed rather to a wanton and transient love of sport, than to any rooted and dangerous reluctance to labour. It requires, therefore, some firmness of spirit, and some activity of understanding, to draw together all the scattered mischiefs that await the poor, into one assemblage, where each shall appear to our judgment in its proper form, and where the pernicious tendency of all instantaneously carries our imaginations over a long and formidable train of approaching evils.

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* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 274.

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But the want of foresight, to which we are chiefly to ascribe the want of feeling in those who are languid in the support of charity-schools, is not to be laid to the charge of this audience. You have attempted what was totally overlooked, or insufficiently provided for, at the Reformation — by adapting your plans to the real advantage of society, and to the real situations of those who are more immediately affected by them, you have done wisely, what in former ages might have been done imperfectly, either from injudicious prepossessions in favour of literature, or from inattention to those changes in the situations and pursuits of men, which at that period were silently taking place, and the causes of which were then preparing to act, and since have acted, with encreasing force and through a wider extent.

Instead, therefore, of disputing against the utility of charity-schools, because they were not earlier instituted, it becomes us to consider some of the advantages which are generally attached to them in their present situations. One of those advantages is the religious instruction which you give the poor; for, if they receive it not from you, in what quarter must they search for it? or of what kind will that be which they are most likely to receive? From the grossness of their own conceptions, and the profligacy of their own lives, some parents bring up their children in habits of profaneness and impiety. Others are too volatile in their tempers, or too intent upon their business, to employ any serious care upon the subject. A third sort have

formed, and will therefore communicate, very mistaken opinions, and through a well-meant, but misguided zeal, either inflame the minds of their children with spiritual pride, or bewilder them with fanaticism, or darken them with despair. "The truths of religion,"* says an illustrious critic, "are too important to be new; they have been taught in our infancy; they have mingled with our solitary thoughts and familiar conversation, and are habitually interwoven with the whole texture of life." But to the poor this flattering description cannot be applied. In their infancy they are seldom taught the fear and love of God, and how then in their manhood will they feel the inclination or obtain the power to learn them? They rise with the rising sun to their labour, and when he sets some retire to repose in refreshing slumbers, and some to revel in coarse intemperance. The unavoidable business of life shuts out severe meditation, and amidst the sudden and sharp cares that often annoy them, either the whole attention of their minds is absorbed in looking after alleviations; or, if alleviations cannot be obtained, they are sometimes depressed into a state of sullen and dreary despondence, and sometimes driven on to frantic expedients of violence and dishonesty. How important is it then to teach religion, when it may be taught easily and effectually? How necessary does it appear to give the poor a saving knowledge of their God, "at a time when he may be found," and "before the great

* Johnson's Life of Milton.

water-floods rush in," when it may be impossible for them "to come nigh him."

To moral agents, however exalted be their station, or however eminent their talents, the knowledge of religion,* which constitutes a most important part, and which includes the most powerful sanctions of morality itself, is essentially necessary But the expediency of teaching it among the poor may be evinced by peculiar reasons—Would you regulate their conduct by the commands of their superiors? those commands may be inconsistent or unjust, sometimes dictated by caprice, and sometimes productive of oppression. Would you subdue their passions by the restraints of law? those restraints lead to negative rather than positive excellence; they deter from great crimes, but do not prevent the less; in many instances they cannot operate, and in all they operate feebly, unless assisted by other principles previously adopted and firmly established. But if these resources fail, can we find no other, you will say, unless we listen to the austere and inexorable voice in which religion exacts the obedience of her votaries? By the higher

* To counteract the power of temptation, hope must be excited by the prospect of reward, and fear by the expectation of punishment; and virtue may owe her panegyrics to morality, but must derive her authority from religion. When, therefore, the obligations of morality are taught, let the sanctions of Christianity never be forgotten; by which it will be shewn that they give strength and lustre to each other. Religion will appear to be the voice of reason, and morality the will of God.—Preface to the Preceptor, p. 27.

and more polished orders of society, other resources, I confess, may be found, though, I fear, to little purpose—but by the lower, I contend, they cannot be found at all. The ideas of a poor man are too narrow to be much enlarged by philosophy, and his sentiments are too coarse to be refined by honour. A delicate regard to propriety, the ardent love of glory, the abstract fitness of things, the intrinsic beauty of virtue, are sounds by the music of which his ear is not exchanted, if we "charm ever so wisely." But when religion is set before him he understands the justness of its precepts, he admires the sublimity of its doctrines, and he feels the awfulness of its commands. Without difficulty he acquires a reverential sense of a Creator and a Redeemer, and he embraces, without hypocrisy, the plain and salutary belief of a Heaven and a Hell.

That religion is useful in taming the fierceness and alleviating the afflictions of the poor, has been acknowledged even by its adversaries. They profess indeed to derive their own opinions from the magnificent eloquence of a Bolingbroke, the pointed raillery of a Voltaire, or the profound researches of a Hume. But their vanity, and, I should hope, even their good sense, prevent them from maintaining that the same opinions can be safely recommended to their inferiors. They are led, by mingled motives of prudence and of benevolence, to confess that the lower orders of mankind are to be restrained only by the belief of that religion, which their superiors it seems are privileged to reject as untrue, and to deride perhaps as absurd.

Unnecessary, therefore, as it were on the present occasion to repel the objections which they urge against the general credibility of the Gospel, I think it not improper to avail myself of the concessions they make in favour of its importance. I will, however, go one step farther, for the sake of checking that petulance, which a contemptuous disbelief of Revelation is too apt to excite, and which, when supported by the examples of those who are placed in respectable stations, extends its malignant influence to the most unlettered, and the most humble classes of mankind. That my sentiments may be heard with more attention, and produce a fuller effect, I will deliver them in the words of a writer whose ingenuity entitles him to respect both from the friends and the adversaries of religious education. "We are led* to the belief of a future state, not only by the weaknesses, by the hopes and fears of human nature, but by the noblest and best principles which belong to it; by the love of virtue, and by the abhorrence of vice and injustice. When the general rules which determine the merit and demerit of actions come to be regarded as the laws of an all-powerful Being, who watches over our conduct, and who, in a life to come, will reward the observance and punish the breach of them, they necessarily acquire a new sacredness from this consideration. That our regard to the will of the Deity ought to be the supreme rule of our conduct, can be doubted of by nobody who believes his ex-

* Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 244.

istence. The very thought of disobedience appears to involve in it the most shocking impropriety. How vain, how absurd would it be for man, either to oppose or to neglect the commands that were laid upon him by infinite wisdom and infinite power?"

Let us return from this digression. While the necessity of training up the poor in the fear of the Lord is thus apparent, it deserves to be remarked, that the opportunities for doing so are very favourable. They are not entangled in that pernicious scepticism which explains away the evidences of Christianity and the obligations of virtue. They are not deluded by that wanton and licentious sophistry which draws a lustre around profaneness from the plea of fashion, and which measures the right to be vicious by the impunity which, amidst the blandishments of opulence and the privileges of power, vice too often enjoys. Their minds are neither relaxed by luxury, nor pampered by pride. They do not affect a haughty and impious independence upon the power or the bounty of Heaven. In the counsels of their own wisdom, or the strength of their own arm, they dare not confide. Pinched as they are by want, buffeted by affronts, or pining in sickness and in sorrow, they gladly flee for shelter to a Master who can protect, and to a Friend who will not desert them. That friend and that master is the God whom we teach them to fear, to love, and obey.

Other reasons for instructing the poor on religious subjects are to be found in the weakness of

their judgment and the intenseness of their hopes and fears. Hence, if their minds have not been early fixed in the belief of the Gospel, or their morals regulated by its laws, they at a later period of life precipitately adopt the most irrational tenets. They are prone to believe that the performance of external ceremonies, and the profession of what is called "a saving faith," will atone for the commission of every vice, and supply the want of every virtue. Shuddering at the danger to which they were from their past misconduct exposed, they rush into every opinion however unreasonable, and grasp at every hope however fallacious, which may hold out to them the prospect of future security. The well-grounded terrors of the Publican are then quickly succeeded by the presumptuous confidence of the Pharisee. They who yesterday smote their breasts, and anxiously called upon God to be "merciful to them as sinners," may to-morrow boldly "lift up their eyes to heaven," and proudly exult in those imaginary effusions of grace which have transformed them into beings such as "no other men are," and have placed them among the elect, who are in no peril of falling. This wild delusion of the understanding is seldom accompanied by any radical improvement of the heart, nor does it lead to that repentance which, in the solemn and emphatical language of the Scripture, is "not to be repented of." On the contrary, it spurns all the calmer dictates of reason, and stifles the most salutary suggestions of conscience. It is not, indeed, supported by the consciousness of former righte-

ousness; but, by the remembrance of former crimes, it often is fatally confirmed. In those who have taken up their system of faith, and entered upon the work of salvation, late in life, it is corrected very rarely. It is to be effectually prevented only by the assistance of education, which, beginning from right principles, advances to virtuous habits, and then, by an easy and uninterrupted progress, terminates in humility without abject fear, in piety without vain superstition, in a faith that will never misguide, and in a hope that will never fail.

Such an education only will either prevent the poor from falling into habits, from which they will have occasion to be reformed, or guard them from the dreadful mistakes they commit in their endeavours after reformation. Such an education too are your Schools evidently calculated to furnish. And who, then, that seriously reflects upon their usefulness, would be so imprudent or so inhuman as to obstruct their success? Permit me therefore to add, that, among other regulations, I could wish every establishment of this kind to adopt some of the rules, which have already been employed in several great cities for the exact and pious observance of the Sabbath-day. In the mode of observing it, we may steer a middle course between the sullen austerity of the Puritan, and the indecorous gaiety of the Papist. To all orders of men, the Lord's Day is made by custom a season of rest from labour — but we may do more for these children. Necessary we know it is for us to summon their attention to meditation and prayer; and, per-

haps, it will not be thought absolutely impracticable to relieve and enliven their minds, by directing the offices of devotion to be succeeded, after a proper interval, by some harmless and temperate recreations.

There are some circumstances respecting the Masters of Charity-schools, which ought to be pointed out, as peculiarly conducive to the success of your institutions. A great writer of antiquity* assigns as one chief cause for the failure of education, that parents make a wrong choice of a preceptor, or that, when he is chosen, they lay aside all further concern about him and his pupil. This alarming objection cannot be alleged against your plan. For your knowledge of a master you do not depend upon casual or partial information. He lives among you, and his real character is known. It is examined before you choose him; and, in making your choice, I will venture to say that a majority of suffrages has never appeared in favour of any candidate, who was disqualified for his office by glaring incapacity as a teacher, or by notorious immorality as a man. When chosen, he is subject to your controul, and dependent upon your approbation. He has no collateral resources, either to promote his own interest or to blow up his pride. Such is the frequency and such the exactness of your enquiries, that he cannot hope for impunity if he be guilty of habitual inattention or flagrant mis-

* See Plutarch de Liberis Educandis, p. 9. edit. Xyland. From this edition I have quoted all the preceding passages from Plutarch.

conduct. Nor should it be forgotten that, in examining the proficiency of his scholars, you come prepared for that examination by more correct judgments, and with larger experience, than fall to the lot of the teacher himself. You are exempt from the pride and the partiality of parents, from their propensity to be deluded "with smooth things," and their reluctance to hear many important though mortifying truths. You decide upon the talents and morals of boys by the test of a plan which you have yourselves instituted, the utility of which you are accustomed to measure by facts, and the defects of which you can discover without difficulty, and supply without delay. You are therefore in the habit of performing what parents are apt to neglect; and it is in your power to perform it much better than their ignorance, their inexperience, their fretful impatience, or their misguided affection, will usually permit them to do.

Another argument for the exertions of our best endeavours to instruct the poor may be urged from the disadvantages which, in this age, accompany the progress of civilization. The luxury that rushed in after the successes of one war, has not been corrected by the disasters of another: the artificial wants of men are multiplied rather than diminished, though many sources of gratification have been interrupted; and the inordinate appetite for dissipation and extravagance which originally burst out among the idle and the opulent, has descended by rapid strides to those persons who derive their subsistence only from their labour. Hence

the long and dismal catalogue of crimes which harrass our families by perpetual alarms, and crowd our gaols with atrocious offenders. Hence the execution of our laws * is frequent without being efficacious, and severe without being formidable. Hence the bitterness of death is so often tasted by those who are in the vigour and bloom of youth, whose proficiency in wickedness has outrun the common course of depraved nature, and whom we think ourselves authorised to cut off before they have attained any distinct sense of right or wrong, or have met even with any fair opportunities of becoming useful members in society. That the number of such criminals surpasses all example, is well known to those worthy and considerate men who have no inclination to indulge their spleen, or to display their discernment in the gloomy and vehement language of exaggeration. By what means then shall we shelter the rising generation from the most flagrant of all corruption, and the most frightful of all dangers? The vigilant spirit of liberty, and the generous feelings of humanity, render every great change in the police of our country most difficult and most perilous. And, indeed, if the laws be ever so nicely framed, and ever so steadily administered, the remedy seldom reaches the root of the disease, and, when employed to check it only in the last stages of stubborness and malignity, it acts with

* Laws are a bad method of changing the manners and customs; 'tis by rewards and example that we ought to endeavour to bring that about.—Analysis of the Spirit of Laws by D'Alembert, p. 72.

a severity which is endured rather than applauded, and which shocks where it ought only to reform. Are we then serious in our wishes to restore health and soundness to the body politic? Do we really pity the sufferings of the offender, and really detest the malignity of his offence? Do our hearts shudder and recoil at the extreme rigours of justice? and are we sincerely anxious to avert the mischiefs which can alone warrant us in employing those rigours? Let us, then—I beseech you, in the name of God, let us earnestly and heartily have recourse to education.—We must "begin at the beginning" —we must prevent what is evil by implanting what is good—we must enlighten the understanding as well as controul the will—we must govern the lower orders of society, not by the dread of losing existence, but by the hope of finding it comfortable—we must shew ourselves the preservers of men's lives, by standing forth as the guardians of their innocence instead of shedding their unrighteous blood, under a plea of necessity, which does not always vanquish our scruples, or calm our indignation,—we must endeavour, by early and wholesome instruction, to save* their precious souls.

After mentioning these advantages in detail, I will now endeavour to impress upon your minds the

* The serious and learned reader will here recollect with pleasure this solemn, and, I think, most apposite passage of Plato: *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς ἅδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται, πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς· ἃ δὴ καὶ λέγεται μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.*—Phædo, p. 107.

utility of charity-schools, by additional arguments drawn from the general state of knowledge in this country, to which I have already called your attention, and from the general mode of instruction that is usually pursued in these seminaries.

Upon comparing the present age with those that are past, we may venture to say, that our proficiency in the abstract sciences has been more rapid and more conspicuous; that our taste in polite literature is formed with greater exactness and refined with greater excellence; and that our habits of thinking, both upon speculative and practical subjects are, upon the whole, more just and more enlarged. But general advantage of every kind is attended with partial inconvenience. We cannot, therefore, wonder that the wide-spread and eager curiosity, which has been awakened by the diffusion of knowledge, should give rise to a swarm, both of writers who are unable to furnish instruction, and of readers who are careless about receiving it. It has, indeed, been said,* that even in seminaries professedly dedicated to the cultivation of learning, a desultory and superficial sort of reading has succeeded in the place of patient and systematical study; that dullness and vanity have, with insolent profanation, seized for their own use, the noblest discoveries of genius, and the brightest improvements of taste; that the presumptuous sciolist has

* I content myself with stating and censuring these injurious representations of our universities. Of the authors I say only as Herodotus says of some Greek plagiaries, Εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα, οὐ γράφω.

usurped the honours due only to the profound scholar; and that the ambition of young men is exercised, not in exploring the dark and deep mine where alone our forefathers searched after truth, but in decking themselves in a slight and gaudy attire of accomplishments, numerous without order, and ornamental without use. We are also told that the higher, and even the middle classes of mankind, lavish their time upon publications which unbrace the vigour of their understandings, degrade the dignity of their manners, and contaminate the purity of their principles. The former of these complaints is not only invidiously exaggerated, but, I trust, is utterly groundless. For the latter, I with sorrow confess there is too much foundation; and yet I never heard it proposed by the most froward murmurer, or the most refining innovator, that all the avenues to trifling or pernicious knowledge should be violently barred up, especially in an age when the path to that which is useful lies open to the same persons, and may also be found nearly with the same ease. If then we do not exclude the opulent and independent members of the community from an education which is so often perverted, why should we refuse to the poor that information which they are most unlikely to pervert? Tied down as they are to their daily tasks, and content with their little earnings, they have no leisure to trifle away, no curiosity to indulge, no superfluities of money to squander upon such books as would relax their industry, inflate their pride, and poison their morals.

That charity-schools are not wholly useless, may, I think, be inferred from the concessions of those who, however they may oppose these schools in the present state of society, would feel some alarm if the poor were universally incapable of reading and writing. If, then, it be in some degree, and in some circumstances, an advantage to read and to write, it becomes the objectors to shew, not by vague surmises and hardy assertions, but in definite terms, and by clear evidences, the limits by which charities of this sort ought to be circumscribed. In the progress of our social improvements these qualifications are beginning to be accessible to the poor, and therefore we require some argument, founded upon the known condition of the world, to convince us, that we are extending our measures beyond the real wants of individuals, and the real exigencies of the public good. But that we do not remotely counteract the one, and that we are actually supplying the other, will appear from a plain state of the question. For, after all the complaints that have been urged against making the poor too enlightened, or too proud, what, may we ask, is in these schools professedly taught? Nothing more, surely, and nothing less, than the fundamental principles of morality and religion—principles, which every man is interested in knowing, which by our plan of instruction are sufficiently known, and which, among those who are not so instructed, are known very imperfectly, or very erroneously. At what time are they taught? When the mind is capable of receiving the best impressions, and when the body

is not strong enough to endure any severe toil. To whom is the office of teaching consigned? To persons who are qualified to perform what they undertake, and who are exposed to censure, if they are negligent in performing it. In what situation does the learner himself stand? He is under the eye of superiors, who are justly the objects of his reverence, and of benefactors, who have a claim upon his gratitude. He is in the presence of boys, whose improvement will excite emulation when it is rewarded, and whose faults, when they are punished, will deter him from imitation. Now the same instruction, conveyed under different circumstances, would probably be productive of less beneficial effects. The diligence of a boy, if exerted and praised only in solitude, would lose much of its vigour. His peculiarities in temper and in manners would not be worn away by the constant and gentle attrition of surrounding examples. His aversion to labour, though it might yield to harsh expedients, would not be overcome by that mechanical sense of obligation, and that instinctive spirit of conformity, which operate most advantageously in large seminaries, where all feel themselves impelled to execute at some time or other, and in some degree or other, what is required of all. It appears, therefore, that in these schools, as well as in other charitable institutions, your bounty is employed in a better direction, and acts with greater effect, than in cases where it is exercised only by individuals for the sake of individuals, and consequently must want the regularity of system, and the energy of combination.

But upon the general utility of charity-schools, as I have, upon a similar occasion, already delivered my sentiments to you and to the public, I now will pursue my enquiries no farther. While, however, I confess my inability to fortify those sentiments by many new arguments, I will not pass over in silence one circumstance which is not dishonourable, I trust, to myself, and the mention of which, I am persuaded, will not be disagreeable to you.

Since the publication of a former Sermon I have met with a book which I conceive to be of very dangerous tendency, because it is written with that wily ambiguity of language which confounds the well-meaning, and with that uncouth yet captivating air of buffoonery, which is too apt to recommend licentious opinions to a numerous class of readers, who are already prejudiced on the side of licentiousness. The writer (of whom I have spoken in the first part of this discourse), with an effrontery equally shocking to decorum and humanity, contends for the abolition of charity-schools. Over false policy he has thrown a veil of false philanthropy, by representing almost every kind and every degree of knowledge in the lower class of men, not only as useless, but even as destructive. Now this wanton and unblushing malignity of Mandeville, reminds me of the Barons, who, from a narrow jealousy, petitioned Richard the Second, that "no villain * should send his son to school;" when their infamous request met with the same repulse which

* See Barrington's Ancient Statutes, p. 271.

the same application would, in these days of enlarged and liberal thinking, undoubtedly experience. It is of a piece with the savage policy of the Spartans toward their miserable Helots. Or, to employ a comparison which later ages may justify, it springs from the same corrupt motives, and leads to the same ruinous consequences, with the customs of those Colonial tyrants who, in order to secure the extorted obedience of their slaves, condemn them to a state of helpless ignorance; who establish the blindness of the understanding as a measure for the activity of the body, and barbarously punish by torture those crimes which instruction might happily have prevented.

They who have imbibed Mandeville's spirit, are not ashamed to re-echo his sophistry. Hence the cause of those who oppose charity-schools is, I know, supported by specious pretences of tenderness to the tranquillity of the poor, and of a regard to the interests of the public. But when these professions are stripped of the disguise in which they are craftily enveloped, we shall generally find them to originate in the pride of those by whom they are urged, and to terminate in cruelty to those against whom they are directed. I hope, indeed, not to be uncharitable when I say, that the real sentiments of such men ought to be clothed in this language: "While the poor are in a state of depression they may be compelled to act in subserviency to the exclusive interests, and in obedience to the arbitrary commands, of their superiors. But should they once be enabled to burst asunder the bonds of ignorance,

they will soon shake off the yoke of oppression. Their intellectual improvement will be followed by an increase of their civil importance. When their opinions are set free from the shackles of error, and their industry is invigorated by the hope of reward, many of them will emerge from penury to competence, and from competence they will aspire to independence and to freedom. They will be placed in a situation where new rights will unquestionably arise, and where they will not want either the judgment to estimate, or the spirit to assert them." These, I suspect, are the dreaded effects which discourage the unfeeling and the proud from co-operating with us in this our labour of love. But surely every person who would oppose such effects deserves, in a civilized country, to be hunted down with infamy, and every measure that tends to produce them ought to be employed with firmness. Debauchery and laziness, hostility to the world, and defiance to the world's law, shameless impiety, and outrageous violence, have been hitherto the baleful fruits of the want of education. Let us, therefore, upon every principle of common sense and common humanity, venture upon the opposite experiment; and let us not cease from repeating it, till its pernicious tendency be evinced, not by precarious assumption, but by indisputable fact; not by the clamorous and insidious complaints of the oppressor, but by the actual and incorrigible misbehaviour of those who would resist oppression.

As to Mandeville's essay, the fame of it had often reached me in the conversation of those who were

entangled in the flimsy toils of his sophistry, or hurried away by the abrupt sallies of his wit. It gives me, however, great satisfaction to find, that in the whole course of his work there is scarcely one trick of misrepresentation which I had not detected, or one effort at reasoning which I had not defeated. I mention to you this success, not from any confidence in the abilities of the advocate, but from my zeal for a cause which is equally dear to you and to myself, from the pleasure I always feel in the consciousness of upright intentions, and from the experience I have had that plain sense is not easily overcome by the combined efforts of romantic speculation and acrimonious raillery.

Upon my former endeavours to justify the cause of charity-schools, I, for another reason, cannot look back with total indifference; for they were honoured, I well remember, by the approbation of a man * who has now paid the last awful debt of nature. The soundness of his understanding, and the integrity of his principles, will not hastily be forgotten by any one to whom he was personally known; and sure I am, that his discreet and unwearied exertions in promoting these charities will endear his memory to such persons among ourselves, as are actuated by the same amiable sensibilities, and engaged in the same laudable undertaking. But the pain which we feel from his loss will be much alleviated by the recollection of the

* John Thurlow, esq.

fidelity and care with which his important office * is now sustained—more than this, I should not say in the house of God; and, consistently with my conviction and my feelings, I could not say less. Be it remembered, however, that praise to the dead cannot be withholden without ingratitude; and surely it is paid with a greater propriety when it conveys, as I intend it should now convey, the most delicate exhortation and the most powerful encouragement to those among the living, who are animated by the strong and generous impulses of virtuous emulation.

Since the death of this excellent man the measures pursued in our schools have lost nothing of their vigour or their use; and indeed many regulations have been lately proposed which bid fair to correct whatever was amiss, and to supply whatever was defective.

But why, it will be asked, is any change at all attempted?—a question this, which upon subjects of government and religion many wise men have started, and which many ingenious, and, I suppose, well-meaning advocates for reformation, have been at a loss to answer fairly and fully upon the broad and sound principles of public utility. I mean not however to deliver my own sentiments, but to mark the conduct of others who are ambitious to proclaim what they think and wish. I would not infringe the sacred rights of private judgment, nor

* Mr. Thurlow was succeeded as treasurer to the charity-schools by Robert Partridge, esq.

would I cast undistinguishing reflections on the manner in which those rights have been exercised; and yet, when I compare, not by the precarious rules of politics, but by the surer test of morality, the behaviour and the language of the same persons upon topics of public and of common life, I am compelled to say, how frail and inconsistent is man! how differently does he think and act even from himself in different circumstances! how strangely does the same passion of pride seek for gratification from contrary causes, from pursuing ideal good, and from giving up that which is attainable and real! One moment he strains out a gnat, and applauds himself for sagacity—in the next, he does not suspect himself of credulity, when he swallows a camel. In those subjects which are properly submitted to the wisdom and authority of the legislature, the machine is vast, the springs are numerous and intricate, the removal of what is weak may obstruct the efficacy even of what is strong, and the smallest alteration in the dispositions of the parts may embarrass the action and deform the symmetry of the whole. Yet, upon matters which lie beyond the reach of common observation, and the sphere of common experience, eager is the disposition which the most unpractised men betray for change, and fixed is the conviction which the most ignorant express for the propriety, and even the necessity of attempting it. Upon these topics they decide without hesitation, and act without dread—doubt in other men, they impute to timidity, dissent to stubborness, and opposition to venality. But in matters

which are really adapted to their apprehensions, and really subjected to their controul, they listen to every whisper of contradiction, and they startle at every phantom of danger. Aversion to change in the generality of the world is, however, a temper which wise men may upon the whole think laudable; and they will be yet more disposed to encourage it, when the restless and undistinguishing fondness for experiment, which the general diffusion of knowledge has excited, calls aloud for resistance. Where I would oppose that temper in the limited concerns of this charity, I will deliver my own sentiments in my own words; and where I would express my fears of the contrary disposition in public affairs, I will first speak in the better language of a most illustrious philosopher: "It is good," says Bacon,* "not to try experiments in states, except the necessity be urgent, and the utility be evident; and well to beware, that it be reformation that draweth on the change, and not the desire of change that pretendeth the reformation." But in respect to your charity-schools, the utility, at least, of alteration is evident, though I should grant that the necessity is not urgent. No change is proposed which deviates from the original and salutary principle, upon which those schools are instituted. The possibility of doing what is now intended to be done, existed perhaps before. But charity-schools, like other institutions, advance slowly to perfection. We do not always turn our thoughts to what is practicable—we

* See Bacon's Twenty-fourth Essay on Innovation.

do not equally feel what is expedient—we do not meet with opportunities for carrying it into execution. Length of time in some situations creates those opportunities imperceptibly, and in others brings them forward directly within our notice. But when they are brought forward, shall we sit in a state of unfeelingness and inactivity? shall we forbear to do what ought to be done, because our predecessors wanted the inclination or the power to do it? We are not impertinently intruding our judgments upon such matters as are subjected to a power, in which we have no share, or such as require information which we do not possess even in the amplest degree. We promote no faction and indulge no selfishness. We regulate those concerns over which we have a right from common sense, and are under an obligation from common humanity to preside. We give not up the smallest portion of any advantage to which our charity-schools have hitherto been instrumental, and we direct our aims to those which it were to be wished they had long ago produced. We at the same time throw no invidious reflection upon others for omitting what we think it our own duty to attempt by these regulations. But in the mode of attempting it, there is, we readily acknowledge, great room for discretion, for candour, and for delicacy. The prosperity, and perhaps the very existence of charity-schools depend, we are aware, upon public opinion: and that opinion will, in its turn, depend very much as well upon the temper we preserve, as the arguments we urge, in the prosecution of any projected change.

Amongst us, then, no tricks of eloquence, no insolence of contradiction, no views of party, no influence of power or station, have the least share in promoting what is in itself wise and good. Every complaint is heard with patience, every objection is answered with politeness, every opinion meets with respect, and every error is treated with tenderness. Doubtless the sentiments of those who differ from us, may in some measure be affected by a sense of importance which is often connected with benevolence, and is also conducive, in the general course of affairs, to public utility. But it is a pride which we may sometimes ourselves feel, and which looks to the same honourable end we ourselves have in view, though perhaps through the medium of different measures. We shall not, therefore, shock its delicacy—we shall not triumph over its mistakes—we shall be content with guarding against the effects which it may produce in defeating those benevolent purposes, which, I trust, are equally dear to those who approve of our regulations, and to many of those who, from a confined, or a crooked view of the question, are at the present moment disposed to condemn them. We look forward even to their consent and their assistance—to their honest consent and their cheerful assistance, when the first alarm shall have spent its force, and when facts shall have established beyond contradiction the usefulness of those measures, which are now supported by argument. From these remarks upon the principle of your late alterations, I proceed to a more minute examination and a closer defence.

One objection to the former state of the schools was, that too much time was spent in reading and writing. But this objection falls to the ground, when you encourage the habits of that industry, to the better employment of which, reading and writing are themselves subservient. It has been said, that the instructions given in schools were often counteracted by the example of parents. You effectually put a stop to this complaint, by placing boys under the mild and more judicious authority which you either employ in your own person, or superintend when it is placed in the hands of others, by throwing new checks upon folly and vice, and by offering new incitements to discretion and virtue. Others have told us that knowledge lifts the minds of the poor above their situation, and agitates them with fantastic desires, which never can be realized. By employing them in the established business of the place, or in something closely allied to it, you prevent their minds from wandering, even if, under other circumstances, they were disposed to wander into ideal schemes of greatness. You fix their attention to the station in which they are certainly to act, and you prepare them for acting in it with propriety and success. Should it be pleaded (and of what plea will not a restless spirit of wrangling avail itself?) that our plan is too indiscriminate, that boys of the quickest parts are chained down to the same dull train of acting with the most stupid, and that neither opportunity nor encouragement is afforded to intellectual excellence, we are at no loss for a fair and decisive answer. They whose talents

are of the ordinary size, are engaged in such pursuits as we think suitable not only to their actual capacities now, but to their probable situations hereafter; and should the blaze of a superior understanding ever burst out, through incumbrances by which it cannot long be stifled, the phenomenon will not pass unobserved by many among us, who have no wish to contract the sphere of operation to the human intellect, and who are both able and willing to assist its most vigorous energies, and its boldest flights. But for the pure and lasting fire of genius, we must be careful not to mistake those little scintillations,* which sparkle suddenly, and as suddenly vanish into darkness from which they emerge no more. If the impetuous sallies of constitutional vivacity, or the early soarings of an eccentric ambition, be indiscriminately confounded with real and solid talents, we shall be induced by the illusions of our pride, it may be, as well as by a misguided sense of justice, to encourage propensities, which it would be more proper, and more kind to restrain.

An ingenious, and upon the whole a benevolent philosopher,† has expressed his apprehensions, that you make children "too proud for ordinary labour, and too delicate for hard labour." I am at a loss to reconcile the justness of this observation to the sobriety, the diligence, the peaceable demeanour, and

* Of such boys Quintilian speaks thus: Illud ingeniorum velut præcox genus, non temerè unquam pervenit ad frugem.—Lib. i. cap. 3.

† See Kaimes' History of Man, book ii. sketch 10.

the humble piety of the hardy race, who inhabit a country, where many of the poor can procure for themselves that instruction, for which they are here indebted to the bounty of their superiors. But sure I am, that if the learned writer had lived to see the plan proposed for these schools, he would have retracted his opinion, or would have confined it to other seminaries in which instruction is provided of a less excellent kind, and for purposes less comprehensive than our own.

Should it be urged against your measures that boys who spin are summoned to a task which belongs solely to the other sex, I answer, that if the complaint were true, it is little to the purpose; and at the same time I contend that it is untrue. It is little to the purpose for the following reason:

Where instruction is confined to few it may be diversified, as different occasions may from time to time require. But when numbers are to be taught, uniformity and stability are great advantages; and they become yet greater where the situation, the capacities, the present wants, and the future prospects of the persons concerned are nearly similar.

I venture to call the charge untrue as well as impertinent, because some of the persons who make it assign to their children in their own houses the very employment which they condemn as unfit or degrading in your schools; and because the same employment is professedly allotted to other boys in eleemosynary institutions of various kinds throughout the whole kingdom.

To encounter the suggestions of vulgar prejudice,

or of a false delicacy is an ungracious and a difficult task. How then shall we treat the objections of those who declaim almost with tragical solemnity upon the disproportion that subsists between the labour of spinning, and the strength of those who are in your schools appointed to spin? We may tell them seriously and justly, that sentiment is often at variance with reason; that some manual arts * which are now practised with general approbation and general success by males, were formerly confined to women, and that among the bravest nations of antiquity the employment of weaving was not thought more masculine than that of spinning. We may sometimes relax a little from our gravity, and address the objectors thus: "They who are endowed with the gigantic robustness, or aspire to the heroic

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* Lucretius thus states the progress of spinning, weaving, &c.

Et facere ante viros lanam natura coegit
Quam muliebre genus, nam longè præstat in arte,
Et solertius est multo genus omne virile;
Agricolæ donec vitio vertêre severi,
Ut muliebribus id manibus concedere vellent,
Atque ipsi potius durum sufferre laborem;
Atque opere in duro durarent membra, manusque.

Lib. v. 1353.

Γυναικεῖον δε τὸ ἱστουργεῖν παρ' Ὁμήρῳ.—Eustath. ad l. 30. Il. I.

Plato contrasts the use of arms with the sedentary arts, and probably included every method of working wool. See Alcibiades I. Serranus' Plato, p. 127. He calls the ταλασιουργία a μάθημα γυναικεῖον.

See Goguet's Origin of Arts and Sciences, p. 199. See too Iliad, vi. 400. et Schol. Æschyl. Vinct. in voce χερνήταν, lin. 891.

atchievements of a Hercules, may be permitted to spurn at an employment to which Hercules himself is said to have stooped, only in a delirious paroxysm of love. But mortals of common bulk and common strength may submit without degradation to the common lot of those who are around them, and if it still be said, that we condemn them to the weaknesses of Egyptian * effeminacy, let us put their sincerity to the trial, by proposing a substitute in the rigours of Spartan hardiness." They who now affect to be disgusted with the capricious tyranny of an imaginary Sesostris, would be scared, I doubt not, at the sterner regulations of a real Lycurgus. If then you give these children instruction upon the whole useful to them; if there be nothing really indecorous in the rules you prescribe; if your schemes jar only with the groundless pride of parents, and the perverse humours of boys, you ought not to recede from the resolution you have formed.

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* Nymphodorus, in the 13th *τῶν βαρβαρικῶν*, contrasts the manners of the Ægyptians with those of the Greeks. *Αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ἐν ἀγορᾷ περιπατοῦσι καὶ καπηλεύουσιν· οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὑφαίνουσιν· ὁ γὰρ Σέσωστρις, ἐκθηλῦναι τοὺς ἄνδρας βουλόμενος, ἅτε μεγίστης χώρας γεγεννημένους καὶ πόλλους ὄντας, ὅπως μὴ συστραφέντες ἐπ' ἰσομοιρίαν ὁρμήσωσι, τὰ μὲν ἐκείνων ἔργα ταῖς γύναιξι, τὰ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐκείνοις προσέταξεν.*

Quoted by the Schol. ad Œd. Col. lin. 352.

———*ἄρσενες κατὰ στέγας*
Θακοῦσιν ἱστουργοῦντες.

Οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες, κατὰ οἴκους ἕοντες, ὑφαίνουσι· ὑφαίνουσιν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, ἄνω τὴν κρόκην ὠθέοντες, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ, κάτω.—Herodot. p. 64. edit. H. Steph.

"According to the ordinary division of labour,"* says Smith, "which, so far as it can be introduced, occasions a proportional increase of the powers of labour, the spinner is almost always a distinct person from the weaver."—The distinction, you see, is founded on convenience rather than delicacy.—But those whom we make spinners when they are boys, may be only weavers when men. It falls within your plan to teach them one of these arts, at a time when the other is too laborious and too expensive to be taught, and when probably it would not be learnt by them under the eye of their own parents. "Now a spirit of industry,"† as a sagacious writer observes, "though not very quickly raised, may be soon transplanted." And what he affirms of nations, is applicable to smaller bodies of men. Hitherto, indeed, no provision has been made in your schools for the manual labour of boys.

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* Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. i. p. 10.

Plato, in his Republic, adopts this idea. *Δύο δὲ ἐπιτεδεύματα ἢ δύο τεχνὰς ἀκριβῶς διαπονεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν οὐδεμία φύσις ἱκανὴ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οὐδ' αὖ τόν μὲν αὐτὸς ἱκανῶς ἀσκεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἄλλον ἀσκοῦντα ἐπιτροπεύειν.*—Lib. viii. tom. ii. p. 846. edit. Serr.

The most extraordinary division of labour I have read of was among the Ægyptians. *ἡ δὲ ἰητρικὴ σφι δέδασται· μιῆς νούσου ἕκαστος ἰητρός ἐστι.*—Herodot. p. 75. edit. H. Steph.

† See the Appendix to the English Review for March 1785.

In the fleeting politics of the day I differ most widely from the anonymous writer. But upon the fundamental and general principles of policy and commerce, I always derive both the most valuable information from his profound researches, and the highest entertainment from his animated eloquence.

But the habits of diligence, which your regulations will cherish in these children, may be easily transferred to other employments more difficult and more profitable, to which they will be hereafter advanced. You in the mean while guard them from the awkwardness and reluctance which they might otherwise feel when they are first entering upon rougher tasks—You deprive the lazy of every excuse which they may wish to find in total inexperience, and you are preparing them, as I have again and again observed, for different scenes of action, in which their industry will be attended with greater advantage to themselves. In the choice of the work itself you are only to take care that it should not be dangerous to health, or very irksome in the execution; that it should be capable of being performed with greater and greater dexterity, according to the length of time and degree of activity employed in it; that it include such a degree of variety as may relieve attention without distracting it; that it be productive of some profit which may associate the idea of utility with that of toil, and that a part of this profit be allotted as a reward to him that earns it, in proportion to the alacrity he has shewn, and the skill he has acquired. All these excellent properties belong to the employments which you have prescribed.

I mean not, however, to answer every objection which the prolific imaginations of speculative men, or which a perverse spirit of contradiction in meaner minds, may suggest. But I am persuaded, that in your proposed reformation, there is a direct ten-

dency to remove many of the evils which a more confined plan did not entirely exclude, and the success already attained by other seminaries is, I think, a sufficient justification of your undertaking. You do not, I acknowledge, set up pretensions to the merit of originality: neither, let me add, have you been compelled to encounter the odium of total innovation.* There is a magnanimity, however, in adopting right measures, which, in some circumstances, is not less meritorious than the sagacity with which they were at first contrived, or the spirit with which they were at first attempted. From the prosecution of your plan, therefore, you will not suffer yourselves to be deterred by the prepossessions of the unexperienced, and the clamours of the officious.

To some men every change, as such, is offensive; and they are unwilling, either from laziness to contemplate the advantages of what may be better done, or from pride to acknowledge any imperfection in what they have themselves been accustomed to do. Others are desirous to grasp for sordid purposes, or to scatter upon frivolous amusements, the pittance which they have hitherto been used to wring from the occasional labours of their children; not considering the objects which you keep steadily and avowedly in your view, I mean the future proficiency of their offspring when they cease to be

* The plan for the Norwich schools is, I am told, taken from those at Bury. The boys are employed on alternate days in spinning, and in reading and writing.

children, and their greater capacity to contribute that share which every protected, and much more every favoured, member of the community owes to the public stock, when he has attained the age of a man. Many will be restrained from becoming the objects of your care in consequence of that parental affection, the excess of which is itself a fruitful source of mischief, the errors of which it is one very important object of your institutions to correct, and the operation of which it is your duty to cherish so far only as it pursues the end, for which it was indisputably implanted in us by the wise and merciful Author of our being. There is another, and, I fear, a numerous class of men, who will complain they know not why, and oppose they care not how. Their envious hatred of the rich they disguise to others, and it may be to themselves, under the specious appellation of disinterested solicitude for the poor; and if they perplex by their turbulence the measures, which they have neither the wisdom nor the activity to conduct, their vanity and their ill-nature are completely glutted. But, surrounded as you are by all these difficulties, you will possess, I hope, that perseverance which will not permit them to become formidable obstacles, that fortitude which will prevent them from acting upon your minds as discouragements, and that generosity which ultimately will triumph over them as accusations.

Your project, indeed, is now in its infancy. You must expect, therefore, to meet with impediments, some real, and some artificial; some arising from

ignorance, and some from obstinacy; some which you do not distinctly foresee, and some with which for a time it may be grating for you to struggle. But all of them will, I am confident, so far as you are concerned, give way in the end to experience; and when that experience shall have brought to light the superior wisdom of your measures, and the superior merit you have in planning and in pursuing them, the consequences will be pleasant and honourable. Every complaint will be hushed in silence; your institutions will be popular in some few of the circumstances where popularity may be considered as an advantage; and there will be a general anxiety to participate your kindness, and a general emulation to convert it to the best purposes.

In this strange and tumultuous world, amidst the narrowness of our views, the stubbornness of our tempers, and the unaccountable fluctuations of our supposed or actual interests, opposition is sometimes eventually serviceable to the cause which it is meant to injure. A keener and a wider curiosity is excited. The motives of men become better known as they are more suspected; and the reproaches of enemies, when refuted, are a surer proof of our merit than the panegyrics of friends. There is an eagerness in the well-disposed and the well-informed part of mankind to support and vindicate the injured party; and even they who have been most forward in raising objections, are, from conviction of their mistake, or even from the very fickleness of their dispositions, prepared to stand forth as advocates where they were once accusers.

I hope to give no offence by saying that very few of the explicit charges which I have heard deserve or admit a serious reply; and as to those which have escaped me, I must be content with opposing known conveniences to unknown dangers. You now form what, in the ordinary course of things, seldom exists — an early connection between the artificer and his future employer; and this too at a season when the former is not impatient of controul or practised in deceit, and when the latter has no opportunities to oppress, and no temptation to overreach. The innocence of a boy, his docility, his regularity, will let his superiors into a more exact view of his talents and of his virtues, and may create in them such an honest prejudice in his favour, as will induce them to employ him hereafter in a more profitable capacity, as well as to distinguish him for the present by ampler rewards. You crush in the bud all aspiring and vain imaginations — all wishes for opulence and greatness — all competition in expence and show. You lay open to these youths the humble path they are to pursue, and you at the same time reconcile them to its hardships by your discreet and tender counsels. You smooth its ruggedness, and hide much of its dreariness, by holding up to them the distant but encouraging prospect of a decent maintenance. You give them an earnest of the safety in which they will live, and even the little distinctions to which at some future period they may be entitled. You show them that the same habits of diligence and honesty which are immediately useful to them-

selves, will give society an interest in shielding them from the wretchedness of poverty, from the crimes to which it instigates, and from the ignominy by which, if it be associated with guilt, it is always overwhelmed.

That you mean to make particular acts of benevolence eventually conducive to the prosperity of the City at large, is a design, at the mention of which, the most delicate and most high-spirited manufacturer has no reason to blush. All public institutions, if they are wise and useful, look beyond the individual, and forward his improvement in subserviency to the general good of which he partakes, and to which he in his turn is expected to contribute. Will you then suffer these very considerations to slacken your activity which ought only to increase it? No, surely. Let your ample fortunes, your elevated situations, and your unblemished characters, be thought sufficient, for sufficient they are, to shelter you from the effects of outrageous invective and poisonous insinuation. Let it not be forgotten by yourselves, or by your accusers, that your scheme is approved, and that in the execution of it you will be assisted by men who are really and apparently above the reach of temptation — by men of well cultivated and enlarged minds, who want neither the penetration to discover, nor the spirit to resist, any abuse which the selfishness of individuals can be conceived ever to attempt — by men who, from the delicacy of their feelings, and the soundness of their understandings, may justly be considered as incapable either

of associating with any one subscriber who is unjust or imperious, or of lending the sanction of their names to any one purpose that is trifling or insidious.

In all regulations which affect numbers, circumstantial and temporary inconveniences will arise. But if those inconveniences, even when they are of considerable magnitude, are not permitted to impede the progress of legislative improvement, far less ought they to operate in private life; and yet less should they clog alteration in the prosecution of those schemes, which are begun and supported by the voluntary contributions of individuals. He that gives has a right to prescribe the conditions upon which his gift is bestowed; and he that receives is guilty at once of ingratitude and of presumption, if he cavils where he ought to submit, or, if in the very moment in which he is refusing submission, he exchanges the humility of request for the confidence of demand. To enlightened and experienced persons must it, therefore, be left to ascertain the advantage which any alteration may produce, and to point out the means of attaining it. Men of candour will, I know, always lament even partial offence, and men of benevolence will endeavour to alleviate what they cannot wholly avert. But when the good in view is important enough to reward the labour, and probable enough to warrant the experiment, it is not merely an instance of imprudence or of negligence, —it amounts even to gross injustice, and is an act of direct hostility to the general welfare, to trifle with the advantage which is placed within our reach, or

to be discouraged from seizing it by the babble of ignorance, and the cavils of captiousness.

The charity over which you preside is, in some measure, supported by the well-meant legacies of those who are no more. Be it so. But you do not trample upon their ashes, because you are acting as if the interests of the poor were not less dear to the living than to the dead. They certainly meant not to check you from guarding against evils which they did not themselves foresee, or from availing yourselves of opportunities which they did not themselves meet with. They intended not their charitable legacies to cramp the wisdom, to curb the authority, or to chill the benevolence of their survivors. On the contrary, they committed to you a trust which you are at this moment discharging, in the very spirit with which it was originally delegated, and for the very purposes to which it was specifically directed.

Amidst the variableness of human manners, and the fluctuations of human interests, it is scarcely possible for men of the most enlarged understandings, and of the kindest dispositions, to provide for future exigencies to the utmost extent of possibility. A presumption which common sense suggests, and which common experience has justified, will, however, always exist, that the founders of charities, if they had lived in our own days, would adopt the same opinions, and pursue the same ends. Hence even in societies, the conduct of which is regulated by express and solemn statutes, deviations are not always considered as a violation of the sa-

cred authority of the dead. Great delicacy and great caution are, it is true, necessary. But the affairs of men are sometimes thrown suddenly, and sometimes gradually fall, into such a situation, that we not only supply what is omitted, but attempt what, under the influence of past circumstances, or from want of foresight into those which are present, has been positively forbidden. Stubborn and peremptory as any prohibition may be, it is often controuled by indisputable and transcendental utility. But the measures you are taking are not in the slightest degree exposed even to this difficulty. While you are aiming at additional advantages, you do not give up the smallest share of the original objects for which these schools were founded. Children are yet taught to read and to write, and therefore, when you do not lose these advantages, what should hinder you from pursuing more? But you need not be contented with this limited justification; for, in your endeavours to establish other and new methods of instruction, you encrease the number of those persons, who can partake of the old.

The money arising* from the manual labour of

* "A moderate proportion of work, at the direction of a committee for that purpose, is to be allotted, and their earnings during that time are to be regularly accounted for; and in case any child should, by greater industry, earn beyond that proportion, it becomes the property of that child, and is to be set apart for his use. It is to be hoped, that in a short time the earnings arising from their stated tasks may be sufficient to form a fund, to be applied partly to encourage and reward the

your scholars will not be laid out for any narrow or selfish purpose. It will produce rewards for the diligent: it will furnish materials of employment for the idle: it will enable you to instruct more boys than hitherto have been instructed in reading and writing: it takes nothing from those, who now read and write. The propriety of your measures is sufficiently clear from these tendencies. But if objectors will not be silenced by the probability of what will happen, here let us call in facts to the aid of theory, and tell them what has happened in other places. Boys, I am told, are employed in the charity schools at York precisely as you mean to employ them here. The consequence has been this. The number of scholars instructed by the profits of those who work at spinning, amounts nearly to one third more than were formerly admitted. Experience has put an end to clamour in that city, and the same extensive success will in our own be attended with the same happy consequences.

Parents complain, as I before observed, that they no longer enjoy what their children earned in the hours of recess. To this it may be further answered, that they who receive much must be content to return a little. Even such an answer ought

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industry of the children, by distributing premiums to such as are more eminently industrious, and partly to assist towards putting out apprentices such as have deserved this distinction."

This passage is quoted from a clear and judicious account of the intended improvements in the charity schools of this city, which cannot be too attentively read, or too widely circulated.

to satisfy those who insist upon the argument with truth; but there is reason to fear that very few have a right to insist upon it at all. The children of too many, when they are dismissed from our schools, are loiterers at home, or vagrants in the streets; and the habits, they by these means contract, defeat the valuable ends for which these schools were instituted. We are, therefore, consistent with ourselves, and kind to others, when we prevent their neglect from counteracting our care. But we do more. We beget in these children more regular habits of industry, and we convey to them a more exact knowledge of the little arts in which they are employed, than desultory and solitary labour can bestow. We do not impose upon them such severe toils as will entirely disable the diligent from contributing at home to the support of their parents. We give them instruction, which is in some measure connected with the more laborious employments to which they will be hereafter summoned; and we provide, too, means of subsistence for seasons when the poor may derive many comforts yet unforeseen from the task you assign them. Those comforts may be found in change of place, in old age, or in an unprosperous state of trade. We will consider them separately.

By the unknown and unavoidable accidents of life, they who now reside among you may be removed to some distant part of the kingdom, where their skill in the established manufactures of the city will be of no service to them, and where, from untoward circumstanees, they cannot find any other

sort of employment. I know not that the case here supposed will often happen; but whensoever it does happen, your regulations will supply some little resources, sufficient, I should hope, to prevent extreme penury, and to avert temptation to those enormities to which inevitable and helpless want sometimes incites. All habits of manual labour acquired when the mind is active, and the limbs are supple, continue for a long time; and though suspended by employments of a different sort, they are recovered without much difficulty. The implements for spinning are by no means expensive, and the produce of it not being dependent, like the higher branches of manufactures, upon local opportunities for action, upon the exigencies of luxury, or upon the caprices of fashion, is sure of finding a purchaser at all times and in all places. But upon the advantages of which I am now going to speak I lay far greater stress. Incapacity for work of every kind adds much to the gloom and the dreariness of old age. What is not usually acquired in the early time of life, when it is not immediately wanted, and when amidst the bloom of health and the vigour of youth men are qualified for harder toils, may, if acquired, be easily and profitably resumed at some future day by those who now follow your directions.—It will cheer them under the painful consciousness of growing imbecility,* to find that some capacity for

* This thought is most pathetically expressed by Lysias. ἐν δὲ τῷ γήρᾳ ἀδυνάτους μὲν εἶναι τῷ σώματι, πασῶν δ' ἀπεστερημένους τῶν ἐλπίδων, ἀφίλους καὶ ἀπόρους γεγονέναι.—Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος, vol. ii. p. 314. edit. Auger.

action yet remains. It will soften every debasing and galling idea of dependence, to be in some degree qualified for supporting themselves. Such are the consolations which you are storing up for the aged; and even before the lingering and listless state of decrepitude shall have come, many unexpected and awful occasions may arise in which the usefulness of your regulations will be clearly evinced. No man can reflect without mingled feelings of compassion for the distresses, and of horror at the crimes, of the poor in a commercial city when trade receives any sudden check and the usual course of business is stagnated.—But if your scheme be carried into execution the distaff may be substituted for the loom; and however trifling such a circumstance may appear in a dim and distant prospect, many important benefits may be secured, and many dismal mischiefs prevented, when the fatal hour is actually arrived. The innocence, the livelihood, the liberty, and even the existence of many a poor man, may be the blessed fruits of that very plan, which they who understand it not, and they who are to be chiefly benefited by it, are now the most forward to condemn.

In seasons of distress to whom shall the poor flee for succour? shall they throw themselves at the feet of the rich? The rich may turn a deaf ear to their prayers. And should the suppliant be told, that if "he had not been obstinate in refusing the means of support you held out to him, and perversely doomed himself to inaction and misery, he would not now be starving" — what reply can he reasonably make to these cutting reflections? Spurned from the door

of the opulent, shall he ask a morsel of bread from the manufacturer? The manufacturer may not have it in his power to relieve those whom he has ceased to employ. His attention may be engrossed by the hardships which have overtaken himself, or those who are nearest and dearest to him; or through the melancholy weakness of human nature, his heart may be steeled by that obduracy and that selfishness which, in seasons of public calamity,* every sagacious observer of life knows to operate most forcibly and most fatally upon the tumultuous fears or the wild desperation of mankind.

Such are the immediate and such the contingent advantages which may result from your regulations. I mean not to offend your delicacy, but to expose the errors of those by whom you are censured, when I turn my mind to the motives by which it is even possible for you to be impelled. You are promoting no immediate, and many of you, it may be said, no remote interests of your own. You are not indulging that intellectual pride which seeks for praise from ingenious inventions. You are not giving way to the impulses of that activity which looks for gratification from arduous and perilous enterprize. You are planning not for yourselves nor your own families, but for other men and for the children of other men. You encourage, but do not compel them to provide for their own well being. You mean to

* See a striking description of despair and unfeelingness in Thucydides's Description of the Plague, book ii. ἀνομίας τὸ νόσημα κ. τ. λ.

protect, but not to betray. In order to promote their happiness you give up much of your own time, your own counsel, and your own money. It were therefore rash to dispute the wisdom of your measures; and to arraign the rectitude of your intentions, is in the extreme wicked.

But let those who cannot comprehend your designs forbear to blame them—let those who are unable or unwilling to promote them, be content with the negative merit of not opposing them—let those who do not aspire to the praise of active benevolence, endeavour at least to escape the infamy of positive malignity.

As I would not trifle with the prejudices of the poor, because it is illiberal, so I would not always yield to them, because it is unwise. And sure I am, that if your plan should be laid, as it were, on the bed of a Procrustes, in order to be stretched or mutilated at the arbitrary appointment of every ignorant and officious objector, all its proportions would quickly be defaced, its vital parts would decay, and their functions would soon be at a pause. But why, it may be asked, does any prejudice exist at all? I will not subject myself to the pain of enumerating all the reasons which may operate; such as the dread of appearing to be compelled, the desire of assuming a little momentary importance in resisting the will of a superior, the mere love of singularity, and other motives, which perhaps are of a worse complexion. But for the conduct of the poor, palliations, at least, may be found; and who that has a right to value

himself upon his candour and his philanthropy, would not be happy to find them?

If impertinent, and, I fear, wicked men, did not blow up a spirit of opposition among the inferior orders of our citizens, all these peevish censures, and all these sullen murmurs, would rage only for a short time, and be productive of no great mischief. Among judges so incompetent and so deluded it may be not worth while at all times and on all subjects, to plant arguments against misrepresentations. But on the present occasion some steps must be taken to check the causes of discontent; and in taking them, your candour will, I think, prevent you from encountering the unfortunate prepossessions of the poor with excessive and undistinguishing severity. You have too much wisdom to give them even a temporary importance by fierce oppositions. You will find that your words, in the beginning of the conflict, will sooth those whom it is impossible to convince, and that your actions will enable you ultimately to rectify all their hasty mistakes, and to allay all their groundless apprehensions.

Unwilling as I am to give way to the insolence, or to gloss over the corruptions of the poor, I always feel a sincere and painful compassion for their infirmities. Disgusted we indeed may be at the petulance, exasperated at the ingratitude, and astonished at the stubbornness of our inferiors; and yet, upon cool reflection, we shall find a great part of their misconceptions and misconduct to take its rise, rather from their contracted habits of thinking, than from a fixed malignity of heart. They see

very little, they hear much, they imagine far more; and from the effervescence of this confused and discordant mass arise those opinions which inflame their furious passions, and hurry them into excesses the most inexplicable and most uncontroulable. But a man of the world, doubtless, will perceive, that a little resolution well directed may confound the boldest, and that a little patience may beget in the most perverse a disposition "to hear and to believe." A Christian, calling to mind his own failings, will catch the forgiving spirit of his dying Redeemer, and will say, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

Pardon me, when, appealing to your sober judgment, and to your tenderest sensibilities, I thus stand forth to apologise for the poor. Your knowledge of the human heart will, I am sure, prevent you from being surprised if, not distinguishing improvement from innovation, they presume to impute your kindness to motives of latent selfishness, and your protection to indirect views of tyranny. Your discretion, at the same time, and your candour, will lead you to the use of such expedients as may disarm them of all their prepossessions, and induce them to give up ideal or frivolous rights for the sake of substantial and permanent advantages.

Uncommon it is not, and it is, I confess, exceedingly painful, for the best of men to have their best actions misconceived, vilified, and counteracted by the very persons whom they wished to serve. But to endure unmerited reproach forms no inconsiderable part of a Christian's trial. On the other hand,

our pride must be of the most abject kind if it suffers mortification from vulgar reproach; and our virtue surely is without stability and without dignity, if we can permit the course of it to be interrupted by complaints, which originate in the stupidity, or the perverseness of other men, or by the imputation of crimes, for which our "own consciences condemn us not."

Glad I am to find that even absurdity and querulousness have their boundaries; for, whatever unworthy opinions may have been entertained about the motives which induce you to alter the mode of educating boys, not a whisper has been raised against the regulations which are intended for the benefit of the other sex. In respect to them, there is no alarm about the wantonness of innovation, no suspicion of lurking deceit, no dread of usurped and perverted power.

The superior strength* both of body and mind which the Creator has bestowed upon man, is a manifest indication of the superior part he is to sustain upon the great theatre of the world.

Hence not only the higher improvements in science, and the momentous concerns of Government, are generally entrusted to men, but the more arduous employments even of private life are properly assigned to them, because they are most able to bear their pressure. That God has made nothing

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* Πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνὴρ· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς.—Plato, p. 455 tom. ii. edit. Ser.

in vain, is, however, a maxim not less applicable surely to females. They have wants to be supplied, they have passions to be restrained, they are capable of peculiar virtues, which ought to be cherished, and they are subject to peculiar difficulties, which ought to be alleviated. Their scanty acquaintance with the business of the world leaves them an easy prey to the seductions of the betrayer, and their unresisting feebleness lays them open to the scourge of the oppressor. Yet by a lamentable imperfection, which pervades almost all public institutions, less provision has been made for their happiness than benevolence, if it be consistent, would wish, and less even than policy, if it be sound, can warrant. The fact is notorious, whatever may have been the cause; whether it be that projectors, with a selfisness and jealousy sometimes imputed to lawgivers, are more anxious to provide for themselves than for others; or, that the bustle of active life seldom leaves room for subordinate considerations; or that the human mind is more powerfully influenced by sensibilities which familiar scenes continually set in motion, than by reflection, which goes in quest of objects however distant, and which surveys with equal attention all the relations of all the parts in a wide and complicated whole.

In countries totally barbarous,* women, for the

* The effects of barbarism and civilization upon the state of women are explained very accurately and very ingeniously by Professor Millar, in his first chapter on the Origin of the Distinction of Ranks. I shall not quote particular passages, but

most part, appear in a deplorable and degraded condition. They either are permitted to languish in sullen and inglorious inactivity, or they are doomed to toil in the most painful employments, without distinction and without reward. It falls not within the limits of this discourse to investigate the general causes of this treatment, or to enumerate the particular exceptions to it. Of the causes, it is sufficient to say that the most frequent and most efficacious of them are to be found in the "dangers to which men* were exposed of perishing from hunger," in the efforts they were compelled to make for "procuring the necessaries of life," in their obscure notions of duty, in the unsettled state of their property, in their love of excessive indolence, produced by excessive labour, in their extravagant admiration of military valour, and their ferocious contempt of domestic drudgery. As to the exceptions, every curious and benevolent enquirer is happy to meet with them in those elevated sentiments, and that rude superstition, which are recorded of the antient inhabitants of Germany; in the fantastic but generous spirit of gallantry that burst through the gloom which envelopes the ages of chivalry, and in the coarse policy which is said even now to

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refer the reader to the whole, as most worthy his perusal. But I have seen the subject no where treated in a manner so masterly as by the philosophical and eloquent Dr. Stuart, in his View of Society in Europe. See chap. i. sect. 2. chap. ii. sect. 2. The notes and illustrations on these sections are particularly deserving of notice.

* Millar, p. 55.

prevail among some tribes of North America.* It may not, however, be improper or unimportant for us to remark, that these exceptions relate, for the most part, not to the general condition of the sex, but to those who were distinguished by personal beauty or splendid birth; and that they operated more in the business of government,† which was confined to a few, than in those duties of private life which exercise the powers, solicit the care, and supply the wants of all the different orders belonging to a community. Now to perpetuate what was temporary, to extend what was confined, and to regulate, upon principles of an enlarged and profound policy, what, in times less auspicious, was the result of accident or whim, of national prejudice or traditional opinion, of blind passion in the savage chieftain, or of tumultuous affection in the heroic barbarian, is the noble privilege of those whom Providence has placed in a better state of manners; and let me add, too, that it is the indispensable duty of ourselves and others, whom the Deity has enlightened by the doctrines of a more sublime religion. We indulge our inquisitiveness in surveying the customs of past ages; we exercise our sagacity in exploring the sources from which they sprung; and we gratify our philanthropy in observing the alleviations which the great Governor of the Universe has scattered over the most imperfect and most

* See Millar, p. 62.

† See Millar and Stewart. See also Selden's Janus, p. 24; and Plato de Repub. p. 456.

wretched state of mankind. It well becomes us, then, to employ the same care in considering by what means the advantages of a more improved condition may be secured, extended, and multiplied.

Now, when nations have arrived at a higher pitch of refinement; when the harshness of man in his savage state is quite corrected; and when experience has shewn the necessity of employing every species and every degree of labour in the improvement of arts, women begin to assume a more just and more exalted rank among social creatures, who can value the importance of society itself. They are no longer considered as being, what the great God of heaven and earth never intended they should be, an useless incumbrance, or a glittering, but empty ornament. They are found to be capable both of contributing to our conveniences, and of refining our pleasures. Their weakness is therefore protected, their fine sensibilities become the object of a regard that is founded on principle as well as on affection, and their talents are called forth into public notice.*

* Περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὦ Κλέα, γυναικῶν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ Θουκυδίδῃ γνώνην ἔχομεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ, ἧς ἂν ἐλάχιστος ἦ παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ψόγου πέρι ἢ ἐπαίνου λόγος, ἀρίστην ἀποφαίνεται· καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τοὔνομα τῆς ἀγαθῆς γυναικὸς οἰόμενος δεῖν κατάκλειστον εἶναι καὶ ἀνέξοδον· ἡμῖν δὲ κομψότερος μὲν ὁ Γοργίας φαίνεται, κελεύων μὴ τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον τῆς γυναικός.—Plutarch. de Mul. Virtut. vol. ii. p. 242.

See Wolfius' Collection of the Greek Poetesses, and of the Female Prose Writers, each in quarto. The History of Female Philosophers which Menage has annexed to the second volume of Diogenes Laertius. See also, in the Supplement to Dodsley, an elegant poem, called the Feminead, by the learned Mr. Duncombe.—See also vol. i p. 520, of Gesn. Isag.

Hence the excellence * which some of them have displayed, in the elegant accomplishments of painting, and music, and poetry; † in the nice discriminations of biography; in the broader researches of history; in moral compositions, ‡ where the subject is not obscured by the arts of a quaint and spurious philosophy, but illuminated by the graces of an unaffected and natural eloquence; where, through the labyrinths in which are to be found the most hidden and complex principles of thought and action, we are conducted by the delicate and faithful clue of manners; and where, instead of being harrassed by subtleties which beguile and weary the understanding, we are led, by a sort of magical attraction, through a long and varied train of sentiments, which charm and improve the heart. Hence the employment

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* The truth of this assertion will be readily admitted in an age which, like our own, may boast of an Aikin and a More, a Sheridan and a Seward, a Brooke and a Burney, a Carter and a Montague. In this splendid catalogue might be justly placed a lady, whose name, indeed, I am not at liberty to mention, but whose virtues are well known among the patrons of our charity-schools, whose taste has been happily displayed in the decoration of our Cathedral, and whose poetical compositions are eminently distinguished by harmony of numbers, by elegance of diction, and by delicacy of sentiment.

To the productions of such women, the most accomplished and profound scholar would not disdain to transfer the panegyric which Socrates bestows on the eloquence of Aspasia. See the Menexenus, in fine.

† Η' οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάξομεν, γυναικὶ δὲ οὐδέν; πῶς; ἀλλ' ἔστι γὰρ (οἶμαι] ὡς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ μουσικὴ φύσει.—Plato, p. 455. tom. ii.

‡ Τι δὲ, φιλόσοφος ἔστι γυνὴ; ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα.—Plato, p. 456.

assigned to others in many different branches of manual labour; and hence too the provisions, which in these later times have been made for the repose of their declining age, for their comfort in the pangs of child-birth, and for their recal to those paths of virtue, from which, in the giddy moments of youth, and amidst the treacherous snares of seduction, they had unhappily wandered.

But to the education of young women in the humbler classes of society, sufficient attention has not hitherto been shewn. In Popish countries, indeed, the monastic life affords an asylum to the friendless, and employment for the industrious. But in our own nation, where they may be protected surely as efficaciously, and far more becomingly employed, no substitute for the advantages afforded by monasteries has appeared; unless, indeed, we look to some hospitals into which young persons of both sexes are admitted. These exceptions, however, do not take away the general defect; and at the same time they ought to be an additional incentive for us to supply it, so far as our plan will allow.

That the sensibilities of females are more keen, and their apprehension more quick than those of boys, is, I believe, generally admitted. In conformity to this distinction, therefore, your scheme for the education of females comprehends a greater variety of objects than it is either necessary or practicable for you to pursue in the instructions you give to the other sex. I proceed, then, to explain, and should there be occasion for it, to justify this part of your system by a more minute detail.

Religion, doubtless, upon the great scale of national utility and moral obligation, is equally attainable and equally salutary to men and women. The latter, however, from the tranquillity, it may be, of their situations, and from the exquisiteness of their feelings, are more susceptible during their youth of pious impressions, than the roving and gay dispositions of boys. A writer,* whose elegant attainments and splendid diction give too much popularity even to his errors, has, I know, indulged himself in many petulant and contemptuous scoffs at the weakness of female superstition. To those scoffs I oppose the general opinion, not merely of the wise and good, but of every person who is not singular in sentiment as well as habit, and corrupt in principle as well as practice. Religion is thought to plant such securities around the innocence of females, and to shed such a lustre upon their virtues, that the avowed and open contempt of it in a woman is shocking to our sensibilities as well as to our reason. There is, on the other hand, a lovely and captivating grace in female piety, which men of the most exalted understanding are not ashamed to admire, and which the philosophical scorner is unable to attain. With consummate propriety then, have you taken care that these children should be early trained up in the love and fear of God; and by familiarizing to their minds those awful sentiments which the belief of a Deity inspires, you have guarded them from the fatal and extravagant errors,

* Mr. Gibbon.

which a sense of religion, if it comes on later in life, is too apt to produce.

As to the acquisitions of mere reading and writing, they are eminently serviceable to boys; but in regard to females, I do not conceive them to be of equal use, unless they be accompanied by other attainments of a more domestic nature. Those attainments, I confess, have not been entirely neglected by you upon former occasions. But the means for pursuing them are likely to be conducted with more regularity, and to a greater extent, in the plan which has been lately formed.

Something, perhaps, ought to be said about the mode in which this plan will be executed. Yet, from my unwillingness to offend, and from my dread of being misconceived, I have a difficulty in expresing what I really think. Let others then decide, what degrees of concession ought to be made from the many to the few; how far general rules may be relaxed in accommodation to temporary and particular circumstances; to what extent the executive power should be controuled by the deliberative in the education of females by females; where the rights of a trustee terminate, and where the privileges of a committee begin. For my own part, I think that discussions of this kind, antecedently to the occasions that call for them, will not often be satisfactory to men of good sense; and, I am persuaded, that all questions leading to such discussions, should either be industriously shunned, or entered upon dispassionately, and pursued with an unfeigned spirit of mutual civility and mutual confi-

dence. As the division of labour facilitates every kind of employment immediately, and ultimately increases the aggregate effects, so in the management of these schools, a separation of offices alloted to men and women, will prevent much unnecessary delay in the exertions of both. I would add, that by transferring a power which we cannot ourselves use, to the extent in which it may contribute to the improvement of these children, we do not renounce any right, which a judicious and truly benevolent subscriber would desire to retain. The matter stands thus: Men, as your common sense will tell you, are the most competent judges of the instruction and government which are necessary for boys; and women, for reasons equally obvious, and equally cogent, must have more correct apprehensions of the methods which are fit to be pursued in the education of their sex. We have both of us our own distinct provinces: we possess distinct qualifications for carrying on respectively the business of them with propriety; we are engaged in a common cause; we are influenced by the same common motives of humanity; and surely we shall not be so unwise or so perverse, as to sacrifice the real and solid advantages of our charity to a tenaciousness of petty or imaginary rights. It cannot reasonably be expected, that the female patronesses of these schools, who are persons disinterested in their intentions, elegant in their manners, and respectable in their situations, should bend to the drudgery of explaining minutely every opinion, or of vindicating formally every regulation. It were

an affront to those nice sensibilities which animate their exertions for the general good of our charitable system, to require that they should encounter the harsh surmises and uncouth contradictions, which in a large and mixed assembly cannot always be avoided. They whose pecuniary contributions are equal, and whose judgment, and perhaps zeal, upon some parts of our plan are superior to our own, must be permitted in their turn to exercise such rights as do not clash with the rules we establish for children, who fall more immediately under our own care. Great delicacy, I think, is due to their sex; great deference to their understandings and experience; and a yet greater portion of gratitude, to their diligence, to their ardour, and to their kindness. I will not, however, prosecute this enquiry through all the particulars into which it might lead us; and in delivering my general sentiments, I consider myself only as speaking what your own politeness has already prompted you to wish, and your own wisdom will certainly induce you to practise.

I am not assuming the language of affected singularity or paradoxical theory, when I say, that in the present condition of society, females, from accident rather than system, have, upon the whole, the advantage over us in point of education. We read critically the ancient writers—we diligently investigate natural causes—we wind through the mazes of logic, and endeavour to fathom the depths of metaphysics. Yet I have reason to fear, that the instructions given to young men have not always so

direct and full a tendency * as might be wished, to qualify them for active life, or to promote those ends to which all the exercise we assign to the understanding in the sciences, and all the polish we can give it from literature, should be ultimately subservient. But "women," † says an acute and

* In recommending the study of ethics to young academics, I am supported by the high authorities of Johnson and Thomas Warton. No man feels a more sincere veneration than I do for the abstruse sciences in which they are engaged, and in which many of them, I know, make a most laudable and honourable proficiency. But I hope to give no offence, in applying to those, and to those only, who do not make a right use of philosophical knowledge, or who pursue it to the total neglect of other kinds of learning, the following passages from my favourite moral writer: Πάντες γὰρ, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, οἱ ἀρχόμενοι φιλοσοφεῖν, τοὺς πρὸς δόξαν λόγους διώκουσι μᾶλλον, οἱ μὲν, ὥσπερ ὄρνιθες ἐπὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τὸ ὕψος ὑπὸ κουφότητος καὶ φιλοτιμίας καταίροντες, οἵδε ὥσπερ τὰ σκυλάκια (φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων) τῷ ἕλκειν καὶ σπαράττειν χαίροντες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἔριδας καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα χωροῦσιν· οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τοῖς Διαλεκτικοῖς ἐνδύντες, εὐθὺς ἐπισιτίζονται πρὸς σοφιστείαν.—Plutarch. de Profect. Virtut. Sent. vol. ii. p. 78.

Μᾶλλον δ' ἄν τις ἀκροάτου καταγελάσειεν εἰς μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα προβλήματα τὸν διαλεγόμενον κινοῦντος· οἷα τερθρευόμενοι τινες τῶν νέων, καὶ παρεπιδεικνύμενοι Διαλεκτίκην ἢ μαθηματικὴν ἕξιν, εἰώθασι προβάλλειν περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀρίστων τομῆς, καὶ τίς ἡ κατὰ πλευρὰν ἢ κατὰ Διάμετρον κίνησις· πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὸ ὑπὸ Φιλοτίμου πρὸς τὸν ἔμπυον καὶ φθισιῶντα ῥηθέν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐλάλησεν αὐτῷ φαρμάκιον αἰτῶν πρὸς παρωνυχίαν, αἰσθόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς χρόας καὶ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τὴν Διάθεσιν, Οὐκ ἔστι σοι (φησὶν) ὦ βέλτιστε, περὶ παρωνυχίας ὁ λόγος· οὐδέ σοι τοίνυν, ὦ εἰς νεαρία, περὶ τοιούτων ζητημάτων ὥρα σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πῶς οἰήματος καὶ ἀλαζονείας, ἐρώτων τε καὶ φλυαρίας ἀπολύθεις, εἰς βίον ἄτυφον καὶ ὑγιαίνοντα καταστήσεις σαυτὸν.—Plutarch. de Auditione, vol. ii. p. 43.

† See Smith, vol. iii. p. 181.

penetrating writer, whose opinion I have eagerly applied to our cause, wheresoever it was possible, "are taught what their parents and guardians judge it necessary, or useful for them to have, and they are taught no more. Every part of their education tends to some useful purpose, to form their minds to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, to economy, to render them both likely to become mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they become such. In every part of her life a woman feels some advantage or conveniency from every part of her education."—To this animated and animating description few exceptions are to be found; unless, in the lower ranks of life, where useful knowledge is rarely taught, and in the very highest, where trifling accomplishments, says an ingenious essayist,* "are too often permitted to usurp the whole attention of their earlier years."

Whether the sagacious Dr. Smith be, or be not, mistaken in assigning the causes of those defects, which, in his opinion, may be imputed to our public plans for a learned education, were an invidious, and upon the present occasion, a superfluous enquiry; let it be, however, some consolation to us, that the objections he makes to the imperfect and unprofitable education of males, do not reach to our own plan for the instruction of these boys; and let us also remember, that, as the protectors of females, we may secure for the lower classes, those important

* Dr. Gregory, in his Essays lately published.

objects which he considers as attainable by every class.

In the general tendency then of your regulations for the instruction of young women, I have seen the strongest appearances both of solid sense and the most refined delicacy. The punishments which you have appointed for laziness and irregularity, are at once efficacious to the offender, and unalarming to the humane spectator. The employments which you have prescribed may be stretched almost through the whole circle of female duty and female economy, by those who are to pursue them.* They contain whatever can be useful to them, whether as mistresses of little families which are their own, or as servants in the families of their superiors. They are calculated to cherish that prudence which is necessary in every station, and that cleanliness which is peculiarly ornamental to the female sex. They tend to produce such habits of industry as are connected with the immediate business of these little ones, and such too as they can with ease and with advantage carry into the very few domestic employments which are not directly included within our plan.

Great praise is, I think, due to the gradations which you have established. All are protected and instructed; all are at the same time encouraged to

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* —— Lydas tamen illa per urbes
Quæsierat studio nomen memorabile: quamvis
Orta domo parvâ, parvis habitârat Hypœpis.
Ov. Metam. lib. vi. 11.

aspire to more honourable protection and more useful instruction. You hold out rewards to the diligent and to the obedient; and those rewards, while they are accompanied by a pleasing reflection on the causes from which they proceeded, carry with them qualifications for higher excellence, and for recompence more lucrative, and for distinctions more flattering. No partiality towards individuals, no recommendations from friends, no importunate solicitations from parents, will be suffered to influence your choice in advancing those children from the lower schools, to that which in dignity and in utility is the first.* That advancement is intended as a reward for their past good behaviour, and will operate, I doubt not, as an incentive to their future. At the same time they who lose, as well as those who gain promotion, are eventually improved by their endeavours to deserve it.

The imperfection of your former plan appears from one circumstance, which I heard with sorrow for what has been, and which I now mention with

* "A superior school is to consist of twenty or twenty-five girls, as it may happen, who are to be admitted at the age of eleven years, and to continue there till they are sixteen years of age. In this school they are to be lodged, maintained, clothed, and instructed in reading and writing. No female servant is to be kept in the house, but these children are, in their turns, to discharge all the useful domestic employments of women; they are to be taught the common business of a family, to wash, bake, brew, cook, and to learn every species of behaviour and work that is suitable for servants at first, and for mistresses of families, in case they should afterwards be called upon to act in that sphere."

pleasure, in the expectation of what will hereafter be. When enquiry was made about children whom you might elect into the higher schools, the list of those who from their age or their attainments, were capable of being elected, fell short of the number whom your resources enabled and your regulations directed you to admit. But when so much new instruction is given, and so many new incitements are proposed for attending to it, this melancholy deficiency will, I hope, never again be experienced. According to the large scheme that will be now adopted, you are securing more effectually and more immediately those ends for which your schools are primarily intended — you fill up the wide gap that was left between childhood and youth — you prevent the negligence or the bad examples of parents, from corrupting the good opinions which you have planted, and the good habits which you have encouraged — you guard these young women from vice and misery, at a season in which they stand most in need of assistance and counsel. Formerly, when they left your schools they were seldom old enough to enter upon any useful employments; but many of them now will not be dismissed till they are qualified for such labours as in their stations are of the most importance. At that critical time of life when the passions are strong, and when ignorance of the world lays young women open to the most formidable dangers,* they will be guided by your advice, and pro-

* To those who are young, and beautiful, and indigent,

tected by your favour. All the virtuous sentiments which they have imbibed, and all the useful habits which they have contracted, will be exercised and confirmed. They will continue obedient to authority, active in business, and fervent in prayer. They will be acquiring new information for the better prosecution of their remote interests, and new strength to resist the temptations which may soon surround them.

From the mere circumstance of having protection administered by a female, the minds of females will probably derive a secret and exquisite satisfaction, that softens every affliction and heightens every enjoyment. Their harmless vanity will be gratified, when they receive favours that are not bestowed upon them with a slovenly or contemptuous air. Their eyes will sparkle with joy, and their

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every sincere lover of virtue, and every correct observer of life, will anticipate me in applying these beautiful lines.

Τέρειν' ὀπώρα δ' εὐφύλακτος οὐδαμῶς.
Καρπώματα στάζοντα κηρύσσει Κύπρις.
Καὶ παρθένων χλιδαῖσιν εὐμόρφοις ἔπι
Πᾶς τις παρελθὼν ὄμματος φελκτήριον
Τόξευμ' ἔπεμψεν, ἱμέρου νικώμενος.

Æschyl. Supplices, l. 1012.

The reader of taste and sensibility will naturally recollect the language of the dying Chrysis:

—— hujus formam atque ætatem vides,
Nec clam te est, quam illi nunc utræque inutiles,
Et ad pudicitiam et ad rem tutandam fient.

Terent. Andr. act i. scene v.

I pray God that these most instructive and pathetic words may sink deeply into the heart of every young man who may cast his eye upon this note.

bosoms will glow with gratitude, when they are visited by persons to whose superiority in birth, in station, in politeness of manners, and in variety of accomplishments, they are accustomed to look up with reverence and admiration.

The usefulness of female superintendence is not confined to the dexterity that may be acquired in the tasks, which are enjoined these scholars. Many amusements which at once are entirely innocent and highly pleasing, in their hours of leisure, many preservatives for their health, and many comforts for them in seasons of sickness, may be pointed out, in consequence of the minute and vigilant attention which is now shown to every want, however remote, and every convenience, however inconsiderable.

Under the auspices of such guardians, many secret faults may be rectified which the broader views of men do not suffer them to perceive; many kind offices may be tendered which our rougher habits of thinking may prevent us from performing. These children may be set right in a thousand points of those petty morals, as they are called, which it is more easy to feel than to describe; and a thousand delicacies which, in the meanest station, adorn the female character without weakening it, may be properly taught them, under the inspection of persons by whom they are most accurately understood and most exemplarily practised. The sense of shame will acquire new keenness; the springs of emulation will be invigorated; all the little jealousies which sour their tempers will

speedily be calmed, and all the sallies of their levity will be curbed effectually.

Their discerning patronesses may see, in some one or other of these scholars, a faint dawning of that genius which adorned the female artist whom antiquity has celebrated, and which, in those whom we instruct, is not accompanied by any offensive vestiges of her impiety and arrogance. They will certainly not be slack in encouraging every appearance of uncommon merit; and however humble may be the situation of these children, or however confined their task, praise for performing that task well, when bestowed upon them by their superiors, and diffused through the circle of their acquaintance, will, to their little minds, have all the gay lustre and all the salutary influence of great reputation. It will gratify the honest pride of the possessors, and excite the emulous endeavours of others, who wish to possess it.

From the consideration of a plan so exact, so comprehensive, and so efficacious, our thoughts are naturally turned to the persons who are entrusted with the execution of it. In the prosecution of an important and laudable purpose, various are the motives for our actions, and different are the degrees of our merit. Some men are impelled to the relief of distress by the strong sympathy which similarity of situation excites; and others, by an ardent love of praise from those whose suffrages are highly honourable. Some encourage us by their good wishes, and others assist us by their money; but they are too indolent or too busy, too unexperienced or too

visionary, to do more. How much, then, ought we to applaud those persons who have undertaken the office of superintending our schools, who execute with delicacy what is planned with wisdom, and who supply by their particular attention what cannot be comprehended within our general rules. I will not, however, insult the labours of these excellent women with the cold and ambiguous name of condescension. They deserve to be classed in a higher rank of virtue. They are marks of good sense united with good nature. They imply activity without officiousness, and generosity without ostentation. They are performed for the sake of those who, when kindness is shewn to them, can make no return; and it is only in the applauding testimony of their own hearts, that the persons who perform them can look for a sure and an adequate recompence.

How congenial, then, are these offices to the characteristic delicacy and tenderness of females! How infinitely more graceful it is to guide the trembling hands, and to cheer the timid spirits of these little ones, than to flutter in places of public resort, to toil through the dull maze of silly and unmeaning ceremonies, or to glitter in the gaudy and meretricious glare of fashionable apparel! In the still and awful season of reflection, how will one hour thus employed console and exalt the mind, when whole days and whole years, trifled away in vacant listlessness, or in giddy dissipation, will be forgotten, as a sort of chasm in our exist-

ence, or remembered only with loathing and with sorrow!

While I view the lowering cloud of calamities which gather from various quarters, and burst unexpectedly upon the heads of many dependent and defenceless women, often does there rush into my mind that pathetic language which an antient writer thus puts into the mouth of a most affectionate and most afflicted father:

> "My sons are men, and, wheresoever fortune
> May place them, cannot want the means of life.
> They shall not burthen you — but, oh! my friends!
> What shall become of my unhappy daughters,
> With tenderest care beneath a father's hand
> Cherished so long? — Oh! take them to thy arms,
> Thou best of men" ——

In the anguish of Œdipus every feeling heart must sympathize, when it reflects on the helpless state of females; and in ages yet unborn it will redound to the honour of many worthy persons among ourselves, to have undertaken that merciful and momentous task which Creon was called upon to perform.

Upon the propriety of this part of your plan I look, therefore, with a most unreserved confidence and a most ardent exultation; for it tends, surely, to lighten many of those distresses, and fence off many of those temptations, to which young women are particularly exposed. Their interests are more deeply wounded than our own by capricious and froward employers, and their reputation is blasted more fatally by the unprovoked and unrelenting

slanderer. The delicacy of their frame renders them incapable of passing, with the versatility and the hardiness of men, from one kind of business to another. They cannot brave the violence of the sky and the change of climates; nor, when the means of support have failed them at home, can they seek for it in foreign countries, by roaming over the bleak and pathless desert, by climbing the steep and rocky precipice, or by traversing the vast and perilous ocean. In conjugal life, their whole care may be taken up in providing a slender pittance of bread, and a thin covering of rags, for their miserable offspring; or, in consequence of their inability to provide them, they are crushed under the scoffs and menaces of an imperious and brutal husband. Even when they preserve their virtue in an unmarried state, it frequently is difficult for the most submissive to fall in with the whims, or crouch under the insults, of their masters; and when they are excluded from servitude, the most industrious cannot always shelter themselves by honest expedients from the sharpest stings of grief, and the keenest cravings of hunger. Against many of these evils, the education you recommend can alone furnish them with resources; and if the want of those resources should drive them to snatch a precarious and disgraceful support in the wages of prostitution, their distresses, unpitied as they are, and even justified — yes, I must add, too severely unpitied, and too indiscriminately justified, will baffle all description.

In other cities, the prostitute may find a refuge.

We rejoice, as Christians and as men, that it is possible for her to find it; and at the same time we think a very high degree of approbation due to our own measures, because they will place females in a condition where, in respect to their chastity, they, with the assistance of God, "will need no repentance." Others remedy, but we prevent. And what, my brethren, are the enormities and the calamities thus prevented? The loss of innocence and reputation — the most inveterate habits of laziness and vice — the torments and loathsomeness of disease — the inability to escape from the taunts of monsters by whom they are first betrayed and then insulted — the forfeiture of protection from the world's law — the despair of receiving one transient look of compassion, one solitary offer of succour, one tribute of a passing sigh, which the heart at the sight of woe involuntarily sends up to heaven — of receiving them, I say, not merely from the churlish and venomous misanthrope, or the reserved and fastidious matron, or the unthinking and unfeeling youth of either sex — but even from those sweet and gentle natures whose tears, on other occasions, gush out abundantly at the first view, nay, at the bare recital, of much blacker crimes, accompanied by much lighter woe.

This part of my subject is so extremely interesting in itself, it is so closely connected with the best effects of our institution, and it has taken such fast hold of my attention, that I will, without reserve and without apology, open to you the most secret and most sacred sentiments of my bosom. Partly

from the solicitude I have ever felt to preserve those who are entrusted to my care from rushing incautiously toward the brink of temptation, and partly from the habits I have contracted of intense and solemn meditation on the awful constitution of the moral world, it has been my wish, and perhaps it is my lot, to have gained some little insight into the most hidden springs and the most intricate channels of that guilt and misery, which in the young we have occasion so frequently and so feelingly to deplore. To the hard, very hard situation of these wretches — but why do I call them so? they have not had the same virtuous education with you, and with myself; but they have the same understanding — the same feelings — the same Redeemer, and the same Creator. I will correct myself, and say — to the hard situation of these poor women, I often bend my sad and serious thoughts; nor do I ever suffer myself to speak of them, not merely with the outrageous and undistinguishing barbarity of vulgar minds, but even with that severity which is thought by some well-meaning persons a necessary tribute to the cause of religion. When I recollect the wiles that are practised against them, the infamy with which they are branded, the little share many of them have in bringing down destruction upon themselves, and the little pains that are taken by the very world, which condemns them for being corrupted, to preserve them from corruption, believe me, brethren, my fortitude and my piety have sometimes forsaken me, and, in the first perturbation and anguish of my soul, I have been tempted

to say, "Why hast thou made them thus?" But from these gloomy and tempestuous thoughts, which drive us on to "charge God foolishly," a good man quickly recovers with "fear and trembling;" and then he quietly passes into this wiser and better train of reflection. What they are they have been made, not by their God, but by themselves and their fellow-creatures; by the excessive wickedness of those who seduce, and, in part, even by the excessive and mistaken piety of those who censure them. Their calamities, however, are the consequences of their sins. They are, therefore, an awful warning for us to preserve our own innocence; they are, also, strong incentives for us to exercise our compassion meritoriously and profitably, not only by mitigating the sufferings of the guilty, but by leading those who are yet undefiled into a safer path. I mean not, be assured, to lessen the horrors of vice, when I recommend that candour toward the vicious, which in well-disposed minds is itself an additional restraint from their evil practices, and which operates chiefly on the hearts of those who are themselves virtuous. It is very easy, I know, from the malignant motives of degradation, and it is very right also, upon better motives of benevolence and of caution, to hold up to young minds the lewdness, the profaneness, and the ingratitude of prostitutes. But the seeming extenuations of their crimes will, by judicious management, become real and forcible preservatives against the contagion of their example; for it is equally easy and equally right to shew that most of their faults originated in the craft, the

profligacy, and the cruelty of libertines, by whom they were deceived and corrupted, and deserted and persecuted.

Even the just abhorrence of a Christian should be mingled with tenderness, and corrected by comprehensive views of circumstantial palliation, where it is to be found. We should recollect, that they who are now tainted by the last dregs of pollution were once spotless; that, goaded by perpetual indignities from the vilest and the lowest herd, they have gradually become callous to all shame; that, being abandoned by others, they at last despaired of themselves; and that, unaccustomed to meet with favour which might soften, or with counsel which might reclaim them, they lost the power of valuing, with the expectation of receiving, either favour or counsel. This method of considering the subject is wise and virtuous. It is wise, because, by proportioning our disapprobation to the real turpitude of crimes, we cut off every flattering hope of impunity in the imagination of those who are yet uncorrupted; we make our reproaches more formidable according as they are more just; and we counteract all the mischievous effects which are produced upon juvenile minds by the disgusting austerity of the prude, and the fascinating levity of the libertine. It is virtuous, because it prevents our breasts from being hardened against that pity which is the loveliest ornament, and, I am not ashamed to say confidently, what I am able to say experimentally, the surest criterion of our own purity. He that is himself "without sin" will not be the first

to assert his right of "casting a stone" at others; but while he rejoices gratefully and meekly in the consciousness that he now standeth, he will anxiously and humbly take heed, lest he should hereafter fall. If he ventures to blame the guilty, he will suspect it possible for himself to be sometimes wrong; but he will always feel the strongest assurance that he is acting right, when he endeavours to rouse the inconsiderate, and to protect the innocent.

I am not speaking to you in a strain of ostentatious and empty declamation—I am not terrifying you or myself with the spectres of a gloomy imagination—I am not calling upon you to lavish your sympathy upon representations of fictitious misery—No. I am only desiring you to open your eyes to calamities which really exist, and many of which it is really in your power to prevent. How many unhappy beings, not "trained up in the way they should go," are at this moment pining with famine, shivering with cold, and wasting away under the slow depredations of disease, without any habitation in which they can lay their guilty heads; without a spiritual director to admonish them, and pour balm into their aching hearts; without external succour to support them in the last lingering remains of life; and without one reflection from within, that can assuage the terrors of impending death.

But, had they been plucked away from the infectious example of wicked parents; had they not been brought up in that gross ignorance which cannot employ time well, or in that idleness which leaves the mind open to the contaminations of lust, and to

the corrosions of malevolence; had they been taught in some little seminary to read their Bible, and to handle the distaff, they might not have been plunged into this joyless and helpless state. They might have, at this very hour, been engaged as diligent servants in some sober and reputable families; they might have been even mistresses of a neat and wholesome cottage; or, at all events, they might have been guiltless and inoffensive members of that community from which, amidst the clamours of indignation, and the hisses of contempt, they are now driven away as a nuisance. Who, then, that reflects upon the dark and perilous state of man, will deny, that the terrible lot of the prostitute, unless your timely care should interpose, may await these guileless, these harmless, and some of them, it may be, friendless and fatherless children? Who that, with the discernment of a philosopher, or the principles of a Christian, weighs in the balance the numberless possible evils from which they are rescued by your assistance, will dare to scatter thorns in your way, to tease you with captious contradiction, or to make your well-meant and well-directed labours the sport of wanton and inhuman raillery? Hitherto, I thank God, no one has attempted so to do.

While the most censorious man may be challenged to fasten any positive charge upon your scheme for the education of females, I, as a firm and zealous friend of that scheme, must confess to you, that something appears yet wanting. Your regulations, it is true, are now recommended by the charm of novelty, and assisted by the fervour of fashion.

But what pleases from novelty will quickly cease to please, because it will cease to be new; and, as to the votaries of fashion, they are volatile, they are unprincipled, and they are equally incapable of any lasting satisfaction from what is praiseworthy in themselves, or of any acute sorrow from the remembrance of what is by others done amiss. Let us, however, congratulate ourselves, that, at the present moment, even the thoughtless and the vain, if such there be, are ashamed to remain quite inactive, when they hear the just and loud applauses which are bestowed upon the wiser and more amiable part of their sex. At the same time, let us look forward to such expedients as may encourage and perpetuate the assistance of those, who now concur with you from the purest motives in promoting the best ends. As to my own fears (for some fears I have), permit me to lay them before you in the words of a writer, in whom religion and learning have lately lost one of their brightest ornaments, and whom it is not an act of adulation or presumption to represent as summoned to that reward which the noblest talents, exercised uniformly for the most useful purposes, cannot fail to attain: "As the hospitals (we are only to substitute the word charity-schools) of the present time subsist chiefly by gifts bestowed at pleasure, without any solid fund of support, there is danger lest the blaze of charity, which now burns with so much heat and splendour, should die away for want of lasting fuel; lest fashion should suddenly withdraw her smiles, and inconstancy transfer the public attention to something which may appear

more eligible, because it will be new. Whatever is left in the hands of chance, must be subject to vicissitude; and when any establishment is found to be useful it ought to be the next care to make it permanent." IDLER, N°. IV.

I presume not to determine how far a permanent establishment is practicable in this place; but I have the highest authority * which this place can afford, for saying that it is very desirable; and I doubt not but your future efforts will be strenuously directed to the attainment of so important an end.

When the noisy and futile complaints now urged against you shall have sunk into oblivion, when the poor shall have learnt to pay the tribute of gratitude and confidence to the poor's friend, and when time shall have placed the utility of your measures in a right, and, let me add, a conspicuous point of view, contributions, I hope, will flow in from the wise and from the munificent. Happy shall I be to hear that these contributions are sufficient to fill up the measure of your benevolent purposes, and to

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* Of the person referred to I cannot speak more justly or more delicately than in the language of Demetrius Procopius, where he is describing the characters of some illustrious Greek prelates: *ἀνὴρ εἰδήμων τῆς τε Ἑλληνικῆς, Λατινικῆς καὶ Ἰταλικῆς γλώσσης, καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἀκολουθίας καὶ τάξεως ἔμπειρος· πεπαιδευμένος τήν τε θύραθεν καὶ τήν καθ' ἡμᾶς παιδείαν· σπουδάζει καὶ μελετᾶ φιλοπόνως τὰς θείας καὶ ἱερὰς γραφάς· κηρύττει καὶ ἀναπτύσσει τὸν εὐαγγελικὸν λόγον μετὰ πολλοῦ ζήλου καὶ θερμῆς ἀγάπης.*

See Demet. Procop. de Eruditis Græcis, articl. 73 and 76. in Fabricii Bibliothec. Græc. vol. xi. p. 796.

make the efficacy of them utterly independent upon languid or reluctant support, upon fickle or treacherous desertion, and upon pertinacious or boisterous opposition.

Reflecting upon the respectable stations, and the solid judgment of my audience, I have, in the course of my Sermon, ventured now and then to step aside from the track which is usually and properly pursued by writers upon subjects of this kind. I thought it unnecessary to enforce the general obligations, or to state the particular restrictions of charity itself. I have been more intent upon confuting the objections of your adversaries, than upon confirming the conviction of your friends. I have been solicitous to explain what you are doing, rather than to inform you what you ought to do; and as I well know that your zeal does not stand in need of any incitement from my admonitions, instead of employing the arts of persuasion upon your passions, I have endeavoured to plant before your understandings the evidence of facts. In any other place I should gladly exchange the coldness and formality of vindication for the confidence and ardour of praise. But in this sanctuary I must rather content myself with justifying good actions than indulge myself in bestowing even merited applause upon good men.

From my arduous employment among you as an instructor of young men, I thought it incumbent upon me not to treat the great subject of instruction itself in a light or a shallow manner; and from my unshaken attachment to the best interests of a

city in which I have lived, let me hope, without dishonour, and which I shall not leave without regret, I am sincerely happy in this opportunity of bearing a most open and most decided testimony to the wisdom of your regulations, and to the rectitude of your motives.

It remains for me to address you with the solemnity of a preacher, who is speaking in the presence of his God, upon measures of which that God approves, and with the earnestness of a fellow-creature, whose face, upon any similar occasion, you will hereafter "see no more."

I therefore appeal to your humanity this last time, for the sake of these innocent children who now stand before you; and I make that appeal in the name of Jesus Christ, who has lived and died in order to save both you and them. I exhort you upon every principle of social utility and of religious obligation, "not to be weary in well doing." I pour forth my unfeigned thanks to Almighty God, for the charitable disposition with which he has hitherto inspired you, and for the numerous benefits which have already resulted from your pious endeavours. I conclude with my fervent prayers, that these children may "never depart from the way in which they should go;" and that their successors, who in future ages shall be trained up by the followers of your venerable example, may ever continue in habits of diligence in their callings, of peace and sobriety in their families, and of gratitude to their benefactors; or, to speak in other and better words, that they may live in a state of constant preparation for the

tribunal of that Being, who once appeared upon earth "to preach his Gospel to the poor," and who will assuredly exalt both them and their protectors to everlasting glory in the Kingdom of his Father.

A

DISCOURSE

ON

THE LATE FAST.

By PHILELEUTHERUS NORFOLCIENSIS.

1781.

Ἡ ἐκεῖνο ἡμῖν θαυμαστέον μᾶλλον, ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι πόλις ἐστὶ φύσει; πάσχουσαι γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα αἱ πόλεις νῦν χρόνον ἀπέραντον, ὅμως ἔνιαί τινες αὐτων μόνιμοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀνατρέπονται. Πολλαὶ μὴν ἐνίοτε, καθάπερ πλοῖα καταδυόμενα διόλλυνται, καὶ διολώλασι, καὶ ἔτι διολοῦνται, διὰ τὴν τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ΝΑΥΤΩΝ μοχθηρίαν.

See Plat. Politic. pag. 557. edit. Ficin.

PREFACE.

THE author of the following Discourse, is a serious, and he hopes an unprejudiced Clergyman of the Church of England. He conceals his name, because he is not impelled by any motives of vanity to venture on publication; and he has published, because the sentiments which he maintains seem to coincide with the most useful purposes which the late Fast could be intended to promote. Those sentiments, indeed, are not likely to attract popularity, by slavish adulation, or seditious invective: they flatter the prejudices of no party, and are honestly intended to reform such immoralities as may justly be imputed to all.

"His ego gratiora dictû alia esse scio: sed me vera pro gratis loqui, etsi meum ingenium non moneret, necessitas cogit. Vellem equidem vobis placere, Quirites: sed multò malo vos salvos esse, qualicunque erga me animo futuri estis."—Orat. T. Q. Capitolini, Liv. lib. tert. ab urbe conditâ.

A DISCOURSE ON THE LATE FAST.

LUKE xiii. 2, 3.

Suppose ye, that these Galileans were sinners above all the Galileans, because they suffered such things? I tell you nay; but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.

THE occasion on which these words were spoken was this: Judas Gaulonites,* a man of a most boisterous and intrepid temper, had raised a sedition in Galilee, under the pretence of rescuing his countrymen from the ignominious pressure of the Roman yoke. Unfortunately fanaticism was at hand to supply fuel to those flames which faction had kindled. Hence the followers of Judas, in that blindness of understanding, and that frenzy of passion, into which they had been seduced by their leader, resolved to pay no tribute but in the Temple; to acknowledge no king but Jehovah. After this overt act of avowed opposition to the Romans, and of personal indignity against Cæsar himself, they appeared at the public sacrifices, intending, no doubt, by the vehemence of their clamours, and the notoriety of their example, to spread wide a spirit of insurrection among the inhabitants of Jerusalem. Their design was, however, crushed by the activity

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* Vide Josephi Antiq. lib. xviii. cap. 1. edit. Genev. 1535.

of Pilate; and it is remarkable that their offence was punished on the same spot where it was committed. In the temple they had determined to refuse the tribute which Cæsar claimed: in the temple they were cut off by Cæsar's representative.

Some Jews, it seems, had taken occasion to mention the fate of these unhappy men to Jesus; and from the sharpness of his reply we may infer the malignity of their motives. Forgetful of their own sins, and altogether unalarmed at the punishment that awaited them, they looked back with savage triumph to the miseries of the deluded Galileans. For this reason our blessed Lord at once mortified their vanity, and roused them from their insensibility.

"Suppose ye," said he, "that these Galileans were sinners above all the Galileans, because they suffered such things? I tell you nay; but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." Doubtless the Galileans had been sinners—their calamities too were justly and evidently the effects of their sins. But from these sins, however atrocious, from those calamities, however severe, no conclusion could be drawn either for the comparative innocence or security of their countrymen. None for their innocence, because the accused, who "suffered such things, were not sinners above all other Galileans,"—none for their security, because the accusers themselves, unless they repented, were likewise doomed "to perish."

In the words of my text yon may observe a kind of indirect censure, which you will readily allow to

have been, on the part of Christ, most deservedly applied, and most graciously intended. But through the secret magic force of self-delusion, that censure was soon forgotten by those to whom our Lord addressed himself; and in process of time the sentence accompanying it was executed with a most astonishing exactness:—It was executed by the very conquerors who had slain the Galileans, in consequence of the very crimes for which the Galileans perished; and on the persons, or at least on the immediate descendants of those very men, who had "told Christ of the Galileans," in order to sport with their misfortunes, and to blacken their guilt.

These things are written for our admonition. Whether we examine the private or the public conduct of mankind, we may observe, that the temptations of pleasure, and wealth, and power, are hostile even to their temporal felicity. Inattentive to the hand that protects, and the eye that watches over them, intoxicated with success, and pampered with indulgence, nations as well as individuals often abandon themselves to the wildest desires of the human heart. With an involuntary or perhaps an acquired indifference to their own situation, with the pride, though not the malevolence of Jews, they recount the faults and vindicate the sufferings of other states; and at last, in the midst of all their gay amusements, and all their towering projects, are themselves overtaken by destruction as by a whirlwind. This conduct, strange as it may appear in beings who are endowed with faculties to recall the past, and to explore the future, must not always be

imputed to hypocrisy, or deliberate uncharitableness. Where no restraints of false shame can be supposed to operate, and the actions of men are sheltered from impertinent and unfriendly inspection, few have the courage to descend into the depths of their own bosoms, to search out every latent corruption, and to provide against every distant evil to which they are peculiarly exposed. Much less then should we wonder at their lethargy amidst the common danger, where each man shifts off from himself what equally concerns his neighbour, and what his neighbour equally neglects; where all confide in others for expedients which none have the resolution to employ; where every doubt is misconstrued into singularity, and every fear ascribed to cowardice; where the blind lead the blind, and the audacious harden the audacious; where indolence makes the best of men unwilling to anticipate what, as despair tells them, cannot be prevented; and the worst, quite plunged in the enjoyments of to-day, set at defiance every mischief which to-morrow may produce.

One difference there is indeed in the dispensations of Providence, as they eventually affect men in their collective and separate capacities; and that one it is most necessary for me to point out, and for you to remember—I mean, that whatever inequality of distribution may be observed among particular men, the rewards and punishments of nations are uniformly and visibly accomplished in this life. The honest endeavours of individuals are often disappointed; their upright actions are misrepresented;

nor do they, in the sight of the world, receive any recompence, however their minds may be fortified against unmerited distress, by the hopes of future retribution. But in the affairs of nations, the proofs of a Providence are not left to be collected by the slow deductions of analogy: they are written in the clear and broad characters of experience; and it is scarcely possible to mention any one uncorrupted people, who have been totally destroyed. An enemy may have disturbed their repose, or an oppressor may have invaded their rights; but virtue has ever produced such harmony of opinion, and such concentration of strength, among those who happily formed at once the best and the greatest part of the citizens; it has inspired them with such wisdom in the council, and such vigour in the field; it has furnished so many resources both to repair miscarriage and to improve success, that they have at last risen superior to the machinations of internal perfidy, and to the assaults of outward force. In private life, we see men of the most licentious morals, whose judgment is reserved by almighty God to the last day, and the lustre of whose happiness, unclouded by the intervention of adversity, sets only in the grave. But there is upon record no one instance of a whole people, whom God, after delivering them over to an infatuated and reprobate mind, has not finally visited with the scourge of his displeasure.

The fact is incontestible, and the reason is obvious: for while the general tendency of sin to produce misery is ascertained by experience, and while

moral evil, when closely analysed, is known to resolve itself into natural, it is not inconsistent with the honour of God to continue even his abused mercies to particular persons; to grant a partial impunity to transgressors, where the instantaneous exercise of justice might immediately, and almost exclusively, involve in the punishment those who did not share in the guilt; to leave men in the possession of external advantages, while their minds, perhaps, are inwardly racked with the most poignant anguish.

On the other hand, states can suffer only in the aggregate character in which they offend. Religion tells you, that their sufferings ought to be inflicted, since it were fruitless to suspend the rigours of justice among those whom mercy, instead of leading them to reformation, would plunge more deeply in guilt. From reason you may learn that their sufferings must be inflicted, because the succours, which among individuals, are supplied by the righteous to the wicked, and by the prosperous to the happy, can have no place among a people who are corrupt without exception, and therefore are, without even a partial exemption, exposed to the consequences of that corruption.

As the popular representation of the punishments assigned to states has been extravagantly misunderstood by some, and unjustly ridiculed by others, it may not be improper to state clearly and concisely, what is meant by the expression. States are composed of individuals; and when I say, that the former can be only, in their collective capacity,

punished in this world, it does not follow that the latter are not exposed to further punishment for the very same actions in a future world. Nations suffer in the subversion of their government, or in the loss of their rights and privileges, or in the defeat of their armies, or in the diminution of their treasures. These public evils are often the effects of public vices, and are then called punishments; those punishments affect the aggregate of persons who constitute a state; and that state, including a community of interests and relations, which do not extend beyond the grave, is properly said to be capable only of such evils or punishments as can be inflicted in the present life, by the destruction of those particular interests, and the dissolution of those particular relations. When, therefore, the whole of a people are criminal, no part can have a right to be safe—where the majority are habitually and desperately wicked, the natural consequences that attend the vices of the many cannot be prevented by the virtues of the few; and hence it is, that flagrant and national depravity always demands, and always incurs, exemplary and national visitation.

Upon subjects of general utility, it is most becoming, and most safe, to speak a language that is in general use; for in the pursuit of uncommon and unnecessary precision we often excite doubts where we mean only to prevent mistakes, and extinguish the ardour of piety by the very arguments which are employed to disperse the gloom of superstition. Philosophy, it is true, has introduced many subtile

distinctions between the ordinary and extraordinary providence of God, and between his general and particular dispensations. But these distinctions have, perhaps, no absolute existence in the nature of things: they are only relative to our imperfect modes of conception, and serve as resting places to finite reason when fatigued and confounded in contemplating the works of an infinite Creator. For this reason I shall not enter into profound and intricate controversies, where, among the peremptory and discordant declarations of the disputants, the difference of their opinions is rather verbal than real; and where, upon every hypothesis which does not professedly deny all divine agency, we are authorized to say that vice brings on misery. While this is the case, the temporal calamities incident to wicked men are equally to be dreaded, and the moral dispensations of their Maker are equally to be approved, whether the sinner becomes wretched by the operation of ordinary or extraordinary laws, by physical necessity, or by judicial interposition. The designs of God are perfectly consistent with each other, however we may be pleased to distinguish them by forensic or philosophical appellations. Though judgments, in the common acceptation of the word, be totally excluded, the vicious man can derive no advantage from the exclusion, because he yet stands exposed to the sad consequences of his vice in a regular and established series of natural causes.

Under the government of that Being by whom those causes are appointed and controuled, seeming contingencies are the result of real and unalterable

design. Events, whether near or remote, whether trifling or important in our uncertain estimation, whether beneficial or fatal to our worldly interests, whether they affect families or kingdoms, whether they depress the most exalted, or elevate the most obscure characters, are, each of them, subject to the direction of unerring wisdom, and each of them conducive to the accomplishment of that extensive plan, the instruments of which are all the actions of all the creatures whom God has formed, and the end of which is their supreme and universal good. We may further observe, that while the projects of the wise and the actions of the virtuous more visibly coincide with the purposes of the Almighty, those purposes are virtually promoted by the very causes which may seem to obstruct them, by the stratagems of the cunning, by the oppressions of the cruel, and by the usurpations of the ambitious.

Whatever scenes, therefore, of confusion may present themselves to our views, which are dim only because they are confined, the Deity does not sit an inactive unconcerned spectator of what is passing in the world. When nation rises up against nation, when thousands perish in the havock of battle, and ten thousands are weeping in secret amidst the loss of their friends, and the plunder of their property, it were the excess of impiety to imagine that he who keepeth Israel slumbereth or sleepeth. Though on some occasions we discover nothing beyond permission or connivance on the part of God, he on those very occasions performs some acts of direct and positive appointment. Even where he seems

carelessly to have thrown the reins on the neck of human passion; where ignorant men suppose the rigour of his government to be relaxed, and wicked men make their boast that his "arm is shortened;" from afar he discerns the precise point at which t is most fitting to curb the impetuosity of his creatures, and to say, "hitherto shall ye come." In truth, the most secret counsels of man are not screened from him, who by "understanding stretched out the heavens:" nor do the most intricate or unwieldy machines of government create any embarrassment to that power before which "the nations are counted as the small dust in the balance."*

Enough has been advanced, I hope, to convince you, that the same providence which presides over the interests of individuals, determines also the fate of nations; and if this fact be established, it follows that the moral government of God is never at variance with the natural, and that the stability of public happiness must depend on the integrity of public manners. Such, therefore, is the wise constitution of things, that virtue becomes to every people the most effectual preservative, not only against inward decay, but external violence. Vice, on the other hand, insensibly, but surely, leads to danger.

That a corrupted state contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction, and that, cherished as it may be by some transient gleam of prosperity, it cannot sustain the rude blasts of adverse fortune,

* Isa. xl. ver. 15.

are positions not less supported by the reasonings of philosophers than by the evidence of historians. The same causes, it is well known by the speculatist, must ever produce the same effects, whether the subjects on which they operate be many or few: and with respect to the number of those who are holden together by the bonds of wickedness, and would "strengthen themselves in their ungodliness," that number, instead of arresting the uplifted stroke, serves only, at once, to accelerate it, by multiplying offenders, through the hopes of impunity, and to aggravate it by increasing the enormity of their offences. Ten righteous men may, in some extraordinary case, extend the reward of their personal merit to a whole city; but the combined efforts of ten thousand unrighteous men are of no avail against that Being, who may indeed be propitiated while his presence is acknowledged "in the still small voice," but who cannot be opposed when "the windows from on high are opened, and the foundations of the earth do shake." You well remember the conditions on which Sodom might have been spared; and can you then forget the reasons for which Nineveh, after the successful interposition of one prophet, and the neglected warnings of another, was at last overthrown?

Most consistent and most interesting is the lesson, which sacred and profane history alike inculcates, in opposition to those who would resolve all events into human agency, independent of the divine, and who suppose the pursuits and the fortunes of men to be determined by the impulse of blind

chance, or the decrees of irresistible fatality. After the measure of their guilt was filled up, the Canaanites were vanquished and exterminated. The Jews took possession of their land; and when they had, in their turn, apostatised from the God who first established, and then protected them, they were dragged into captivity. Immersed in voluptuousness, and enervated by sloth, the Persians sunk under the shock, when attacked by the brave and uncorrupted Greeks. But soon was the courage of the victors enfeebled by the luxury of those whom they had subdued; and they fell an easy, I must add, an inglorious prey, to the hardy veterans of Rome. Afterwards, the Romans themselves were destroyed, when the generous sentiments, the manly pursuits, and the austere manners of their ancestors had fallen into disuse, and even into contempt: when a spirit of ambition had inflamed the higher ranks, when a spirit of insurrection had divided the lower ranks, and a spirit of effeminacy and debauchery had poisoned all ranks indiscriminately. Their destruction, too, was accomplished by a rabble of barbarians, whom they defied without the power of resisting them, but whom in the times of ancient valour they might have defied without the imputation of rashness, and in the times of antient discipline they would have resisted without difficulty. Had no swarms of Goths and Vandals rushed down upon the Romans, had the "blast of the terrible ones not been as the storm against the wall," their ruin might have been delayed but not averted. The mutinous spirit of the provinces, the

brutal depravity of the citizens, and the outrageous licentiousness of the soldiers, would soon have produced the same effects with circumstances equally tremendous. Unquestionably the vices of the conquered have even proved more pernicious than the arms of the conquerors; and it may be laid down as an invariable maxim, that no empire, however fruitful in resources, extensive in dominion, or conspicuous in fame, can long subsist after it has ceased to be virtuous. Ostentatious magnificence, and the appearance even of formidable strength, it may still preserve; but on the first breakings of those tempests which hang over all the aims of thoughtless and aspiring men, its unsuspected weakness will be inevitably exposed in its unforeseen perdition.

Curious it is to observe the rapid strides with which the most celebrated States have descended from the airy and slippery eminences of greatness to misery and to shame. When the sword has been sheathed, and every alarm far removed by the successes of war, ingenuity and diligence are usually employed in improving those inventions to which men have been led by accident or incited by necessity. Refinement succeeds to improvement, and is itself followed close by corruption. Artificial wants then multiply beyond the power of supplying them; the dominion of appetite is extended farther and farther, till the objects of gratification, with whatever diversity they have been combined, and to whatever perfection they may have been wrought up are almost exhausted. The lust of pleasures gives new force to the lust of wealth, be-

cause wealth only can furnish the materials of enjoyment. To the depravity of private morals succeeds the extinction of public spirit, and all become ripe for revolt, because all are eager for plunder. Complaints are then reciprocally urged and retorted, by those who cannot govern and those who will not obey. Laws enacted to prevent evasion and violation, are themselves evaded by new artifices, and violated with greater audacity, Secret cabals are formed, open tumults break out, till some daring usurper rivets, in one lucky moment, the fetters of despotism on a lawless helpless multitude; or some foreign enemy, invited by the facility of conquest, bends down their necks to the galling yoke of servitude.

In this dismal catalogue of national evils it well becomes us to remark some circumstances which constitute, I think, the heaviest part of human distress, which carry with them the sharpest mortification to our vanity, and at the same time suggest to our humbled reason the most salutary cautions. In certain stages of excellence, and in certain favourable situations, the arts are known to strengthen the intellectual powers of men, and to enlarge the sphere of their operation. But the same arts, when they have degenerated into a vicious affectation, and are, to an excessive degree, intermixed with extraneous causes, debilitate the understanding and deprave the heart. Instead of furnishing the conveniences, they multiply, without bounds, the superfluities of life; and lead on in their train not only that false taste which prefers the specious to the

solid, but those feverish and insatiable appetites which every principle of reason, and every restraint of law will be at last insufficient to controul. The arts are indeed auxiliary to commerce; and commerce, in the exaggerated language of its panegyrists, is said to swell the tide of national wealth, to fasten the bonds of national union, to animate the measures of a people with new vigour, and to throw new splendour around their name. These advantages, I confess, are derived from commerce; but they are derived conditionally, and with restrictions; they continue so long only as the encroachments of monopoly are severely checked, and the price of commodities is regulated upon wise and enlarged principles; so long as the middle ranks of men are content to receive protection, while they enjoy the fruits of industry without panting for the distinctions which cherish laziness; so long as innovation, either in manners or laws, is strictly watched, and every change in the employments or the amusements of private life is made subservient, not to the vanity or avarice of individuals, but to the public good. But commerce, while it brings in opulence and power, does not always bring with them their correctives; and, without correctives, they have ever been observed to corrupt. When, therefore, the torrent of corruption once breaks in upon the manners of a people, it rushes forward with increasing rapidity; it soon bears down all the barriers which private example or public authority can oppose, and at last plunges every great and

every good quality in one undistinguished deluge of iniquity.

I have said that the vices of nations are generally to be ascribed to their luxury, and that luxury always terminated in their ruin. But the assertion is contested. We are told that national corruption and luxury are terms of vague import; that men of churlish tempers and contracted views are more ready to misapply than to explain those terms; that public evils bring along with them their own remedy by an eventual, though an indirect increase of public happiness, and that even the vices of individuals contribute to the advantage of the community. Thus the excesses of the voluptuary, like the austerities of the recluse, triumph in the suffrage of perverted reason; and it is not easy to check every emotion of contempt, when the advocates for sensuality commend each other for the liberality of their sentiments, and the depth of their penetration.

Of these speculatists, who make every system of morals to be dependent on that of politics, and who sacrifice principles, hitherto esteemed invariable, to those which ever have been, and ever must be, fluctuating and problematical, some are actuated by the pride of singularity; others, by the hopes of escaping from their own secret apprehensions, when they have inspired their fellow-citizens with a kind of contagious confidence; and more, I am afraid, by the detestable expectation of pushing their own interests most effectually amidst the supineness and false security which their artifices have produced. But whatever be their motives, which charity itself

would be staggered to pronounce honourable, their arguments are professedly rested on the usefulness of luxury; and from its usefulness the transition, in shallow and precipitate judgments, is not difficult to its innocence and even meritoriousness. This question therefore deserves to be seriously and fully examined, where the causes of national depravity are the topics of investigation; for, if any people should be persuaded that they are less sinful than other nations have been, they will instantly suppose themselves in less danger of suffering what other nations have suffered.

A state may be rich and powerful; but the causes of political as well as physical good have their limitations. As excessive heat is found to consume instead of cherishing, and excessive light dazzles rather than directs, so excessive power and riches have always proved fatal to those interests which a moderate share of each has been known to promote. Let me not be misunderstood. To condemn the acquisition of money indiscriminately were more becoming the romantic speculatist than the impartial reasoner. In the improved state of society wealth becomes in some degree necessary to the energy of military operations, to the dignity of civil government, and even to the comforts of domestic life. It stimulates invention, and invigorates labour; it encourages population by conferring upon every man what he may enjoy without interruption, and impart without diminution; and it preserves liberty by making him both anxious and able to secure what he has obtained. But when the chasm that subsists

between the higher and the inferior orders of men is not filled up, or the distinctions that ought to separate them are effaced by uniformity of wickedness; when the inundation of riches produces artificial poverty, which, co-operating with pride, always terminates in a poverty that is real; when the neglect of frugality exposes even the laborious to all those miseries which the lazy justly suffer without an effort to alleviate them, the state is equally endangered by private opulence and public want. On the one hand, wealth acquires an undue importance from the extravagant value that opinion stamps upon it; and the possessors, finding their influence to increase with their ambition, are soon encouraged to oppress those whom they have successfully attempted to corrupt, and to impoverish by corruption. On the other hand, the multitude by degrees sink down into the same meanness of disposition, and the same grossness of sentiment, that once induced the Cappadocians to continue in vassalage from habit and from choice. Harrassed by desires they know not how to gratify, they soon become indifferent to rights of which the existence is almost forgotten with the use; they gladly resign a precarious freedom for the sake of an indolent and mercenary servitude; and when the perversion of their rights is adduced to justify the cruelties of usurpation, however we may detest the insolence of the oppressor, who makes the plea, we can scarcely commiserate the sufferings of the wretches against whom it is urged.

In civil, as well as religious concerns, the imagi-

nations of men are often amused, and their reason beguiled by groundless distinctions. They suffer themselves to be comforted under known evils by plausible and confident harangues upon the efficacy of unknown resources; and are persuaded that one State may be on the whole benefited by the very practices, by which another State has been entirely subverted. Hence the most elaborate defences have been produced in favour of relative luxury, and nations have been reconciled to their crimes, or rather flattered into a conviction, that they have the efficacy of virtue.

It is not merely to the love of paradox, that such defences owe their currency. Few men have the prudence to distrust, and yet fewer have the intrepidity to examine, the soundness of those opinions which strike in with their own inclinations and habits. While they intend only to indulge their own sensual appetites, they can, upon reflection, justify the indulgence, by saying that the purest streams issue from an impure source; that the luxury charged upon themselves is rather nominal than real; that it circulates wealth, encourages assiduity, and causes the wants of the poor to be supplied by the superfluity of the opulent.

True it is, that God often extracts good from ill, and converts even the irregularity of his creatures to the honour of his government. But evils, so far as they are evils, ought to be lamented; and they also ought to be redressed, where the good resulting from them is apparently disproportionate to the ag-

gregate of such disadvantages as are confessedly present, and of such as are probably future.

Even in monarchical states, where vanity lavishes what generosity would not confer, and where the distance that exists between the various ranks of society somewhat slackens the progress of vicious emulation, it is not always safe to apply the distinctions which some men would support in favour of relative luxury. But in a mixed state like our own, where the lower orders of men are less compelled to be dependent on their superiors, and are more able to imitate them, where the immediate advantages arising from luxury are often confined, and the consequential mischiefs are most rapid and most pernicious, those distinctions are in many respects impertinent. It is not by the sudden and irresistible will of a superior, but by the steady direction of laws, by the salutary discipline of manners, and by an habitual liberality of sentiment, that a free people can preserve their happiness or their virtue. Among such a people, if venality prevail in the lower classes of men as well as the higher, it must be imputed to some imperfection in their morals as well as their policy.* It generally arises from the excessive refinements of luxury, when all become eager to enjoy what ought to be confined to a few, and when the indigent are content to earn by prostitution some share of those pleasures, which the rich obtain with greater ease by their wealth, and in a far greater degree by their

* Vide Hume's Essays, vol. i. p. 305.—I differ from him.

prodigality. I am indeed convinced that many of the advantages ascribed to relative luxury are ideal, many of them trifling, and yet more of them dependent on those external and incidental circumstances which undergo a continual though a gradual change, and, in the end, leave an open field to the ravages of evils, the virulence of which they may have occasionally softened, and the eruption of which they may have long retarded. To advantages thus hollow and treacherous we may justly apply the words of the Prophet: "In the day we make the plant to grow, in the evening we make the seed to flourish; but the harvest is an heap in the day of grief and of desperate sorrow."*

It is with states as with individuals. Among the latter, there are periods at which the most stubborn and persevering industry languishes into sluggishness; and it is not uncommon to see the same man pass from the extreme of frugality to that of profuseness, and squander in corrupt amusements what he had amassed by honest labour. Thus, in all flourishing states, there is a critical point, where undisturbed tranquillity, itself the effect of vigilance and activity, renders men careless and inactive; where opulence can no longer gratify the desires which it has excited by the facility and inflamed by the frequency of enjoyment; where diligence is enfeebled by the violent and unremitted stretch of the very springs which set it in motion; where they who have toiled to procure the pleasures

* Isaiah, xvii. ver. 11.

of other men are themselves impatient to enjoy those pleasures; where luxury quite drains the sources it for a time supplied; and where the wealth that, flowing through various channels, once diffused general prosperity, is silently drawn within that vortex in which the avarice of the few is ever ready to collect and absorb what the dissipation of the many has rashly scattered. It is recorded of the Carthaginians,* that for many years they were neither disturbed by sedition nor harassed by tyranny. But this singular felicity could not save them from ruin, when the prevalence of Asiatic luxury, and the exorbitant wealth of individuals, had introduced corruption into the state. Many of their institutions, as a distinguished writer on the science of legislation complains, tended to make opulence more respectable in the public eye than virtue. The pernicious consequences of these institutions were, as he observes, retarded by good fortune rather than by good laws; and the justness of that observation was afterwards demonstrated by the distracted counsels and vitiated morals which preceded the overthrow of that once virtuous and once prosperous republic. After the reduction of Carthage, and the defeat of Antiochus, the felicity of Rome seemed to rest on the firm pillars of opulence and power. But the state was, in truth, oppressed and debilitated by its own enormous weight. Amidst all the treasures which unwearied diligence could accumulate, or rapine protected by law could

* Vid. Arist. de Repub. lib. xxi. p. 334 and 335. edit. Du Val.

extort; amidst the vigour of arms, the lustre of victory, and the authority of dominion, this stupendous fabric decayed, tottered, and fell. "Thou hast said in thy heart, I will ascend into heaven; I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: how art thou fallen from heaven, how art thou cast down to the earth, which didst weaken the nations!"*

Perhaps, within the circle of your own observation, other states may be found, where all the pleasures of Asia are poured into the lap of sensuality, and all her wealth is eagerly seized by the grasp of avarice. In those states, it might be invidious to commend the sagacity and exalted patriotism of the Consul, who, refusing to pray for the increase of the Republic, was content to ask from heaven the preservation of that power which, in his opinion, and in reality too, was already great enough.† But surely every wise people will be on their guard against the distant and possible evils of luxury; nor will they trust to temporary and precarious expedients for deliverance from those evils which other nations have suffered; they will recollect that, in states as well as families, prosperity and greatness are not convertible terms; that the opulence which makes a people happy should be carefully distinguished from that which makes them luxurious; and that wide is the difference between the stability of an empire and that excessive stretch of domi-

* Isaiah, xiv. ver. 12 and 13.

† See Political Disquisitions, vol. iii. p. 63.

nion which, like gold in its last state of expansion, exchanges solid strength for empty and transient show.

The different people whose sufferings I have had occasion to set before you, were indisputably and notoriously sinners — but would it not be hard to say they were sinners above all other people? And are we not ourselves placed in a situation, where the recollection of our own sins ought to follow the retrospect we have taken of the crimes and the sufferings that are recorded of past ages?

In the description which I mean to hold out to your view, I wish to abstain from churlish and declamatory exaggeration; nor could I, without violence to my own feelings, descend either to the servility of adulation or the acrimony of factious invective. It is indeed no pleasing task, but it is a most important one, to know the times and seasons; to detect every lurking corruption which partiality would colour over or cowardice dissemble; to mark every alarming symptom, which, having baffled the power of palliatives, calls for a more specific and unsparing treatment.

We cannot avail ourselves even of the futile pleas that are urged in vindication of relative luxury. When a frivolous and corrupt emulation has levelled all distinctions; when it is become ignominious for a man to confine his expences within the sphere of his station; when custom is supposed to sanctify every excess that it has encouraged; when profusion rather than parsimony gives the keenest edge to the rapacity of avarice; when

the cravings of artificial appetites are so importunate, as to silence not only the milder remonstrances of discretion, but the peremptory menaces of law itself; when the pestilential taint of venality has infected all ranks of men, and all the virtues both of friendship and patriotism are swallowed up in the abyss of selfishness; the luxury of such a people may be pronounced absolute; and absolute luxury has ever been acknowledged indefensible, and almost incurable.

I know that our manners are polished; that the conveniences and pleasures of life are most abundant: or, in other words, that all the refinements which our vices have fostered, and our vanity has dignified with the name of liberal arts, or public blessings, are encouraged among us with a zeal that borders upon extravagance. I also know, that these specious advantages are a very inadequate compensation for the mischiefs that attend them. They always forebode, and often generate, those evils which terminate in national ruin. They were possessed in their utmost extent by the Romans, when the dearest rights of that people were surrendered up to the insidious encroachments of Augustus. They were possessed by the Athenians, when an extravagant and puerile admiration of those arts which enervate the mind, as well as polish it, an ostentatious and expensive splendour in their buildings, an immoderate passion for theatrical amusements, a lavish abuse of private and of public wealth, disappointed all the expectations that might have been formed from the wisdom of a Solon, the

integrity of a Socrates, and the eloquence of a Demosthenes. By their own vices were those self-conceited, self-deluded, self-devoted wretches betrayed into the hands of their conqueror.

What is recorded of these states may be extended to all others that have been equally corrupt; for that any people should exist, whom luxury does not gradually weaken, and ultimately destroy, is a supposition which history contradicts, which experience does not warrant, and which speculation, however it may torture facts, or embellish fiction, will be scarcely able to support. In order therefore to check the triumphs, and to guard against the misrepresentations, of persons who would infer the justness of their own sentiments from any incorrectness of expression in those who differ from them, I will now recapitulate what has been offered to your consideration on the subject of luxury; a subject which in speculation is always curious, and which in practice is to us most important.

It were, I confess, an abuse of language, to call that people luxurious, among whom the elegant refinements of life, when obtained by diligence and ingenuity, are enjoyed with prudence and moderation; but when this ceases to be the case, diligence and ingenuity become public evils by corrupting the public manners, and therefore ought to be controuled in their operation, or directed to other objects of more unequivocal or more unmixed utility. Does then the condition of man leave no room for the existence of relative luxury? Unquestionably it does; and the term may be properly applied,

where it should be also strictly confined to that state of things, in which the evils are few and incidental, while the good is solid and lasting. But, even in this state of things, the most flattering state in which luxury can be supposed to prevail, and the only state in which it ought to be defended, we have no right to say that every apprehension is irrational, or every restraint superfluous. So exposed are the affairs of men to change, so strong are their propensities from bad to worse, so alluring are the blandishments supplied by luxury, and so importunate are the desires excited by it, that we cannot, without the grossest improbability, suppose any whole people to continue long within those boundaries which reason prescribes to the caprices of appetite and the dominion of custom. The truth is, that relative luxury has in all nations, sooner or later, degenerated into absolute. Such is the unavoidable tendency of things, and such have been their uniform operations. Occasions indeed there are, on which the lenitives of art, or the more severe correctives of laws may be applied with success. But, unhappily for mankind, they who ought to apply them, are seldom superior to the joint temptations of habitual voluptuousness and immediate gain. On the contrary, they are often induced not only to withhold the remedy but to cherish the disease; they treat with derision even the idea of providing for future safety by present renunciation; and they affect to consider it as the consummation of political wisdom to encourage the vices of those around them, with little hazard of detection from

others, and with the certainty of much profit to themselves.

However political utility may be separated from moral rectitude; however the tenets of some men, and the practices of others, may favour the separation; it is not the part of a good citizen to slacken the obligations of virtue. He will trace the actions of men from their primary motives to the remotest consequences; he will look upon the criminal application of labour as equally detrimental with a total suspension; he will remove the necessity of having recourse to either of these terrible alternatives, by directing the attention and accommodating the interests of men to better pursuits. Instead of confiding in sumptuary laws, which operate more by prevention than by remedy, and which are seldom instituted till the prevalence of wickedness makes it scarcely possible for them to be observed, he will lay the foundations of national happiness in such a reformed system of politics and education, as will employ the rising generation wisely and virtuously, without the odium or the inconveniences of a violent and sudden check to the wrong employments of the present. These opinions, however prejudice may for a time condemn them, experience will, in the issue, justify. Repugnant they are, indeed, to the base and narrow craftiness which gratifies private ambition and private avarice at the expence of the public manners; but they will be found entirely consistent with that enlarged wisdom which, selecting the best means for the best purposes, intends honestly, pursues steadily, and executes successfully.

So rooted, and, as it were, instinctive, is the abhorrence of dissolution, so vigorous are the struggles exerted to repel it, even in its last and nearest approach, that from the most alarming proofs of decline in any empire, we cannot always predetermine the period to which its existence may be prolonged. By the energy of its original constitution, by the use of occasional remedies, or by the concurrence of fortunate circumstances, our own country may for some years mitigate the severity of these evils, which are produced by a sickly and enormous corpulency. But the stoutest and soundest constitution may be destroyed; the most flattering remedies may come too late; and upon contingent circumstances, the efficacy and the existence of which are equally unknown, no reasonable hope can be grounded. In the body politic, as in the body natural, there is a degree of corruption, which, having reached the first principles of life, no longer yields to the force of expedients injudiciously applied, or rashly neglected. How far this may be our own case it well becomes us to enquire; and to me it seems, that the unwillingness of men to engage in the enquiry is no doubtful indication, no inconsiderable part, of the evil itself.

But you will ask me, is there no fairer side of things? There is, my brethren; and I will stop to contemplate it, not to amuse you with phantoms of imaginary happiness, but to rouse you from your insensibility to that which is real; not to gratify your vanity, but to convince you that your ingratitude leaves you no room to be vain.

Venerable for its antiquity, and endeared to us by a long experience of its use, the constitution of this country may justly challenge the annals of the world to produce an equal. Founded on the solid rock of justice, cemented by duration, and fortified by every expedient that policy could suggest, it has hitherto withstood all the shocks of external violence, and all the dark machinations that have been employed to undermine it. Complaints, I know, have been urged against the multiplicity of our civil and the rigour of our penal laws: but when these laws are compared with such as are established in other countries, their principles will be found equitable, their spirit mild, and their administration most impartial. Although the discipline of our armies be excelled in some neighbouring states, where military strength is perverted into an engine of oppression, their valour in every just cause has long excited the admiration even of their enemies; and with regard to that force which forms the peculiar and firmest bulwark of our safety, the skill of our commanders, and the intrepidity of our seamen, are confessedly without example. Narrow indeed will be his views, and languid his satisfaction, who would confine the glory of this country to the wisdom of its laws and the vigour of its arms. Polite literature has been cultivated among us with a success that antiquity only has surpassed. The mechanic arts have been improved by us, not perhaps to the highest perfection of exterior elegance, but to the no less honourable purposes of general utility. In this respect they have probably reached

their summit; and it might be wished that the wantonness of innovation, and the debaucheries of refinement, should be, in future, controuled. As to the more abstract sciences, so profound have been our investigations, and so important our discoveries, that we are permitted to take the lead, I say not merely of northern Europe, where civilization has scarcely dawned, nor of those southern parts, where superstition blasts every effort of genius, but of those brave and accomplished people who are alone entitled to dispute the palm of superiority with us, either in the achievements of war or in the arts of peace. But, amidst the advantages that distinguish this country, a very illustrious rank must be assigned to that religion which is alike exempt from the harshness of Calvinism and the corruptions of Popery; which preserves the sacred privileges of revelation, without infringing the no less sacred rights of reason; which looks, I trust, with some degree of favour on the worthiest and ablest of its teachers, who have been eminent as well for their enlarged sentiments of toleration as for their exemplary piety; and which no longer lifts up the terrors of persecution over the manly and rational enquirer, who, without offering any wanton insult to prescription, asserts and enjoys the liberty of paying a larger share of homage to the superior authority of truth.

It will not, I hope, be thought paradoxical, if, in recounting the happy effects of our admirable constitution, I should mention the present condition of those numerous and respectable citizens who are

not included within the pale of our ecclesiastical establishment. Their condition, indeed, does the highest honour to our country and to our age. By the most vigorous efforts of the understanding they have delivered themselves from the galling bondage of bigotry and superstition, with which their forefathers were unfortunately shackled. They have made many valuable improvements in literature, in science, and in rational theology. They have acquired a degree of political importance which, so long as it is controuled by the supreme power of the laws, must eventually contribute to the general stability of our freedom, and the general dignity of our Empire. It has, I know, been asserted, that their zeal in defence of liberty is turbulent, and their ideas of it romantic. I will not enter into the invidious discussion of a charge which no man who adduces it means, I trust, to extend beyond individuals; but I should be guilty of the meanest dissimulation, if I did not acknowledge that the greater part of them have the merit of acting consistently with their solemn professions and noblest interests. Whether it be owing to the steady principles in which they are educated, or to the advantageous circumstances in which they are placed, few of them have hitherto learned to barter away their most important rights for those splendid but treacherous bribes, the influence of which has been very unfavourable among persons to whom I stand in a nearer and more sacred relation. Undoubtedly we have reason to thank God that the illiberal and pernicious distinctions which divided them and our-

selves are gradually wearing away; and, if the misfortunes which our sins have now brought us should hereafter be happily removed, the day, perhaps will at last come, when a system of perfect equality will be thought at once consistent with the public safety and conducive to the public welfare. The spirit of our benevolent religion requires this auspicious change; the principles of our free constitution warrant it; the tendency of external events seems to favour it; and the exertions of all good and wise men should be employed to accomplish it. At all events, the capacity of a state to admit such a change is no inconsiderable part of our national glory: and every approach that has been actually made towards it should be considered as a national advantage.

Thus numerous, and thus conspicuous, have been the blessings of Providence towards us. But can it be said that our returns of thankfulness and obedience bear any proportion to those blessings? Here, alas! a gloomy prospect seems to present itself: — but we must not shrink from the question, for it is suggested to us by the words of my text; it is urged home to our consciences by the solemnity of this day; it is even forced upon our fears by the interest that ourselves and our posterity have in a just decision. Let us endeavour to obtain a just decision by a diligent and impartial enquiry.

Before such enquiry can be prosecuted with effect, or even begun with propriety, it is necessary for me to suspend the force of some reigning pre-

judices, that may render you averse to the sternness of truth, which is often the more unwelcome in proportion as it is more momentous. When a nation is wearied with prosperity, giddy with ideal greatness, and quite insensible to the dignity of virtue; when it is no longer able to bear either its own vices or the rigid discipline essential to their reformation; a host of comforters usually start up, who invert the very order of things that God has assigned, who give a sanction to the iniquity that he has forbidden, "who put light for darkness, and darkness for light."* Declarations of this kind are not less weakly supported than they are zealously propagated: and perhaps I am not very uncharitable in saying, that they who make them are to be found amongst the most wicked, and they who adopt them amongt the most credulous of men. But in a wicked and a credulous world, the retailers of such declarations will be numerous; and it unfortunately happens that they who are bound by their superior situations in life, or their superior share of abilities, to oppose every delusion, are too often tempted by their own wayward passions, and their own ambitious designs, to vindicate what, in the moment of uttering it, they know to be false and dangerous. But woe to that nation "where the seers see not, where the prophets prophesy not right things," and "they who are appointed to rule over men, and lead them, cause them to err."† "Though evil tiding be hushed, and good be pro-

* Isa. chap. ii. ver. 20. † Isa. cap. iii. ver. 12.

claimed continually, great reason is there to fear that the Lord of Hosts is not for a crown of glory to that people, nor for a spirit of judgment to him that sitteth in judgment, nor for strength to them that turn the battle to the gate."*

I have already pointed out to you the fallacy of some arguments implicitly admitted, because they are confidently alleged in vindication of luxury. But there is another point equally prevalent, and equally mischievous, with that which I have before endeavoured to confute; for we are told, nay we are all of us too ready to tell ourselves, that the quantity of vice and virtue is the same at all times. If this opinion be just, all complaints must be as ineffectual as they are groundless, and deserve to be charged on the causes to which they are commonly attributed, on the sullenness of misanthropy and the deliriums of enthusiasm. But those complaints, however ridiculed, or however disregarded, are grounded on facts; and that they are so, the very popularity of the objections made to them affords a strong presumption. They who cannot aspire to the honour of positive justification, hope to shelter themselves from infamy by invidious and unjust comparison. The Pharisee applauded himself because he was not as other men were; we acquit ourselves on the supposition that other men were what we are; and each of us is guilty as well of partiality in the sentence we pass on our own conduct, as of rashness in arraigning the imaginary

* Isa. chap. xxviii. ver. 5 and 6.

faults of other men. It may perhaps be said, that they who insist upon the equality of different ages in respect to their moral attainments, do not seriously believe what they obstinately maintain. But let not the extreme improbability, or the flagitious wickedness of any opinion, be thought sufficient to destroy its credit among those whose indolence and whose selfishness induce them to profess, and to disseminate it. The effects of rational conviction are too often feeble and inadequate. It is equally true, and equally lamentable, that a partial or pretended conviction produces the most powerful effects; that men are more strenuous to support what they suspect to be erroneous, than what they know to be just; that, through the fascination of errors familiarised by custom, and endeared by interest, it becomes rashness to controvert, in one age, the very position it was thought folly to advance in another; and that tenets which shock common sense and common justice at length acquire all the authority of popular maxims, and all the efficacy of established principles. Self-delusion is ever averse from enquiry, though by enquiry alone can the charm be dissolved. Hence arises the necessity of exposing in the clearest point of view, and in its fullest magnitude, the absurdity of opinions which he who avows them can seldom persuade himself to examine, but which he may be ashamed not to renounce, after the apposite and cogent proofs employed by other men in their confutation.

These remarks will not, I hope, be thought impertinent. I have made them as a kind of apology

for entering minutely into the futility of a plea, which, ridiculous as it is when reduced to a particular examination, is yet advanced with all the confidence of general assertion, and is admitted too as a satisfactory answer to every charge of increasing depravity.

Let us then see how far the assertion, that the same degree of vice has prevailed at all times, can be applied to mankind universally. They who thus contend for it are not entitled even to the scanty praise of plausibility, till they can prove themselves able to ascertain the precise number of men that have lived at different periods; to discover not only the prominent features of national character, but the more hidden and complex motives that actuate individuals; to balance their relative and absolute interests; to penetrate their subordinate, as well as ruling passions; to determine the exact degree of civilization to which they have respectively advanced, and the exact degree of barbarism in which they have been plunged.

Those nations which have arisen to any eminence in the cultivation of knowledge, and the improvements of social life, have been once placed in a less honourable condition. But if the paradox now under consideration be well founded, whether these nations were much civilized, or little, or not at all, the quantity of happiness enjoyed, and the quantity of virtue practised, would be the same. It follows, therefore, that the artificial advantages of society do not preponderate, when weighed against the artificial evils; that by the restraints of law, the re-

searches of philosophy, and directions of religion, mankind are not, in fact, elevated above the savage state; that the enlightened inhabitants of Europe cannot much boast of their superiority over their own fierce and ignorant forefathers; and that, as to real and intrinsic good, they stand on a level with those tribes who roam over the barren deserts of Africa, or the gloomy forests of America. This state of the case is fair and impartial. If no difference subsist between men in the scale of moral excellence, the consequence I have just deduced is inevitable; if any difference subsist, the degrees of that difference are to be ascertained, not by arbitrary assumption, that they are very small, but by an appeal to facts, which may prove them to have been very great.

So far as the opinions of these men respect the whole of our earthly system, they are of fatal tendency. They throw the severest reproaches on the attributes of God, who has invested us with seeming powers, which we are, in truth, incapable of exerting, or which we exert to no purpose. They check, and are intended to check, the zeal of virtue, by persuading us that we cannot become better than other men; and they give new confidence to guilt, by flattering assurances that we are not become worse. They contradict the general appearances of things, which, so far as they have been collected by judicious and unprejudiced comparison, give us reason to hope, that mankind, upon the whole, are in a state of progressive, though it be slow, improvement. In a more extensive point of view, I there-

fore pronounce those opinions unphilosophical, as well as irreligious; and I shall directly oppose to them one fact, which to me appears both pertinent and decisive. The virtues of the Greeks were lighter in the balance, when they plundered the wealth and rioted in the pleasures of the Persians whom they had conquered. But we do not hear that the equilibrium supposed by this hypothesis was restored, either among the Greeks by the introduction of other virtues, or, in respect to the general sum of moral good, by the reformation of the Persians: and to assume that it was restored by the reformation or improvement of any other unknown contemporary people, is to decide without evidence, and to beg the very question in dispute. As to the more limited, and, I believe, the more popular application of the same hypothesis to particular countries, it is fully confuted by such partial knowledge as history has supplied. But in regard to what we do not know, it is presumptuous to deduce positive conclusions from premises which are conjectural, or merely negative; and it is perverse not to admit, under any restrictions, the proofs that analogy furnishes for a gradation of crimes, in different places, and in different ages.

In the prophetical and historical writings of the Jews, the crimes of that people are painted in the most faithful and glowing colours; but they had not reached the extremity of wickedness till their rejection of the Gospel, their inhuman treatment of its author, and its friends, their gross impositions in commerce, and their tumultuous disobedience to

government, brought upon them their last, and their heaviest distresses. Surely the contests between Sylla and Marius left their countrymen more seditious, more dissolute, more rapacious, than their ancestors had been; and however we may condemn the refined vices that prevailed in the age of Augustus, we cannot place them on a level with the horrible excesses which disgraced the courts of a Nero, a Domitian, or an Heliogabalus. In our own country, the manners of the people were less licentious in the reign of Elizabeth than in that of Charles the Second; and to compare one acknowledged evil with another, it may be doubted whether the fanaticism and blind zeal, which raged during the grand Rebellion, were more offensive to God, and more injurious to man, than the deluge of profaneness and debauchery that poured in upon us after the Restoration. Of that inauspicious reign, let it never be forgotten, that the same people who were luxurious at home, were contemptible abroad; that the enemies who had been kept in awe by the ferocity of an Usurper, insulted us almost with impunity; and that the constitution was nearly sapped by the intrigues of Popery, the establishment of which must always be facilitated by libertinism, which consistently enough prefers a religion of ceremonies to one of morals, and by infidelity, which measures the merit of all religions by their subserviency to the execrable purposes of despotism.

By these arguments you will, I hope, be effectually cautioned against the rash assumptions of those who pronounce the vices of our forefathers

uniformly and precisely equal with our own. It is absurd to say, that our ancestors were in all respects as criminal as ourselves; and to say that they were, upon the whole, more criminal, might be unjust and arrogant. Doubtless there is, in every state, a fluctuation of virtues and vices: yet it by no means follows, that the causes of those fluctuations succeed each other in the same order, or that they operate with the same degree of intenseness. We are still at liberty to deny, that the same vices prevail in the same extent at all times, and that all vices are equally malignant in their nature, and baleful in their effects.

The crimes which now prevail in this country are of a most alarming and portentous kind. To deduce them solely from our commerce and our arts, were to confound the abuse of things with their use; to call those causes primary and necessary which are only secondary and occasional; or rather, to mistake the accidental instrument for the radical principle. To inveigh against the deficiency of our laws, the intrigues of statesmen, and the corruption of courts, were to bring an odium on some distempered parts, when the unsoundness of the whole body calls for correction. The root of the evil lies deeper; it is to be found in a general want of morals, producing, and in its turn produced by, a general want of religion. The more immediate sources of both are said to lie in our national successes, in our exorbitant wealth, and in the luxury resulting from them. But it is not uncommon for effects to react with double force upon their causes; and when

this happens, all of them conspire to increase the sum of those evils which they respectively produce. The accusation which I have produced, you may think trite and unappropriate—but I know it to be just; and if the faults that have been separately imputed to other ages, should be found almost collectively in our own, shall this preeminence in wickedness be permitted to impose silence, or extort approbation?

It is remarked by a writer, whom no man has ever charged with the weakness of superstition, that Rome was indebted for its prosperity not more to the policy of Romulus, than to the piety of Numa.* But that religion should be considered as unessential, and even injurious to the public welfare, is a discovery reserved for the superior penetration of our own times, in which the morals of the Epicureans are united with the tenets of Pyrrhonists.

What excuse, I beseech you, can be urged for the indifference of some men, for the real or affected contempt of others, towards the most sacred and most interesting truths? Why are the great principles on which eternal happiness is suspended hunted down by wanton raillery, explained away by temporising accommodation, or bewildered in all the labyrinths of sceptical perplexity? Are there wanting among us men of such daring effrontery, as not only to pluck down the pillars of Christianity, but to shake natural religion itself from its basis, and by one desperate effort to crush every consolation of afflicted virtue, and every fear that can restrain the

* See Machiavel, b. i. ch. 11.

audacity of the wicked? Do not these wretches meet us in open day? And are not we stunned with the clamorous paradoxes of such men as stand forth avowed advocates for the most insidious sophistry, for the most shocking impiety, for "all the rash dexterity of wit," when levelled, with unsparing and undistinguishing fury, against the majesty of God, and the dearest interests of mankind?

Unless they have arrived at the last stages of wickedness, mankind, however they may neglect the practice, are yet willing to assume the appearance of virtue; and if the turpitude of crimes may be estimated by their consequences, some degree of negative commendation seems due to the decency which conceals the offences forbidden by religion, and even to the hypocrisy which, by implication, approves what is commanded by it. But it is the characteristic infamy of our own times, that vice should not only be tolerated, but justified; not only practised without compunction, but avowed without shame; not only caught by the secret and sudden contagion of example, but acquired with all the firmness of deliberation, and all the formality of system. Hence the precious days of our youth are consumed, not in treasuring up stores of knowledge, not in forming habits of morality, but in the attainment of exterior accomplishments, or in the pursuit of frivolous amusements, or in determined anxious preparation for more open and more hardened wickedness.

Do we not see the purity of education sullied, her dignity degraded, herself become a willing slave

to the tyranny of fashion, and stooping to accept the wages of prostitution, from folly, from affectation, and from lust? These, or such as these, are the instructions which almost every parent drops into the ears of almost every child: "My son, you are destined for a world where appearances are highly valued, because they are easily perceived; where real merit is not less rare than it is obscure; where they who can discern it will depreciate it from envy, and they who cannot will despise it from stupidity. Learn, then, to practise upon the weakness and the ignorance of that world; and be assured, that your happiness depends upon the ease with which you accommodate yourself to the caprices of the fickle and the prejudices of the obstinate. The task is not difficult, for they who fear detection are seldom forward to detect; and the glaring colours of fashion are more than sufficient to cover the blackness of your designs. In such a world you must suspect all professions of disinterested friendship as a more refined species of selfishness: you must habituate yourself to look upon public spirit as quixotism, upon religion as an imposture, and upon virtue itself as an empty name."

Perhaps, my brethren, you shudder at the bare recital of these admonitions, which resemble, no doubt, rather the malignity of a fiend than the tenderness of a parent; and yet, into these admonitions may the schemes of education yourselves are pursuing be resolved, when stripped of the thin disguise which conceals them from your abhorrence.

When lessons, which at once soothe the vanity

and kindle the passions of youth, are industriously inculcated, they will be eagerly adopted; and can we then wonder that such culture in such soils should never fail of success, that the rising generation should quickly arrive at a maturity of wickedness, and that the harvest of their crimes should more than repay the barbarous activity of the labourers? Rather ought we to be surprised at each solitary instance of virtue in our posterity, after vice has been recommended to them at once by the force of instruction, the authority of experience, and the more powerful allurements of domestic example?

Instead of looking around for the hideous deformity of sin in other nations, against which we may triumphantly indulge our censures, we shall with greater propriety anticipate in imagination the scenes which may hereafter be realised among ourselves. In the contemplation of those scenes, we may surely adopt the language of the Jews, without incurring the disapprobation of Christ; for in our own children, depraved by our own precepts, we are likely to behold a race of men who will be indeed sinful beyond all other sinners.

By many of us the inestimable gift of freedom has been abused into an instrument of the grossest licentiousness, into a defiance of those laws by which society itself subsists, and a contempt of that subordination by which alone it can subsist happily. Others there are, who have endeavoured to subvert the fundamental principles on which our liberties are built, and who for the sake of profit, that seldom

aggrandises the hireling, or of distinctions that make his infamy more conspicuous, would bereave us of all the rights for which our forefathers have expended their treasure and their blood.

They would persuade us that power, in the very nature of things, must be possessed without limitation, and therefore cannot be opposed without guilt; that liberty is not an inherent right of men, but the accidental concession of their masters; that every advantage, voluntarily conferred, may be arbitrarily revoked; that the dignity of a prince, in fact, consists in the meanness of his subjects, his strength in their weakness, his wealth in their poverty, his glory in their shame.

Such doctrines Asiatic ignorance, and Asiatic indolence only, have suffered to be reduced to practice. But such doctrines have been seriously recommended in theory, not only amidst the boasted improvements of European knowledge, but under the jealous vigilance of English freedom.

It is my duty to condemn the immorality of these pernicious opinions; and where they who maintain them are loaden with rewards, and decked out with honours, I must lament the weakness or the hardiness of those who bestow them.

I have spoken with very pointed severity of those who would lull asleep the apprehensions of their fellow citizens, who, for the worst purposes, are always ready to varnish over the worst actions, and who, to gratify the lawless pride of individuals, would undermine the most important rights of the community. But there are men of an opposite

character, who brood with gloomy satisfaction over the distresses of their country, and paint in the darkest colours the conduct of their governors.

While the contest subsisted only between this nation and America, the attention of men was engaged in examining the origin of government, the limits of freedom, the political restraints of commerce, the legal conditions of taxation, and the hitherto undefined extent of parliamentary authority and colonial rights. When questions thus abstruse and thus complicated were in debate, mutual charity, and even mutual deference, were due among those who could not agree in their general principles, or in the application of them to a particular case. Yet, surely, all difficulties in speculation, or, at least, all opposition in practice, ought to have vanished upon the first appearance of hostilities from an enemy by whose interposition every man was injured, and by whose success no man could be benefited. It pains me, however, to reflect, that national danger hath not yet produced national unanimity, and that our internal divisions constitute no small part of our misfortunes, and of our crimes. Great allowances are, I confess, to be made for improprieties of expression, and even for some irregularities of behaviour, into which men may be precipitated under the consciousness of upright intentions, and by the impulse of strong sensibilities. But a race of men has lately started up among us, for whom, as candour can suggest no apology for them, so indignation itself can scarcely furnish a

name. It is the peculiar, and I hope the unenvied privilege of these men, to aggravate every mistake, to triumph in every disappointment, to arraign, without distinction and without reserve, every measure of their superiors; and to ascribe it either to the most despicable weakness, or the most flagitious wickedness. They consider the exaltation of America as inseparable from the depression of their own country. They look with unconcern upon the insidious designs of those who ever must be our enemies, while these designs are supposed to baffle every hope of reunion with those who were once our friends. They seem to measure their own wisdom by the assumed errors of their governors, and their own importance by the exaggerated sufferings of the governed. Instead of pressing forward with vigour and alacrity to the attainment of some good which may yet be within our reach, they rather choose to take an invidious retrospect of that which is already lost. Instead of promoting the public welfare by well-timed concessions, well-planned counsels, and well-directed efforts, they are too intent upon indulging their resentment against those, whom they represent as the voluntary authors of all our calamities. Instead of supporting the arm of our national strength, when lifted up against the national foe, they eventually, I dare not say designedly, open new prospects to his pride, supply fresh virulence to his malice, and give far greater efficacy to his devices. That such men should exist in a civilised state, without restraint, or, at least

without infamy, is an additional proof of the sickly complexion which belongs to our times.

I am now treading upon slippery ground, and will therefore explain myself so as to prevent the possibility, not of misrepresentation, indeed, but of mistake. No man can feel a more sincere reverence, a fonder attachment, a warmer zeal, than I do for the cause of genuine and rational freedom. I blush not to say, that my indignation has kindled at the ungenerous affronts which have been sometimes offered to that cause, and at the wily sophisms which have been employed to distinguish away what the common sense of mankind clearly understands, their common feelings approve, and their common interests require them to watch with jealousy, and to defend with steadiness. But it were a mark of weakness, or of obstinacy, not to perceive a wide difference between the designs, and even the claims of the nations who are now contending: between the efforts of our brethren, who have resisted what they believed to be injurious to them, and the intrigues of our enemies, who have interfered with a manifest intention to injure: between the contest we have long supported against the real or supposed rights of others, and the exertions we are now making in defence of our own honour and safety. It were blindness in the extreme to overlook the sorcery of party-prejudice, where the judgments of men are warped by their affections, where the treachery of their hearts hides from them the real source of their own actions, and where the violence of their resentment passes on from particular per-

sons, who are justly or unjustly the objects of it, to every adventitious and external circumstance, every near and remote interest, every private and public measure, with which the remembrance of those objects is associated.* At this dangerous juncture, it were the height of wickedness to adopt the harsh suspicions, and to countenance the bitter reproaches of men who would deprive us of the vigour which even temporary unanimity would give to our endeavours, and some of whom (I shudder to mention it!) some of whom would be content to see the community labour under all the dismal effects of repeated miscarriages, that they might enjoy the illiberal and inhuman pleasure of traducing those governors whom they scarcely wish to succeed, lest success should confirm their power and vindicate their innocence.

Upon topics which the irreconcileable interests and tumultuous desires of mankind frequently bring into agitation, it is not easy, as, indeed, it is not necessary, to strike out any information which may recommend itself as well by novelty as by truth. But

* With these undistinguishing partisans we may contrast the amiable character of Eteoclus, as it is drawn by the masterly pen of Euripides. I cannot resist the impulse I feel to place these instructive lines before the reader; and I recommend them to the serious attention of those who judge of measures by men, and are seldom candid in the opinion they form about either:

Τούς τ' ἐξαμαρτάνοντας, οὐχὶ τὴν πόλιν
Ἠχθαιρ' ἐπεί τοι γ' οὐδὲν αἰτία πόλις
Κακῶς κλύουσα διὰ κυβερνήτην κακόν.

Suppl. Mul. l. 878.

if men will continue to repeat their misconduct, we must continue to warn them of their danger. If they will persist in throwing out intemperate and undistinguishing invectives against the leaders of the state, we must remind them that it is a far smoother and more delightful task to censure the faults of others than to amend our own: that the weakest men may, after the event, perceive the mistake, against which the wiser cannot provide: that we are frequently betrayed into rashness and uncharitableness, when we condemn the conduct of men who are surrounded by difficulties with which our own wisdom has never been embarrassed, and temptations by which our own virtue has never been assailed: that it is not always safe to argue from a known failure in the execution, to some unknown absurdity in the choice of the means, or of the end: that it is not unusual for men who are accused of deliberately deceiving their country, to be themselves involuntarily and innocently deceived: that among their accusers moroseness often skulks under the form of rigorous justice, the rancour of envy is confounded with the ardour of patriotism, and a blind, implacable hatred of individuals is mistaken for a pure and generous love of the public.

The foregoing observations are very trite, but very interesting. They have been employed, I well know, to hush the suspicions, and to slacken the activity of men under the most corrupt forms of government. But I also know, that there is frequent and urgent occasion for enforcing them under the most upright administration of the best go-

vernments; for, in the best governments, men are often insensible of the blessings which Providence has spread before them, and unjust to the human instruments that are appointed to convey those blessings.

From the treacherous praises of some partizans, and the groundless calumnies of others, in public matters, let us proceed to examine the moral conduct of men in their private characters.

Superficial understandings are easily dazzled by the glare that surrounds exalted stations; but when we follow the great and the powerful into the recesses of their families, do we find them arrayed in those virtues which shed a less brilliant indeed, but a more equal and a more pleasing lustre over domestic life? In vain shall we there look for that decency of behaviour, that manliness of thinking, and that integrity of principle, to which our ancestors were indebted for their prosperity and their fame. All that commanded respect in them is meanly sacrificed by their abject children, who are content to receive in exchange the gaudiness of foreign dress, the insipidity of foreign manners, and, what is yet more odious, the rankness of foreign infidelity.

But the depravity of our own age is equally marked by the meanness, as by the excess of our vices. No longer do our bosoms glow with that ambition, which, seduced by the brilliancy and the magnitude of its object, too often spurns the restraints of justice and of law. Instead of this passion, which carried with it an air of wild grandeur,

we are distinguished by a loathsome mixture of vanity, covetousness, and venality; by a readiness to corrupt without delicacy, and to be corrupted without shame; by an impatience to glitter in those honours, which, after they have ceased to be revered by the unthinking herd, yet continue to be the objects of envy among their more unthinking superiors. True it is, that we are exempted from all the inconveniences of that ferocious spirit, which, however it may exalt the mind to independence, and brace it with vigour in the hour of danger, is too apt to disturb the repose of private life: but we have little reason to boast of the exchange, when the effeminacy, the false delicacy, and profligacy of the times are thrown into the opposite scale.

There is a dreadful period in the progress of luxury, where the improbability of attaining a better situation betrays men into such actions as hasten the arrival of the worst. Every reflection on the growing insufficiency of the laws to controul the encroachments of power, upon the diminished security of property, and upon the languishing state of the arts by which it is acquired, is at first attended with sullen despondence or frantic desperation. The transition then becomes short and rapid from unsuccessful industry to incorrigible supineness—from factious resistance to abject submission—from querulousness under supposed wrongs, to apathy under those which are real. The prospect of approaching poverty, which once alarmed the mind, now serves only to stupify it, and, instead of teach-

ing discretion, tends rather to produce extravagance. Eager to snatch the few remaining moments of gratification, we no longer think it criminal to abuse what it may soon be impossible for us to use rightly; and we squander upon the most fantastic wishes of the imagination, and the most corrupt desires of the heart, what may suddenly be wrested from us, and what, in the seeming course of human affairs, cannot be long enjoyed. In the general distress, which all are compelled to lament, and which none have the fortitude to alleviate, domestic virtues die away. The sweet cares of providing for posterity are quickly extinguished, where the provision itself is likely to be inconsiderable and precarious. The baleful effects of prevailing manners are secretly ascribed to some unknown fatality, from which flight is impossible, and to which opposition is vain. Under this delusion we shift off the imputation of personal guilt, upon I know not what external necessity. We rush too precipitately upon all the miseries which we discovered too late; and abandon ourselves, without reluctance, and without remorse, to the most wanton dissipation, or the most riotous debauchery.

These observations naturally suggest themselves to the impartial observer of those disastrous circumstances, which attend the downfall of luxurious kingdoms. They deserve, too, some share of attention from every man who is disposed to examine the tendency of our own reigning vices, with philosophical exactness and with religious seriousness.

In the higher stations of life, we see rank without

dignity, money without wealth, and voluptuousness almost without enjoyment. Our indignation, indeed, is somewhat stayed in its course by the virtues which yet keep their ground among the middle orders of men; though a serious observer can scarcely survey even them without secret apprehensions, that many of the fences are broken down, and that these last retreats of religion will soon be over-run by the devastations of increasing licentiousness.

Much stress has been laid upon the zeal and munificence of our charitable institutions. To dispute the justice of the praises, so peremptorily demanded, and so lavishly bestowed, in favour of these institutions, to depreciate almost the only virtue which fashion has patronised, to examine how far ostentation may co-operate with generosity in relieving the distressed, and in comforting the afflicted, were both illiberal and impolitic: but, surely the confidence of self-approbation ought to be in some degree repressed by the mischiefs that have arisen from the injudicious or indiscriminate use of well meant contribution; by the decay of hospitality in the families of the opulent, where lazy dependents are pampered by those superfluities by which the hungry orphan ought to be fed; and, above all, by the scanty streams that issue from private liberality, in situations to which the regular and limited course of public charities cannot be extended.

As we descend to the lower ranks of men, we see a spirit of prodigality, which the conduct of their superiors promotes, and, therefore, in some degree, extenuates; a spirit of rancour and envy, which re-

peated kindness cannot soften; a spirit of indolence, from which the sluggard is hardly awakened by the stimulations of extreme penury; a spirit of discontent and faction, which has already trampled down the distinctions of station and fortune, and which threatens the very existence of society with general dissolution. To these evils in the people must be added the corruption of too many among those to whom the sacred power of government is, in its various branches, entrusted; the seditious turbulence of some, the shameless venality of others, the affected moderation and timid neutrality of many, the artificial insensibility and voluntary blindness of more.

When the public worship of God is openly neglected, his Word ridiculed, and his Providence indirectly denied; when adultery more than escapes from an abhorrence, for it engages some share even of our esteem, under the imposing title of gallantry; when profaneness is censured for ill-breeding, only to shelter it the more effectually from every morose charge of immorality; when the fortunes and honours of the most illustrious families are suspended on the precarious throw of a die; when suicide is become a reputable and almost a necessary refuge to disappointed avarice; when ideal honour usurps the place of justice, and the severity of the laws is blunted by the number and rank of the offenders — when these melancholy indications of depravity surround us on every side, "by whom shall I comfort you?" In such a situation, to say that all is well were weak and perfidious. It is

folly to think that our efforts can counteract the designs of Providence: it is equally folly to imagine that, in order to gratify a vicious people, the Deity will alter that order of things which his wisdom has instituted for the discouragment of vice itself: and it is the excess of infatuation, to suppose that luxury will not exhaust our strength; that dissipation will not debase our spirit; that the flagrant and premature debaucheries of the young, the incorrigible and almost unnatural corruptions of the old, will not ultimately bring down upon us the most fearful judgments of an offended God.

Far be that day of sorrow from our Zion! Yes, my brethren, every good man will, in the sincerity of his heart, join you in your wishes, that it may be very far removed; and he will further wish, that each of you may, in this your day, know and pursue the things that belong to your peace. But the condition in which you are involved leave no room for us to trifle or dissemble with you; it has already confuted all the smooth things which interested ambition most solicitously, and, I blush to say it, most successfully prophesied in the ear of credulous ignorance: it has surpassed the expectations of sober unprejudiced reason, and has almost rescued every menace of unprincipled and malicious faction from the charge of exaggeration.

War, though it be undertaken, according to popular opinions and popular language, with justice, and prosecuted with success, is a most awful calamity: it generally finds men sinners, or makes them such; for, so great is usually the dispropor-

tion between the provocation and the punishment, between the evil inflicted, or suffered, and the good obtained, or even proposed, that a serious man cannot reconcile the very frequent rise, and the very long continuance of hostilities, to reason or to humanity. Upon whom, too, do the severities of war fall most heavily? In many cases, they by whom contention is begun or cherished feel their influence extended, their dependants multiplied, and their wealth, in the regular and fair course of public business, increased. While fields are laid waste, and cities depopulated, the persons by whose commands such miseries take place are often wantoning in luxurious excess, or slumbering in a state of unfeeling and lazy repose. The peaceful citizen is, in the mean time, crushed under the weight of exactions, to which, for "conscience sake," he submits; the industrious merchant is impoverished by unforeseen and undeserved losses; and the artless husbandman is dragged away from those who are nearest and dearest to him, in order to shed the blood of beings as innocent and as wretched as himself, to repel injuries which he never felt or suspected, and to procure advantages which he may never understand or enjoy. Such are the aggravating circumstances belonging to war, when it is carried on against a foreign enemy, and though it be disarmed of many terrors which accompanied it in less enlightened and less civilized ages.

But our situation is attended with yet heavier distresses. We are engaged in a contest where the most sacred ties are torn asunder, the fondest affec-

tions alienated, the most useful attachments disregarded; where every warrior points his sword against the bosom of a fellow citizen, and every conqueror may stain it with the blood of a friend.

These evils, which to common observers once appeared but as the small distant cloud, have gathered around us from every quarter, and burst with all the fury of a tempest, terrible because unexpected. In the past we behold desolation most rapid, most extensive; perhaps irremediable to those who have suffered the blow; and, what is more strange, nearly unprofitable to those who have inflicted it. The present is yet big with difficulty and danger; and over the future is cast one dark impenetrable veil of uncertainty and horror.

Let not these assertions be hastily ascribed to the dreams of melancholy, or to the ravings of discontent. You will not think them ill-timed, or ill-founded, if you consider the numerous and increasing evils which surround us.

America has opened a most spacious and unexplored field for experimental policy; and it may not be within the compass of our penetration to discover, or of our courage to counteract, those projects which the fierce resentment of our colonists, united with the profound cunning of our enemies, may hereafter accomplish. I mean not to entangle you in political discussions of the motives which have impelled our brethren to connect themselves with a most inveterate and insidious foe. Whether you applaud that connection as prudential, or rail at it as unnatural, whether you consider it as

imposed by necessity, or suggested by perfidy, the fact itself is indisputable, and the effects of it upon our interests are sorely felt. It has certainly barred up many avenues to reconciliation; it has enlarged the circle, and multiplied the miseries of war; it has produced among us such an accumulation of calamities as it is more easy for the impartial patriot to lament than for the most sage politician to encounter.

That ambitious house, which once aspired to the sovereignty of Europe upon the Continent, hath suddenly changed its object, without relaxing its activity, and is endeavouring to subdue us on that element where, by our situation and our valour, we have hitherto maintained an unrivalled superiority. A people that were often protected by our arms, and enriched by our wealth, are now employing their own arms and their own wealth to hasten our downfall. Impatient to share the treasures which America is supposed to contain within its bosom, they have courted the friendship of those very nations by whom their own provinces have been often plundered, their best citizens put to the sword, and the foundations of their free constitution violently shaken. Under the pretence of avenging wrongs which they deliberately provoked, they have found a favourable moment for throwing aside the mask, exchanging evasion for defiance, and seizing by force those advantages which they had not the audacity to claim on any acknowledged principles of equity.

When such formidable powers have combined for

our destruction, we might expect some neighbouring nations, either from compassion to ourselves, or from jealousy to our adversaries, to step forward for our protection. We might expect some efforts to be made for preserving, or, rather, for restoring that balance of power which, although it was not totally unknown to the ancients, has been better understood by the moderns, and which has long been considered as the most secure defence against the encroachments of the crafty and the depredations of the powerful. But such expectations, however reasonable in themselves, have hitherto been vain. Some nations have, I fear, smarted under our insolence; others have dreaded our power; more have envied our prosperity; and all seem prepared to remain the triumphant, or, at least, the inactive spectators of our aggravated, and almost unexampled misfortunes. Thus separated from one great and flourishing part of our empire, abandoned by our former allies, harrassed by our implacable adversaries, we feel not only our strength impaired, and our importance in the political scale diminished, but our very existence,* as a free and independent people, most alarmingly endangered.

True it is, that we have nothing to apprehend from some calamities by which nations, though trained to arms, and though civilized by arts, have,

* Nunc verò non (solùm) id agitur, bonisne an malis moribus vivamus; neque, quantum, aut quàm magnificum imperium populi Anglicani sit: sed, hæc cujuscumque modi videntur, nostra, an, nobiscum unà, hostium futura sint.—See the speech of Porcius Cato, in Sallust.

in former ages, been fatally and finally overthrown. We need not be alarmed about the sudden and impetuous incursions of those roving tribes which are more to be dreaded from their savage insolence in victory than their brutal fierceness in battle, and which, with astonishing rapidity, have been sometimes able to defeat disciplined armies, to desolate cultivated countries, and to subvert established forms of government. But have we nothing to fear from other quarters? Are we threatened with no dangers from the malignant jealousy of our rivals, from the insatiable ambition of our enemies, or from the cruel policy of those whom Providence, in its just displeasure, may one day permit to be our masters? Grant, however, that these distresses are for the present averted by the seasonable interposition of other states, and the vigorous exertions of our own. Can any serious man look with unconcern upon our intestine divisions, upon our vitiated manners, upon the enormous magnitude of our debt, upon the galling pressure of our taxes, upon the progressive spirit of emigration, or upon the silent decay of population? If we rest in thoughtless security because the last and greatest of evils are not yet arrived, the last and greatest of evils will, like a thief in the night, overtake us, after we have neglected every expedient that may check the intermediate stages of ruin. To check them, however, is, I trust, yet in our power, if all our attention, and all our resolution, be summoned to the task. But God forbid that such a task—so delicate in its nature, so difficult in its execution, so

interesting in its consequences, should be undertaken by feeble, by unskilful, or by perfidious hands! Never can it be properly intrusted to each specious patriot, or each hardy adventurer; to the narrow selfishness of a party, or the irregular passions of a rabble. It will never be honourably accomplished, but by those wise and upright men whom the Deity sometimes vouchsafes to raise up for the support of a sinking people; by those who have learned to distinguish between the plausible in theory and the useful in practice; by those who disdain to profess what they do not mean, and to undertake what they do not understand; by those who can be temperate without languor, and active without violence; by those who are prepared to improve what is excellent, without visionary refinement, and to correct what is hurtful, without daring innovation. The race of these worthies is not, I hope, utterly extinct. Some marks of this exalted character are to be found among the advocates and the opponents of our present measures; and may their wishes never be fettered by partial convenience or temporary connections! May they happily find, or, rather, may they generously unite in creating, opportunities for the glorious display of all their talents and of all their virtues!

When a nation is placed in the disastrous circumstances that I have represented to you, it were unfeeling only to acknowledge the fact; and to account for it on political principles, to the utter exclusion of moral, were glaringly absurd. Indeed, every man whom system has not deluded, or pride

hardened, will carry his views much farther. He will look for the most efficacious, though not for the grosser and more obvious causes of our present distractions, both in his own vices and those of other men; and in their effects he will discern, not merely the intricate windings of human cunning, or the irregular sallies of human passion, but the awful correction of that Being whose power controuls the madness of the people, and whose anger is kindled not a little when they are let loose to destroy.

If the Jews, over whom the rod of justice was yet suspended, be inexcuseable in condemning the Galileans, what apology can be framed for us, who are overtaken, at least, by the "beginning of sorrows?" Probably, among ourselves, as among the Jews, experience of past favours has produced tumultuous and confident expectations of future succour.

Be it so. The Jews were delivered from the hosts of Assyria: they were brought back from their captivity in Babylon: but of their final dispersion the most dreadful traces remain to this day. Though repentance had repeatedly averted the judgments that were threatened against this people, and repeatedly mitigated those which were inflicted on them, they have at last drunken the cup of fury in its unmixed bitterness, and wrung out the very dregs of vengeance.

From the delusions of fanaticism, and the miseries of anarchy, which followed after the grand rebellion, this country was happily delivered. In a

subsequent reign * it was rescued from the oppressions of despotism, leagued with popery; and our escape was then effected with such ease, and such rapidity, that men were almost surprised into the possession of all the blessings which they had viewed only in the horizon of distant futurity, and towards which they were preparing to go forward, through toils and perils, through the animosites of party, and the horrors of war.

With the confidence of the Jews you may boast of these interpositions. You have also abused them with the ingratitude of the Jews in the hour of insolent prosperity; and the period may have arrived to you, as it certainly has arrived among the Jews, when it will be no longer in your power to make a wrong use of protection, because it is no longer bestowed.

To an understanding that brings into one point of view all the complicated operations of those natural and moral, those political and religious causes which are now unfolding themselves; to a mind that can steadily weigh the strength of the contending parties, not in their immediate exertions, but in their future resources, our present calamities may seem not less to require the aid of heaven than those from which we have hitherto been delivered. For my part, I do not presume to anticipate the designs of the Almighty towards us, to scrutinize the measures he may employ in bringing to pass his "strange act," or to extend my conjectures

* James II.

through that chain of events, of which, perhaps, scarcely the first link is experimentally known. But sure I am, that, however unlimited be our ingratitude, the mercies of God are not bound to keep pace with it; and that the interpositions of Omnipotence will not for ever wait upon the call of a disobedient people. At all events, we cannot have a more efficacious plea for imploring the protection of God than our conformity to his righteous laws; nor can we pursue a surer path of escaping the Jewish punishments denounced in my text, than by shunning the Jewish crimes of pride and uncharitableness condemned in it.

In the course of this address I have endeavoured to fix upon your minds the best impressions that can be made by the present solemnity; I mean, a deep and contrite sense of your numberless offences, a fearful expectation of the judgments that may await you, a sincere and steady resolution of speedy amendment. But, if any man be so prejudiced as to disbelieve the reality of our national corruptions, and yet so presumptuous as to join in a service where those corruptions are repeatedly acknowledged, let him hear, not from me, but from the mouth of an inspired prophet, how far a sensual and self-sufficient habit of thinking can agree with the religious institution of this day. * "In this day has the Lord God called to weeping, and to mourning, and to sackcloth: but behold joy and gladness, slaying oxen and killing sheep, eating flesh and

* Isaiah, chap. xxii. ver. 12 and 13.

drinking wine; let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Such inconsistent and impious sentiments our legislature has virtually disclaimed, in those serious terms by which every member of the community is called upon to humble himself before the Lord; and every worthy member of the community equally disclaims them by his obedience to that call. But, if any one of my hearers should entertain different sentiments, if he rush into the sanctuary, not with the spirit of humility and repentance which our church recommends, but in the spirit of strife and debate which the prophet has condemned; if he expect to hear from me inflammatory invectives against the vices of our enemies, or elaborate encomiums on our own virtues; it is my wish to disappoint that man, as it is my duty to undeceive and to reform him. Let him, then, recollect, that the Almighty does not launch the thunderbolts of his vengeance at the bidding of every short-sighted and presumptuous creature; that, amidst the discordant interests, the headstrong passions, and disproportioned powers of mankind, success is not invariably the criterion of justice; and that even in mercy to those who repent before they utterly perish, God often finds the instruments of their correction in other obdurate and impenitent sinners, whose very conquests are intended to accomplish their ruin, and upon whom, in the full career of their glory, the vials of divine wrath are poured down from above. Let him know that zeal, even in the best cause, is despicable when it proceeds from ignorance, and hateful when it is the effect of

pride; that imaginary loyalty cannot expiate inhumanity; and that the efficacy of piety is not always to be measured by the clamorous importunity of supplication. To all such hearers, if such there be, I address myself in the animated language of the prophet, * "forasmuch as this people draw near to God with their mouth, and with their lips do honour him, and their fear towards God is taught by the precept of men; therefore, † when you spread forth your hands, he will hide his eyes from you; when you make any prayers, he will not hear; your hands are full of blood." But in the bosom of the sincere worshipper there will be no room for the haughtiness of self-admiration, or the acrimony of revenge. On the contrary, he will acknowledge the tendency which the virtues of individuals must have to promote the happiness of the community: he will consider the character of a good Christian as inseparable from that of a good citizen; and, not content with deploring the calamities which his own misconduct has in some measure occasioned, he will endeavour to alleviate them by immediate reformation. With an understanding which sophistry cannot mislead, and with passions which reproach cannot irritate, he will explore the true sources of all those events which perplex the prejudiced, deceive the precipitate, and terrify the ignorant; he will perceive, that government is the medium through which the Deity conveys punishment to the wicked, as well as reward to the righteous: that in

* Isaiah, c. xxix. v. 13. † Isaiah, c. i. v. 15.

the commotions of states, there is room for condemnation as well as pity; that the misconduct of governors derives its origin frequently, its efficacy always, from the antecedent and general depravity of the governed: that slavery is seldom established among those who deserve freedom, and never escaped by those who have abused it: that between the misfortunes and demerits of a people, there subsists not only the most intimate connection, but the most exact proportion: that their distresses arise from repentance long delayed, and their ruin from impenitence absolutely incorrigible.

Under this conviction he will transfer his complaints from appearances to realities; from contingent and temporary evils to such as are essential and permanent; from the intrigues of ambition, and the outrages of party, to that indisputable and nearly universal corruption of which they form only a part. Hence, in all the revolutions of human affairs, he will discover the appointments of a divine Providence. The success of aspiring statesmen, he will acknowledge to be ordained for the chastisement of wicked states—amidst the agonies of an exhausted and expiring constitution, amidst intestine divisions and outward dangers, amidst all the fallacious reasonings, all the impotent remonstrances, and all the fruitless expedients of miserable and worthless men, he will find new motives rising upon himself, for admiration of that wisdom, which may be partially traced, and acquiescence in that justice which ought to be humbly adored. As to our adversaries, he will leave the measure, both of their

guilt and of their correction, to be determined by the Deity, whose designs are neither retarded by our perverseness nor accelerated by our impatience. He will beware of uncharitableness in pronouncing them "the worst of sinners because they have suffered such things" from the formidable resentment of those with whom they are contending. He will renounce every groundless claim of perfection, and, awakened from all the delusive dreams of fixed and unalterable security, he will tremble at that warning voice, "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish."

The events of which I have been speaking in this discourse, will be seen in different points of view, according to our different habits of thinking. Thus the Religionist will, with reverential awe, trace them up to the dispensations of that Providence by which vice is punished, and virtue sometimes permitted to share in the punishment. The philosopher will discern in them the operation of those moral causes which are intimately connected with physical, and which, together with them, make up the whole of our sufferings and our enjoyments. The politician will discover in them those springs of action, the consequences of which, however diversified by accidental circumstances, may be resolved into the same common principles, whether we survey the wildness of the human character in a state of barbarism, or its regularity under the directions of government. These various forms of speculation have their peculiar rules, and their peculiar uses. But the objects of those speculations are, both in

their causes and their effects, closely interwoven. To understand them, also, falls within the compass of enquiries, distinct indeed, but not incompatible: for, if a just attention be paid to the particular properties of each cause and each effect; if an impartial estimate be made of their collective efficacy; if their connections and mutual dependencies be accurately examined, the religionist, the philosopher, and the politician, may rise superior to contracted prejudices, may subdue the obstinate pride which favourite and exclusive systems are too apt to inspire, and may render the most solid and signal services to their country. They will immediately enlarge the sum of such virtue, and such felicity, as are allotted to man in his present state of imperfection. At the same time, they will eventually qualify their species for those new stages of existence, new spheres of action, and new modes of happiness, to which it is the gracious intention of our Maker to conduct his creatures through an unexplored and endless futurity.

To conclude—in respect to the disputes that unhappily subsist between this Country and its Colonies, every feeling heart must bleed at the bare recollection of them and of their consequences. But to bring them forward for the purpose of minute discussion in the pulpit, were invidious in itself, foreign to the more important ends of our present meeting, and indecent even to profanation in this temple, sanctified as it is by his presence, who is the God of Peace.

Far, very far, does the turbulence of political de-

bate stand removed from the calmness of religious investigation: and when a Clergyman, whether seduced by real or pretended zeal, strikes aside from the beaten path of moral instruction, and bewilders his hearers in the dark and crooked mazes of party, he seems to forget the simplicity of the Gospel, and the meekness of its blessed Author. Most honourable it is to our holy religion, and most comfortable to those who would teach it in sincerity, and obey it with consistence, that the precepts of Christ will enable men to be virtuous under the worst form of government, while they tend to produce and to perpetuate all the advantages of the best. For this reason, our advice, like that of the Apostle, should be earnest but general; and it should be expressed, not in the captious terms of human wisdom, but in the purity and plainness of scriptural language, applied only on scriptural principles. We bid you "pay tribute where tribute is due." But Christianity furnishes no clue to conduct us through the real or artificial difficulties, in which the controversies of men are usually involved. It gives us no commission to weigh the jarring claims of nations in the "balance of the sanctuary." We exhort you to "honour the King," and every other Magistrate, as "the servants of God appointed for your good." But we say not, for we have no warrant from the Gospel to say, that the abused authority of a righteous master extends an unlimited and unconditional protection to his unrighteous stewards; and we leave it, as Christ actually has left it, to the consciences of well-disposed and well-informed Christi-

ans, to determine, when the Magistrate deviates from the duties of his venerable character, and forfeits those privileges which are, upon the soundest and most enlarged principles of policy, annexed to it. Be it, therefore, the employment of other men, to trace out the political causes of our present divisions. Ours be the humbler, but not less useful task, of lamenting them, and of alleviating their effects; and well, my brethren, does that man deserve of his Country, who studies to promote its happiness, by his counsel, by his prayers, by his exemplary innocence in private life, and his uncorrupted integrity in public.

To re-echo the clamours, or to gratify the prejudices, of any among the numerous parties that now prevail among us, were an unpardonable prostitution of our sacred office:—but there are measures in which the labours of all parties ought to unite; and there is also a language of soberness and truth, by which we may becomingly recommend those measures to your approbation and your practice.

From whatever origin our dissensions and our distresses may have arisen, it should be the earnest desire, the fixed resolution, the unremitting endeavour of every man to bring them to a conclusion. While, therefore, the final event of war is hung up in awful uncertainty, I entreat you, my brethren, to soften the harshness of mutual suspicions, to quell the fierceness of mutual resentment, and studiously to abstain from that contemptuous scurrility, which is more likely to exasperate than to intimidate. I exhort you to form your own opinions with impar-

tiality, to support them with moderation, and to oppose with good manners and good nature the sentiments of other men, who, with equal abilities to discern truth, and equal honesty to embrace it, are compelled to differ from you. If the contest should happily terminate, according to the purport of the petitions you have this day offered up to the throne of the Almighty, then, as a friend to the real interests of my country, as an advocate for the unalienable rights of mankind, as a minister of that Gospel, the foundation of which was benevolence on the part of God, and the end of which is universal charity among men, I call you up to the discharge of nobler and more arduous duties. Appeal to the voice of Reason, and it will tell you that your lenity only can conciliate the affection of those whom your arms may have subdued. Consult the oracles of Religion, and you will be informed, that however the Colonists may be now divided from you, however they may have violated your laws, abused your protection, and insulted your authority, they are yet fellow-creatures, whom you ought to pity, fellow-citizens whom you will be bound to support, fellow-christians, whom, under the penalty of final condemnation, you are commanded to forgive.

A

SPITAL SERMON,

PREACHED AT CHRIST CHURCH,

UPON EASTER TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1800;

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

NOTES.

Quantùm possumus, boni ac benefici esse meditemur; si quid nobis opum, si quid suppetit copiarum, id non voluptati unius, sed multorum saluti impartiatur. Voluptas enim tam mortalis est, quàm corpus, cui exhibet ministerium. Justitia vero et beneficentia tam immortales, quàm mens et anima, quæ bonis operibus similitudinem Dei assequitur.—Lactantius de Irâ Dei, vol. ii. page 179. edit. Paris, 1748.

Συμφωνεῖν τοῖς λόγοις (τοῖς περὶ θεωρίας) ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι· πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά· τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον.—Aristotle de Moribus, lib. x. cap. ix. edit. Duval.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HARVEY CHRISTIAN COMBE, Esq. M. P.

LORD MAYOR OF LONDON;

AND TO

THE GOVERNORS OF THE ROYAL HOSPITALS

WHO ATTENDED HIM AT CHRIST CHURCH ON EASTER TUESDAY LAST,

THE FOLLOWING DISCOURSE,

PUBLISHED AT THEIR REQUEST,

IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

BY THEIR OBEDIENT SERVANT,

SAMUEL PARR.

Lan St. Frede, Monmouthshire,
Aug. 16, 1800.

A

SERMON, &c.

GALATIANS vi. 10.

As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith.

ENOUGH there is, and more than enough, to humble our pride, and to awaken our caution, when we reflect upon the errors of ingenious men, in their attempts to unfold the most familiar operations of the human mind. The eager desire of paradox; the ambition of assigning new terms,[1] or new arrangements, to facts already known; the habit of contemplating a favourite topic in one distinct and vivid point of view, while it is disregarded under all others; a fondness for simplicity[2] on subjects too complicated in their inward structure, or their external relations, to be reduced to any single and uniform principle, have given rise to numberless disputes in moral, as well as natural philosophy. But upon no occasion, perhaps, have the talents of men been more strangely misemployed, than in tracing the motives by which we are impelled to do good to our fellow-creatures, and adjusting the extent to which we are capable of doing it.

[1] The notes referred to by figures are printed at the end of the Sermon.

The Epicureans [3] of old contended that all our views are selfish, and that to procure for ourselves pleasure, or to avert pain from ourselves, was the ultimate design of every action. An opinion not very dissimilar prevailed among the school-men of the middle age, who represented a direct regard to our own happiness, as the sole motive by which our wills are determined, and who incautiously, but not irreverently, spoke even of virtue itself, [4] as desirable chiefly on account of the rewards annexed to it. These theories, the one denying a future state, the other admitting it, yet agreeing so far as to resolve all our agency into the unmixed and unceasing operations of selfishness, slumbered for some time in the Christian world. But in the seventeenth century * they were revived with new modifications, and gradually assumed a more formidable aspect.

"Common reason and humanity," says Butler, † "will have some influence upon mankind, whatever becomes of speculations." Hence, that we never feel the disinterested [5] desire of doing good to any man, is a tenet, which, though professed now and then by the fantastic humourist, though favoured by the churlish misanthrope, though defended by the logical gladiator, and employed, it may be, as an occasional instrument of irritation or imposture by the wily politician, did not work any important change in the sentiments or habits of a people.

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* Mr. Hobbes—he was followed by Rochefoucault and Mandeville, and afterwards by Rousseau and Helvetius.

† See Sermon xi. 229.

But, as opinions of this kind always gain a temporary popularity from their novelty, or even their extravagance, and always produce, too, a partial effect upon conduct, they ought to be resisted. Accordingly, to the credit of our own country,[6] the selfish system was successfully combated by men of high reputation for the soundness of their judgments, and the precision of their reasoning; and, it may be worth while to remark, that in vindicating those moral sentiments, which are beautifully said to form "the party of mankind* against vice and disorder its common enemy;" equal abilities were exerted with equal zeal, by writers,† whose sentiments upon the abstruser points of theology, as connected with metaphysics, were wholly discordant. "That we are made as much for society, and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as to take care of our own health:‡ that selfishness is not to be confounded with self-love:§ that self-love may mingle and even co-operate with benevolence:[7] that our sympathy with others arises from the very constitution of our nature,[8] and not from any views of personal advantage: that we feel a pleasure[9] in doing good to others, because we love them, but do not love them for the sake of that pleasure:" these

* See Hume's Essays, vol. ii. p. 349, edit. 1767.

† Lord Shaftesbury, Bishop Butler, Mr. Hutcheson, Mr. Hume, Adam Smith, and Lord Kaimes in his History of Man.

‡ See Butler, Sermon i. p. 6, and Hume's Essays, vol. ii. p. 239.

§ See Butler, Sermon xi, particularly where he explains in p. 214, the word selfish. See also his Preface, p. 24.

are truths not very soon to be disturbed by the restlessness of innovation, or undermined by the craftiness of scepticism. The danger we have to apprehend proceeds from another quarter.

In a country not very distant, theories [10] of more or less value, and with greater or less ingenuity, were some time ago constructed for the improvement of society: and, in the progress of speculations, carried on with a glowing and impetuous spirit of enthusiasm, certain romantic and even pernicious notions were started, upon the powers with which we are furnished, and the obligations by which we are bounden to promote, by direct aims, the universal good of the species. How far the advocates for these opinions may have been sincere and consistent in making them the rule of public measures, is a point quite foreign to the business of this day, and, I must add, to the duties of this hallowed place. It rather becomes us to remember, that the new doctrine of universal philanthropy has found its way to our own country, and that whatever changes may have been wrought upon its surface, by the officiousness of admirers, or the dexterity of copyists, it still retains so much of its original features, as to remind us whence it came, and to give us an interest in considering, whither, for a season at least, it may spread.

If the peculiar circumstances of the times should induce you to compare the selfish with the philanthropic system, as the latter has been recently taught, you will find that the one never occasioned so much mischief as it seemed to threaten, and that the other

will be productive of less good than it promises, accompanied by a long and portentous train of evils, which had been negligently overlooked, or insidiously disguised by its panegyrists. The selfish, indeed, on its first approach, repels and scares us with the sternness of its appearance; it gives an instantaneous alarm to all the centinels, which self-respect, as the ally of virtue, has placed around the heart; it sullies the general dignity of our nature, and even selfishness, standing aghast at the supposed extent of her own domain, would, for the moment, be content to hold a divided empire with her more amiable rival. But the philanthropic wears a more engaging form: it announces its pretensions in a milder tone: by a thousand secret spells, it wins over to its purposes our vanity and our credulity, and from the service in which our affections are usually engaged, it would decoy them away, by opening to us the prospect of far mightier achievements, to be followed by a richer harvest of glory to ourselves, and a fuller tide of happiness diffused among our fellow-creatures.

From many of the baneful effects which the selfish might produce, the authority of public law protects the public welfare; and the crimes to which it might incite us, fall within the reach of definitions and rules. But, in the motives by which the philanthropist is impelled, the kind affections may be so writhed around the unsocial: in the character of his actions, the freaks of absurdity may be so blended with the outrages of wickedness: in their consequences, evil may have such an alloy

from concomitant good, that, if our common sense did not revolt from the incongruous mass, scarcely any judicial or even intellectual process could separate affectation from hypocrisy, delusion from malignity, that which deserves only contempt or pity from that which calls aloud for reprobation.

Do you ask what led me into this train of reflection? I answer, the words of the text, in which we are commanded to "do good unto all men, and especially unto them who are of the household of faith:" for, the spirit of the first proposition has been violated by those who insist most strenuously on the letter; and the justness of the second has been obliquely controverted, or obscurely and reluctantly admitted. That text, however, like many other passages in Scripture, has the substance, without the form, of genuine philosophy. In language that is obvious to every understanding, it exhibits the result of the most minute analysis that can be given of our faculties and duties, as social beings. It contains all that is practicable in the doctrine of general benevolence, and all that is required of us indispensably in the exercise of that which is particular. But you will permit me to observe, that the words "let us do good" will not convey to you entirely what the Apostle meant. The original expression implies not merely "let us do good," but, "let us work and labour in doing it," ἐργαζώμεθα τὸ ἀγαθὸν; and to the use of that expression St. Paul may have been led by the preceding imagery, where he had said, that "what a man soweth, that shall he reap;" that "he who soweth

unto the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting;" that "in due season we shall reap, if we faint not." The metaphors, you see, have a strong resemblance, and are drawn from a common source. As to the import of the text, nothing can be more just than the condition laid down by the Apostle: "let us labour in doing good, as we have opportunity:"—nothing more comprehensive than the precept, let the good be done "unto all men;"—nothing more proper than the preference which is especially given to "them, who are of the household of faith."

In the further prosecution of the subjects which the text has suggested to us, I shall first examine how far, by the constitution of human nature, and the circumstances of human life, the principles of particular and universal benevolence are compatible; and, secondly, I shall make some observations upon the charitable institutions over which you preside.

Against the union of our species into one community, [11] where the action of every part would visibly and immediately affect the whole, innumerable barriers are placed by mountains, deserts, or seas: by differences in climate, soil, and speech: in physical wants; in traditional customs, civil institutions, religious opinions, intellectual pursuits, manual employments, and all the various and prominent circumstances which distinguish one nation from another. The inconveniencies arising from this diversity may be diminished, and the benefits (for benefits there are) may be multiplied by mutual,

but limited intercourse; [12] and it deserves to be remarked that the ambition of conquerors and the wisdom of legislators have usually paid some regard to these local distinctions, whether natural or moral. When, therefore, we speak about the community of mankind, we use the language rather of rhetorical ornament, than of philosophical precision; and were such a community recommended on the plea of giving a wider scope to the exercise of our benevolent affections, and a more abundant supply to the happiness of our fellow creatures, I should adopt the reasoning, which a great writer of antiquity [13] employed against an imaginary republic, where all children were to be considered as equally related to all citizens. "In such a state," he argues, "the principle of affection would be diluted, and, as it were, watery, where the father could not say, my child, [14] nor the child, my father: for as a little sweet mingled with much water makes the whole mixture tasteless, so would the relation arising from the indiscriminate use of these names, become weak and imperceptible." What filial or parental affection would have been in the commonwealth of Plato, that would our benevolent affections be, diffused equally to all, if "all people, nations, and languages" were gathered together with the name of one society, and under the regulations necessary to keep it one.

But the moral obligations of men cannot be stretched beyond their physical powers. Here then a question arises, whether, according to the present constitution of things, we can be, in any sense of

the words, required to "do good unto all men." Probable it is, that, by the laws of association, the elements of those affections which impel us to "weep with them who weep," and to "rejoice with them who rejoice," were brought into action by events that immediately interested ourselves—that produced our own pleasure, or removed our own pain. It must, however, be allowed that these affections, mingled as they may have been originally with other confused sensations, gradually put on a more definite form, and become distinct, entire, ultimate perceptions, without reference, not indeed in their duties, but in their essence and energies, to any other. When they have been repeatedly exercised by correspondent and appropriate objects, reflection arises, and is followed by a calm desire of universal good,[15] according to the same order in which self-love, or the calm desire of our own good, succeeds those gratifications of particular appetites and affections, which are the means of satisfaction to ourselves. Every man, in all probability, has felt some degree of universal benevolence thus understood. Do we not admire the exploits which spread happiness among our fellow-creatures in the ages that are past? Do we not love the exalted wisdom[16] and heroic virtue of those who achieved them? Do we not approve, and, in some measure, even partake the gratitude of those who shared in their auspicious effects? When we read of laws and institutions[17] successfully established for the public good in any foreign kingdom, do we never experience more than the cold assent of our judgment?

During the "ideal presence" * of the objects, do we not form good wishes towards them? Do we not, at the moment, covet [18] a sort of fellowship with them? Do not our bosoms throb with indignation against the ferocious oppressor or the sanguinary invader, who would disturb their peace? In conformity, then, to this part of our nature, which takes an occasional interest in the felicity of strangers, we are commanded by St. Paul to "do good unto all men," and, by a greater than St. Paul, to "love our neighbour as ourselves;" and though, in the estimation of some men, who, according to the language of a Father of the Christian church, † "are neither altogether asleep in folly, nor sufficiently awake in the true light of the understanding," the precept of our Lord should be defective in what they call philosophical accuracy, [19] sufficient it is for every practical purpose, and often does it carry the direct and plenary force of obligation, for the benefit of the very persons recommended to us in systems of universal philanthropy. It so far includes all men, that, by implication, no man is excluded. For, "who is my neighbour?" [20] Every man, be he countryman or stranger, in some circumstances. What is the ground of this neighbourhood? [21] The participation of a common nature, capable of pain and pleasure.

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* For this expression I am indebted to Lord Kaimes. See his Elements of Criticism, p. 82. vol. i. edit. 3.

† The passage is in St. Austin De Civitati Dei, lib. x. cap. 1. I found it in Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, p. 83.

Consider the case of him who had "fallen among thieves." He was not born in the same country with the Samaritan. He did not altogether profess the same religion. His personal merit, his kindred, and his employment were unknown. Yet, when he was in distress, the Samaritan[22] hastened to his succour, and the blessed Author of Christianity has justified the deed. Had he been born in any other country, or professed any other religion, still, by the unalterable laws of nature, his claim to relief was founded on his sufferings; and by the gracious provision of the same nature, compassion[23] would have led a virtuous spectator to relieve him. The feeling that prompted the relief is inseparable from the mind of man. The obligation[24] requiring it arose in strict conformity with the text, "as we have opportunity, let us do good unto all men."

Again, in the Sermon on the Mount it is said, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." But in what does this perfection consist? To the Creator of the universe alone, must belong the love of the universe,* because to the care of the universe his omnipotence only is equal. We must look, then, for some other signification of the words, and the context will supply it. Our benevolence must be promiscuous. It must extend to the bad as well as the good, like the benevolence of that Being "who causeth the sun to shine, and the rain to descend "on the just," and "on the unjust." To all men we must do justly. We must also love

* See Butler's twelfth Sermon, p. 234.

mercy, and of mercy it is the peculiar attribute to benefit those who may not deserve our moral approbation. We must love not only "those who love us," for this the persons,[25] to whom our Lord upon another occasion addressed himself, admitted; but those "who hate us," and this they denied, or at least doubted; and what we are thus directed to do as our duty, we are qualified to do by our affections —by the pity which precedes forgiveness, and by the good-will which generally follows it. But thus to do good, requires the strongest exertions. We must grapple with our resentment, ere we can do good to those who injure us; and the good so done is considered by all moralists as the surest indication[26] of a virtuous disposition, and as the best security for that extensive benevolence which forwards, as occasion may require, the interests of all mankind. The precepts of Christianity, then, have a marked superiority over the tedious and intricate[27] rules of modern theories. They teach what is intelligible—they enjoin what is practicable—they do not make the moral worth[28] of the sufferer the sole, nor in all cases even the chief, measure of his right to succour. They do not strain or relax the springs of our particular affections, but direct them in their proper tone towards their proper objects. They do not bewilder and annoy our minds by throwing compassion, or gratitude, or clemency into an hypothetical state of variance with justice.[29] They admit the principle of loving those by whom we are loved, and they enforce the distinct, and certainly not inferior, principle of extending a portion of that love

to those by whom we are "despitefully vexed and persecuted."

Now whether we consider universal benevolence as a quality of nature, or a principle of action, it is highly expedient for us not to misunderstand its properties or its office. I admit, and I approve of it as an emotion[30] of which general happiness is the cause, but not as a passion, of which, according to the usual order of human affairs, it could often be the object. I approve of it as a disposition to wish, and, as opportunity may occur, to desire and do good, rather than harm, to those with whom we are quite unconnected. I approve of it as a capacity sometimes to receive uneasiness from their pains, and satisfaction from their joys; but an uneasiness and a satisfaction far less frequent, less intense, less permanent, than the uneasiness and satisfaction which we feel for those around us, and by which we are stimulated to act as we feel in their behalf.

"A man," says the author of Ecclesiastes, "cannot find what is done under the sun, though he labour to seek it out; yea, though a wise man think to know it, yet he shall not be able to find it." Nature therefore preserved her usual economy and usual kindness,[31] when she did not subject us to any exquisite or habitual anxiety for an object so indistinct, so huge, so far surpassing our powers of exertion and even apprehension, as universal good. As an aggregate of blessings it is indeed secured by the aggregate efforts of individuals; just as, in the artificial division of labour, through a large and complicated system, he that attentively performs the task

allotted to himself, takes the surest method of contributing most amply to the success of the whole.[32] But, if this be the case, why should we shrink from acknowledging that our affections are generally enfeebled by expansion, and invigorated[33] by compression? The final cause of this difference is apparent, for the consequences of our actions, so far as the knowledge of them may be necessary to direct the judgment or excite the will, ordinarily lie within a narrow compass, and in such actions we are ordinarily engaged.

Experience has taught us to look, sometimes with jealousy, and sometimes with contempt, upon the projects of men whose minds have not been matured by long practice or deep wisdom, for advancing the welfare even of a nation; and should any adventurer seriously propose by his own solitary endeavours to render any immediate service to the whole species,[34] the glaring extravagance of his attempt would hardly be expiated by the possible purity of his motives. We should condemn him for folly; we should suspect him of vanity; we should advise him to distinguish between the vigour of enterprise and the hardiness of infatuation; we should entreat him to exchange singularity for common sense; we should think it better for him to "wrap even ten talents in a napkin," than to lavish only one without the smallest chance of advantage.

To me it appears that the modern advocates for universal philanthropy have fallen into the error charged upon those who are fascinated by a violent and extraordinary fondness for what a celebrated

author calls "some moral species."* Some men, it has been remarked, are hurried into romantic adventures by their excessive admiration of fortitude. Others are actuated by a headstrong zeal for disseminating the true religion. Hence, while the only properties, for which fortitude or zeal can be esteemed, are scarcely discernible from the enormous bulkiness [35] to which they are swollen, the ends, to which alone they can be directed usefully, are overlooked or defeated; the public good is impaired rather than increased; and the claims that other virtues equally obligatory have to our notice, are totally disregarded. Thus too, when any dazzling phantoms of universal philanthropy have seized our attention, the objects that formerly engaged it shrink and fade. All considerations of kindred, friends, and countrymen, drop from the mind during the struggles it makes to grasp the collective interests of the species; and when the association that attached us to them has been dissolved, the notions we have formed of their comparative insignificance will prevent them from recovering, I do not say any hold whatsoever, but that strong and lasting hold they once had upon our conviction and our feelings. Universal benevolence, should it, from any strange combination of circumstances, ever become passionate, will, like every other passion, "justify itself:"† and the importunity of its demands to ob-

* See Hutcheson, p. 99, upon the Passions.

† See Malbranch, as quoted by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 220. London edition of 1767, and by Hutcheson in his Inquiry, p. 139.

tain a hearing, will be proportionate to the weakness of its cause. But what are the consequences? A perpetual wrestling for victory between the refinements of sophistry and the remonstrances of indignant nature; the agitations of secret distrust in opinions, which gain few or no proselytes, and feelings which excite little or no sympathy; the neglect of all the usual duties by which social life is preserved or adorned; and in the pursuit of other duties which are unusual, and indeed imaginary, a succession of airy projects, eager hopes, tumultuous efforts, and galling disappointments, such, in truth, as every wise man foresaw, and a good man would rarely commiserate.

Is it my intention, then, to depreciate the propensity to "do good unto all men," in defiance of the text which commands us to labour in doing it? No. I mean only to state what, as an incentive to action, it ought to be, and what, as a part of our nature, it really is: and happy were it for those, who seem to be the loudest in its praise, if they practically fulfilled the purposes which it unquestionably is qualified to answer. As a calm desire of general happiness, it puts us on our guard against the silent encroachments of self-love, or the calm desire of our own happiness; it assists us in quelling the fury of our malignant passions; it raises us above the narrow and sordid aims of our selfish affections; it impels us to attend to the dictates of our reason,[36] when employed in considering by what means the welfare of our fellow-creatures may be most effectually secured; it attaches us to those means, when they are

discovered, for the sake of the end; it facilitates and regulates the operations of every amiable, but more confined affection, which may be suited to particular cases, and which produces a greater or less quantity of good, and diffuses it among more or fewer persons, according to the station in which we are placed, and the powers with which we are endowed; it dissipates those gloomy views of human follies and human vices, which, by frequent meditation upon them, contract the heart, and infuse lurking and venomous sentiments of general ill-will towards our species; it incites us to take a higher pleasure in contemplating the brighter side of every man's character, his talents, his attainments, and his virtues; it prepares us for "doing good unto all men, as we have opportunity," without impeding us [37] in our attempts to do it unto "them who are of the household of faith." Instead of separating us from those who are nearer, and therefore dearer [38] to us, it eventually forms a closer union between them and ourselves, by representing them to us as parts of a great whole [39] established and regulated by a common Creator, for the common purpose of happiness to all: and whether we deliberate before we act, or reflect after we have acted, it gives us a firmer confidence in the utility, [40] a stronger love for the moral beauty of those particular affections,[41] which, under the guidance of conscience,[42] urge us to promote the welfare of their peculiar objects. If the modern philanthropists mean thus much only, their words [43] are at a distance from their opinions; if they mean more, their opinions are at variance with facts: and

I leave them to make their own choice, between ambiguity and error.

From the view that we have hitherto taken of the subject, it appears that God has indeed "made us lower than the angels." But at the same time, and from the same proofs, it farther appears, that, if we act up to the purposes for which we are made, if "we labour in doing good:" if we do it, "as we have opportunity," both unto strangers and "unto them who are of the household of faith;" it is the intention of the same God "to crown us with glory and worship." Such are the dictates of unperverted reason, and such the precepts of pure religion.

The interests of kindred, of friends, of benefactors, of countrymen,[44] may, I grant, be insufficient to fill the capacious mind of a modern sage, who is accustomed to be wrapt in beatific visions of universal benevolence, to gaze upon some ideal archetype of moral perfection,[45] as men of old set before themselves the image of consummate eloquence,[46] and to pant, restless and unsatisfied, till he hath reached the "fullness of the stature" of the man of reason. But to inferior beings, such as we are, a more confined sphere of agency may not seem inconsiderable; and to do good in it, "as we have opportunity," may require incessant labour in the acquisition of useful knowledge, in the cultivation of a sound judgment, in watchfulness over self-love, in resistance to passion, and in the habitual exercise of prudence, fortitude, justice, liberality, and mercy. He that "giveth all diligence" to attain even this pittance of imperfect virtue,[47] may have little to dread

from contrast with the panegyrists of universal philanthropy; and he will be content, too, with the imperfect reward of endearing regards from those whom he loves, of unfeigned gratitude from those whom he has endeavoured to serve, of esteem from the wise and good, and of approbation from his own heart. At all events he, in my estimation, is a better citizen than they who brood over the inconveniences, while they slight, and teach others to slight, the numerous and solid blessings of social life.[48] He is a better religionist[49] than they, who place the merit of faith in a vehement, obstinate, and ostentatious predilection for unprofitable and unintelligible jargon, or who find no criterion of piety so unequivocal as the rigid observance of trifling, irksome, and debasing mummeries. He is a better moralist than they who would turn aside the stream of our benevolent affections from its wonted course, scatter it abroad over a wide and trackless expanse of surface, where it never could nourish nor even penetrate the soil, or force it up into thin and fleeting vapours of refinement, from which it seldom would descend in soft and gentle dews of beneficence to refresh the weary.

"If nature," exclaims the immortal Hooker,[50] "should intermit her courses, and leave, though it were for a while, the observation of her own laws; if the celestial sphere should forget its wonted motions; if the prince of the light of heaven,[51] which now rejoiceth as a giant to run its unwearied course, should, as it were, through a languid faintness, begin to stand and to rest himself; if the moon should

wander from her beaten way, the clouds yield no rain, the earth be defeated of every heavenly influence, and the fruits thereof pine away, what would become of man himself, whom these things do now serve?"

And thus we may ask, if the elements which give life and vigour to the moral world should be dissolved; if the mother could forget the child[52] that "hanged from her breasts;" if the friend, "with whom we took sweet counsel together," should forsake us, when we are compelled to beg our daily bread; if they, to whose succour we ran on the first sight of their distress, and poured "wine and oil into their bleeding wounds," should ponder ere they stretch forth their hands to rescue us from wretchedness, and pause, lest peradventure some other human being might be found a little more virtuous, and a little more miserable than ourselves; if the tears of the widow and the cries of the orphan should be disregarded, till their conduct[53] had passed the ordeal of some rigid principle, or it may be too, of some untoward prejudice, in those before whom they lie prostrate; if they who have trodden the same soil with ourselves, spoken the same language, followed the same customs, enjoyed the same rights, obeyed the same laws, bowed before the same altar, should be no more endeared to us than other men, whose kindness we have never experienced, whose faces we have never seen, whose voices we have never heard; if all these things were done under the pretence of some obligation, which stern, inflexible justice[54] lays upon us, to be extreme in

marking what is done amiss, and to weigh every action of man, every motive to act, every consequence of acting, in the balance which every individual may set up within his own bosom for adjusting in every case the direct and most efficacious means to promote the general good;[55] what would become of society, which parental affection, which friendship, which gratitude,[56] which compassion, which patriotism do now uphold? how changed would be the scenes around us! how blunted the edge of all our finer affections! how scanty the sum of our happiness! how multiplied and embittered the sources of our woe!

But between such a state as philosophy recommends, and that in which the will of the Almighty has placed us, there is fixed a gulph, which neither our social feelings, nor our sober reason will suffer us to pass "into regions of sorrow and doleful shades," where love and mutual confidence can never dwell.

The stoics,[57] it has been said, were more successful in weakening the tender affections than in animating men to the stronger virtues of fortitude and self-command; and possible it is, that the influence of our modern reformers may be greater in furnishing their disciples with pleas for the neglect of their ordinary duties, than in stimulating their endeavours for the performance of those which are extraordinary, and perhaps ideal. If indeed the representations we have lately heard of universal philanthropy served only to amuse the fancy of those who approve of them, and to communicate that pleasure

which arises from contemplating the magnitude and grandeur of a favourite subject, we might be tempted to smile at them as groundless and harmless. But they tend to debase the dignity, and to weaken the efficacy of those particular affections for which we have daily and hourly occasion in the events of real life. They tempt us to substitute the ease of speculation and the pride of dogmatism for the toil of practice. To a class of artificial and ostentatious sentiments they give the most dangerous triumph over the genuine and salutary dictates of nature. They delude and inflame our minds with pharisaical notions of superior wisdom [58] and superior virtue; and what is the worst of all, they may be used as "a cloke to us" for insensibility where other men feel, and for negligence where other men act with visible and useful, though limited, effect.

Whether we are induced by an excessive zeal for religion, or by a supposed proficiency in philosophy, "to think more highly of ourselves than we ought to think," and "to seek the praise of men," by affecting to be righteous over much, the haughtiness of our pretensions will awaken suspicion in those observers who have sounded most skilfully the depths of the human heart. No, says a celebrated writer [59] of our own country, "I will not be a citizen of the world, I reject with scorn that proud title under which philosophers conceal an equal indifference to the whole human race." "Beware," says a foreign writer,[60] whose original and sublime genius entitles him to a hearing, "beware of those cosmopolites, who deduce from books the far-fetched obligations

of universal benevolence, while they neglect their actual duties to those who are around them." If, to the decision of these enlightened men, be opposed the example of Socrates, who called himself "a citizen of the world,"[61] the objection is easily surmounted. The expression, we must observe, is quoted by other writers, not to slacken our activity in the ordinary duties of life, but to shew that unmerited exile[62] is not intolerable to a virtuous man. Socrates himself did not lavish his time in visionary schemes for the immediate good of that large commonwealth of which he incidentally and rhetorically called himself a member. He did not misemploy his talents in wily insinuations, or declamatory harangues, to the discredit of gratitude or patriotism. He obeyed the laws of his country,[63] and even fought in its defence.[64] He did not cherish the unbounded love of his species so far as to experience any torpor in the feelings, any reluctance towards the exertions, any distrust in the principles, which belong to our particular affections. In domestic life he was at least irreproachable, and in the sentiments of good-will and the interchange of good offices which characterize friendship he was amiable and exemplary.

What Socrates practically was, and even more, we, as Christians, are bounden to be.[65] We are bounden to "love our neighbour as ourselves," and to consider not only relations, friends, and countrymen, but strangers and enemies, as invested, more or less, with the rights of men. We are bounden not merely to wish, but to labour, "as we have op-

portunity," for the good of all men. So we are bounden to do by the most plain and express law; and if the power of doing so were not given us, the infliction of any penalty for the violation of that law implies such injuctice as cannot, without the most shocking impiety, be ascribed to the moral Governor of the world.

From the foregoing considerations you may perceive what general benevolence,[66] or the calm desire of "doing good to all men," really is, and how far it coincides, and may even co-operate with our particular affections. It is, however, proper for me to observe, that the same principles, upon which the influence of any of those affections may be defended in any of our social relations, extend their authority in favour of them who are literally "of the household of faith." They to whom the precept in the text was originally addressed, were persons of obscure stations and scanty fortunes. Spurned by the Gentiles, and abhorred by the Jews, they had no refuge but in the pity, no resources but in the contributions, of their Christian brethren, who were themselves poor, and therefore could not, without effort, administer relief. But while the minds of all were fraught with a warm and grateful sense of their recent escape from the errors of polytheism, and of their admission to the knowledge of the purest and most encouraging truths, no topic, surely, could be more seasonable than the connection in which they stood with their brethren of the Christian household, and with Christ their common head. The obligations which then lay on the poor to assist the

necessitous, cannot be weakened by the greater wealth of those among whom Christianity is now professed; and therefore, without violating the benevolent feelings which interest you for other moral relations, we may insist upon the peculiar attention that is due to men, as heirs of the same religious promises, and even members of the same national church.

That our religion, as well as our country, should sometimes be a ground for preference, will not be disputed by the philosophers* who contend that "in the partiality we feel for our remoter kindred and our acquaintance, there is always implied a relation of sentiment—that we enter easily and familiarly into their conceptions, and, that our imagination passing from self, which is ever intimately present with us, runs smoothly along the connection, and conceives with full sympathy the person who is nearly related to self."

Now, in the propensity of men to form themselves into religious classes — in their eagerness about proselytes, and their hatred of apostates—in their willingness to surrender nearly any rights, and renounce nearly any opinions,[67] sooner than those which are connected with their religion — in the fury of the prosecutor, and the patience of the martyr, the strength of the religious spirit is equally conspicuous. However we may try to conceal the fact from others, or even from ourselves, that spirit enters more or less into almost all our attachments

* See Hume on the Passions, p. 207.

and aversions—it mingles not merely with the prejudices of early education, but the habits of maturer age—it influences, in some degree, our opinions upon subjects of public as well as private life: and though reflection does correct, and ought to correct its excess, yet, an acute observer will generally find some laudable and useful qualities in those attachments, and a faithful monitor will be unwilling to disturb them. Surprised, indeed, should I be, not at the parsimony, but the inconsistency of nature, if sympathy, which acts so powerfully upon other and slighter occasions, should, in points relating to religion, be quite benumbed. Inexplicable to me would be the structure of our minds, if we could forget, or if without any strong feeling of tenderness we could remember, that he who now calls upon us for succour hath met us again and again in the same sanctuary—hath shared with us in the performance of the same solemn and most pleasing duties [68]—hath joined us in the same language, and at the same moment, in penitential confession, in humble adoration, in fervent thanksgiving—hath at the same altar, commemorated the sufferings of a dying Redeemer, and implored in the same holy name, consolation, support, and pardon, from the same merciful God. Be it, however, remembered—and, a lesson it is, which at this eventful crisis cannot be inculcated too earnestly,—that the very same circumstance which gives a quicker and fuller effect to our benevolence when it is guided by an enlightened conscience, [69] may produce the most fatal mischiefs, if our minds be inflamed by zeal, [70] deluded by

fanaticism,[71] or hardened by superstition. On the other hand, the same just balance of the social affections * which throws the greater part of their force towards them who are more immediately "of the household of faith," will also incline us to cherish sentiments of good will towards others, who belong to it more remotely.

Consider—yes, I beseech you as Protestants to consider very seriously, and very thankfully, the wide difference between your situation and that of the first converts to Christianity. They lived among an ignorant and superstitious populace, who "had changed the incorruptible God into an image" made like to corruptible man—among learned scoffers who denied the eternal power of the Godhead, or who knowing God to be, "glorified him not as God"—among whole nations "given up to vile affections," to all "filthiness and superfluity of naughtiness," to that "reprobate mind," which not only was eager in doing evil, but "had pleasure in them that did it." Yet the Apostle commands the Galatians to do good even to such sinners.[72]

More than this, He that had created such sinners, spared them; for "thine they were, O Lord!" thou Judge and "Lover of Souls."†

But in that happy state of improved religion and extended civilization, the blessings of which you share, many, who may not be wholly with you,[73]

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* See Hutcheson, on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, pp. 55, 56.

† Wisdom of Solomon, chap. xi. v. 26.

are not, therefore, fiercely and corruptly against you. They investigate, they believe, they may sometimes doubt after investigation, as we ourselves may sometimes believe without it. But they do not, in this country at least, insult our understandings and our feelings with the effrontery of the libertine, the arrogance of the scoffer,[74] or the fell impiety of the blasphemer.[75] Diffident they are and humble, where the knight-errant of atheism[76] rejects indiscriminately and undauntedly. They are silent where he clamours rudely. They blush when he dogmatizes, and they shudder when he reviles. By such enquirers then no snares will be laid for credulity; no encouragement holden out to rashness; no palliatives spread over the foulness and deformity of vice; no objections pushed forward that can affront the authority, or even wound the delicacy of real virtue. As to disputed points in religion,[77] Christianity itself, we must be aware, is no longer taught by inspired Apostles; it is no longer confirmed by signs from heaven; it is subjected, like every other question concerning the moral government of God, to the examination of unprejudiced reason; it contains much to employ our sagacity, our industry, our caution, and our candour;[78] and from opposition it has ultimately nothing to fear, because "it is founded on a rock." But, if upon topics most interesting to them as rational creatures, men should assert peaceably and exercise honestly the right of using their reason to explore what is truth, shall it be said that, as sensitive or social creatures, they forfeit every other

right; that when hungry, they should not be fed;[79] that when naked, they should not be clothed; that in adversity, they should not be relieved; or, that in affliction, they should not be comforted? We who "search the Scriptures," as well as profess our faith in them, "have not so learned Christ," neither shall we throw such a "stumbling-block" in the way of our brethren. No affiance, we hold, in the diligence or impartiality of our own enquiries; no conviction as to the truth or importance of our own opinions; no consciousness of superior erudition or superior acuteness can authorize us to cease from looking upon them as admitted, together with ourselves, into the great household of society,—can justify us in doing them the smallest harm on account of their attachment to this Church or that sect,[80]—can absolve us for one moment from the obligation to do them good, "as we have opportunities for doing it." After patient, dispassionate, and above all, serious research, whatever difficulties they may be less able to solve than others have been, in the doctrines, or perhaps the evidences of revelation, still, in the sacred and fundamental article of all religion, in the belief of an almighty and omniscient Creator, in the adoration of his attributes, in reverence for the precepts and example of his Son, in solicitude to discover, and promptness to obey his will, in a sense of gratitude for his favour, and dependence upon his providential care, in the hope of final retribution from his justice, and forgiveness from his mercy, they do, and it is at the peril of our

own salvation that we treat them as if they do not, belong to the household of God.[81]

I proceed, in the last place, to make some observations upon the institutions over which you preside.

We live at a period, when, amidst the din of superficial cavillers, and the vanity of presumptuous empirics, there are men who, with the very purest intentions, would enquire, not only into the proofs of speculative opinions, but the practical tendency of public institutions, such as those you now commemorate. Sensible you must be, that objections sanctioned by the authority of a great name,[82] will be echoed and re-echoed by sciolists, too indolent for detail, or too precipitate for discrimination. Sorry you would be, that the good you intend should be "evil spoken of," and therefore, it may be worth while to examine how far the credit of these charities may be affected by the strictures of a late foreigner,[83] who had deeply explored the true science of politics, and was sincerely attached to the best interests of humanity. I mean Mr. Turgot, Minister to Louis XVI.

The first circumstance I would offer to your notice is, that these hospitals were erected soon after the reform of that religion which, till very lately, prevailed among Mr. Turgot's countrymen, and from the abuses of which arose the greater part of the evils that seem to have struck more forcibly his penetrating and benevolent mind.

After the subversion of popery, the poor, who had been accustomed to receive an extensive, and in some respects, I grant, an excessive protection from

the religious houses, were suddenly deprived of all succour from them; and to provide some effectual alleviation for their sufferings was the chief purpose of these foundations. Had it been Mr. Turgot's good fortune to witness in his own country such a temperate reform in ecclesiastical establishments as our forefathers effected, so many happy consequences flowing from it as we ourselves have experienced, so many restraints thrown upon the fury, and so many correctives applied to the rapacity of the prince who favoured it, so much lenity mingled with justice, so much justice admitted into policy, so much policy employed in the cause of literature and piety, so much regard to lenity, justice, policy, literature, and piety, preserved in the perilous convulsions of change, he might have felt that conviction to his wisdom, and that gratification to his humanity, which we ought to feel to our own.

Be this as it may, I must refuse my assent to this great writer, when he asserts that "there is not one which would stand the test of enlightened policy," and when the avowed purpose of this assertion is, "not only to excite an aversion to new foundations, but to destroy the remains of what he thinks our superstitious respect for the old."[84] Fixing then upon the very specific points which he has himself enumerated, we ask, can it be said of any one among these various institutions that it "virtually offers a prize for idleness, and the disorders resulting from it?" That it "diminishes labour and the productions of the earth?" That it "makes a void in the wealth of a state, and throws additional bur-

thens upon the industrious?" I affirm peremptorily, that no such tendency, either direct or indirect, can be imputed to any of these hospitals,—that there is no one circumstance, either in their original plan, or their visible administration, against which such a charge can be alledged with the faintest colouring of probability. How far what he calls "a frivolous vanity" may have actuated the founders, is a question upon which it were impossible to decide, without a deeper insight than he had, or we have, into the heart of man. We, indeed, are concerned with actions rather than with motives. Yet the probable intentions of those founders, if we chuse to examine them, may be gathered from facts; from the situation in which they were placed, from the measures which they took, and from the correspondence of those measures with their own deliberate and repeated professions; and when you consider the wretched state of the poor, who had been recently deprived of their former resources, you will admit that sound wisdom concurred with Christian compassion in suggesting the provisions that were made for their benefit.

No, says our writer: for, "in all foundations, there is one irremediable defect; the impossibility of securing their execution." How so? "Zeal," it seems, does not communicate itself from age to age, and there is no community that does not, in the end, lose the spirit it set out with." Granted. But may not reflection perpetuate what zeal began? May it not guide us safely, where zeal has erred? May not a more enlightened age, acting up to the

spirit, rather than the letter, preserve and even multiply the benefits, which owed their rise to views less exact and less enlarged? Are men become quite callous to the dictates of benevolence? Are they utterly inattentive to the warnings of experience? And has experience pointed out any eventual, but unforeseen inconvenience from these institutions, which they who preside over them have wanted either the good sense to discover, or the honesty to remove? But "there is no sentiment," we hear farther, "that is not blunted by custom, and familiarity with the objects which excite it." Be it so. Can a philosopher, however, be ignorant, that in the wonderful texture of the human mind, the ends of virtue are secured by another and most useful property of our nature? Has not Butler,* with his usual acuteness, informed us, that "practical habits are strengthened, but passive habits weakened by repetition?" That "active principles, at the very time they are less lively in perception, are wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice, and, therefore, that benevolence, considered as a practical principle, will strengthen, and acquire a greater aptitude to assist men, even while we are less affected by the miseries of life?" Is not the truth of these observations exemplified in your hospitals, where a very acute sense of pity would often defeat the skill of those persons who are most be-

* See Butler's Analogy, in Part i. chap. v. of a state of moral discipline, p. 152, 5th edit.

neficially and meritoriously employed in the art of healing?

But "enthusiasm," says our objector, "cannot be kept alive." I am not sure that enthusiasm had any share in producing these foundations. If the writer of whom I am speaking had perused, as I have, your indentures and your rules, he would have found in them seriousness without austerity, earnestness without extravagance, good sense without the trickeries of art, good language without the trappings of rhetoric, and the firmness of conscious worth, rather than the prancings of giddy ostentation.

We are asked, "Can the servants of a foundation, without enthusiasm, always execute it with the same exactness?" I have no reason to believe that enthusiasm ever acted upon the servants of these hospitals, or that the influence of it would ever have been desirable. Fidelity and diligence in their office, are the most proper qualifications of servants, and for them we have a better security in common sense, which understands and obeys fixed rules, than in enthusiasm, which might violate them with good intentions, and very bad effects. But "inspectors, we find, are selfish or indolent." For the imputation of selfishness there is no room whatsoever among the inspectors of these hospitals; and whether or no they be chargeable with indolence, is a point, upon which they and their predecessors may, I believe, challenge the severest scrutiny. Well: but "society," we are told, "has not always

the same wants. From difference of occupation, customs, and employments, new wants spring up, the old ones are no longer felt, and thus the utility of foundations destined to supply them disappears or diminishes."

Admitting, in part, the truth of this passage, as a general observation, I contend, that to your particular institutions it is wholly inapplicable.

The complete abolition of vassalage, the improved state of agriculture, the multiplied articles of commerce, the more regular division of labour, and, above all, the general civilization of society, which, in some respects, is the cause, and in others, the effect of the foregoing circumstances, have doubtless mitigated many of the harsher inconveniences, which, more or less, are inseparable from the condition of the poor. Yet the lower and more laborious classes of the community will always be exposed, in seasons of sickness, to improper diet, unwholesome air, scanty attendance, and injudicious treatment, within their own houses—to casualties, by which their limbs or their lives are endangered—to strange, complex, stubborn forms of disease, which may baffle the endeavours, because they rarely fall within the notice of common practitioners. For these evils, to which the poor are and ever will be peculiarly liable, your hospitals have provided remedies; and it must surely facilitate the progress of the science of medicine, that after observing the treatment of the numerous and various cases which the hospitals of a large town only can present to

his view, the student may advance from literary and historical to experimental knowledge.*

The mind too—that part of man, where he is more eminently formed in the image of his Maker—will always be exposed to the fixed gloom of melancholy, or the wild paroxysms of phrensy, in madness; and, be it observed, that the succour you grant to persons afflicted with this most dreadful of all maladies, is systematically confined to such as have not the pecuniary means of procuring relief for themselves; and that from the opportunities your hospitals afford for surveying insanity in all its stages, and all its variations, the best rules are formed for the treatment of other unhappy beings in other places, labouring under the same tremendous visitation of God.

Pardon me, my hearers, if speaking upon this subject, I give vent to my feelings, and pay a just tribute of praise to the learning, wisdom, integrity, and humanity of that excellent person, who once was my scholar, and is now the physician of your hospital † for the insane.

But further: in the capital of a great kingdom there will always be offenders, whom policy as well as compassion would lead us to employ, rather than punish. In the increased civilization of the coun-

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* See page 18 of Bishop Lowth's excellent Sermon, preached at Oxford for the Infirmary in 1771.

† I mean Dr. Thomas Monro, who was my scholar when I lived at Stanmore, in Middlesex.

try, there will always be an increased necessity for extending the increased advantages of education to young men, whose parents are unable to procure for them the advantages which this hospital supplies; and when I reflect upon the comprehensive plan which has been adopted for them, on the spot where we now are, upon the salutary discipline that is established among them, upon the various kinds of knowledge in which they are instructed, upon the many excellent teachers[85] that have been set over them, upon the many industrious and prosperous tradesmen, the many courageous defenders of their country, the many luminaries of learning and religion that have come forth from this seminary, I am persuaded that it will be found to have fewer defects, and perhaps more direct tendencies to public good, than the magnificent institutions of a late northern Potentate;* and that no school or college in this kingdom is entitled to higher praise, on the ground of accommodation to the real interests of society.

Not yet have we reached the golden age of political or moral regeneration,[86] in which children can be left to the judgment or the exertions of their parents indiscriminately: and the surest way to reach, or I should rather say, to escape and to excel it, as we have lately seen it described, is to preserve a race of men early impressed with a sense of deco-

* I mean the late Empress of Russia. For an account of Russian Schools, see the Life of Catharine, vol. ii. pp. 73, 434, and elsewhere.

rum, morality, and piety; early qualified for the part they have to sustain in a free, civilized, Christian country; such men, I mean, as this seminary has often produced, to the immortal honour of its Founder, Governors, and Teachers; to the peculiar advantage of the capital, and even the advancement of our national prosperity.

Such are the wants of men, such your method of supplying them, and wholly distinct they both are from the causes whieh have been assigned for the diminished usefulness of foundations.

It has, I know, been proposed to throw the poor upon the spontaneous bounty of the rich. But, much as I exult in that noble spirit of benevolence which actuates, or, as I ought rather to say, distinguishes the inhabitants of this country, I believe that no discreet man would be in haste to make the experiment. The influence of vanity, the decay of zeal, and a variety of other trite and invidious suggestions, may be applied to hospitals supported by voluntary contributions, just as obviously, and just as undeservedly, as to your own: and whatever superiority they may seem to have in the regularity of their administration, in the activity of their patrons, and in their capacity of being regulated by new measures, adapted to new exigencies, yet we must not condemn institutions that have flourished for centuries, on the evidence of theoretic possibilities, or for the sake of contingent advantages.

Between those hospitals and your own, there is no clashing of interests, no contrariety of design, no criminal rivalry in your claims to public approba-

tion; and as your plans must have suggested many useful hints to your fellow-labourers in these goodly deeds of charity; so it is probable, that, in matters of internal regulation, you "provoke each other to good works." They supply what your institutions want, and they imitate what you practise. In the former case, they prove that your revenues, though insufficient to provide assistance for every species of distress, are faithfully applied to the purposes for which they were originally intended, and in the latter, they evince the efficacy of wholesome example.

As to the Founders of your hospitals, they, in all probability, had more directly in view the relief of distressed individuals. But the utility of their institutions is not to be estimated only by their immediate and more obvious consequences. By the long, the invisible, but firm concatenation of causes and effects, which binds together the interests of man with the actions of man, the numbers who return into the bosom of society with health re-established, with the use of limbs restored, with morals corrected, must contribute by their honest labour not only to the support of their families, but to the convenience or profit of their fellow-creatures in many distant places, and to the aggregate stock of public happiness.

From the peculiar circumstances of their own age, when a reformation in religion had been recently effected, the same Founders, I can readily suppose, had a more especial regard to them "who were of the household of faith." But the doors of your hospitals, I imagine, are not thrown open or shut,

according to any narrow rules[87] of religious distinction.

From the confluence of all ranks in this capital, and its extensive intercourse with other countries, likely it is that you have afforded succour to those who dissent from our religious establishment, as well as those who belong to it; to the members of the Greek and the Latin, as well as the English Church —to the natives of Asia, Africa, and America, as well as of Europe—to any unhappy sufferer from any shore, who, pining with want, or fainting with sickness, or writhing with pain, and severed from the gladdening presence of kindred and friends, could not have found, but in these houses of refuge, where to recline his drooping head.

What then, let me ask, are the objects of your charities? The ingenuousness of youth, the imbecility of old age, the helplessness of penury, the sharp anguish of wounds and fractures, the latent and inexpressible anxieties of complicated diseases, the awful and incalculable sufferings of insanity, the capacity of usefulness to mankind, and of repentance before God in those who "have stolen," and are desirous to "steal no more."

To whom is the care of these charities committed? To men independent in their fortunes, respectable in their stations, enlightened by long experience, and distinguished by professional skill. But no statement however accurate, no encomiums however elaborate, can so clearly exhibit the merit of your Institutions, as the unadorned, but grave and ener-

getic language of "the humble suit"[88] made to Edward your Founder, and his Council.

In the enumeration of the persons for which it provides, it begins with "the poor child, that he might be harboured, clothed, fed, taught, and virtuously trained up." The blessing of God hath rested, and may it for ever rest, upon this part of your Institutions.

Afterwards the indenture professes to "take out of the streets, the miserable aged, sore and sick persons, and by physic and surgery to cure and make them whole." Having previously stated that, "the cause of all misery and beggary was idleness; that the greatest numbers of beggars by lewd and evil services, and other causes,[89] have so utterly lost their credit, that though they would shew themselves willing to labour, yet they are so suspected and feared, that few or none dare or will receive them to work;" the authors of it proposed, in the third place, that "a house of occupations be erected, where children unapt to learning, where they who have been suffered to wander as vagabonds in the commonwealth, and where prisoners who are quit at the sessions, should be set to labour." Wisely they think, that "because the number of such persons is great, the place where they were to be exercised should also be great;" and this they emphatically describe as "the perfection of all their former travail."

My brethren! when the indenture for purposes so judicious, so humane, so holy, had been presented to the King, ratified by him, and endowed with a

sum most worthy of royal bounty, do you wonder, that, recovering for a while, from the langour of a lingering disease, and having before him the prospect of impending dissolution, he should exclaim,[90] "Lord, I yield thee most hearty thanks, that thou hast given me life thus long, to finish this work to the glory of thy name!"

Within a few days, mute was the tongue that uttered these celestial sounds, and the hand which signed your indenture lay cold and motionless in the dark and dreary chambers of death. But to the fervid ejaculation of a Sovereign thus breathing, near his last moments, "good-will towards men," and triumphantly anticipating the effects of Institutions that were to comfort and enlighten so many future generations, would you prefer the dying words recorded of any hero who perished in the arms of victory?

Does not the "last end" of such a righteous man appear to your minds more desirable than that Euthanasia,[91] for which a Roman Emperor is said to have prayed, as the choicest gift of heaven?

Would not the work, in which your Founder was thus engaged, be degraded by comparison with those bequests, which sometimes were dictated by the transports of vanity, the terrors of superstition, or the agonies of remorse;[92] and which too often served no other purpose, than to shelter the lazy recluse, or to pamper a luxurious and rapacious priesthood?

Surely, the pageantries of wealth hide their diminished glory, the splendour of military prowess fades

away, the most gorgeous displays of imperial grandeur are quite eclipsed, upon the first dawn of such benevolence, rising, as the Prophet describes "the sun of righteousness, with healing in its wings."

Forgive me, my brethren, if under the impressions of seriousness and tenderness, which the remembrance of your Founder thus dying, has made upon my mind, I point your attention towards one class of sufferers, who more particularly attracted the notice of your predecessors, and their royal coadjutor.

In that assemblage of glories which forms the constellation of benevolence, mercy shines as a star, if not of superior magnitude, yet of purer lustre; and how can its light be more auspiciously directed, than in guiding the steps of an unfortunate creature, just delivered from chains and dungeons, and the darkness of death? The world is his enemy; the world's law is not his friend; and hope, which cometh to other men, amidst all their faults, and in all their tribulations, cometh not unto him. The robustness of his constitution, the agility of his limbs, the acuteness he may possess from nature, the dexterity he may have acquired from practice, are bereaved of their wonted effects, and crippled in every effort he would make, even for self-preservation. "The wrath of God," he has been told, "is but for the twinkling of an eye,"[93] and, "though heaviness may endure for a night," yet, to the contrite heart, "joy ariseth in the morning." But, when he looketh towards the earth, he findeth in it,

"a time for hatred,* but not for love;" he seeth before himself only "the bread of adversity † and the water of affliction;" and though "he mourn like a dove, ‡ and his eyes be weary with looking upward," who is there among his fellow-creatures and fellow-sinners, to wipe away his tears? The discreet shun him—the austere frown upon him—the inhuman scoff at him—and, perhaps, the virtuous, after heaving a sigh, are content to "pass by on the other side." To his wants, the fertile village affords no more supply than the solitary waste, and to his imagination, even the crowded city must resemble a dark and savage wilderness, in which he is himself doomed to roam, hunt down his prey, and perish.

To the thoughtless, the luxurious, the proud—men "who wear purple and fine linen, and fare sumptuously every day," easy it is to deign scarcely a glance towards that wretchedness, which they never felt, and to hurl accusations against those crimes, which they never were tempted to commit. But the pleas of timorous indolence, or of fluttering vanity, or of bloated and fastidious sensuality, for crushing every offender, who, goaded by inevitable and intolerable wants,[94] would seize a small portion of their superfluities, are not so easily accepted before God, nor even by considerate and virtuous men. While "the viol and the harp, the tabret and pipe, and wine are in their feasts," the voluptuary may

* See Ecclesiastes, c. iii. v. 8. † See Isaiah, c. xxx. v. 20.
‡ See Isaiah, c. xxxviii. v. 14.

feel no check from compassion, no smart from remorse, no warnings from the instability of all human affairs, when urged by his pride or his rage, "to break the bruised reed." But they whom reflection hath raised above the prejudices of the sordid, and the passions of the vindictive; they who remember how precious must be the life of man in the sight of that Being, before whom "not a sparrow falleth to the ground" unnoticed; they who consider punishment as an accumulation of evil[95] upon the evil of crime, and as ceasing to be defensible, at the very point where it ceases, in kind, or in degree, to be manifestly and indispensably necessary, these men will sometimes venture to hesitate, ere they assent to the justice of inflicting the last dreadful severities[96] of law upon such an unfortunate person as I have been describing. He still carries about him, they must recollect, the appetites and affections of our common nature. He cannot by an act of volition stifle the cravings of hunger.[97] He must shudder when exposed to "the pelting storm." Gladly would he recline, not indeed on that soft and downy pillow, where the rich and the powerful are sunk in deep slumber, but on a pallet somewhat better than the rugged flint, or the dank and unwholesome clod. In the freshness perhaps of youth, or the vigour of manhood, with compunction for having stolen already, with anxiety to steal no more, he feels himself destined to rove, day after day, and year after year, an outcast in his native country, and a vagabond in the land of his fathers. He knows

that his sighs are unheard, that his professions are disbelieved, that his good intentions are disregarded; and can you be surprised then, if, "in the anguish of his soul," he should cry out * "O Death! acceptable is thy sentence to the needy, to him that is vexed with all things, and to him that despaireth and hath lost patience?" Have you a right to be incensed, if under the pressure of such unsought, unmerited, and unpitied woes, he should rush where the company even of the wicked may afford some little relief from the dreariness of solitude; where intemperance may for a while assuage the corrosions of sorrow; and where example must incite him to the perpetration of fresh outrages, forbidden under penalties, which he has ceased to dread, because, to his view, existence is stripped bare of all its enjoyments, and the grave is to be welcomed as a sure and speedy refuge from chilling neglect, from hissing scorn, and from unrelenting persecution?

Believe me, my hearers! I should disdain to plead the cause of such a wretched being, before captious and dictatorial sophists, who see very dimly into the emotions of the heart, and are quite unfit to decide [98] upon the affairs of human life. But with confidence should I appeal to the suffrage of the true philosopher, who knows by how many secret and indissoluble ties of sympathy, we are bound to the love of virtue and the hatred of vice! How salutary is the discipline of shame [99] and remorse [100]

* Eccles. c. xli. v. 2.

upon the human heart! How wisely the author of our nature has erected in every man's bosom a tribunal, which anticipates, and, as it were, represents his own [101] for judging the conduct of his fellow-creatures! How intolerable, even to the stoutest spirit, must be an irreversible sentence of condemnation from all mankind!

When your forefathers remarked "it has been a speech used of all men, to say unto the idle, work, work;" when they represent "idleness as itself the enemy of all virtue, and good exercise as the conqueror of all vice;" when for the suppression of idleness, and the nourishment of good exercise, they caused this house of occupation to be erected, and said, that "because the number of offenders was great, so should the house itself be great;" they spoke the language of sound policy as well as genuine humanity. You must have observed how often they recur to this subject, how long they expatiate upon it, how much they insist upon it, and, surely, if they had foreseen the encreased wants of society, the encreased population of the capital, the encreased provocatives to vice, the encreased opportunities for thieving, and, let me add, with deep concern, the encreased rigours of penal law, they would have made yet ampler provision that this most favoured part of their institutions, should have brought forth "its worthy fruit" with unfailing and even encreased abundance.

You, my brethren! who now hear me, I believe to be, as you are described in your rules, "wise and good men." I persuade myself that, as you have

been clearly directed, as you have been earnestly entreated, nay, as you have been most solemnly charged by your predecessors, you have never ceased to travail "diligently for good order's sake, in furthering this acceptable work of God." I rejoice that a portion of what cannot be done by yourselves, is done judiciously and successfully by the voluntary patrons of a similar institution, the usefulness of which is most indisputable, and has been very extensive. Amidst the multiplied incentives to wickedness, and the multiplied sufferings of the wretched who fall into it, and are solicitous to fall no more, I should be happy if the authority of the legislature were exercised in giving fuller effect to the regulations of your founders, and the endeavours of intelligent and generous individuals.

Unquestionably the police, which cannot embrace such numerous and important objects, is radically defective in wisdom; and the police which can, but does not regard them, lies open to weightier accusations. It fails alike in the duties it owes to the community, and to the offender. It remedies imperfectly the public mischief which it should try to prevent [102] by incessant care; by well regulated expense; by offer of employ to the friendless; by the institution of rewards for the penitent; and by the use, if need there be, of well-timed and well-measured correction, to the slothful and the hardened. But as matters have too long stood, and in the estimation of calm and discerning observers, even now stand, we virtually, I do not say intentionally, compel to the crime, and then punish the

criminal; we dishearten where we should have encouraged; we desert where we should have protected; we destroy where, as men, as citizens, and as Christians, we ought, if it were possible, to have reformed.

To conclude. To him who remembereth the "two great commandments, on which hang the law, the prophets," and the plainest, the most frequent, and indispensable precepts of the Gospel itself; to him, who "loveth the Lord God with all his soul, and his neighbour as himself," considerations never can be wanting to direct his judgment and animate his activity in this "labour of love."

The example of your predecessors and your royal founder, a lively and generous sense of your own duty, the peace of your capital, the credit of your country, the honour of your religion, the preservation of the sick, the relief of the needy, the intellectual and moral improvement of the young, the growing amendment of the penitent, and the occasional correction of the profligate, all conspire in summoning the whole force of your minds, and the whole weight of your authority to the momentous task.

"The fees and profits ye shall have," said your predecessors, and their words deserve to be pronounced even in this sanctuary, "are such as Almighty God hath promised to them that travail in relieving the needy members, and no other."

But, as dependent beings, you cannot be debased by reflecting, that "he who giveth to the poor, lendeth unto the Lord."

As moral agents, you support the proper dignity of your nature, by aspiring to future society with "the spirits of just men made perfect."

As Christians, you will not slight the proffered favour of that gracious Master, "who went about doing good, and who hath brought life and immortality to light" by his gospel.

If, therefore, in obedience to his commands, and conformity to his example, ye invite "sinners to repentance;" if ye "train up the child in the way in which he should walk;" if ye "heal the broken in heart, and bind up their wounds;" if ye visit in sweet pity the weeping and forlorn prisoner; whatsoever ye thus do unto the least of "them who are of the household of faith," will be recompensed [103] at the last day, as if it were done, immediately and deliberately, for the sake of your Redeemer and the glory of your God.

The foregoing Sermon has been detained from the press longer than I expected, in consequence of business, illness, and the relaxation that was necessary for the recovery of my health; but chiefly for the want of an amanuensis. In those parts of it that were preached, I have introduced only a few verbal alterations, and of those which are now printed, but were not delivered from the pulpit, due notice will be taken. I have ventured to make the Notes very copious, because I wished to save my reader the trouble of consulting books, and because I was anxious to place distinctly in his view, the opinions of many eminent writers on the interesting subject of Benevolence. I I was necessarily led to touch upon many great questions connected with that subject, and I hope not to be blamed for having given my own observations every advantage they might derive from the authority, the reasoning, and even the words of the most celebrated authors. The reader, I trust, will pardon me for having pursued now and then some topics which occurred to me while I was writing the notes, and which I conceived to be important, though not immediately relating to the matter contained in the Sermon.

As to my own opinions, they have no pretensions whatsoever to the praise of originality. Some, perhaps, were the result of my own reflections; but most of them may be found in writings, from which no man of letters would be ashamed of receiving instruction, and they are laid before the judgment and candour of the public, for reasons, which, as a well-wisher to the honour of our holy Religion, and to the happiness of mankind, I shall shall ever be ready to avow.

NOTES ON THE SPITAL SERMON.

Note 1, p. 361.

"Among the badges of suspected and falsified science," Bacon, in his Work on the Advancement of Learning, places "the novelty and strangeness of terms."—See p. 428, vol. ii. of Bacon's Works.

Again, in his third Essay, he says, "Men create oppositions which are not, and put them into new terms so fixed, as whereas the meaning ought to govern the term, the term in effect governeth the meaning."—Vol. iii. p. 304.

Note 2, p. 361.

It may be worth while to shew some instances of the refinements of philosophers, in their attempts to give new names to virtue: *Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας ἀνῄρει τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, ὡς μίας οὔσης, καὶ χρωμένης πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον.* Aristo and Zeno multiplied distinctions unnecessarily, and at the same time affixed new generic terms to virtue: *Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χίος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει, καὶ ὑγείαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τί πως διαφορούς καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἔθελοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν, λεύκων μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην, λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δέ, μελανθέαν, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκόπουσα, καὶ μὴ ποιητέα, κέκληται φρόνησις· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κόσμουσα, καὶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα, σωφροσύνη· κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμίλουσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους, δικαιοσύνη· καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἐν μὲν ἐστιν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλῳ διαίρει· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφορούς μιᾷ φύσει χρῶμενον· ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων εἰς τοῦτό πως ὑποφέρεσθαι ὁ Κιττιεύς, ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν, ἐν μὲν ἐπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, ἐν δὲ διαιρετέοις σωφροσύνην, ἐν δὲ ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρείαν.*—Plutarch, edit. Xyland, vol. ii. p. 440.

In the Meno of Plato, Socrates employs a long process of reasoning, to show that all virtue may be resolved into prudence. Soc. *οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα, καὶ καρτερήματα, ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως, εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτῇ, ἀφροσύνης δὲ εἰς τοὐναντίον*; Me. *ἔοικεν*. Soc. *εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι*.—Vid. Plat. Oper. edit. Serran. vol. ii. p. 88.

The observation which Aristotle makes upon this opinion of Socrates is very judicious: *ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστιν εἴδη—τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσική, τὸ δὲ ἡ κυρία· καὶ τούτων, ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως· διόπερ φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Σώκρατης, τῇ μὲν, ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει· τῇ δὲ ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμαρτανεν· ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγε*.—Aristot. Mor. Nicom. lib. v. cap. xiii. p. 277. Wilkinson's edition, Oxford, 1716.

They who wish to enter more largely into the subject of prudence, may consult Gassendi in libro secundo De Virtutibus, cap. i. & ii. p. 736, tom. ii. and Vasquez's Commentaries in primam secundæ sancti Thomæ in Disput. 88. I will quote two passages from chap. iv. of Vasquez, as they may throw light upon this logomachy about prudence. Primum quidem dicendum est, si sermo sit de connexione virtutum essentiali, unam virtutem non pendere, neque connexam esse cum alia secundum rationem habitus, aut secundum rationem Virtutis, ut optime docuit Durand in 3d. 36. q. 1, quia una virtus non habet speciem suam, et essentiam ex ordine ad aliam virtutem, sed solum ex ordine ad objectum per prudentiam propositum.—Vasquez, vol. iii. p. 604.

Omnes virtutes connexas esse participatione quadam dixit Hieronymus (statim allegandus), intelligens per participationem similitudinem quandam virtutis secundum generales quasdam rationes. Etenim in quolibet actu cujusque virtutis tria sunt, quæ assimilantur actibus trium virtutum, ita ut hac ratione idem actus videatur participare rationem trium virtutum sub quibus reliquæ continentur. Nam in quovis virtutis actu est firmitas animi in operando, in qua assimilatur fortitudini, est etiam rectitudo operationis, et æqualitas cum regula, in qua assimilatur justitiæ: est denique moderatio, in qua assimilatur temperantiæ.—Vasquez, vol. iii. p. 605.

As a writer of great celebrity and uncommon acuteness has

lately resolved gratitude, and, indeed, all our social virtues into justice, I shall endeavour to shew, from antient and modern writers, that this extensive sense of the word for which he contends has no claim to novelty.

*Ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ δίκαιον, ὧν τὸ μὲν κατὰ νόμον ἐστι· δίκαια γὰρ φασιν εἶναι, ἃ ὁ νόμος πράττει· ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει τὰ ἀνδρεία πράττειν καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἅπαντα ὅσα κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγεται· δίο καὶ (φασι) δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι * * * * ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον, οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνην ζήτουμεν (κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ δίκαία ἐστι, καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὄντα δίκαιον εἶναι, ὁ γὰρ σώφρων, καὶ ἀνδρείος, καὶ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτόν ἐστι τοιοῦτος,) ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ εἰς ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰρημένου κατὰ νόμον δίκαιοῦ ἐστι.*—Aristot. Magn. Moral. lib. cap. xxxiv. p. 164. edit. Duval. vol. ii.

Again, he assigns another reason for calling justice a perfect virtue: *αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατιστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη· καὶ οὐθ' ἕσπερος, οὐθ' ἑῶος, οὕτω θαυμαστὸς· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοὶ φαμεν,*

Ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετή 'στι.

Καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετὴς χρῆσίς ἐστι· τελεία δ' ἐστιν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτήν, καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρήσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν.—Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. edit. Duval. lib. v. cap. iii. p. 59. tom. ii.

The same matter, and nearly the same words, occur in the first chapter and fourth book of the Eudem. See also the Paraphrasis of Andronicus Rhodius, p. 260. edit. Heins.

Justice has sometimes been so defined as to include the duty we owe to God, as well as man. Thus in a work de Virtutibus et Vitiis, improperly ascribed to Aristotle, we read, *δικαιοσύνης δέ ἐστι, τὸ διανεμητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ σώζειν τὰ πατρία ἔθη, καὶ τὰ νόμιμα· καὶ τὸ σώζειν τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους, καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἐν τῷ διαφέροντι, καὶ τὸ διαφυλάττειν τὰς ὁμολογίας· ἐστι δὲ πρώτη τῶν δικαιοσύνων πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, εἶτα πρὸς δαίμονας, εἶτα πρὸς πατρίδα καὶ γονεῖς, εἶτα πρὸς τοὺς κατοικχομένους· ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ἡ εὐσέβεια, ἤτοι μέρος οὖσα δικαιοσύνης, ἡ παρακολούθουσα· ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότης καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ πίστις καὶ ἡ μισοπονηρία.*—Vide Arist. edit. Duval. tom. i. p 293.

There is a passage resembling this in the Oratoriæ Partitiones

of Cicero: In communione quæ posita pars est, justitia dicitur; eaque erga Deos, religio, erga parentes, pietas, vulgo etiam bonitas: creditis in rebus fides, in moderatione animadvertendi lenitas, amicitia in benevolentia nominatur.—Edit. Gruter, tom. i. p. 179. On Justice, as including our duty to God, see Lactantius, in Epitom. Divin. Institut. cap. 15 and 56.

How far justice may be said to comprehend all our social virtues, Cicero, I think, explains more intelligibly, and more instructively, than any other antient writer: In omni autem honesto de quo loquimur, nihil est tam inlustre, nec quod latius pateat, quam conjunctio inter homines hominum, et quasi quædam societas et communicatio utilitatum, et ipsa caritas generis humani: quæ nata a primo satu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota domus conjugio et stirpe conjungitur, serpit sensim foras; cognationibus primum, tum adfinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus, et iis qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanæ. Quæ animi adfectio suum cuique tribuens, atque hanc, quam dico, societatem conjunctionis humanæ munifice et æque tuens, justitia dicitur: cui sunt adjunctæ pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quæque sunt generis ejusdem. Atque hæc ita justitiæ propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia. Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit ut habeat quiddam innatum quasi civile atque populare, quod Græci πολιτικον vocant; quicquid aget quæque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam exposui caritate atque societate humana non abhorrebit. Vicissimque justitia, ut ipsa se fundet usu in ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet: servari enim justitia, nisi a forti viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. Qualis est igitur omnis hæc, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum: quandoquidem honestum, aut ipsa virtus est, aut res gesta virtute. Quibus in rebus vita consentiens, virtutibusque respondens, recta et honesta et constans et naturæ congruens existimari potest. Atque hæc conjunctio confusioque virtutum, tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. Nam cum ita* copulatæ connexæque sint, (ut omnes omnium participes

* Davis would read illæ for ita, and, upon the authority of a Paris Manuscript, he would omit the five words which I have included in a parenthesis.

sint,) nec alia ab alia possit separari; tamen proprium suum cujusque munus est: ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in prætermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in delectu bonorum et malorum, justitia in suo cuique tribuendo.—De Fin. lib. v. par. xxiii. p. 411. edit. Davis.

The extended sense of the word justice has not been unnoticed by modern writers. After stating the generic and specific sense of the word as it is employed by Aristotle, Gassendi thus proceeds:

Cum soleat vero justitio hæc laxius, strictiusque usurpari; et laxius quidem prout comprehendit genera omnia officiorum; quo pacto etiam Religio, Pietas, observantia, amicitia, Liberalitas, Gratitudo, species quædam justitiæ sunt; strictius vero, quatenus ea solum officia complectitur, quæ aut obligationi exæquantur, quo pacto excluduntur, v. c. Religio, atque Pietas; aut nisi impleantur, ad multam, pænamve nullam obligant; quo pacto excluduntur, amicitia, Liberalitas, cœteræ: Ideo sunt, qui, ut rem componant, dicunt has virtutes, puta Religionem, Pietatem, et alias, esse partes justitiæ, non subjectas, sed potentiales; aut species quidem, sed adnexas solum. Verum ne hæreamus in controversia quæ videatur de nomine, sufficiat videri officium, munusve esse justitiæ, quoties id cuipiam tribuitur, quod aliquo ipsi titulo debetur, ac potest ideo comprehendi definitione celebri, qua apud Jurisconsultos "Justitia esse dicitur constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi." —Gassendi de Virtutibus, lib. ii. cap. v. vol. ii. p. 784.

"The word," says Adam Smith, "which expresses justice in the Greek language has several meanings, and as a correspondent word in all other languages, so far as I know, has the same, there must be some natural affinity among those various significations." "The word (in one sense) coincides with what Aristotle and the Schoolmen call commutative justice, and Grotius the justitia expletrix, which consists in abstaining from what is another's, and in doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced to do. The second sense of the word coincides with what some have called distributive justice, and with the justitia attributrix of Grotius, which consists in proper beneficence, in the becoming use of what is our own, and in the applying it to those purposes, either of charity or generosity, to

which it is most suitable in our situations that it should be applied. In this sense justice comprehends all the social virtues. In another sense, what is called justice means the same thing with exact and perfect propriety of conduct and behaviour, and comprehends in it not only the offices of both commutative and distributive justice, but of every other virtue, of prudence, of fortitude, of temperance."—See Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. p. 210.

"As Justice," says Tucker, "consists in a hearty desire of doing right to every one against the solicitations of other desires urging another way, and as among contending impulses the most vigorous will always prevail, therefore justice, though distinct from temperance and fortitude, cannot well subsist without them, because it is their office to reduce our desires within a manageable compass.—See Light of Nature, vol. ii. p. 308.

"There is a beauty," says Edwards, "in the virtue called justice, which consists in the agreement of different things which have relation to one another in nature, manner, and measure. There is an harmonious corresponding of one thing to another, that he who from his will does evil to others should receive evil from the will of others, and that he should suffer evil in proportion to the evil of his doings."

"Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, when he whose heart opposes the general system should have the hearts of that system, or the heart and the head of the Ruler of the system, against him, and that in consequence he should receive evil in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his heart."

"So there is a like agreement in nature and measure, when he that loves has the proper returns of love, when he that from his heart promotes the good of another has his good promoted by the other, as there is a kind of justice in a becoming gratitude."

"Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will be found to partake of the nature of justice. There is some natural agreement of one thing to another, some adaptedness of the agent to the object, some answerableness of the act to the occasion, some equality and proportion in things of a similar nature, and of direct relation of one to another. So it

is in relative duties, duties of children to parents, and of parents to children, duties of husbands and wives, duties of friendship and good neighbourhood, duties of rulers and subjects, and all duties that we owe to God our creator, preserver, and benefactor, and all duties whatsoever considered, as required by God, and also considered as what are to be performed with regard to Christ."—Edwards's Nature of true Virtue, p. 152.

From many of the foregoing passages, it appears that the resemblance of justice to other virtues, or its connection with them, gave rise to the large signification in which the word is sometimes used. Be it observed, however, that justice is by none of the antient writers set in opposition to any other social virtue, such as gratitude, liberality, or parental affection, that they did not erect systems upon the basis of justice, nor employ the colossal weight of the term in crushing other moral excellencies, which, together with justice, were considered as pillars in the temple of virtue.

Bishop Butler, in the Preface to his admirable Sermons, expresses a wish "that it had been a custom to lay before people nothing in matters of argument but premises, and leave them to draw conclusions themselves." I have in the same manner thrown before my reader such premises as may enable him to form a judgment of the use which a celebrated modern writer has made of the word justice. If those passages be well considered, they will preserve him from any evil consequences to which he may be exposed from any equivocal use of the term. They will relieve him from the surprize he may have felt at the supposed novelty of its signification in the book to which I allude, and perhaps they may induce him to suspect that no important end, either of speculative or practical justice, will be promoted by deviation from the ordinary and established language of ethics.

NOTE 3, p. 362.

"There is a strange affectation in many people of explaining away all particular affections, and representing the whole of life as one continued exercise of self-love. Hence arises that surprising confusion and perplexity in the Epicureans of old."—Butler's Preface to his Sermons.

"One need only look into Torquatus's account of the Epicu-

rean System in Cicero's first Book de Finibus, to see in what a surprising manner this was done by them. Thus the desire of praise and of being beloved, he explains to be no other than desire of safety; regard to our country, even in the most virtuous character, to be nothing but regard to ourselves."—Butler's Preface to his Sermons, p. 23, Note on Epicureans.

"The division of our desires (into public and benevolent) has been disputed since Epicurus; who, with his old followers, and some of late, who detest other parts of his scheme, maintain that all our desires are selfish, or that what every one intends or designs ultimately, in each action, is the obtaining pleasure to himself, or the avoiding his own private pain."—See Hutcheson on the Passions, p. 13.

Gassendi, in the first Book of his Ethics (de Felicitate), and particularly in chapters iv. and v. has endeavoured, but I think unsuccessfully, to vindicate Epicurus himself from most of the charges brought against him by the Academics and Stoics.* Probably there was much exaggeration in those charges. But after repeated perusal of the ratæ sententiæ, and of Gassendi's explanation, I believe that the language of Epicurus induced many of his followers to contend for the tenets which Cicero and Plutarch opposed.

"Juxta naturam suam," says Gassendi, "quicquid homo agit, quodam cum respectu ad seipsum agit."—See Gassendi Opera, tom. ii. p. 710. True; but the selfish system gains nothing by the concession. "Every particular affection," says Butler, "even the love of our neighbour, is as really our own affection as self-love, and the pleasure arising from its gratification is as much my own pleasure as the pleasure self-love would have from knowing that I myself should be happy some time hence would be my own pleasure."—Butler's Sermons, p. 207.

"Whether the principles of our actions be self-love or the hatred or the love of another, they would agree in this, that the actions proceeding from them are done to gratify an inclination in a man's self."—Butler's Sermons, p. 209.

Great ambiguity has arisen from the use of the word self-interest, advantage, &c. But I have found no term so clear and

* Vide Brucker's Hist. Critic. Philosoph. vol. i. part ii. liber ii. cap. 13. parag. 4, 5, 14, 18.

so correct as satisfaction,* and I grant with Tucker that "every man's satisfaction is the spring that actuates all his motions."—Vol. v. Light of Nature by Search, p. 353. Or, if we examine more strictly, "It is not very satisfaction, but the prospect or idea of it."—Vol. i. p. 105.

Tucker most admirably guards the term satisfaction from abuse: "For it may be urged that if satisfaction, a man's own satisfaction, be the groundwork of all our motives; if reason can furnish no ends of her own, but serves only to discover methods of accomplishing those assigned her by sense; if she recommends virtue and benevolence, solely as containing the most copious sources of gratification; then are virtue and benevolence no more than means, and deserve our regard no longer than while they conduce towards their end. So that upon an opportunity offering, wherein a man may gain some pleasure or advantage slily and safely, without danger of after damage to himself, though with infinite detriment to all the world beside, and in breach of every moral obligation, he will act wisely to embrace it.

"I cannot deny that the consequence follows in speculation upon the case above supposed; but I conceive such case can never happen, in fact, so long as a man has any prospect of good and evil to come. For we must take into account not only the advantage accruing from an action, but likewise the benefits or mischiefs of the disposition of mind giving birth to it; and if this will lead us into evils overbalancing the present profit of the action, we cannot be said to do it without danger of after damage to ourselves. The virtues belong to the heart rather than the head, or, to speak in our own style, their residence lies in the imagination, not the understanding, and, to be complete, must direct our inadvertent motions as well as our deliberate; that is, must become appetites impelling to action without standing to consider their expedience. Now, whoever resists that impulse soberly and premeditately, upon consideration of their being inconvenient to his private purposes, will thereby

* Hence, according to the opinion of metaphysicians, omnis sive de ultimo fine, sive de mediis, deliberatio, ad sensum quendam proximum grati et molesti, tandem referenda est.—Hutcheson's Synops. Metaphysic. p. 63.

make such a breach upon their authority, and give such a crooked turn to his mind, as must unavoidably draw him into evils greater than any immediate advantage he may gain. All vice, says Juvenal, stands upon a precipice, and if we once step over the brink, nobody can tell how far we shall go down: one of these two things must necessarily follow: either we shall continue sliding till we fall into destruction, or must put ourselves to infinite trouble in climbing the precipice, a trouble far exceeding the pleasure we may have felt at first in the case of a down-hill motion. He that cheats when he can do it safely will want to cheat at other times, and consequently must suffer either by a self-denial or the mischiefs of an indulgence, so that it had been more for his benefit to have adhered inviolably to his rule of honesty. The ultimate end we have assigned for a reasonable creature to act upon was not present pleasure or profit, but the aggregate of enjoyments; and we have laboured, I hope not unsuccessfully, to prove, from a survey of human nature, that nothing adds so largely to that aggregate as a right disposition of mind."—Search, vol. ii. p. 364.

Butler says, "it may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness are most important to us, and that though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to, and pursuit of, what is right and good, as such, yet that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."—Butler's Sermons, p. 229.

Note 4, p. 362.

This certainly was the opinion of the Epicureans. "Virtue," says Adam Smith, according to Epicurus, "did not deserve to be pursued for its own sake, nor was of itself one of the ultimate objects of natural appetite; but was eligible only on account of its tendency to prevent pain, and to procure ease and pleasure." —See Smith's Theory of Morals, vol. ii. p. 283. See also p. 274.

Gassendi qualifies the proposition: Ut, quod caput est, de ipso honesto ad voluptatem relato dicatur, observandum est hanc ad voluptatem relationem nihil videri obstare quo minus hones-

tum dicatur quodam sensu per se, sive propter se expeti.—Gassendi, Oper. tom. ii. p. 705.

I allow, with Reid, that "all the antient sects, except the Epicureans, distinguished the "honestum from the utile, as we distinguish what is a man's duty from what is his interest."—Reid on the Active Powers, p. 234. As to the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, take the following passage from Reid:

"Some well-meaning persons have maintained, that all regard to ourselves, and to our own happiness, ought to be extinguished; that we should love virtue for its own sake only, even though it were to be accompanied with eternal misery. This seems to have been the extravagance of some mystics, which perhaps they were led into, in opposition to a contrary extreme of the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, who made the desire of good to ourselves to be the sole motive to action, and virtue to be approveable only on account of its present or future reward."—See Reid on the Active Powers, p. 263.

Perhaps some of the expressions which gave rise to the observation of Dr. Reid arose from the ambiguity of the word utile, by which the Schoolmen, following Aristotle, meant not good or advantage as an end, but the mean of procuring it: δόξειν δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι, δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθὸν τι ἢ ἡδονή.—Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. edit. Wilkinson, 1716, p. 341. Retaining this sense of utile, some of the Schoolmen contend for honestum as Dr. Reid or I should understand it. Ex sententia sancti Thomæ quod bonum relate, nempe quod alteri bonum seu conveniens est, triplex est: aliud est bonum honestum, nempe virtutis: aliud bonum delectabile, quod Anselmus commodum appellavit: aliud autem est bonum utile. Duo priora constituunt rationem finis, (ut disputatione 4 capite 2 ostendimus) quia gratia sui appetuntur, utile autem solum est bonum, quod in mediis reperitur: dicitur enim bonum utile, quod est bonum et conveniens, non gratia sui, sed gratia alterius, honesti, aut delectabilis: eo quod conducit ad consequendum id, quod honestum, aut delectabile seu commodum est. Vasquez in S. Thoman, tom. iii. p. 7. Disput. i. cap. ii. But let us hear him further: Quod vero attinet ad mores, utile, ut utile, non tribuit bonitatem moralem actioni, nisi ratione finis. Porro finis aut est honestum aut delectabile bonum quod Anselmus, (ut ibidem vidimus) vocavit commo-

dum. Vel ergo voluntas fertur in objectum honestum, quatenus delectabile et commodum est, et hoc modo non potest esse voluntas honesta. Vel, voluntas fertur in objectum honestum allecta ab ipsa honestate, et ita operatur honestum propter ipsum. Ac proinde habemus id quod contendimus, nempe nunquam esse voluntatem bonam moraliter et studiosam, nisi feratur in rem honestam propter ipsam honestatem. Id quod non obscure docuit sanctus Thomas in questione 19, ubi asserit in hæc verba. (Sed ad hoc, quod sit voluntas bona, requiritur quod sit boni sub ratione boni.) Id est quod velit bonum et propter bonum. Per bonum autem intelligit honestum.—Disput. lxxiii. cap. vii. p. 498. tom. iii.

NOTE 5, p. 362.

I had great pleasure in reading the following observations upon disinterestedness: "The hypothesis of disinterestedness would never have had so many adversaries, if the complexity of human motives had been sufficiently considered. To illustrate this, let it be recollected that every voluntary action has in it a mixture of involuntary.

"We are capable of self-oblivion, as well as of sacrifice. All that is strictly voluntary, in the beneficence of a man habitually generous and kind, commences from this point: if other considerations intervene in the sequel, they are indebted for their intervention to the disinterested motive. But, at the same time that this truth is clearly established, it is not less true — first, that the indirect and original motive, that which laid the foundation of all our habits, is the love of agreeable sensation; secondly, it is also to be admitted, that there is probably something personal directly and perceptibly mixing itself with such of our beneficial actions as are of a sensible duration."—Polit. Justice, vol. i. p. 430–1, 3d edit.

NOTE 6, p. 363.

I am glad to find that the Author of Political Justice thinks with me in this point: "Among the French, not a single writer upon the nature of the human mind is to be found, who does not, more or less explicitly, declare for the hypothesis of self-

love. Among ourselves, several authors of eminence have undertaken to support the practicability of disinterested action."—Vol. i. 3d edit. p. 422.

NOTE 7, p. 363.

"Though benevolence and self-love are different, yet they are so perfectly consistent, that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree, and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society. It may be added, that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we were made for both."—See Butler's Sermons, p. 9. See also Kaimes's History of Man, vol. ii. sec. 3. book 3.

"It must be here observed, that as all men have self-love as well as benevolence, these two principles may jointly excite a man to the same action, and then they are to be considered as two forces impelling the same body to motion."—See Hutcheson's Inquiry, p. 136.

NOTE 8, p. 363.

"That this sympathy with others is the effect of the constitution of our nature, and not brought upon ourselves by any choice with view to any selfish advantage, they must own: whatever advantage there may be in sympathy with the fortunate, none can be alleged in sympathy with the distressed: and every one feels that this public sense will not leave his heart, upon a change of the fortunes of his child or friend; nor does it depend upon a man's choice, whether he will be affected with their fortunes or not."—See Hutcheson on the Passions, p. 14.

NOTE 9, p. 363.

"I feel a pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him, but do not love him for the sake of that pleasure."—Hume's Essays, eleventh, on the Dignity of Human Nature, p. 95, edit. 1767.

What Mr. Hume expresses so closely and so clearly, is stated at greater length, but with equal precision, by another writer:

"If what they mean, who say that all comes from self-love,

be not, that our loving such and such particular persons and things arises from our love to happiness in general, but from a love to our own happiness, which consists in these objects; so, the reason why we love benevolence to our friends or neighbours is, because we love our happiness consisting in their happiness, which we take pleasure in: still the notion is absurd; for here the effect is made the cause of that of which it is the effect, our happiness, consisting in the happiness of the person beloved, is made the cause of our love to that person. Whereas the truth plainly is, that our love to the person is the cause of our delighting, or being happy, in his happiness. How comes our happiness to consist in the happiness of such as we love, but by our hearts being first united to them in affection, so that we, as it were, look on them as ourselves, and so on their happiness as our own?"—Edwards on True Virtue, p. 158.

Note 10, p. 364.

I allude to the French Œconomists under the late monarchy, and to their successors, Mr. Condorcet, &c.

Note, p. 366.

Ἐργαζώμεθα. Ἔργα is applied by the Greek writers specifically to works of agriculture. Thus in Callimachus:

—— σύες ἔργα, σύες φυτὰ λυμαίνονται.

Callim. Him. in Dian. v. 156.

So in Ovid, Non hominum video, non ego facta bonum; which Gesner well interprets, agros cultos, opera hominum et bonum.—See Epist. of Ariadne to Theseus, line 60.

As the Apostle in the text evidently alludes to those works, I think it right to discuss the question fully — ἔργον proprie est agricultura, opus quo terra exercetur et subigitur, nam est ab ἡ ἔρα. Hinc. ὁ αὐτουργὸς est ὁ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐργαζόμενος γῆν.— Eurip. Orest. 918. Non vero forensis homo — deinde, est in genere, Opus, labor, et si epitheton nullum in contrarium additur, semper notat honestum in se opus et utile. Denique notat et difficultatem aliquam; sed primario notat τὴν γεωργίαν.— Damm's Lexicon Homeric.

Ἐργάζομαι often signifies what is done with great effort. Magnam verbi Ἐργάζεσθαι vim laborem strenuum indicandi esse aliquot Hesiodi exemplis probatum dedit celeberrimus Jo. Henr. à Seelen, in Bibliotheca Lubecensi, vol. vii. p. 459. See Wolfius in Ephes. cap. iv. ver. 28. I have not Mr. à Seelen's work; but the following passage is an instance:

Ἀλλὰ σύ γ' ἡμετέρης μεμνημένος αἶεν ἐφέτμης
Ἐργάζευ." Hesiod, Opera et Dies, v. 298.

Ἐργάζομαι in the Sacred Writings, says Schleusner, vol. i. p. 823, signifies studiosus sum circa aliquid, operor, occupatus sum in aliqua re, facio, exerceo. Matth. c. vii. v. 23. Thus Psalm xv. ver. 2.

Ἐργάζομενοι τὴν ἀνομίαν improbitatis studiosi. Sirac, c. xxiv. v. 35, οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι ἐν ἐμοὶ qui mihi operam dant, ibid. c. xxx. v. 13. ἔργασαι ἐν αὐτῷ, operam da ei instituendo et educando.

Ἐργάζομαι implies great labour in Homer, Iliad xxiv. v. 733. Οἷσίν τε χρῦσον εἰργάζετο, et quibuscunque aurum laborando subigebat. See also Hesiod, Opera et Dies, v. 151. χαλκῷ δ' ἐργάζοντο.

The reader will probably admit that I was not mistaken in referring the imagery of St. Paul to *agriculture*, and that by ἐργαζώμεθα we must understand *intense* labour. The duty is well explained by Barrow: "He must labour in effectual performance of all good offices, and in catching all occasions of doing good; he must exert that κόπον ἀγαπῆς, that labour of love."—See Barrow's Sermon, 18th, upon Industry, vol. iii. p. 213.

It may not be improper to observe, that in Ephesians, c. iv. ver. 28. a similar expression occurs, but with a very different sense, ἐργαζόμενος το ἀγαθὸν ταῖς χέρσιν.

Ἐργάζεσθαι here signifies labore comparare, acquirere, and in John, c. vi. ver. 27.

Ἐργάζεσθε μὴ τὴν βρῶσιν τὴν ἀπολλυμένην non tam cibum periturum vobis comparate. Hesych. et Phaverin. εἰργάσατο, ἐποίησιν, ἐπράξατο. See Schleusner in voce. Dresigius, in p. 282 of his Commentary de Verbis Mediis N. T. after stating the version of John, c. vi. ver. 27, by the Vulgate, Erasmus, and Beza, observes, nullus verum verbi medii usum est assecutus, quum sit interpretandum operamini vel comparate *vobis*. Our

English version says, "labour not for the meat," which though preferable to the version of Erasmus and the Vulgate, is defective. But in the Ephesians it is far more defective, "working with his hand the thing which is good."

With all the deference which every man of letters owes to the sagacity of Bishop Sherlock, I will state my reasons for dissenting from his Lordship in the interpretation of a text which relates to the duty of benevolence, and just now occurs to my memory. In the third volume of his admirable Sermons, p. 148, he translates ἀγάπη ἐκτενὴς an uninterrupted love. The English version calls it fervent charity. In my opinion the word signifies intense, which is nearer to fervent in the English version than "uninterrupted." In favour of the Bishop's opinion it must be observed, that Œcumenius interprets ἐκτενὴ, διαρκὴ, ἐπὶ πολὺ διατείνουσαν, dilectionem continuam, constantem, diu durantem. To these words of Œcumenius, quoted by Suicer, I will add from Hesychius, ἐκτενίαν (which Scaliger reads ἐκτενιᾷν, Kuster interprets κατ' ἐκτενίαν, and Pricæus corrects into ἐκτείνειν) συνεχῶς ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ. But we also read in Hesychius, ἐκτενει, ἐπιμελει, and ἔκτενες, διατεράμενον, and ἐκτενῶς, προθύμως, ἢ διατεταμένως. Suidas explains the same word ὁλοψύχως καὶ προθύμως. Phavorinus, ἐκτενῶς, συντόνως, ἐπιμόνως, ἢ ὁλοψύχως, και προθύμως και φιλανθρώπως. St. Luke uses ἐκτενης twice. It occurs in Acts, c. xii. ver. 5. προσευχὴ δὲ ἦν ἐκτενής.

The English translations interprets *without ceasing*, the word which, with equal probability, may be rendered, according to Shcleusner, *ardentissimæ, enixæ* preces fiebant. St. Luke, c. xxii. ver. 44, uses ἐκτενέστερον προσηύχετο. Hic *intensius*, says Suidas, *fervidius* reddunt eruditi. Glossa, ἐκτενέστερον enixius. Vetus, prolixius. Chrysostomus, τὴν εὐχὴν μετ' ἐκτενείας ἀναφέρειν. The English translation is, "he prayed more earnestly." I therefore approve of the English version of St. Peter, as expressing degree, rather than duration. The word occurs four times in the Septuagint, and is explained by Biel extense, vehementer. But further, I observe that in Polybius ἐκτενὴς and ἐκτενῶς are applied to degree rather than duration, γεγόνασι πάντων ἐκτενέστατοι τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας αὐτονομουμένων omnium civitatum liberarum, que in Asia sunt, summo studio amicitiam hos coluisse (i. e. Romanorum).—Polyb. lib. xxii. cap. v.

Ἔτι δὲ συστέσαντος τῷ ναυκλήρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιβάταις ἐκτενῶς, quum etiam nauclero et vectoribus eos studio magno commendasset.—Polyb. lib. xxxi. cap. 22.

Πάσων αὐτὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλαδα πόλεων ἐκτενῶς καὶ μεγαλοψύχως ἀποδεξαμένων κατὰ τὴν δίοδον. Omnibus Græciæ civitatibus per quas iter faciebat summo studio et magnificentia eum excipientibus.—Polyb. lib. xxxiii. cap. 4.

In each of the foregoing instances the degree of kindness and good will is signified by ἐκτενὴς and ἐκτενῶς. In Appian it means degree, not duration: καὶ τὴν ἀλλὴν Ἰτάλιαν καὶ Ρώμην ἐπ' αὐτῇ Σύλλαν ἐκτενῶς κεχείρωσθαι et omnem reliquam Italiam cum urbe Roma in Syllæ potestate jam penitus esse.—Appian de Bell. Civil. lib. i. p. 131. vol. ii. edit. Schweighæuser.

Note 11, p. 367.

When Bishop Butler argues upon any supposed case, he shews so much caution, as well as sagacity, as must guard his readers from applying the supposition to any bad purpose. In his chapter upon the Moral Government of God, p. 93, in order to shew the happy tendency of virtue, he supposes a "kingdom or society of men upon earth perfectly virtuous for a succession of many ages, to which may be given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy." But after describing this kingdom, he takes care to add, that "our knowledge of human nature, and the whole history of mankind, shew the impossibility, without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men here on earth should unite in one society of government, in the fear of God and universal practice of virtue."—See Butler's Analogy, p. 95.

Note 12, p. 368.

"We find the creation, so far as our intercourse reaches, divided into distinct species and limited societies, the effects of whose actions extend no further than a certain number of those with whom they have intercourse. Nor can we presume otherwise of those unseen consequences depending upon the secret concatenation of causes which, however they may in part extend to innumerable multitudes, are likely to affect some particular

class of beings principally with whom we stand nearest concerned."—Search, vol. v. p. 371.

I hear with concern that the works of this admirable writer are very scarce, and therefore I shall not apologise for ample and frequent quotation.

Note 13, p. 368.

These are the words of Aristotle: *Ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδάρη γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἡ υἱὸν πάτερα, ἡ πάτερα υἱὸν· ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολὺ ὕδωρ μιχθέν, ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκείοτητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων, διαφοντίζειν, ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὂν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, ἡ πάτερα ὡς υἱῶν, ἡ υἱὸν ὡς πάτρος, ἡ ὡς ἀδέλφους ἀλλήλων.*—Aristot. Politic. edit. Heins. lib. ii. cap ii. p. 212. "No man," says Johnson, "forgets his original trade: the rights of nations and of kings sink into questions of grammar, if grammarians discuss them." I will confirm, by a fresh instance, the justness of Johnson's observation; for, while writing notes upon the subject of benevolence, I shall stop to remark, that *ὑδάρης*, which occurs in the sentence just now quoted from Aristotle's Politics, is also to be found in the last chapter of the Poetics: *ἀκούλοθουντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει μύθον φαίνεσθαι ὑδάρη.* Fabulam apparere dilutam et languidam.—See Mr. Tyrrwhit's excellent note.

Note 14, p. 368.

I have often been struck at the use which is made of this word, expressing relation, by the advocates both of the selfish and the benevolent systems. "What say you of natural affection," says Hume, "is that also a species of love? Yes, always self-love. My children are loved only because they are mine. My friend, for a like reason. My country engages me only so far as it has a connection with myself. Were the idea of self removed, nothing would affect me."—Hume, Essay 11th, p. 94. The sense allows me to substitute *my* for *your*.

The proposition may be true, if rescued from ambiguity in the terms, and yet no consequences would flow from it in favour of

the selfish system. Now let us see how little stress is laid upon the particle of relation to self, by an advocate of the benevolent system. A case is stated, where it may be in a man's power to save the life of Fenelon, or of a valet who was his own brother, father, or benefactor. "Justice, it is said, would have taught him to save the life of Fenelon, because it was more valuable, at the expence of the valet's life. What magic, it is added, is there in the pronoun '*my*,' that should justify us in overturning the decisions of impartial truth? My brother or my father may be a fool, or profligate, malicious, lying, or dishonest. If they be, of what consequence is it that they are mine?"—See Political Justice, vol. i. p. 128.

Probably, if the appeal were made to the common sense and common experience of mankind, the circumstance that they are mine would, even in the case supposed by our philosopher, be of great consequence. But what if a father were neither a fool nor a profligate, would it then be of consequence that he was mine? Would the remembrance of his relation to me be no cause of endearment, no incitement to acts of beneficence towards him? I believe that Aristotle would have laid much greater stress upon the pronoun "my," *δύο γὰρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ χήδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν.*—See Aristot. Polit. edit. Heins. p. 112.

I suspect that *ἀγαπητόν* here means more than carum; it may be rendered unicum, atque adeo carum. Aristotle, in lib. i. cap. 7. Rhetor. says of the eye, destroyed in him who had only one, *ἀγαπητόν ἀφῃρῆται.* See Hen. Stephens's Thesaurus; but I should observe, that in the margin of Arist. *καὶ μόνον* are added, perhaps, as explanatory. Upon the word *ἀγαπητόν* in SS. for *μονογενῆ*, see Suidas and Hesychius in V, and the notes.

Would our modern philosophers, who exclude self from the duty of what they call justice, deny the influence of self upon many other occasions? They who adopt, as I do, Mr. Hume's opinion about "the double relation of impressions and ideas," which he illustrates in the case of pride (see Dissertation on the Passions, vol. ii. p. 198, 9), will readily admit the easiness of transition from one to the other, in cases of benevolence where the object is related to self. In page 207, Mr. Hume states, that a relation to ourself excites affection towards any person; but he

seems to limit the operation of the principle to relations who are less near than parents or children, and to consider the affection between them as founded upon "an original instinct." Granting, however, that parental affection originates in such an instinct, yet I suspect that the continuance of it must in part be ascribed to other causes. "Parental fondness," says Tucker, "rises from the consideration of being our own blood, the habit of attending to the cares of nature and education, the hope of seeing the good fruits of our endeavours, the solace and support expected from returns of duty."—Tucker upon Charity, vol. vi. page 354.

The remainder of former affections, and the accession of new ones, which make the sum total of parental love, and the various sources of filial affection, are explained by Hartley, sect. iv. upon the Pleasures and Pains of Sympathy.

The pronoun my, I believe, will always be found to have great weight, both in the sentiments and the duties of mankind.

Note 15, p. 369.

"Our calm affections, private or public, are perfectly distinct from our particular affections. Calm self-love is quite distinct from hunger, thirst, ambition, &c. So calm good-will towards others is different from pity, parental affection, or the passion of particular friends. Now every kind passion, which is not pernicious to others, is virtuous and lovely, and yet a calm good-will towards the same persons appears more lovely. So good-will towards a small system is more lovely and preferable to more passionate attachments, and yet a more extensive calm benevolence is still more beautiful and virtuous, and the highest perfection of virtue is an universal calm good-will towards all sensitive natures."—Hutcheson's Inquiry, page 182. See also Hutcheson on the Passions, sect. ii. art. 2 and 3.

Note 16, p. 369.

"The actions we approve in others are generally imagined to tend to the natural good of mankind, or some parts of it. But whence this secret chain between each person and mankind.

How is my interest connected with the most distant parts of it, and yet I must admire actions which shew good-will towards them, and admire the author."

"As soon as any action is represented to us as flowing from love, humanity, gratitude, compassion, a study of the good of others, and an ultimate desire of their happiness, although it were in a more distant part of the world, or in some past age, we feel joy within us, admire the lovely action, and praise its author."—Hutcheson's Inquiry, page 114.

"We frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions performed in distant ages and remote countries, where the utmost subtlety of imagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest, or find any connection of our present happiness and security with events so widely separated from us."—Hume's Essays, vol. ii. page 284.

NOTE 17, p. 369.

"Let a man of a composed temper, out of the hurry of his private affairs, only read of the constitution of a foreign country, even in the most distant parts of the earth, and observe art, design, and a study of public good in the laws of this association, and he shall find his mind moved in their favour; he shall be contriving rectifications and amendments in their constitution, and regret any unlucky part of it which may be pernicious to their interest; he shall bewail any disaster which befalls them, and accompany all their fortunes with the affections of a friend." —Hutcheson's Inquiry, p. 162.

NOTE 18, p. 370.

"Civil society doth more content the nature of man than any private kind of solitary living, because, in society, this good of mutual participation is so much larger than otherwise. Herewith, notwithstanding we are not satisfied, but we covet, if it might be, to have a kind of society and fellowship even with all mankind. Which thing Socrates intending to signify, professed himself a citizen, not of this or that commonwealth, but of the world. An effect of that very natural desire in us, a manifest token that we wish after a sort of an universal fellowship with

all men, appeareth by the wonderful delight men have, some to visit foreign countries, some to discover nations not heard of in former ages: we all desire to know the affairs and dealings of other men, yea, to be in league of amity with them. And this not only for traffick's sake, or to the end that when many men are confederated, each may make others more strong, but for such cause also as moved the queen of Sheba to visit Solomon, and, in a word, because nature doth presume that how many men there are in the world, so many gods, as it were, there are, or, at leastwise, that they should be towards men."—Hooker, page 89.

The most eloquent description I have ever read of universal benevolence, and, perhaps, the most correct statement of its restriction according to our particular relations in society, are in Bishop Taylor's Discourse on the Nature and Measure of Friendship. I cannot resist the strong impulse I feel to quote a part of it. "Perfect friendship, by the principles of Christianity, is warranted to extend to all mankind, and the more we love the better we are. It is not ill that you entertain brave friendships, and worthy societies; it were well if you could love, and if you could benefit all mankind." "I confess this is not to be expected of us in this world. But as all our graces here are but imperfect, at best they are but tendencies to glory, so our friendships are imperfect too, and but the beginnings of a celestial friendship, by which we shall love every one as much as they can be loved. Then so we must here in our proportion, and, indeed, that it is that can make the difference. We must be friends to all, that is, apt to do good, loving them really, and doing to them all the benefits which we can, and that they are capable of. The friendship is equal to all the world, and of itself hath no difference, but is differenced only by accidents, and by the capacity or incapacity of them that receive it. Nature and religion are the bonds of friendship; excellency and youthfulness are its great endowments; society and neighbourhood, that is, the possibilities and circumstances of converse, are the determination and actualties of it."—Taylor's Collection of Moral and Polemical Discourses, page 643.

NOTE 19, p. 370.

"This maxim, though possessing considerable merit as a popular principle, is not modelled with the strictness of philosophical accuracy."—See Political Justice, vol. i. page 126.

To this opinion I shall oppose the authority of Butler, in his twelfth sermon, where, with his usual sagacity, he so explains the precept as to leave, with few of his readers, the smallest doubt of its precision. "The Scripture not being a book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for mankind, has, with the utmost possible propriety, put the principle of virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is, that part of the universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and with which we have to do."—See Butler's Sermons, pa. 235.

Aristotle examines how far precision is to be expected in moral discussions, and says, *ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας, παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τ' ἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι.* Aristot. de Mor. lib. i. cap. i. He often takes occasion to repeat the same observation, as in cap. vii. the same book, in lib. vii. cap. vii. de Republicâ, and in the last chapter of the second book of Metaphysics. According to his rules and to his practice, the maxim of our Lord will be found sufficiently accurate even for a philosopher, and when connected with the explanation of the maxim by the case of the Samaritan, our Lord's instruction may be thought entitled to praise, according to another remark of Aristotle—*ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις, οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις.*—Edit. Wilkinson, Ethic. Nicom. cap. vii. p. 74.

But that the precept is comprehensive, seems granted in page 422 of Political Justice, vol. i.; where we read, "that the active and ardent spirit of the founders of religion has, perhaps, always carried them into the liberal system."—See Matt. ch. xxii. ver. 37. 41.

Yet these concessions fall very short of the commendations due to Christianity. Let us hear what is said of it by men whose views, to say the least, were equally comprehensive and equally accurate with those of the writer to whom I allude. "It may

be truly affirmed (says Bacon), that there never was any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the holy faith."—Bacon's Advan. Learning, p. 508.

Again: "These be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love, Amor melior sophista laevo ad humanam vitam, That love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist, or preceptor, which he calleth left-handed; because, with all his rules and perceptions he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself, and govern himself, as love can do; so certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other."—Bacon's Advancement of Learning, p. 520.

"Christian charity is friendship to all the world, and when friendships were the noblest things in the world, charity was little like the sun drawn in at a chinke, or his beams drawn into the centre of a burning glass; but Christian charity is friendship expanded like the face of the sun when it mounts above the eastern hills. Nature hath made friendships and societies relations and endearments; and by something or other we relate to all the world; there is enough in every man that is willing, to make him become our friend; but when men contract friendships they inclose the commons; and what nature intended should be every man's, we make proper to two or three. Friendship is like rivers and the strand of seas, and the air, common to all the world; but tyrants and evil customs, wars and want of love, have made them proper and peculiar. But when Christianity came to renew our nature, and to restore our laws, and to increase her privileges, and to make her aptness become religion, then it was declared that our friendships were to be as universal as our conversation; that is, actual to all with whom we con-

verse, and potentially extended unto those with whom we did not."—Taylor's Polemical Discourses, p. 642.

NOTE 20, p. 370.

We may say of the word neighbour (Arist. Mor. lib. v. cap. ii. edit. Duval, p. 58), what Aristotle says of justice, *ἐοικε πλεονάχως λεγέσθαι*, and therefore *διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτοῦ λανθάνει.*

Now it is plain, that the lawyer who wished to justify himself, used the word neighbour in a very restrained sense. It is equally plain from our Lord's answer, that the word was capable of a more extended signification; and upon a term which is so important in itself, and which occurs so frequently, it cannot be improper to bestow some remarks.

Vorstius, in the third chapter of his book, de Hebraismis N. Test. has very judiciously and very copiously explained the words brother and neighbour, as used either in the Old or New Testament. In the New Testament, *ἀδελφὸς*, says he, signifies quemvis alium, which the Greeks vulgo exprimunt by *ὁ πλησίον* and *ὁ ἕτερος*. Thus *πας ὁ ὀργιζόμενος τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ εἰκῇ*, quicunque temere irascitur alteri, Matt. cap. v. ver. 22. So Matt. cap. vii. ver. 3. Matt. cap. xviii. ver. 15. cap. xxi. ver. 35. Luke, cap. iv. ver. 41, 42, 43. Romans, c. iv. v. 10, &c. Cæterum usurpata sic est vox Græca *ἀδελφὸς* ad exemplum Hebrææ רעה Hebræi cum significare volunt quemvis alium uti solent ista vocula. He refers to Levit. c. xix. v. 17. Psalm l. v. 20. Gen. c. xxvi. v. 3. It is even used for alius alium, alter alterum of things inanimate, as in Exodus, c. xxvi. v. 5, in the feminine; and in Exodus, c. xxv. v. 20, of the cherubim in the masculine; so the word רע. Kings, lib. i. cap. xx. v. 40. Græci interpretes verterunt *κατεφίλησεν ἕκαστος τὸν πλησίον, καὶ ἔκλαυσεν ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ πλησίον.* He further says, that *ὁ πέλας* and *ὁ πλησίον* mean not only vicinum, socium, propinquum generally, but quemvis alium. He then quotes from Thucydides and Polybius—*νομίζειν τὰς διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι.* Thucyd. lib. i.—putare, sententias aliorum similes esse nostris—*ἡ τῶν πέλας ἀπειρία, μέγιστον ἐφόδιον γίγνεται τοῖς ἐμπείροις πρὸς κατόρθωσιν.* Polyb. ib. ix.

Raphelius, in his notes upon Matthew, cap. v. ver. 43, illustrates ὁ πλησίον by four passages from Polybius, of which it will be sufficient to produce two—πικρὸς γὰρ γεγονὼς καὶ ἀπαραίτητος ἐπιτιμητὴς τῶν πέλας εἰκότως ἂν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πλησίον αὐτὸς ἀπαραιτήτου τύγχανοι κατηγορίας. Nam cum alios ipse acerbe atque inclementer obsurgare soleat, jure merito ab aliis pari inclementia tractabitur. Polyb. edit. Casaub. p. 1396. πάντα γὰρ ἐπιδέχεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ τὰ πικρότατα τὸ γένος, οἷς ἐκεῖνος κέχρηται κατὰ τῶν πλήσιον. Nullum est tam acerbum genus convicii, quo ille adversus alios utitur, quod huic illius facto non arbitror convenire. —Ibid. p. 1401.

Biel, in his Lexicon for the Septuagint, interprets ὁ πέλας not only qui prope est, but alius, and instances in Prov. chap. xxvii. ver. 2. Again, under ὁ πλησίον he produces instances where it corresponds to pater, frater, socius, and even hostis. Though, in this instance some read רע for עי.

As to the Hebrew terms in the Old Testament, we find great variety in their significations. Thus אח is by Parkhurst explained, a brother by nature, Gen. cap. iv. v. 2. One consociated by similarity of condition or manners, Ezek. cap. xviii. v. 10. A countryman, Levit. cap. xxv. ver. 46. One connected with us by partaking of the same nature, Levit. cap. xix. ver. 17; and here Parkhurst refers to Luke, cap. x. ver. 29, et seq. where the English translation gives neighbour. These instances shew the great latitude of the word.

רע as we have seen above, has various senses. See Taylor's Concordance. By Parkhurst it is explained, an intimate or special friend and companion, as Deuter. cap. xiii. ver. 6. Prov. cap. xxviii. ver. 7, &c. &c.; but most commonly it is used for a companion or neighbour in general. Gen. cap. xi. ver. 3. Exod. cap. xx. ver. 16. Levit. cap. xix. ver. 18.

Even עמית Parkhurst explains, a member of the same society. Levit. cap. vi. ver. 2. cap. xviii. ver. 20. But in Taylor's Concordance it is explained, one another, or a man's neighbour. Levit. xxv. 17, and one to another, or a man to his neighbour. Levit. xix. 11.

The foregoing citations and references plainly shew, that, consistently with the genius of the Hebrew language, our Lord gave a very wide signification to the word neighbour. If the reader

should be wearied with quotations from verbal critics and lexicographers, perhaps he will be refreshed a little by the charming language of Jeremy Taylor. "The Scripture," says he, "which often describes the duties of parents and children, never describes the duty of brothers, except, where by brethren are meant all that part of mankind who are tied to us by any vicinity of religion or country, of profession and family, of contract or society, of love and the noblest friendships."—Page 455 of Taylor's Polem. Discourses.

Again: "The New Testament speaks of friends often, but by friends are meant our acquaintance, or our kindred, the relatives of our family, or our fortune, or our sect; something of society, or something of kindness in it; a tenderness of appellation and civility, a relation made by gifts, or by duty, by services and subjection; and I think I have reason to be confident, that the word friend (speaking of humane intercourse), is no otherways used in the Gospels or Epistles, or Acts of the Apostles: and the reason of it is, the word friend is of a large signification, and means all relations and societies, and whatsoever is not an enemy."—Ibid. p. 641.

The objection to the Gospel for omitting to give any precepts about friendship is well answered by Search, in his Light of Nature, part ii. vol. iii. p. 417.

But of the term neighbour, used by our Lord, he says, in p. 418, "it was the properest to distinguish the object of our good offices, because it arises from situation, and not from personal character."

NOTE 21, p. 370.

"It is not man's being a social creature, much less his being a moral agent, from whence alone our obligations of good-will towards them arise. There is an obligation to it prior to either of these, arising from his being a sensible creature, capable of happiness or misery."—Butler's Sermons, page 166.

NOTE 22, p. 371.

I have no where seen the case of the Samaritan argued so ably as by Sherlock in the eleventh discourse of his fifth vo-

lume. "When the relief had been given, the question was, who had been neighbour to the unfortunate man in the sense of the law. As the case was stated, there was no room to insist on the near relation which the Levite bore to the wounded man. The nearer their relation the worse neighbours they were for neglecting him; no room to object against the Samaritan, his want of relation, or his difference of religion. The less and fewer his obligations were, the more disinterested was his obedience to the law, and the better neighbour was he."—See p. 273.

NOTE 23, p. 371.

The illustrious Prelate whom I mentioned in the former note, was certainly no advocate for the selfish system. But a passage once dropped from his pen, which they who are advocates for it might pervert to very evil purposes: "To administer relief to the extreme distresses and sufferings of our fellow creatures, is in some degree to comply with the cravings of nature in ourselves, and to provide for our own ease and enjoyment: for the pity and compassion which miserable objects raise in us, are attended with a pain and uneasiness to ourselves, no otherwise to be allayed but by relieving the misery that caused them."—See Sherlock, discourse ii. vol. v. p. 34.

Now Hartley has traced up compassion "to the appearance and ideas of any kind of misery which children have experienced, and to the signs of distress which they understand, to the connection between the adjuncts of pain and the actual infliction of it. When these and such like circumstances have raised their desires and endeavours to remove the causes of their own uneasy feelings, or the miseries of others, in all which they are much influenced by their disposition to *imitate*, and when a *variety* of internal feelings and desires of this kind are so blended that no part can be separated from the rest, a child has compassion. An attentive person," he adds, "may discern the constituent parts of his compassion while they are yet the internal and selfish feelings, and before they have put on the nature of compassion by coalescence with the rest."—See Hartley, p. 474, edit. 1749. True; and the uneasiness, it is granted, remains when compassion is formed. Yet Hutcheson is perfectly right, when he says

"that we are not immediately excited by compassion to desire the removal of our own pain. We think it just to be so affected upon the occasion, and dislike those who are not so; but we are excited directly to desire the relief of another, without any imagination that this relief is a private good to ourselves."—See Hutcheson, p. 240 of the Enquiry. See also p. 146 of ditto, and p. 522 of the Nature and Conduct of the Passions. "Our intention," as Hutcheson well observes, p. 195 of the Enquiry, "is not to free ourselves from the uneasiness of the passion, but to alter the state of the object."

When I thus notice what seems to me a passage not *sufficiently* qualified in Bishop Sherlock, I would not be understood to deny that he deserves the reputation which has generally acquired for depth of thought, acuteness of reasoning, and precision of style. *Οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω σκαιός, μηδ' ἀναίσθητος ἐγὼ γενοίμην, ὥστε ταύτην τὴν δόξην περὶ ἄνδρος τηλικοῦτον λαβεῖν· ἔπει πολλὰ καὶ περὶ πολλῶν οἶδα μέγαλα καὶ θαύμαστα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας δυνάμεως ἐξειρηνέγμενα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.* So said a critic of antiquity, when he censured parts in Plato, and so say I, by way of apology for myself, when I have expressed dissent from Bishop Sherlock. —Vide Dion. Halicar. Tractatus de Antiquis Scriptoribus, p. 176. edit. Holwell, 1766.

In the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful, sec. xiv. Mr. Burke remarks, "that we have no small degree of *delight* in the real misfortunes and pains of others; that the Creator designing us to be united by a bond of sympathy, has strengthened that bond by a proportionable delight, and *there* most where our sympathy is *most wanted*, in the distresses of others; that this delight hinders us from spurning scenes of misery; that the pain we feel prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving those who suffer; and all this is antecedent to any reasonings, by an instinct that works as to its own purpose without our concurrence." I admit the existence both of pleasure and pain in compassion. The final cause of both is to quicken our exertions for the benefit of others. But yet I maintain that the agent intends directly neither to obtain that pleasure nor to remove that pain, but to succour the distressed object. Akenside, in the second book of the Pleasures of Imagination, has most beauti-

fully described the pain and the pleasure which accompany compassion:

—— O deemest thou indeed,
No kind endearment here by nature given
To mutual terror and compassion steers?
No sweetly melting softness which attracts,
O'er all that edge of pain, the social powers
To this their proper action and their end.

NOTE 24, p. 371.

I do not speak only of the obligation "which conscience, approving of any action, imposes upon us to obey the law of our nature, which doubtless in such a case would urge us to relieve." —See Butler's Sermons, p. 50. I have *also* in view the express or implied obligations of religious command. "When any sanctions co-operate with our moral sense, in exciting us to actions which we count morally good, we say we are obliged."—Hutcheson's Inquiry, p. 277.

Universal benevolence as a feeling I have endeavoured to explain; but as an active duty, I grant it cannot be practised, nor, as such, is it inculcated without restrictions arising from opportunity, &c. "Our active duties," says Lord Kaimes, "regard particular persons, as our relations, our friends, our benefactors, our masters, our servants. Even distress," he observes, "though it has a tendency to convert benevolence into a duty, is not sufficient without other concurring circumstances; for to relieve every person in distress is beyond the power of any human being. Our relations in distress claim that duty from us, and even our neighbours; but distant distress, without any particular connections, scarce causes our sympathy, and never is an object of duty."—See book i. sect. 3, 4. vol. ii. of Sketches of History of Man.

NOTE 25, p. 372.

I allude to the conversation of our Lord with his Disciples, as related in Luke, chap. v. from ver. 32 to 36. When writing the Sermon, I fell into a μνημονικὸν ἁμάρτημα, which upon reading it in print I afterwards discovered, and have corrected.

NOTE 26, p. 372.

"Benevolence towards the worst characters, or the study of their good, may be as amiable as any whatsoever; yea, often more so than that towards the good, since it argues such a strong degree of benevolence as can surmount the greatest obstacle, the moral evil in the object. Hence the love of unjust enemies is counted amongst the highest virtues."—Hutcheson's Inquiry, p. 179.

NOTE 27, p. 372.

Some rules which have been laid down about justice, gratitude, &c. remind me of what Bishop Taylor says in the Preface to his Ductor Dubitantium. "There is a wood before your doors, and a labyrinth within the wood, and locks and bars to every door within that labyrinth, and after all we are like to meet with unskilful guides, and yet of all things in the world, an error in these things is the most intolerable."—Preface, p. 7. "Unhappy would it be for mankind if a sense of virtue was of as narrow an extent as a capacity for *such* metaphysics."—Hutcheson's Inquiry, p. 119.

NOTE 28, p. 372.

In one of the senses ascribed to justice, in a former note, it implies a due degree of esteem for any object; so I find it used by Hierax, in his work upon justice, quoted by Stobæus, Serm. ix. *πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἄδικος, εἰ ὁμοίως τιμήσει τόν τε σώφρονα καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον, καὶ τὸν ἄφρονα, καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον.* No man ever meant to deny that our affections will carry us forward more eagerly to assist a good than a bad man, i. e. "when good appears attainable by a person of moral dignity, our desire of his happiness, founded upon esteem or approbation, is much stronger than that supposed in a former class of persons, by whose happiness or misery our public passions are moved abstractedly from their moral qualities, or that the misfortune of such a person raises stronger sorrow, pity, or regret."—See Hutcheson on the Passions, p. 73. But the social relations in which we stand even to the bad, and the excess of their misery,

and various other circumstances, may justify us in granting to them the assistance which we at the same time do not grant to better men. "Every kind and every degree of misery," says Sherlock, "is an object of mercy, and whether men are exposed to calamity by the necessity of their condition, and the over-ruling Providence of God, or whether they bring them upon themselves by sin and wickedness, or by folly and indiscretion, yet, considered as miserable, they are objects of pity."—See Sherlock's Sermons, vol. v. p. 275.

It is impossible to lay down rules that should be adapted to all cases. However, the reader may peruse with advantage Hutcheson's Canons, sect. iii. art. xi. and his Corollaries, sect. vii. art. ix. of his Inquiry, and the general law according to which our desires arise, in sect. ii. art. iv. of the Nature and Conduct of the Passions.

NOTE 29, p. 372.

The reader will not be displeased with the following quotation from Gregory de Valentia's Commentaries, vol. ii. p. 995. "Comparatio virtutum moralium quoad perfectionem, non tam mihi utilis et scitu digna, quam obscura et difficilis cognitu videtur. Nam quælibet virtus absolute est satis præstans, et quoad aliquid etiam censeri potest reliquia præstantior.

"Cum autem alia virtus in alio aliis excellat, simpliciter quidem illa erit censenda reliquis præstantior quæ consideratis omnibus habeat dignitatem majore dignam æstimatione, sive quia in pluribus attributis excellat, sive quia in aliquo sive aliquibus, quæ præponderent. Quod certe dignoscere difficillima et perobscura res est."

It is the usual practice of the best writers of morality, both antient and modern, rather to distinguish virtue into genera et species, and to mark the connections and resemblances between one virtue and another, than to perplex the mind by contrasting the degree of their obligation. However, it must be owned that Aristotle sometimes engages in useless speculations; and he did so, probably, because such questions were started in his own times.

In the seventh book Eudemorum, chapter eleventh, he discusses the question, whether we are to do good to a *friend*, or to

a *good man*, and leaves the difficulty, I think, nearly where he found it: *ἂν μὲν γὰρ φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος· ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπὸν, ἂν μήτις τὸ μὲν αὐξήσῃ, τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποιῶν, ἐπιεικὴ δὲ ἥρεμα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται· οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ· ὁ δὲ ἔσται, οὔπω δὲ, ἥ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δὲ οὐ· διὸ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ, οὐδὲ ἔσται.* Another solution is, *ἴσως ἐστιν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἀλλὰ δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ.*—Edit. Duval, vol. ii. p. 283.

To the general question, I could not obtain from Aristotle such a general answer as amounts to a principle, and his distinctions are perhaps so numerous as to exclude the possibility of a general rule. But I observe that he does not make the degree of moral merit the sole standard for regulating our actions. In chap. ii. of the Mor. book ix. we have some other curious questions: *ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον, πότερα δεῖ πάντα τῷ πάτρι ἀπονέμειν, καὶ πείθεσθαι· ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ πειστέον· στρατηγὸν δὲ, χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικὸν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ, μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαῖῳ ὑπερετητέον· καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον, ἢ ἑταίρῳ δετέον, ἐὰν ἄμφοιν μὴ ἐνδέχηται· ᾧρ οὖν παντὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διόρισαι, οὐ ῥάδιον, πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοιας ἔχει διαφορὰς, καὶ μεγέθει, καὶ μικρότητι, καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ.*—Edit. Duval. p. 117.

The following observation is replete with good sense: *ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρίσμενον τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσιν· ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτ' αὐτὰ πάσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πάτρι πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Δίι θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἔπει δ' ἕτερα γόνευσι, καὶ ἀδέλφοις καὶ ἑταίροις, καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον—οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται.*—Arist. edit. Duval, tom. ii. p. 118.

I have seldom seen either any momentous truth illustrated, or any important duty facilitated, by the statement of rare and extreme cases. Even in the moment when we are discussing them, they amuse the imagination without stirring up the affections. They supply matter to the subtle disputant, more than guidance to the virtuous agent. When they happen, they are accompanied by peculiar and prominent circumstances, which are at once perceived by the understanding and felt by the heart. But they suggest only remote and dubious analogies for ordinary cases.

On the contrary, the discipline of the mind, by a right conduct in ordinary cases, is the best security against error and defect in those which are extraordinary.

NOTE 30, p. 373.

I borrow this term from Lord Kaimes: "An internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it passes away without desire, is denominated emotion; when desire follows the motion or agitation, is denominated passion."—Elements of Criticism, vol. i. p. 39.

The same writer distinguishes, as I do, between a wish and a desire: "Desire, in its proper sense, is that internal act which, by influencing the will, makes us to proceed to action. Desire, in a lax sense, respects also actions and events that depend not on us, as when I desire that my friend may have a son to represent him, or that my country may flourish in arts and sciences. But such internal act is more properly termed a wish, than a desire." From the same writer also I draw the distinction between a cause and an object: "Passions being accompanied with desire have a tendency to action; but every passion must have an object, namely, that being or thing to which it is directed, and with a view to which every action prompted by it is performed: and to what being or thing is a passion directed? Plainly, to the same being or thing that occasioned it. The cause of a passion, therefore, and its objects, are the same in different respects: an emotion, on the other hand, being in its nature quiescent, and merely a passive feeling, must have a cause; but cannot be said, properly speaking, to have an object." —See Elements of Criticism, vol. i. p. 41.

Mr. Hume, I am aware, uses the word emotion in a larger sense, and distinguishes, though not precisely in the same terms, between an object and a cause: "The object of love and hatred is some other person: the causes are either excellencies or faults; the causes are what excite the emotion, the object is what the mind directs its view to, when the emotion is excited." —Dissertation on the Passions, vol. ii. of Essays, p. 192.

NOTE 31, p. 373.

As upon this subject there may be some difficulty in satisfying a virtuous mind concerning the wisdom or the benevolence of our Creator, I will lay before my readers the opinions of several great writers.

"While every man consults the good of his own community, we are sensible that the general interest of mankind is better promoted than by any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species, whence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly limited object on which they can exert themselves."—Hume's Essays, vol. ii. p. 294.

"'Tis wisely ordained by nature, that private connexions should commonly prevail over universal views and considerations; otherwise our affections and actions would be dissipated and lost, for want of a proper limited object. Thus a small benefit done to ourselves, or our near friends, excites more lively sentiments of love and approbation, than a great benefit done to a distant commonwealth. But still we know here, as in all the senses, to correct these inequalities by reflection, and retain a general standard of vice and virtue, founded chiefly on general usefulness."—See Hume's note in p. 299 of his Essays, vol. ii.

"All men, even those at the greatest distance, are no doubt entitled to our good wishes, and our good wishes we naturally give them. But, if, notwithstanding, they should be unfortunate, to give ourselves any anxiety upon that account, seems to be no part of our duty. That we should be but little interested therefore, in the fortune of those whom we can neither serve, nor hurt, and who are in every respect so very remote from us, seems wisely ordered by nature; and if it were possible to alter in this respect the original constitution of our frame, we could yet gain nothing by the change."—Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 343.

"As one great purpose of society is to furnish opportunities of mutual aid and support; nature seconding that purpose, hath provided the principle of benevolence, which excites us to be kindly, beneficent, and generous. Nor ought it to escape observation, that the author of nature, attentive to our wants, and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It excites us to be kind, not only to those we are connected

with, but to our neighbours, and even to those we are barely acquainted with. Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in distress, who require immediate aid and relief. To the principle of benevolence it hath superadded the passion of pity, which in every feeling heart is irresistible. To make benevolence more extensive would be fruitless; because here are objects in plenty to fill the most capacious mind. It would not be fruitless only, but hurtful to society: I say hurtful, because frequent disappointments in attempting to gratify our benevolence, would render it a troublesome guest, and make us cling rather to selfishness, which we can always gratify."—See Kaimes's History of Man, vol. ii. p. 292; see also p. 311.

"Because of the great numbers of mankind, their distant habitations, and the incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to great multitudes; that our benevolence might not be quite distracted with a multiplicity of objects, whose equal virtues would equally recommend them to our regard; or become useless, by being equally extended to multitudes at vast distances, whose interests we could not understand, nor be capable of promoting, having no intercourse of offices with them; nature has so well ordered it, that as our attention is more raised by those good offices, which are done to ourselves or our friends, so they cause a stronger sense of approbation in us, and produce a stronger benevolence towards the authors of them.—See Hutcheson's Inquiry, p. 220.

When Aristotle discusses the question, whether we should have many or few friends, and determines that it is best to have neither many nor few, he assigns a reason which may be applied to universal benevolence—*πολλῶν μὲν' ὄντων, ἐργων ἐφ' ἕκαστον μέρισαι τὸ φιλεῖν· ἐφ' ἁπάντων γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαδύνατεῖ ἡμων ἡ φύσις ἀσθενὴς οὖσα, πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφίκνεισθαι.*—Aristot. Magn. Moral. lib. ii. cap. xvi.

The same philosopher observes, that upon objects placed beyond our reach, we do not employ even consultation. *περὶ ὧν δ'ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, αλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τοῖς ανθρώποις ταῦτα δ'ἐστιν ὅσα εφ'ἡμῖν ἐστι πράξαι ἢ μὴ πράξαι. διὸ οὐ βουλενόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν' Ἰνδοις, οὐδὲ πως ἐι ὁ κύκλος τετραγωνιστέος· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· τὸ δ' ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν.*—Eudem, lib. iii. edit. Duval. p. 214.

In the 18th chapter of the first book of Mag. Mor. he says, that we have also no *προαίρεσις* upon objects that are remote: *πολλάκις διανοούμεθα ὑπερ τῶν εν Ἰνδοις. ἀλλ' οὐ καὶ προαιρούμεθα.* The readers of Aristotle know well the distinction he makes between will and election—*οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαίρειται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.—βούλεται δὲ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος.* See cap. x. lib. ii. Eudem. *βούλησις*, indeed, is applied to voluntary actions, as, in the case of the *ἀκρατὴς, ἡ ἀρὰ βούλησις ἑκούσιον*—Mag. Mor. lib. i. cap. xiv. and to circumstances in which we do not act, as *βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων· οἷον, βουλόμεθα μὲν ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προιαιρούμεθα δὲ οὔ.*

I suppose, that in the language of Aristotle, the word will, used in a very low sense, and implying merely a wish, might be used of the good of all mankind. This however is not such a wish as would amount to desire, in the modern philosophical sense of the word—such, I mean, as is accompanied with the view of an end, and rouses us to action. "Into actions done with a view to an end," says Lord Kaimes, "desire and will enter: desire to accomplish the end goes first; the will to act, in order to accomplish the end is next; and the external act follows."—History of Man, vol. ii. p. 219; and Bentham, sect. viii. upon Intentionality, and 10th upon Motives. My purpose in this note is to shew, that universal happiness cannot be proposed to our minds as an end,—that as an object it does not excite our desires,—that the attempt to promote it directly forms no part of our duty,—and, that these limitations of the principle and feeling of universal benevolence, being adapted to our limited powers, are proofs of the wisdom of the Deity.

Note 32, p. 374.

"Our powers being small, the effects of them would be utterly lost, like a handful of salt thrown into a pond, if diffused among too many; whereas, by severally confining our service within a compass where they may be felt, they will prove of real value, and the good of the whole will be best promoted."—Light of Nature, vol. iii. part ii. of the Posthumous Works, p. 361.

NOTE 33, p. 374.

"But our understanding and power are limited, so that we cannot know many other natures, nor is our utmost power capable of promoting the happiness of many: our actions are influenced by some stronger affections than this general benevolence. There are certain qualities found in some beings more than in others, which excite stronger degrees of good will, and determine our attention to their interests, while that of others is neglected. The ties of blood, benefits conferred upon us, and the observation of virtue in others, raise much more vigorous affections than that general benevolence, which we may have towards all."—Hutcheson on the Passions, p. 309.

NOTE 34, p. 374.

I am persuaded with Hutcheson, that "any universal increase, whether of the social or the benevolent affections, would in the whole be of little advantage, and that the medium of the public is a sufficient counterbalance to the medium of the selfish. If the public were raised, the hero of Cervantes would be no rare character. If the selfish, the world would be filled with universal rapine and war."—Hutcheson on the Passions, p. 203.

But surely the adventurer whom I describe would be chargeable with Quixotism.

NOTE 35, p. 375.

"'T were infinite to compute in how many instances want of due order, measure, and manner, do spoil and incommodate action. 'Tis wisdom that applies remedy to these mischiefs. Things must be compared to, and arbitrated by her standard, or else they will contain something of monstrous enormity, either strutting in unwieldy bulk, or sinking in defective scantiness."—See Barrow's Works, vol. i. p. 8.

NOTE 36, p. 376.

"When benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue, it is

not spoken of as a blind propension, but as a principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their reason: for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent. And that will lead us to consider distant consequences, as well as the immediate tendency of an action: it will teach us that the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our charge by nature and Providence; as also that there are other circumstances, suppose friendship or former obligations, which require that we do good to some, preferably to others."—Butler's Sermons, p. 153.

NOTE 37, p. 377.

"Universal charity is not incompatible with private prudence, nor particular affection; so far from it, that it encourages and furnishes us with rational inducements to cultivate them."—See Search, vol. iii. part ii. of his Posthumous Works, p. 360.

NOTE 38, p. 377.

"So easy is it for every man to err, and so hard to wrest from any man's mouth the plain acknowledgment of error, that what hath been once inconsiderably defended, the same is commonly persisted in as long as wit, by whetting itself, is able to find out any shift, be it never so slight, whereby to escape out of the hands of present contradiction."—See Hooker's Eccl. Polity, book iii. p. 133.

The sagacity and candour of the author of Political Justice have led him to display a most honourable exception to the foregoing remark of Hooker. "Some readers of my graver productions will perhaps, in perusing these volumes, accuse me of inconsistency; the affections and charities of private life being every where in this publication a topic of the warmest eulogium, while in the enquiry concerning Political Justice, they seem to be treated with no indulgence and favour. In answer to this objection, all I think it necessary to say on the present occasion is, that for more than four years I have been anxious for opportunity and leisure to modify some of the earlier chapters of that

work, in conformity to the sentiments inculcated in this—not that I see cause to make any change respecting the principle of justice, or any thing else fundamental to the system there delivered; but, that I apprehend domestic and private affections inseparable from the nature of man, and from what may be styled the culture of the heart, and am fully persuaded that they are not incompatible with a profound and active sense of justice in the mind of him who cherishes them."—"The way in which these seemingly jarring principles may be reconciled, is in part pointed out in a little book, which I gave to the public in the year 1798, and which I will therefore take the liberty to quote."

"A sound morality requires that nothing human should be regarded by us as indifferent; but it is impossible that we should not feel the strongest instinct for those persons whom we know most intimately, and whose welfare and sympathies are united to our own. True wisdom will recommend to us individual attachments; for with them our minds are more thoroughly maintained in activity and life than they can be under the privation of them; and it is better that man should be a living being than a stock or stone. True virtue will sanction this recommendation, since it is the object of virtue to produce happiness, and since the man who lives in the midst of domestic relations, will have many opportunities of conferring pleasure, minute in the detail, yet not trivial in the amount, without interfering with the purposes of general benevolence. Nay, by kindling his sensibility and harmonizing his soul, they may be expected, if he is endowed with a liberal and manly spirit, to render him more prompt in the service of strangers and the public."—Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Women, cap. vi. p. 90, second edition.

I will not insult the foregoing observations with the name of concessions. I am more disposed to consider them as modifications suggested by maturer reflection, and expressed with some degree of contrition, that they had neither occurred to the writer, nor had been conveyed to the reader, before. For the purpose of doing them complete justice, I have quoted them literally and entirely; and I think that they cannot be too attentively perused, nor too widely circulated.

In regard to "the principle of justice, and other things fundamental to the system" which our writer yet retains, I suppose that in Ethics, as well as Theology, men will differ about fundamentals. I have heard it, however, remarked by persons well skilled in the tactics of controversy, that, after the surrender of so many outworks, the citadel itself is scarcely tenable.

While the principle of justice was so explained as to degrade the virtues of domestic life, and other individual attachments between friends, benefactors, and the persons whom they serve, I conceived it to be indefensible. How far the culture of the heart may be compatible with the profound and active sense of justice which is still pronounced fundamental, is a point upon which I shall myself decline entering into any direct altercation; and my reason shall be given in the words of an antient writer: *πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως πειρώνενον φαίνεθαι διαφεύγειν δίκαιον μὲν πάντως πείρασθαι συλλογίσαθαι, οὐκ εὔσχημον δὲ· διοπερ οὐ δεῖ συνεστάναι εὐχερῶς πρὸς τοὺς τυχόντας· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πονηρολογίαν συμβαίνειν.*—Aristot. Top. lib. viii. cap. xiv. tom. i. p. 281.

If it were necessary to deviate from the established forms of language, I would rather say with Mr. Bentham, that "the dictates of justice are nothing more than a part of the dictates of benevolence, which, on certain occasions, are applied to certain subjects, to wit, to certain actions."—See Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation, page 123.

Mr. Bentham, it is to be observed, measures benevolence by utility. Hutcheson refers all virtues to benevolence, as acting by what he calls the moral sense. Butler, when he states, that "in a higher and more general way of consideration, benevolence seems in the strictest sense to include in it all that is good and worthy," adds that, "in so doing we leave out the particular nature of creatures, and the particular circumstances in which they are placed."—P. 258. He traces up "the common virtues and the common vices of mankind to benevolence, or the want of it, so as to justify the Apostle's assertion, that all other commandments are comprehended in the love of our neighbour." But he does not pass over "the cautions and restrictions which further require to be considered in the virtue of a being, who

has such a nature, and is placed in such circumstances as man." His note in p. 257 of the sermon, is full of the best sense, and the impartial philosopher will do well to compare it with p. 462 of the Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue, subjoined to the Analogy. I must again observe, that Butler does not set one virtue at variance with another. He marks their resemblances as well as their differences, and he shews their happy tendency from the constitution of our nature to the same end. "Temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual pleasures, have an influence upon the happiness of others, and therefore they may be produced by the love of others." The effects of the opposite vices, as inconsistent with benevolence, are most impressively stated by Hutcheson: see page 172, on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions.

NOTE 39, p. 377.

"By wisdom we understand we are parts and members of the great body, the universe; and are therefore concerned in the good management of it, and are thereby obliged to procure its order and peace, and by no irregular undertaking to disturb or discompose it; which makes us honest and peaceable men: that we proceed from the same primitive stock, are children of the same father, and partake of the same blood with all men; are endued with the like faculties of mind, passions of soul, shape of body, and sense of things: that we have equally implanted in our original constitution inclinations to love, pity, gratitude, sociableness, quiet, joy, reputation: that we have an indispensible need and impatient desire of company, assistance, comfort, and relief: that therefore it is according to the design of nature, and agreeable to reason, that to those to whom our natural condition by so many bonds of cognation, similitude, and mutual necessitude, hath knit and conjoined us, we should bear a kind respect and tender affection, should cheerfully concur in undergoing the common burthens, should heartily wish and industriously promote their good, assist them in accomplishing their reasonable desires, thankfully requite the courtesies received from them, congratulate and rejoice with them in their prosperity, comfort them in their distresses, and, as far as we are able, re-

lieve them; however, tenderly compassionate their disappointments, miseries, and sorrows."—See Barrow's Works, vol. i. p. 9.

NOTE 40, p. 377.

"Reason, when fully assisted and improved, is sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendencies of qualities or actions: it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means." "'Tis requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here therefore reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial."—See Hume, Appendix i. concerning Moral Sentiments, page 360, edit. of his Essays 1767.

Having quoted from Mr. Hume a passage in which he uses the word reason, I ought to state, that I do not always confine the use of the word in moral deliberations, as he does, merely to "that power by which we become acquainted (see page 364) with objects, their relations and circumstances, and then experience approbation and blame, which is the work of the heart only, and not of the judgment; on the contrary, I with Reid, understood reason sometimes to mean "that moral power by which actions ought to be regulated, and which suggests to us what are called rational principles of action."—See p. 471; and 212 of Reid on the Active Powers of Man. I agree also with Dr. Reid in his explanation of the word sentiment, "as implying not mere feeling, but judgment accompanied with feeling.—See p. 479.

NOTE 41, p. 377.

"In the benevolent affections, the happiness of any one person is an ultimate end, desired with no further view, and yet

the observing its inconsistency with the happiness of another more beloved, or with the happiness of many, though each one of them were but equally beloved, may overcome the former desire: yet this will not prove, that in each kind action men form the abstract conception of all mankind, or the system of rationals. Such conceptions are indeed useful, that so we may gratify either our self-love, or kind affections, in the fullest manner, as far as our power extends, and may not content ourselves with smaller degrees either of private or public good, while greater are in our power. But when we have formed these conceptions, we do not serve the individual only from love to the species."—See Hutcheson on the Passions, p. 222.

On the other hand, the particular affections indirectly re-act on the general, or, as Hutcheson says, "a powerful determination even to a limited benevolence is observed to give a strong bias to our minds towards a universal goodness, tenderness, humanity, generosity, and contempt of private good in our whole conduct."—See Inquiry, p. 258.

Note 42, p. 377.

Upon conscience, as connected with benevolence, Butler's first and second Sermon cannot be read too often, nor too attentively. I have been also much instructed on the subject of conscience by Dr. Reid, in the 6th, 7th, and 8th chapters, in his third Essay on the Active Powers of Man. The energy of it in quickening the operations of benevolence is most eloquently described by Adam Smith, p. 336, vol. i. of Moral Sentiments.

There is some unsteadiness among philosophers in their use of the word. Butler warily (p. 13 of his Sermons) calls it "the principle in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, or actions." This he calls "the strict use of the word, but allows it to be sometimes so used as to take in more." Dr. Reid, p. 243, calls it "an original power of the mind, or moral faculty, by which we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, and the dictates of which form the first principles of morals."

On the contrary, according to Adam Smith, "conscience

does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. It supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its direction."—See Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. p. 355.

"Those who write of conscience," says Sir Matthew Hale, "tell us it hath three offices or acts, synteresis, syneidesis, and epicrisis; so those principles are lodged in that chest of the conscience called synteresis."—See Sir M. Hale, on the Primitive Origination of Mankind, p. 64.

It may be worth while to state the account which a learned schoolman gives of Synteresis, and which, in part, corresponds with the opinion of Adam Smith: "Synderesis item non est aliqua potentia, sed habitus potius naturalis, quo intellectus cognoscit prima principia practica, sicut habitus naturalis quo intellectus cognoscit prima principia speculativa, solet vocari intellectus principiorum. Quod facile ostendit D. Thom. artic. 12, et patet ex eo, quod potentiæ rationales habent se ad opposita, ut docet Aristoteles, 1. Metaphys. text 3. Synderesis autem tantummodo est de bono—Conscientia denique, nihilo magis aliqua peculiaris potentia est ab intellectu distincta, sed est proprie applicatio quædam scientiæ universalis practicæ ad particulare aliquod objectum, sive (quod idem est) usus quidam scientiæ circa objectum particulare. Itaque est indicium, quo vel cognoscimus quidpiam nos fecisse, aut non fecisse, quo pacto conscientia dicitur testificari; vel quid sit nobis faciendum vel non faciendum, quo pacto conscientia dicitur ligare aut solvere; vel bene aut male factum esse quod fecimus, quo pacto conscientia dicitur excusare vel accusare, et remordere, ut optime explicat D. Thom. hoc artic. 13. Ubi et recte addit, aliquando etiam habitum synderesis vel scientiæ ex quo ejusmodi judicia proficiscuntur, solere conscientiam nominari. Ut cum Origines, lib. ii. in Epist. ad Roman. dicit conscientiam esse pædagogum animæ sociatum. Et Basilius in libro proverb. initio esse naturale Judicatorium, et Damascenus libro 2do, de fide orthodoxa, cap. xii. esse lucem intellectus nostri. Et D. Hieronymus cum in caput 1st Ezech. dicit scintillam conscientiæ quam, inquit, συντηρησιν Græci vocant, in Cain quoque, postquam ejectus est ex Paradiso,

non fuisse extinctam."—Greg. de Valentia Comment. in D. Thom. vol. i. Disput. 6. Quæst. 5, sub fin. page 1288.

The schoolmen, I have observed, usually write the word Synderesis. Perhaps they adopted this pronunciation from modern Greek, in which ν before τ is pronounced δ, as ἀντρον, ἀνδρον. —See Ducange's Gram. p. 21.

NOTE 43, p. 377.

I suspect that what Hume says upon another occasion may be applied to some modern writers about universal benevolence. "There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy." When they reject gratitude, as the advocates of the selfish system "rejected all private friendship, if no interest or self-love intermixed itself, I am confident that they abuse terms, and confound the ideas of things."—Vide Essay xi. vol. i. p. 94.

I am aware, with Mr. Bentham, that in moral discussions, "the imperfections of language are sometimes great: that a man, confining himself to the terms most in use, can scarcely avoid running, in appearance, into perpetual contradictions; that his propositions will appear sometimes repugnant to truth, and sometimes adverse to utility; and that, to obviate this inconvenience, he must have recourse to the unpleasant remedy of laying aside the old phraseology, and inventing a new one."—Page 101. In the very difficult subject which Mr. Bentham undertook to discuss, and the very new points of view in which he exhibits many parts of it, Mr. B. by such observations, made a proper, and, I think, a satisfactory apology for himself. But they cannot be applied to the modern teachers of universal philanthropy, nor do they justify another class of writers, whom Mr. B., in appearance at least, has attempted to vindicate, not perhaps in their systems, but their phraseology. Speaking of "the clamours raised against those ingenious moralists who, travelling out of the beaten track of speculation, have found more or less difficulty in disentangling themselves from the shackles of ordinary language, he names Rochefoucault, Mandeville, and Helvetius," the well-known patrons of the system of selfishness. He adds, that "to the unsoundness of their opi-

nions, and, with still greater injustice, to the corruption of their hearts, was often imputed what was most commonly owing either to a want of skill in matters of language on the part of the author, or a want of discernment; possibly now and then, in some instances, a want of probity on the part of the commentator." I could wish that Mr. Bentham had specified the instances in which the opponents of these writers have shewn their "want of discernment, or their want of probity." Butler, in page 206 and 214, has explained the words self-love, selfishness, &c. In page 82, 3, 4, 5, he examines Hobbes's account of pity. He shews "what it really is, because there is raised upon it a general scheme which undermines the whole foundation of common honesty and humanity." These, I think, are the severest terms that he employs, and he employs them justly. In p. 24 of the Preface, too, he explains the words selfish and interested; but I see no one expression in which he charges his opponents with corruption of heart. Dr. Adam Smith, in chap. iv. sect. vii. part 2d. examines the licentious system, in which he includes that of Mandeville. He mentions it "as the great fallacy of Mandeville's book, to represent every passion as wholly vicious which is so in any degree or in any direction." He speaks of Mandeville's eloquence as "coarse and rustic, but lively, luminous, and calculated to throw upon his doctrines an air of probability, which is very apt to impose upon the unskilful." He allows, however, that "in human nature there are some appearances which, when viewed in a certain manner, favour the notions of this writer. Most of them, he thinks, in almost every respect erroneous; but some he grants to be just," and he assigns very judicious reasons why even some of those which are most overcharged, must have had some foundation." But when does he attack directly or indirectly the moral character of Mandeville? No man felt a nobler love of virtue, or a deeper indignation against vice than Mr. Hutcheson. But does he indulge himself in wanton invective or sly insinuations? Does he not tell me, "that Lucretius and Hobbes shew themselves in innumerable instances struck with some moral species; they are full of expressions of admiration, gratitude, praise, desire of doing good; and of censure, disapprobation, aversion to some forms of vice."

I am not sure that, in opposing the selfish system, even Bishop Butler felt much more solicitude, or displayed much more ability, than Mr. Hume; and I sometimes observe a very striking resemblance between the reasoning and the terms of the prelate and the philosopher.—See page 239 of Hume's Essays.

Yet Mr. Hume tells us, page 234, "that whoever concludes, from the seeming tendency of the selfish system, that the advocates of it cannot possibly feel the true sentiments of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himself in practice very much mistaken." He ascribes "probity and honour to Epicurus and his sect, a generous and friendly disposition to Atticus and Horace, most irreproachable lives to Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the selfish system of morals." In page 383, Mr. Hume, speaking of the ambiguity of the word pride, says, "the French express this sentiment by the term *amour-propre*; but as they also express self-love, as well as vanity, by the same term, there arises a great confusion in Rochefoucalt, and many of their moral writers. Is there any attentive reader of Rochefoucault who has not experienced frequent embarrassment from the equivocal sense of these words?

Aristotle seems to have been aware that the Greek term for self-love was open to misapplication, and therefore he found it necessary to fix it by definition, and to guard it from abuse: *ἔστι δὲ φίλαυτος, ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν πάντα πράττων, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ λυσιτελές· ὁ μὲν οὖν φαῦλος, φίλαυτος ἔσται, αὑτὸς αὑτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκεν πάντα πράττει· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ σπουδαῖος· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι σπουδαῖος, ὅτι ἄλλου ἕνεκεν τοῦτο πράττει· διὸ οὔκ ἐστι φίλαυτος.*

Towards the goods of pleasure or advantage, a virtuous man, according to Aristotle, is not *φίλαυτος*; though, in a more loose way, he may be said to be so—*κατὰ τὸ καλόν.* "*τούτου γὰρ μόνου ἄλλῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐκσταίη· τὰ δὲ συμφέροντα καὶ ἡδέα εκστήσεται· τὴν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ καλὸν αἵρεσιν, φίλαυτος ἔσται· τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφερόν, καὶ καθ' ἡδονὴν λεγομένην, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλὰ ὁ φαυλος.*"—Arist. Mag. Mor. lib. ii. cap. xiii. ver. ii. page 192. Whatever might be the subtleties of disputants in the schools of Greece, I believe that in Greek books we do not find *φίλαυτοι* applied in a good sense, without some obvious circumstances in the situation of the agent, or some concomitant explanation on the part of the writer, to qualify what was the rare use of the word.

But, to return to Mr. Hume, in p. 284, vol. ii. he acknowledges the "deduction of morals from self-love, to be a very obvious thought, and not arising wholly from the wanton sallies of the sceptics." He mentions Polybius, "one of the gravest, most judicious, and moral writers of antiquity, as assigning this origin to all our sentiments of virtue." But in p. 236, he ascribes this use of the word self-love "to that love of simplicity, which has been the source of much false reasoning on philosophy." In p. 241 he also calls "such philosophy more like a satire than a true delineation of human virtue;" and in p. 345 he again notices the "spirit of satire which some advocates of the selfish system have indulged." But where does he accuse their hearts of corruption?

I know not whether any professed answer to Helvetius has been published. Doubtless his perspicuity, his vivacity, his facility in gliding through the mazes of metaphysics, and his unrelenting hostility against the usurpations of what he calls "prejudice," will always secure to him a numerous class of readers. By his singular use of terms I have not myself been much embarrassed, because he has defined them more clearly, and adhered to them more steadily, than any other advocate of the selfish system. The chief faults which I observed in his writings as compositions are, a looseness of arrangement which sometimes slackens the attention, and sometimes bewilders the judgment, of his readers; a fondness for multiplying narratives, which frequently interrupt the continuity of his reasoning, and a wantonness in scattering witticisms, which are often not well-suited to the importance of his subjects. In his work upon education, however, he has completely refuted the captivating but most pernicious paradoxes of Rousseau; and to his Essay on the Mind, though deeply tinged with hatred of the priesthood, and lavishly decked with the trappings of infidelity, I cannot refuse the praise of brilliant genius, and of benevolence, which, however romantic and ill-directed, I dare not pronounce insincere. Yet his Code of Ethics seems to be imperfect, because it does not consider the Nature of Man, as it has been justly viewed by Butler, and other philosophers, in the light of a "system or constitution, of which the several parts are united, "not by a

physical principle of individuation, but by the respect they have to each other, their restraints upon each other, and their proportion to each other, under the absolute and entire direction of conscience." Sermon 3d. I find no warrant in experience for his scheme, "De fonder la probité, non sur des principes aussi respectables que ceux de la religion, mais sur des principes dont il soit moins facile d'abuser, tels que sont les motifs d'intérêt personnel," or as he had before said "d'intérêt temporel, maniés avec adresse par un legislateur habile." (Chap. xxiv. Discours II.) In common with other reformers of the modern school, he opens the widest range for those sensual appetites, the restraint of which is indispensably necessary to the well-being of society. He plucks up the wheat with the tares in matters of opinion; and by attempting, as he thought, to rescue virtue from the shackles of religion, he would rend asunder what, in the original frame and the unalterable condition of man, the Deity has joined together.

Mr. Bentham may smile at my "want of discernment," but he will not impute to me "want of probity."

When examining the opinions of such an able writer as Mr. Bentham, I thought it necessary to go into detail, and no place surely can be more proper for the vindication of those who have defended the benevolent system, than notes upon a sermon which is intended to explain and enforce benevolence. "Nature," I agree with Mr. Hume, vol. i. p. 50, "will always maintain her rights," and therefore, I am convinced, that many of the writers, who seem to contend for universal philanthropy, so as to lower the dignity and weaken the efficacy of our particular affections, would in their own practice, be grateful to benefactors, and tender to relatives. But their writings ought to be opposed, and their improper use of terms should be pointed out, for they produce great inquietude in virtuous minds; they perplex the judgments of young men in their endeavours to understand the principles of morality, and they furnish bad men with specious apologies for their omissions in the necessary and amiable duties of private life.

NOTE 44, p. 378.

Few men, I believe, are endowed with such strength of mind, that their political tenets should never have any influence over their speculations. I have not, therefore, been surprised at a kind of fashion, which prevails among some writers, to depreciate the love of our country, to represent it as interfering with the principles of general benevolence, and to resolve it into prejudice, vanity, jealousy, or weak and inglorious selfishness. Can it be unreasonable, then, to remind a reader of the sources from which it proceeds? "Whatever place we have lived in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remarked the various affections of human nature; we have known many lovely characters; we remember the associations, friendships, families, natural affections, and other human sentiments; our moral sense determines us to approve those lovely dispositions where we have most distinctly observed them; and our benevolence concerns us in the interests of those persons possessed of them."—Hutcheson's Inquiry, pp. 163, 164.

Will my readers excuse me for producing some observations which I once had occasion to make, in a Sermon of my own, "upon those who endeavour to draw down patriotism itself from that high seat of honour which it has long been allowed to fill near the throne of virtue. There is, I grant, a spurious, and there is also a genuine patriotism; just as there is a philosophy which corrupts our minds, as well as there is a philosophy which improves them. But true philosophy has ever borne testimony in favour of true patriotism, because it considers the good of our country as forming a part, and in respect to our own agency, our own duty, and our own welfare, a very considerable part, of general happiness. These considerations, no doubt, when presented to the mind of a virtuous statesman, will inspire him with additional joy; and when they become, as they always may, additional motives will enhance the merit of his measures. The object which rouses all his desires, and nerves all his strength, is the well-being of his country; and as to the dangers he has to encounter, or the toils he has to endure, they are abundantly compensated by the magnitude of the services performed, by the

quantity of good immediately produced, by the multitudes to whom it is diffused in various degrees and in various directions, and by the long series of years through which it is likely to continue. But in regard to the greater part of mankind—to men, who neither pant for extensive power, nor shine in public opinion, the love of our country may be traced up, not to the blind prejudices of education, not to the sordid desire of gain, not to the insatiable thirst of glory, not to a savage appetite for devastation, but to other and better motives; to the remembrance of scenes where we have passed the delightful seasons of boyhood and of youth; to sympathy with the complicated interests of parents, children, and kindred; to joy for the safety, or for the prosperity of those who have lightened our own sorrows, or promoted our own success; to the pleasing recollection of the hours we have spent in learned or in cheerful society; to respect for the laws by which our liberty, our property, and our lives, have been protected; to reverence for that mode of religion which we believe to be most warranted by the law of God; to the rapid communication * of passion over related objects brought into a group; to the mechanical and potent influence of numbers upon our imaginations; and to the facility with which they pass from ourselves and our countrymen, to a near and even a remote posterity."

God forbid that I should ever presume to palliate the guilt of men, who, at any time, or in any country, may have perverted this generous passion to the purposes of their own wayward and inordinate ambition. For I allow, with the wise and benevolent Hutcheson, "that tyranny, that faction, that a neglect of justice, a corruption of manners, and any thing which occasions the misery of the subjects, may destroy," or, as I would rather say, "weaken this national love." But let not every kind of it be represented as a weakness, nor every degree of it as a crime. Let not the abuse of it be confounded with that use which nature often suggests, which experience warrants, and which Christianity does not forbid. Let it not be severed entirely from benevolence, of which it forms a sound, a large, and a conspicuous

* Elements of Criticism, lib. i. cap. 2, sect. 4.

part; nor rudely thrust out from the duties of society, which, in its absence, could neither flourish, nor perhaps exist. The sophistry which has been employed to degrade it will in part be defeated, not, perhaps, by my wishes, or by my reasoning, but by the authority of a much greater writer, whose judgment and even eloquence will be readily admitted by any attentive reader of the following observations: "The faculty we have of uniting numberless individuals into one complex object, enlarges greatly the sphere of benevolence. By that faculty our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public spirit, and of a lively affection. The individuals that compose the group, considered apart, may be too minute, or too distant for our benevolence; but, when united into one whole, accumulation makes them great, greatness makes them conspicuous; and affection, preserved entire and undivided, is bestowed upon an abstract object, as upon one that is single and visible, but with energy proportioned to its greater dignity and importance. Thus the principle of benevolence is not too sparingly scattered among men."—Kaimes's History of Man, vol. ii. p. 292.

NOTE 45, p. 378.

In an age when so much has been said to so little purpose about perfectibility, it may not be amiss to consider the sober and judicious language of a real philosopher. "The wise and virtuous man directs his principal attention to the idea of exact propriety and perfection. There exists in the mind of every man an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his observations upon the character and conduct both of himself and of other people. It is the slow, gradual, and progressive work of the great demi-god within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct. This idea is in every man more or less accurately drawn, its colouring is more or less just, its outlines are more or less exactly designed, according to the delicacy and acuteness of that sensibility with which those observations were made, and according to the care and attention employed in making them. In the wise and virtuous man they have been made with the most acute and delicate sensibility, and the utmost care and attention

have been employed in making them. Every day some feature is improved, every day some blemish is corrected. He has studied this idea more than other people, he comprehends it more distinctly, he has formed a much more correct image of it, and is much more deeply enamoured of its exquisite and divine beauty. He endeavours, as well as he can, to assimilate his own character to this archetype of perfection. But he imitates the work of a divine artist, which can never be equalled. He feels the imperfect success of all his best endeavours, and sees with grief and affliction in how many different features the mortal copy falls short of the immortal original. He remembers with concern and humiliation, how often, from want of attention, from want of judgment, from want of temper, he has, both in words and actions, both in conduct and conversation, violated the exact rules of perfect propriety; and has so far departed from that model according to which he wished to fashion his own character and conduct."—Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. pp. 147—149, 7th edit.

The foregoing statement is perfectly free from the confusion and obscurity which pervade our modern writers upon perfectibility, and it has no tendency to excite those visionary expectations which amuse the fancy without improving the heart.

Note 46, p. 378.

"Ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest. Cogitatione tantum, et mente complectimur, &c." Cicer. Orator. edit. Gruter, vol. I. p. 156; and Quintilian, lib. i. Proem. p. 5, Rollin's edit.

Note 47, p. 378.

"The most plausible exception lying against the expediency of labouring for the general good arises from our inability to contribute so much towards it as to make our share worth the consideration.

"But let us consider that, if this doctrine were to prevail, most of the blessings of nature, the benefits of society, and conveniences of life would be lost; the most valuable of which are procured by the operation of feeble and inconsiderable agents.

"We need not undervalue our particular services because they yield but little profit; for though the performance of them cannot do much good, yet it may prevent great mischiefs which might have ensued upon the omission.

"What though our persons be single and our efforts small; nobody can say what multitudes they may not affect, nor what tides of industry they may not excite. 'Tis notorious of how spreading a nature both the virtues and the vices are, for example and sympathy diffuse the stream to all quarters from a single fountain; and a man may sometimes find that in his power wherein all mankind shall have concern in the consequences. The founders of religions and sects in philosophy, inventors of arts and sciences, though imparting their thoughts to a few, have thereby opened channels which overflowed whole nations and countries.

"It may be said, this might happen, perhaps, to extraordinary persons once in an age; but a private man never stands in a situation to work consequences that can possibly extend beyond the narrow circle of his own acquaintance. But I would ask him how he knows that, for we have shewn in our chapter on Providence that the affairs of the world are all complicated and interwoven into one tissue. There is no such thing as trifle in nature, every little incident and sudden fancy being provided for by perfect wisdom with regard to the whole; for how narrow soever the views of creatures may be, God beholds the universe, and directs every little stroke, in his all comprehensive plan, so as to constribute its share towards the greatest good. Or if there be such things as trifles, they are so intermingled among the imperceptible springs of important events, that the most prying eye cannot distinguish them apart. Therefore we ought always to stand upon our guard, and shape our minute motions, by such discretion and regard to rectitude as is proper upon the occasion, for the chance of effecting what unseen good, or escaping what unthought of evil may possibly depend upon them. But it would be in vain for a man to take his measures upon con-

sequences that human sagacity cannot investigate; therefore he has nothing to do with him, or with any thing else, besides the rules of prudence, charity, propriety, and innocence, so far as in the present circumstances of the case he can discern them." —Tucker's Chapter upon General Good, vol. v. of the Light of Nature.

Philosophy, in the passages just now quoted, is brought within the reach of common sense, and is more skilfully applied to the duties of common life, than by any of the writers on Universal Benevolence with whom it has been my fortune to meet.

Note 48, p. 379.

I have always been charmed, and in the present state of the world my mind is deeply interested, by the manner in which Hume has described some of those blessings. "In antiquity, the heroes of philosophy, as well as those of war and patriotism, have a grandeur and force of sentiment which astonishes our narrow souls, and is rashly rejected as extravagant and supernatural. They, in their turn, I allow, would have had equal reason to consider as romantic and incredible the degree of humanity, clemency, order, tranquillity, and other social virtues, to which, in the administration of government, we have attained in modern times, had any one been then able to have made a fair representation of them."—Hume, vol. ii. § vii. p. 828.

Note 49, p. 379.

I trust, that in what is here delivered, my opinions agree entirely with those of Barrow. "The principal advantage of wisdom is, its acquainting us with the nature and reason of true religion, and affording convictive arguments to persuade men to the practice of it, which is accompanied with the purest delight, and attended with the most solid content imaginable. I say the nature of religion, wherein it consists, and what it requires; the mistake of which produceth daily so many mischiefs and inconveniences in the world, and exposes so good a name to so much reproach. It sheweth it consisteth not in fair professions, and glorious pretences, but in real practice; not in a pertinacious

adherence to any sect or party, but in a sincere love of goodness, and dislike of naughtiness, wherever discovering itself; not in vain ostentations and flourishes of outward performance; but in an inward good complexion of mind, exerting itself in works of true devotion and charity; not in a nice orthodoxy, or politic subjection of our judgments to the peremptory dictates of men, but in a sincere love of truth, in a hearty approbation of and compliance with the doctrines fundamentally good, and necessary to be believed; not in harsh censuring and virulent inveighing against others, but in carefully amending our own ways; not in a peevish crossness and obstinate repugnancy to received laws and customs, but in a quiet and peaceable submission to the express laws of God, and lawful commands of man; not in furious zeal for or against trivial circumstances, but in a conscionable practising the substantial parts of religion; not in a frequent talking or contentious disputing about it, but in a ready observance of the unquestionable rules and prescripts of it."—Barrow, vol. i. sermon i. p. 10.

Note 50, p. 379.

The names which learned men bear for any length of time are usually well founded. If Duns Scotus was justly called the most subtle Doctor, Roger Bacon the wonderful, Bonaventure the seraphic, Aquinas the universal and evangelical, surely Hooker has, with equal, if not superior justice, obtained the name of the judicious. Bishop Lowth, in the Preface to his English Grammar, has bestowed the highest praise upon the purity of Hooker's style. Bishop Warburton, in his book on the Alliance between Church and State, often quotes from him, and calls him "the excellent, the admirable, the best good man of our order." I have ventured to call him the immortal, but if the word judicious had occurred to me I should have preferred it. Mr. Hall, of Cambridge, in one of the notes to his late most excellent Sermon (see p. 62), had stiled him the great and judicious Hooker: and it is with concern that I find him censured for doing so by some of his contemporaries. Their unmerited severity reminds me of an observation which I once read in the Bishop of Limerick's Life of Bishop Bramhall, and which they, who reverence

Mr. Hall, as I do, will peruse with great pleasure. "At this time also the learned, the meek, and the judicious Hooker opened that fountain of reason that shall serve as an inexhaustible spring for this use, whose only fault is, that his researches are so deep that those with whom he deals having nothing to draw, are not so much instructed as they might be by more slight discourses, because more suited to their models and capacities." Bishop Bramhall's Life, prefixed to his Works, p. 2.

In common with all men of letters, I read with exquiste delight Mr. Hall's Sermon lately published. As compositions, his former works are replete with excellence; but his last approaches to perfection, *μετὰ τοῦ σεμνοῦ τὴν χάριν ἔχει*. He apologizes for its length, but the apology was unnecessary; for every man of taste and virtue will apply to this publication what Phocion said upon the *λειμναριον* of Johannes Moschus, *ἐξ ἁπάντων τὸ χρήσιμον ὁ συνετὸς καὶ ὁ θεοφιλὴς ἀνὴρ δρεπόμενος, οὐκ ἂν τῶν συντεταγμένων κόρον καταγνοίη*. Bacon tells us that "the contemplative atheist is rare, and that atheism did never perturb States, because it makes men weary of themselves, as looking no farther." But I agree with Mr. Hall, that "the present times furnish a melancholy exception to this general observation," and Mr. Hall probably will agree with Bacon, that "superstition also has been the confusion of many States, and bringeth in a new primum mobile, that ravisheth all the spheres of government."—Bacon's 17th and 18th Essays. The liveliness of Mr. Hall's imagination, and the strength of his feelings, may now and then have led him to speak rather too strongly in each of his late publications. In the former, I thought that he ascribed too much to the effects of Popery under the French monarchy; and in the latter, too much to the effects of philosophy in the French Revolution. But in both works he has made many wise and interesting observations; in both he has preserved a most beautiful and animated style; through both he has been actuated, I believe, by the purest motives; and by the last more especially, he has deserved well from every friend to civilized society and pure religion. I am not sure that Mr. Hall stands in need of any vindication upon the score of inconsistency; but I am sure that he is most able to vindicate himself against accusations really strong, if such there be; and I am equally

sure that he has too much candour and too much magnanimity to persist in any error which his own sagacity may discover, or the objections of his antagonists shall clearly prove.

Having stated my wishes, that in a few, I mean a very few instances, Mr. Hall had been a little more wary in pushing his principles to consequences, which they may not quite warrant, I will give my general opinion of him in the words that were employed to describe a prelate whose writings, I believe, are familiar to him, and whom he strongly resembles, not perhaps in variety of learning, but in fertility of imagination, in vigour of thinking, in rectitude of intention, and holiness of life. Yes, Mr. Hall, like Bishop Taylor, "has the eloquence of an orator, the fancy of a poet, the acuteness of a schoolman, the profoundness of a philosopher, and the piety of a saint."—See the Funeral Sermon upon Jerem. Taylor, by Dr. Rush, Bishop of Dromore.

Sincere as my attachment is to Protestantism, I confess that I have been pained by some outrageous invectives that have been lately thrown out against the Church of Rome; and at the present crisis, I must further confess, that they appear to me not only unjust, but indiscreet and even inhuman. Let me remind the accusers of Mr. Hall, that, in the estimation of Lord Bacon, "divisions in religion, if they be many, introduce Atheism"—"that there is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think they do best by going farthest from what they think the superstition formerly received, and therefore care should be had that the good be not taken away with the bad, which commonly is done when the people is the reformer." Among those who censure Mr. Hall, there may be thoughtless and injudicious persons, who often repeat the witty and decisive answer of Sir Henry Wooton to the priest, who asked, "where was your religion to be found before Luther?" Let me then recal to their memory the advice which Sir Henry gave to one whose earnestness exceeded his knowledge, and who was perpetually railing against the Papists: "Pray, Sir, forbear, 'till you have studied the points better; for the wise Italians have this proverb—he that understandeth amiss concludes worse; and take heed of thinking, the farther you go from the Church of Rome, the nearer you are to God." To men of sounder judgment and more candid dispositions, I would recommend the serious perusal of "Cassandri

Consultatio," of Grotius's notes upon it, and his three replies to Rivetus. When they read "the Syllabus Librorum et Epistolarum doctorum aliquot et piorum virorum," in the third volume of Grotius's Works, they may cease to think Mr. Hall singular, when he remarks in his Preface, "how trivial, for the most part, are the controversies of Christians with each other." They may be disposed to join him in his prayer, that "Ephraim may no longer vex Juda, nor Juda Ephraim;" and they may be converted to the wise and salutary opinion of Grotius, "quam non sit difficilis in Religione Conciliatio, si controvertendi studium vitetur!"

NOTE 51, p. 379.

For part of this beautiful imagery Hooker is indebted to the Psalmist. I remember in the book De Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, a very fine passage upon the same subject. The imagery is different from that of Taylor, but it is so charming that no learned Christian will, I think, blame me for enabling him to compare it with the quotation from Hooker: *Καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ, κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος, συνεπήχει πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἄνδρων, ἐσθ ὅτε καὶ γυναίκων, ἐν διαφόροις φώναις ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἐμμελῆ κεραννύντων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορεύθεντος, κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστρα ἀεὶ, καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανὸς· πορεύεται δὲ διττὰς πορείας ὁ παμφαὴς ἥλιος· τῇ μὲν, ἡμέραν καὶ νυκτὰ διορίζων, ἀνατολῇ καὶ δύσει· τῇ δε, τὰς τέσσαρας ὥρας ἄγων τοῦ ἔτους, πρόσω τε βόρειος, καὶ ὀπίσω νότιος διερξέρπων.*—Aristotle, edit. Duval, vol. i. p. 612.

In a tone more peremptory than usual, Fabricius pronounces the book de Mundo to be the work of Aristotle; but Harles and his learned coadjutor have given what I think weighty reasons for considering it as spurious; and I confess, that so far as any internal proofs can be found in the style or the matter, they are in favour of Harles's decision.—See Fabric. Bibliothec. Græc. by Harles, vol. iii. p. 234.

I must inform the reader, that from the paragraph in p. 379, beginning, "If nature," to the paragraph in p. 384, ending with "Governor of the world," no part was preached.

NOTE 52, p. 380.

Shall philosophy be permitted to trifle with the affection to which religion itself has, by silence, paid the most marked respect? "In the Decalogue," says Adam Smith, "we are commanded to honour our father and mother. No mention is made of the love of our children; nature had sufficiently prepared us for the performance of the latter duty."—Vol. i. p. 348.

NOTE 53, p. 380.

In respect to every social duty, we may grant, nihil per se quemquam decere—referre, quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, et cetera, sine quibus facile ratio non constiterit. Seneca de beneficiis, liber 2d. Other circumstances being equal, the most virtuous person is to be preferred. But how is this sufficiently to be ascertained? How can the comparative worth of men (which, from the imperfection of human nature, it is granted that we cannot often settle, see Political Justice, vol. i. p. 130), be laid down as a rule for the degree in which we are to succour distress? Is it not farther granted (page 133), that when a person in distress applies to us for relief, it is our duty to bestow it, and that we commit a breach of duty in refusing it? But upon what is the duty really founded? Surely upon the distresses of others, and upon our power to relieve them; not upon their merit, and our power to measure it. "We are directed to take the pattern of our charity from our self-love, and taught to love our neighbour, not as we do our child, our brother, or our friend, but as we do ourselves: now we do not love ourselves for being handsome, wise, or witty, or good tempered, or accomplished, or virtuous, or born in such a place or family, nor for any adjunct or circumstance observed in us, but for being ourselves. If we be distempered, deformed, wretched, and involved in crimes, this does not abate our fondness, which rests directly upon the person: and from hence we may learn to bear a like personal regard for others, however circumstanced."—Tucker upon Charity, vol. iii. part ii. Post. Works, p. 359.

But, may not the principle of relieving distress, be limited by the consideration that relief may in some instances "inflict an injury of superior magnitude upon myself or society?"

There is an ambiguity in the word injury. Let us, however, suppose it to mean physical harm. If the harm, after a balance of circumstances, appears greater to society than the good we do to an individual; then, neither the circumstance of his distress, nor any other circumstance, either of his being a child, a parent, a benefactor, or a friend, can warrant the greater harm; for the greater physical harm, in such a case, becomes a moral injury. Yet this, surely, has been long known, and perhaps was never disputed by any man of sense.

But, do the occurrences of common life often require such nice and accurate comparisons? Do not the circumstances which constitute material differences, present themselves, and without any deliberate effort of our own excite a correspondent degree of right affection, and determine us ultimately to a right choice? Is the practice of "weighing grains and scruples" likely to produce more good than evil, where the interests of many relations or benefactors are concerned; and would our social affections be more amiable or more useful, from the officious intrusions of reason? My fixed opinion perfectly agrees with that of Plutarch: his words are remarkable, and contain all the great principles, by which the dispute ought to be decided—*τοὺς μὲν ἀλλοτρίους (ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόφραστος) οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν—ὅπου δὲ ἡ φύσις ἡγεμονίαν τῇ κρίσει πρὸς εὔνοιαν, οὐ δίδωσιν, οὐδὲ ἀναμένει τὸν θρυλλοῦμενον τῶν ἅλων μέδιμνον, ἀλλὰ συγγεγέννηκε τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς φιλίας, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ μὴ πικροὺς εἶναι, μηδὲ ἀκριβεῖς τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐξεταστάς.*—Plutarch de Fraterno Amore, 482. But, I fear, that under the pretence of regard to the general good, some motive less honourable would lead us to these inquisitorial proceedings, when we were considering, whether consistently with that good we were to grant or refuse succour to a friend with many faults; or whether, in consequence of those faults, we should give the preference to a stranger whom we esteemed more virtuous. A small share of ingenuity would suggest difficulties, which, like the *ignavæ rationes* of the sceptics, would suspend all action; or, like the more pernicious subtleties of the casuists,

would furnish us with palliatives for acting according to the secret dictates of selfishness, or vanity, or prejudice.

Again, if the harm done to ourselves be greater than the good done to another, numberless circumstances must be taken into the account before we can be justified in granting or refusing. But to grant where the greater harm is done to ourselves is, in many circumstances, a duty; and the performance of that duty shews the predominance of the social affections over the selfish. "Charity seeketh not its own." It will sometimes relinquish the greater good to itself, that it may procure the less for another man; and sometimes it will incur the greater evil, in order to avert from another man the less.

In the page of Political Justice, where it is represented as our duty to relieve a person in distress, the ground of the duty seems to be for a moment, even in the writer's own mind, the distress itself; and in truth we in most cases act virtuously when we follow the impulses of compassion, excited by the view of distress. But if the moral worth of man be made the only standard, by which our relief is to be measured, let it be remembered that we are continually exposed to error; that our prejudices and our passions often prevent us from seeing the truth; and that our bad dispositions and bad habits would sometimes make us disregard it, even when we do see it. The distress of men excites our pity: the moral worth of men excites our esteem. We are often influenced by both in doing good to our fellow-creatures, and we may be influenced so to do by either, in the absence of the other. But in the conflict between esteem for one man and compassion for another, various circumstances, distinct from the comparative moral worth of the claimants, and perhaps more easy to be ascertained, may concur, to justify us in acting from compassion, rather than esteem; and the general good of society, as included in the good of the individual, would thus be most effectually promoted.

Butler has told us all that we need know for the general regulation of our conduct. "It may perhaps be expected that notice should be taken of occasions, circumstances, and characters, which seem to call forth affections of various sorts. Thus vice may be thought the object of pity and indignation, folly of pity and laughter. How far this is strictly true I shall not

enquire; but only observe upon the appearance, how much more humane it is to yield and give scope to affections which are more directly in favour of and friendly to our fellow-creatures; and that there is plainly much less danger of being led wrong by these than by the other."—Serm. vi. p. 100.

If the appeal in any doubtful case lay between the opinion of Bishop Butler and that of any modern theorist whatsoever, I should have no hesitation about the answer which it becomes me to give, as an agent who is responsible both to God and man.

Must I not "do the utmost in my power to discover the truth?" Perhaps so, if the good cannot be done without discovering it. But the question is, what are the truths which in any given circumstances I am most required to investigate? What, I am most able to discover? What, I am chiefly obliged to take into the account, when they are discovered? There are many other truths besides the positive or comparative worth of a fellow-creature which lie within my reach; truths, of which the knowledge is necessary to regulate my conduct towards him; truths, which in the moment of action may render it proper for me no farther to regard his moral defects than to avoid both the appearance and the reality of giving them encouragement. The domestic, and other social relations in which he stands to me, are truths; the benefits which he has confered on me, are truths; the immediate degree, and the future consequences of his misery, are truths; the chances which he has, or has not, of receiving adequate succour from any other person than myself, are truths. Some of them may be known with certainty, others may be calculated with probability; but the knowledge of the one and the calculation of the other, will not be facilitated by the rules of some modern systems of philosophy; and as to the utility of those rules in producing a right conduct, I confess myself utterly at a loss to find in what it consists. The rules of justice, as the word is commonly understood, are indeed fixed, and so far as they have the force of general rules applicable to any case under all its circumstances, they must not be violated, either from any strong impulse of our affections, or from any notions which individuals may have formed of general good. Gratitude itself, as we may hereafter see, is a virtue which, ac-

cording to the general apprehensions of mankind, approaches more nearly than almost any other social virtue to justice. Yet a very sagacious writer has shewn us that, "however we may approve of a sentiment which prompts the receiver of a benefit to reward his benefactor, it is impossible to adjust by rules the degree of that reward." "The general rules," says he, "of almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, are in many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of so many exceptions, and require so many modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them. The common proverbial maxims of prudence being founded in universal experience are, perhaps, the best general rules which can be given about it. To affect, however, a very strict and literal adherence to them, would evidently be the most absurd and ridiculous pedantry. Of all the virtues I have just now mentioned, gratitude is that perhaps of which the rules are the most precise, and admit of the fewest exceptions. That as soon as we can, we should make a return of equal, and if possible of superior value to the services we have received, would seem to be a pretty plain rule, and which admitted of scarce any exceptions. Upon the most superficial examination, however, this rule will appear to be in the highest degree loose and inaccurate, and to admit of ten thousand exceptions. If your benefactor attended you in your sickness, ought you to attend him in his? or, can you fulfil the obligation of gratitude by making a return of a different kind? If you ought to attend him, how long ought you to attend him? the same time which he attended you, or longer? and how much longer? If your friend lent you money in your distress, ought you to lend him money in his? How much ought you to lend him? When ought you to lend him? Now, or to-morrow, or next month? And for how long a time? It is evident that no general rule can be laid down, by which a precise answer can in all cases be given to any of these questions. The difference between his character and your's, between his circumstances and your's, may be such, that you may be perfectly grateful and justly refuse to lend him a halfpenny; and on the contrary, you may be willing to lend, or even to give

him ten times the sum which he lent you, and yet be justly accused of the blackest ingratitude, and of not having fulfilled the hundredth part of the obligation you lie under."—Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 437.

The same observations may be applied to the sentiment of ingratitude, and to the actions flowing from it. "Examine," says Mr. Hume, "the crime of ingratitude, which has place wherever we observe good will expressed and known, together with good offices performed on the one side, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill offices or neglect on the other. Anatomize all these circumstances, and examine by your reason alone in what consists the demerit or blame; you never will come to any issue or conclusion."

"Reason judges of matter of fact and relations." "There is no matter of fact which can be called crime; the ill-will or the indifference reside in the persons who are ungrateful; they are not always crimes, but become so when directed towards persons who have before displayed good-will towards us." As to the relation to be considered here, "it consists in the relation of contrariety, between good-will and good offices in one, and ill-will and ill offices in another; but the relation of contrariety does not prove the crime; for if a person has ill-will and ill offices towards me, and if I have indifference towards him and do him good offices, he has the same relation of contrariety towards me, yet my conduct is often highly laudable. Therefore we never can rest immorality on relations, but must have recourse to sentiment." Upon the whole he states, that "the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual fact, but arises from a complication of circumstances, which being presented to the spectator, excites the sentiment of blame by the particular structure and fabric of his mind."—Vol. ii. p. 361.

This account of ingratitude I allow, with Dr. Reid, to be "true and intelligible;" but with him I understand the word sentiment to imply a judgment accompanied with feeling, not a mere feeling without judgment.—Reid's Essays, p. 484.

Now that reason which has been employed to invent rules for gratitude, implies judgment without feeling; and if it be unable to analyze the sentiment of ingratitude itself, it must

be equally unable to furnish rules for measuring the degrees of ungrateful actions.

If, then, general rules about gratitude are confessedly so loose, must we conclude that men know not how to be grateful? Experience proves the contrary. Where the affection is strong, where the intentions of him that feels it are sincere, where his exertions are active, and his general disposition is benevolent, small is the danger of error in defect or in excess.

In regard to the principles that have been laid down for determining whether we are to assist a virtuous man, or a benefactor less virtuous, I would say of them, as Adam Smith says of the works of the Casuists, "That they attempt to direct by precise rules what it generally belongs only to feeling and sentiment to judge of. They could be of little use to one who should consult them upon occasion, even supposing their decisions to be just, because, notwithstanding the multitude of cases collected in them, yet upon account of the still greater variety of possible circumstances, it is a chance if among all those cases there be found one exactly parallel to that under consideration. None of them tend to animate us to what is generous and noble; none of them tend to soften us to what is gentle and humane; many of them, on the contrary, tend rather to teach us to chicane with our own consciences; and by their vain subtilties, serve to authorize innumerable evasive refinements with regard to the most essential articles of our duty."—Vol. ii. p. 393.

Should it, however, be asked, whether the general character of a benefactor, or his motives upon any particular occasion to confer a benefit, are to be totally disregarded? my answer is, that they are not. But, without giving any countenance to the rules which have sometimes been laid down for our behaviour, I will state clearly from Adam Smith, some considerations which have been confusedly and darkly insisted upon by other authors.

"What gratitude chiefly desires, is not only to make the benefactor feel pleasure in his turn, but to make him conscious that he meets with this reward in consequence of his past conduct, to make him pleased with that conduct, and to satisfy him that the person upon whom he bestowed his good offices was not unworthy of them. What most of all charms us in our be-

nefactor is the concord between his sentiments and our own, with regard to what interests us so nearly as the worth of our own character, and the esteem that is due to us. We are delighted to find a person who values us as we value ourselves, and distinguishes us from the rest of mankind, with an attention not unlike that with which we distinguish ourselves. To maintain in him these agreeable and flattering sentiments is one of the chief ends proposed by the returns we are disposed to make to him. A generous mind often disdains the interested thought of extorting new favours from its benefactor, by what may be called the importunities of its gratitude. But to preserve, and to increase his esteem, is an interest which the greatest mind does not think unworthy of its attention. And this is the foundation of what I formerly observed, that when we cannot enter into the motives of our benefactor, when his conduct and character appear unworthy of our approbation, let his services be ever so great, our gratitude is always sensibly diminished."—Vol. i. p. 238.

Here we have a statement of facts, not a code of rules. Considered as a statement, it is very intelligible, it is very just, too, and it is, moreover, so very obvious from every man's experience, that no man needs to be reminded of it for the purpose of restraining his gratitude. His sentiments will suggest the whole, without any assistance from the severe and minute operations of his reason, as the word is understood by some writers.

Esteem for virtue, and indignation against vice, are natural affections, and they are so conducive both to general and particular good, that we must often wish the profession of them more sincere, the feeling of them more intense, and the effects of them more frequent than they generally are. But gratitude, and filial or parental love, are affections equally natural, and when they operate only in a just proportion to other affections, requiring other duties, they also contribute both directly to particular and indirectly to general good. The presence of them is one of the virtues which attract our esteem, and the absence of them one of the vices which provoke our indignation. I contend, therefore, that being sometimes parts of virtue, and often the instruments of happiness, they ought not to be ex-

cluded from any system which professes to instruct us in virtue, or to guide us to happiness. I further contend, that they would be less meritorious, and less salutary, if they were permitted to influence our behaviour solely by the measure of moral merit or demerit in their objects. Nay, I contend still further, that virtue may exist under circumstances where the quantity of moral worth in a fellow-creature is not regarded, as, for instance, in the feeling of compassion, and in the acts to which compassion prompts us, towards distress considered merely as distress. And it may exist also under circumstances where the want of moral worth is not considered, as in forgiveness, and in the acts to which forgiveness incites us, towards an envious rival, or a malicious enemy.

In regard to friends, children, or benefactors, the direct causes which call our affections into action, are the relative situation, or the relative deserts of our fellow-creatures. But the indirect causes of restraining those affections are accidental—they may vary indefinitely—they cannot be illustrated by extreme cases, nor do they admit any rules clear, precise, and comprehensive. The former causes can be ascertained more easily and more frequently than the latter; and in practical cases (for of speculative and hypothetical ones, there is no end, and indeed no use), the latter can rarely have such force as to supersede entirely the moral obligations which result from the former.

General benevolence requires, doubtless, that we should consider the virtue of another man, as one of the causes for which he may become an object of kind affection and kind offices; but not to the exclusion of other causes. "Our understanding and power," says Hutcheson, "are limited, so that we cannot know many other natures, nor is our utmost power capable of promoting the happiness of many: our actions are therefore influenced by some stronger affections than this general benevolence. There are certain qualities found in some beings more than in others, which excite stronger degrees of good-will, and determine our attention to their interests, while that of others is neglected. The ties of blood, benefits conferred upon us, and the observation of virtue in others, raise much more vigorous affections, than that general benevolence which we may

have toward all. These qualities or relations we may call the causes of love."—Hutcheson on the Passions, page 309.

More than once I have had occasion to remark, that the doctrines of the new philosophy are founded upon partial and confused views of real facts, and become erroneous and mischievous by the excess to which they are indiscriminately pushed. "Among the irregularities of our natural sentiments," Smith says, "our love and admiration for some virtues is such, that we would wish to bestow upon them all sorts of honours and rewards, even those which we must acknowledge to be the proper recompences of some other qualities with which those virtues are not always accompanied. But nature bestows upon every virtue and every vice that precise reward or punishment which is best fitted to encourage the one, or to restrain the other. She is directed by this sole consideration, and pays little regard to the different degrees of merit and demerit which they may seem to possess in the sentiments and passions of man."—i. 420. Now, supposing our modern philanthropists to be actuated, not by an undue love of paradox, but by a sincere regard for virtue, still I must contend that they are mistaken, when they would transfer to the virtuous man those rewards which are due to the benefactor. The same voice of nature which prompts us to reward the one, prompts us also to reward the other; and the same course of moral causes and effects which procures a reward for the one, procures it also for the other. The proper reward of a benefit conferred is the return of benefit. "The proper rewards of truth, justice, and humanity," says Smith, "are the confidence, the esteem, and love of those we live with. Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved. It is not in being rich that truth and justice would rejoice, but in being trusted and believed, recompences which those virtues always acquire."—P. 416. But when we take upon ourselves to neglect the benefactor, and to prefer as the object of benefits from ourselves the more virtuous man, we not only withdraw from that benefactor the recompence due to his acts of kindness towards ourselves, but virtually inflict a kind of punishment upon him for the want of equal worth. We give to the virtuous man a reward which he did not seek, directly or indirectly, and we refuse to the benefactor a reward

to which by the common sentiments and the common practice of mankind he is evidently entitled. But if the person thus preferred were in reality a virtuous man, he might not be in haste to accept the kindness that was offered him upon such conditions, he might feel the dignity of conscious worth insulted by the mockery of such homage, he might disdain to take any share in the unhallowed spoils holden out to him by ingratitude.

If it were my misfortune to meet with any human being who should maintain, that the moral deserts of his fellow-creatures are the only measure for his kindness towards them, and that by disregarding all other measures he would himself act most conformably to the principles of virtue, and most effectually for the happiness of his species, I should, for the refutation of his error, fix upon the claims of a benefactor to whom he objects some faults, and I should expostulate with the objector in these serious terms:

Who art thou that judgest another? Who hath laid open to thee every thought of thy benefactor's heart, or made to thee every effect, and every tendency of his actions, known? Who hath revealed to thee every extenuating circumstance of his misconduct, or every secret, minute, and exquisitely delicate motive, which in the sight of heaven may have enhanced the merit of his better deeds? Who has thrown open to thy view the register in which are recorded all that he hath done well, and all that he hath done amiss, "from his youth upward even until now?" If the tree which is very good can easily be discerned from the tree which is very corrupt, yet in most of the objects that are placed before thee, canst thou determine how many blossoms of virtue have faded away by want of nourishment, from opportunity, or encouragement, or example? How many have reached their full maturity, unobserved by thee? How many roots of good intention may yet be exempt from decay, and in due season bring forth fruit, some ten, and some an hundred fold?

And, besides all this—In searching for the mote that is in thy brother's eye, art thou quite sure that the beam is cast out from thine own? Art thou superior to the wayward prejudices of education? to the mechanical force of custom—to the blind impetuosity of appetite—to the sudden and irregular sallies of imagi-

nation—to the false colourings in which passion is wont to decorate or to blacken the objects of desire or of aversion? And while thou art subject to all, or to any, of these imperfections, is it not probable that to some virtues thou mayest be more partial, and more indulgent to some vices, than "the wisdom which is from above" may warrant? Conscious thou mayest be of errors, of infirmities, of evil dispositions, or of evil habits; and while the stings of affliction, or the shafts of adversity pierce thy soul, if they with whom thou hast wept when they wept, and rejoiced when they rejoiced, should make thee no return of sympathy and succour,—if under pretences of a regard to truth, they should add insult to neglect,—if from pleas of conformity to justice, they should recount thy faults, instead of assuaging thy sorrows, —is it possible that thou shouldest consider them as doing to another man, what another man, even in their estimation, ought to do unto them? As a comforter, who is called upon to administer comfort, thou canst not err; but as a self-appointed judge, thou mayest err, and injure by error. Unknown thou must be in part to thyself, and thy benefactor, in the whole extent of his agency, is yet more unknown. But his good will and good services to thee are known, and known to thee would be thy duty also, if the voice of nature within thee were heard. Turn away then from the refinements of vain philosopy, and ask thy own heart, for "it will tell thee more than seven watchmen who sit on a high tower."—Eccles. xxxvii. 14.

Note 54, p. 380.

The consequences "of the radical positiou, that we are bound in justice to do all the good we can, and that all moral duty is comprised in justice," are stated with great clearness by Mr. Green: "Allow the first position," says he, "and all the inferences follow so clearly, and irresistibly, that it seems impossible to elude their force, however subversive they may be of the principles which have hitherto governed the conduct of mankind.

"If we are bound in justice to do all the good in our power, to produce the greatest sum of happiness in sentient nature, which it is within the compass of our faculties to effect, then,

doubtless, justice being altogether an inflexible duty, admitting no dispensation, no remission, no, not for a moment, our whole mind must be solely directed to this single purpose; and the desire to effect it must constitute the only legitimate motive of human action. Then, whatever leads us to act upon any other incitement, or with any other view, must be extirpated or subdued, as revolting against the rules of justice. Then, every passion and emotion of the human heart must be extinguished as abhorrent to our duty; it being in the essence of all affections of this kind, to prompt us to act upon particular motives, sometimes not apparently conducive to the general good, and never certainly grounded upon it. Then patriotism, friendship, gratitude, affection, pity, all the public and private virtues, all the social and domestic charities, which have hitherto been considered as the best blessings and surest hope, as well as the grace and ornament of our nature, must be effectually rooted from our feelings, as creating an unjust preference in favour of certain individuals, or descriptions of individuals, independently of their disposition and their power to co-operate with us in promoting the general good. Then, whatever obstructs us in the pursuit of this good, is an abateable nuisance. All determinate rules are blind restrictions. All legal property is inveterate injustice: I have a right to as much as I conceive will best enable me to accomplish my grand project: and nobody has a right to any other portion upon any other title. All law is usurpation upon reason; all judicial process, fetters and oppression; prevailing sentiments and manners, antiquated prejudice. If we accept the principle; we must take the consequences—they are potentially included." —See page 15th of Mr. Green's examination of the leading principles of the new System of Morals.

I perfectly agree with Mr. Green, that "what gives force to the whole body of the new system of morals, is the opinion which has lately prevailed, that virtue consists altogether in utility—that it is the beneficial or pernicious tendency of any action, which alone constitutes it virtuous or vicious."—See page 16th of the above-mentioned Work. Mr. Hume is the avowed, and, perhaps, the most able advocate for that opinion; yet, he allows to our affections that force which his followers deny. "The social virtues of humanity and benevolence, exert their

influence immediately, by a direct tendency or instinct, which keeps chiefly in view the simple object,—moving the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, nor the consequence resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his child; transported by that natural sympathy, which actuates him, and which affords us leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like circumstances. A generous man embraces cheerfully an opportunity of serving his friend; because he then feels himself under the dominion of the beneficent affections, nor is he concerned whether any other person in the universe was ever before actuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their influence. In all these cases, the social passions have in view a single individual object, and pursue alone the safety and happiness of the person loved and esteemed. With this they are satisfied; in this they acquiesce. And as the good resulting from their benign influence, is in itself complete and entire, it also excites the moral sentiment of approbation, without any reflection upon further consequences, and without the more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other members of society."—Essays, vol. ii. pp. 371, 372.

If the justice upon which some late philosophers have expatiated, and which tends to destroy all rights to property and all inequalities of possession, were realized, it would supersede the necessity of justice as the word is ordinarily understood. "The rules of equity or justice depend entirely upon the particular state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to utility, which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the condition of men; produce extreme abundance, or extreme necessity: implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice: by rendering justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon mankind."—Essays, vol. ii. p. 254.

A man of plain common sense, would be surprised to hear, that a term which, according to the received opinion of mankind, pre-supposes the existence of property and unequal possession, should be adopted in a system which tends to destroy pro-

perty and equalize possession—that a common name is given to subjects so widely different as justice, in the language of the old philosophy, and justice according to the doctrines of the new—that the virtue which, according to the old, derives its origin from utility, should be quite incompatible with the virtue which, according to the new, is founded upon the same general principle of utility, and described by the same appellation of justice: "Non nostrum est tantas componere lites."

NOTE 55, p. 381.

Mr. Green properly denies that, because "the end of virtue is the general good, it is tendency of it to this end, which determines us to distinguish it as virtue, and because the final cause of moral distinction is utility, therefore that utility must be its proximate cause also."—P. 22. Nay, he affirms, "that there is no single instance in the whole moral economy of man, in which the end to be attained is the motive appointed to attain it. Thus the end of parental affection is the preservation of helpless infancy. But do we love our children on that account? The ultimate end here too is the general good; but does it form any part of the incitement?"—P. 23. "So far," says he, "are we from estimating virtue on this principle, that, if a man could bring himself, by any effort, to perform any one of the virtues with this view, to discharge, for example, very punctually, all the duties of gratitude and humanity without any of the ordinary motives to such actions, without any kind of grateful emotion or fellow-feeling, but purely from a conviction of the ultimate tendency of such conduct to promote the general good, he would be an object to us rather of disgust and aversion."—P. 27.

NOTE 56, p. 381.

We are told that, "if by gratitude we understand a sentiment of preference which I entertain towards another upon the ground of my having been the subject of his benefits, it is no part either of justice or virtue:" and in a note subjoined to this sentence we are further told, that "this argument is stated with great clearness in an Essay on the Nature of true Virtue, by

Jonathan Edwards, Author of a celebrated Work on the Freedom of the Will."—Political Justice, vol. i. p. 129.

The principle contained in the position about gratitude, and the fact contained in the note about Mr. Edwards, shall be considered separately.

As every enquiry concerning the merit of gratitude is of the highest importance, it becomes us to remember carefully what the question before is not, as well as what it is.

The question is not, whether any social affection, e. g. the gratitude we feel to our benefactors, or (we may add by way of illustration only) the love we have for our parents, or the regard we bear to our country, may not sometimes be carried to such an excess as to be criminal.

No man will deny that Blossius would have been criminal, if he had set fire to the capitol of Rome, in consequence of his personal attachment, and probably personal obligations, to Tiberius Gracchus.—Cicero de Amicitia, vol. ii. p. 545.

No man will deny that Agesilaus would have been criminal if, in obedience to his father, he had passed a sentence of which his conscience did not approve.—Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 534. edit. Xylandri.

No man will deny that Themistocles was criminal when, for the advantage of the Athenians, he made a proposal which the Athenians had the magnanimity to reject, for burning the ships of the Greek States which had sought shelter in the harbour of Athens.—Plutarch, vol. i. p. 122.

Again, the question is not whether any oblique views of selfishness in a benefactor, or any general defects in his moral character, may not weaken the feeling of gratitude, and slacken the obligation to a grateful return—I say weaken, but not extinguish: slacken, but not supersede.

The question is, whether simply, universally, in the presence or in the absence of any collateral considerations whatsoever, the "sentiment of preference which I entertain towards another upon the ground of my having been the subject of his benefits be, or be not, a part either of justice or virtue."

Seneca, I remember, where he is enquiring "a quibus accipiendum esset beneficium," and where he answers, "ab his quibus dedisse vellemus," makes a distinction in the high language of

the stoical school. "Non loqui se de sapientibus, quos quidquid oportet, et juvat, qui animum in potestate habent, et legem sibi quam volunt, dicunt, et quam dixerunt, servant: sed de imperfectis hominibus, honesta sequi volentibus, quorum affectus sæpe contumaciter parent."—Lib. ii. de Benefic.

In discussing, therefore, this question about gratitude, I profess not to instruct those modern sages, if such there be, who, revering the omnipotence of truth, the immutability of justice, and the infallibility of reason, have reached the same empyreum of virtue to which the wise man of the Stoics aspired. I would be understood to speak only de imperfectis hominibus, honestatem sequi volentibus, and they, I suppose, comprize all the known natives of Asia, Africa, and America, and all the inhabitants of Europe, except the chosen few who may have entered into the school of our new philosophy, as Cato frequented that of the Stoics, non solum disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi."—Vide Ciceronis Orat. pro Muræna.

"The sentiment," says Smith, "which most immediately and directly prompts us to reward is gratitude; to us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude. To reward is to recompense, to remunerate, to return good for good received."

"A system of natural philosophy," says Smith, "may appear very plausible, and be for a long time generally received by the world, and yet have no foundation in nature. But in moral philosophy, he who pretends to account for the origin of our moral sentiments cannot deceive us so grossly; a departure so very far from all resemblance to truth. If he deceives us at all, he is like a person that would inform us of what passes in our neighbourhood, and the falsehoods he imposes upon us must have some resemblance to truth, and even a considerable mixture of truth in them."—Vol. ii. p. 321.

Now, is there any feeling upon which men are more "in their own neighbourhood," than in the feeling of gratitude? Is there any subject upon which they can with more confidence apply the observation of Hooker, that "the most certain token of evident goodness is, if the general persuasion of all men do so account it!"—Ecclesiast. Polit. p. 80. Will they not tell you that, "of all the duties of benevolence, those which gratitude recom-

mends to us approach nearest to what is called a perfect and complete obligation?" That "what friendship, what generosity, what charity, would prompt us to do with universal approbation, is still more free, and can still less be extorted by force, than the duties of gratitude? That we talk of the *debt* of gratitude, not of charity, or generosity, nor even of friendship, when friendship is mere esteem, and has not been enhanced and complicated with with gratitude for good offices?"—Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 195. Will they not assent to the maxim of Chrysippus, "Qui gratus futurus sit, illum velut in certamen cursus compositum, et carceribus inclusum, opperiri debere suum tempus, ad quod, velut dato signo, prosiliat?" Seneca de Benef. lib. ii. Will they not say, that mythology was never applied more laudably to the illustration of morality, than by the people who *χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμπόδων ἐποίουντο, ἵνα ἀνταπόδοσις εἴη*. Arist. Ethic. lib. v. cap. v. edit. Wilkinson. Will they not tell you, that the gratitude of man resembles, with reverence be it spoken, the justice of God, "the justice of one, that requireth nothing mincingly, but all with pressed, and heaped, and even overenlarged measure."—See Hooker, p. 93.

As to ingratitude, without maintaining it to be a vice, "sine quo vix ullum magnum facinus accreverit," do they not feel "esse istud grave vitium, esse intolerabile, et quod dissociet homines, et concordiam, qua imbecillitas nostra fulcitur, scindat ac dissipet?"—Vide Sen. de Benef. lib. i. & lib. vii.

Amidst all the imperfections of human language, the principles of gratitude have fixed and intelligible terms. I have, indeed, read of one exception, in the storehouse of Stoical refinements, and of the method, too, in which the exception is to be solved. "A consuetudine quædam quæ dicimus abhorrent; deinde, alia via ad consuetudinem redeunt. Dicimus eum qui beneficium bono animo accepit gratiam retulisse, nihilominus illum in ære alieno relinquimus, gratiam relaturum etiam cum reddiderit. Exhortatio est illa, non inficiatio beneficii."—Sen. de Benef. lib. xi. p. 28. But, when "gratitude, as a sentiment of preference, upon the ground of our having been the subject of benefits" from another man, is said to be "no part of justice or virtue," "a consuetudine quæ ita dicta sunt, abhorrent, neque ulla via in consuetudinem redeunt."

About eighteen years ago I read Mr. Edwards's Enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of the Freedom of the Will, &c. and I afterwards lent it to a learned friend, whom it completely detached from the common opinions, or, perhaps I should rather say, from the popular language of men, upon a subject over which the serra λογομαχίας has been, and hereafter will be drawn, again and again. Charmed as I was with the metaphysical acuteness and the fervent piety of the writer, I became very desirous to read his Dissertations "concerning the end for which God created the World, and the Nature of true virtue." I met with them about the year 1790; and I found in them the same romantic imagination, the same keen discernment, the same logical subtlety, and the same unextinguishable ardour.

Mr. Edwards is a writer who exercises our minds, even where he does not satisfy them; who interests us, where he does not persuade; who instructs and improves us, where he does not ultimately convince; and, as I know his authority to be very great, among a numerous and pious class of Christians, it is of some importance that his real opinions should be clearly understood. From his own words then, I will endeavour to show that, in his estimation, gratitude is, in many respects, not unconnected with justice: and that the virtue from which he distinguishes it, is essentially different from the virtue of which the author of Political Justice pronounces it to be no part.

"There is a secondary kind of beauty," says Edwards, "in the virtue called justice, which consists in the agreement of different things that have relation to one another in nature, manner, and measure. There is this agreement, in nature and measure, when he that loves has the proper returns of love; where he that from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other; as there is a kind of justice in a becoming gratitude."—P. 132. I have quoted these words already for another purpose.

But further, "if we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude there is the exercise of some kind of moral sense (as it is granted there is something that may be so called), all the moral sense that is essential to that affection is a sense of desert, which is to be referred to that sense of justice before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary kind of beauty

that lies in uniformity or proportion. Others love and kindness to us appears to us to deserve our love, or, in other words, it seems to us no other than just, that, as they love us and do us good, we should also love them and do them good."—P. 164. (I omit the words which relate to anger.)

"That fore-mentioned approbation of justice and desert, arising from a sense of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex and indirect influence to cause men to approve benevolence, as men see that he who is benevolent and loves others, and does them good, deserves himself also to be beloved and rewarded by others, as they see the natural congruity or agreement, and mutual adaptedness of these things; and having always seen this, the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and associated, with the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to self-love; and by virtue of this association of ideas, benevolence itself becomes grateful, and the contrary displeasing."—P. 170.

Mr. Edwards, in another part of his book, makes gratitude, as explained by himself, subject to conscience. "The other thing," says he, "which belongs to the approbation of national conscience, is the sense of desert which was spoken of before; consisting in a natural agreement between loving and being loved, between shewing kindness and being rewarded."—P. 176.

Further still, "Another reason why the things which have been mentioned, i. e. natural affection, natural pity, &c. are mistaken for virtue, is, that there is indeed a true negative moral goodness in them. They have this negative moral goodness, because a being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil."

From the foregoing passages it is plain that Mr. Edwards represents gratitude as a part of justice, according to his own explanation of the latter word. He does not indeed consider gratitude as a part of what, according to his own peculiar system, and his own peculiar language, is true virtue. But we shall now examine in what true virtue, according to Mr. Edwards, consists; and by such examination we shall see that when Mr. Edwards, and the author of Political Justice denied gratitude to be a part of virtue, they apply the same term virtue to subjects essentially

different, and consequently that their notions of gratitude, as forming no part of virtue, have little or no resemblance.

In p. 127, Mr. Edwards says, "True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to beings in general." In p. 128, he explains that proposition by saying, that "he does not mean to say that no one act of the mind, or exercise of love, is of the nature of true virtue, but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and immediate object; so that no exercise of love, or kind affection to any one particular being, that is, but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue; but, that the nature of true virtue consists in a disposition to benevolence towards being in general, though from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular beings, as objects are presented and occasions arise." In p. 131 he says, "The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being simply considered; and if being, simply considered, be its object, then being in general is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propensity to is the highest good of being in general; and it will seek the good of every individual being, unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of being in general."

Having thus stated the primary object of virtuous love, he, in p. 132, contends, "that the secondary object of a virtuous propensity of heart, is a benevolent being!"

From these premises he concludes, in p. 135, "that true virtue must consist chiefly in love to God, the Being of beings, infinitely the greatest and best of beings, and this, he maintains, appears, whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous love."

Now gratitude, in his opinion, does not form a part of this true and primary virtue, though we have before seen that he allows a place to it in the secondary class of virtues; and such a part as even connects it with justice.

I am not disposed to rail at any man for opinions, nor to cavil with him about words. But I must confess that, in the book upon Political Justice, there appears to me "nec vola nec vestigium" of that virtue which Mr. Edwards calls "true and primary;" that virtue, which consists in the love of being in ge-

neral; that virtue, which necessarily has the Deity for its first and greatest object.

Whatever virtue may be, according to the author of Political Justice, evidently it is not the true virtue of which Mr. Edwards speaks.

In the book upon Political Justice much is said of a regard to general good, by which, I suppose, was meant the good of man; and if in the judgment of the writer this regard was virtuous, I suspect that Mr. Edwards, having in view what he calls true virtue, would have maintained such regard not to be virtuous. "It is manifest," says Edwards, "that no affection limited to any private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private system be, let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to the great all comprehending system."—Dissertations, p. 141.

My immediate concern is, not in the truth or falsehood of Mr. Edwards's system, but in the resemblance which it has, or has not, to that position in the work upon Political Justice, which pronounces gratitude, under a certain respect, to be no part of justice or virtue.

In the Preface of the Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Hutcheson supposes that, "it would have moved the indignation of Lord Shaftesbury to find a dissolute set of men searching into his writings for his insinuations against Christianity, that they may be the less restrained from their debaucheries; when, at the same time, they were incapable of relishing those noble sentiments of virtue and honour which he has placed in so lovely a light." Would not Mr. Edwards have felt equal, or even greater indignation, if he had found the avowed advocates of infidelity misrepresenting, or at least misconceiving, his notion of true virtue; and misapplying the arguments which he urged in defence of it, to the discredit of that gratitude which, under certain circumstances, and with certain restrictions, he approved as part of justice itself? In p. 56 of Mr. Hall's admirable Sermon, many judicious, and, I think, decisive objections are brought against the fundamental principle of Mr. Ed-

wards; and they who wish to go more deeply into the subject, would do well to peruse section sixth in Mr. Hutcheson's Illustration of the Moral Sense, where he examines "how far a regard to the Deity is necessary to make an action virtuous." When they have read Mr. Hutcheson, they may, with great advantage, enquire by what means the love of God, according to the laws of association, is generated, and to what extent we are capable of reaching it; and for this purpose let them see Hartley on the Pleasures and Pains of Theopathy.—P. 289 and p. 696 of the notes and additions by Pistorius.

Since my examination of Mr. Edwards's opinion may have led the mind of the reader to the love of God as resembling benevolence, he may not think his time misspent in perusing what has been said upon that subject by other and more sober writers. "Our affections towards the Deity," says Hutcheson, "arise in the same manner as towards our fellows, and are in proportion to our attention to the causes of love in Him, and the goodness of our temper. The reflection on his goodness raises approbation and complacence; his benefits raise gratitude, and both occasion good-will or benevolence."—Illustrations on the Moral Sense, p. 312.

"The love of God," says Mr. Bentham, "is a kind of sympathy or good-will, which has the Deity for its object."—Introduction upon Motives, p. 108.

Barrow, after describing love in general to be "an affection or inclination of the soul towards an object, proceeding from an apprehension and esteem of some excellency therein, its beauty, worth, or usefulness;" after observing that "these and other properties well agree with that love which we owe to God;" and after stating that "the faint resemblance of the Creator in things created are apt to allure our affections to them;" then asks, "why should not, from a like, but so much greater cause, the like effect proceed? Whence can it be that the apprehension of an object so infinitely lovely, so incomparably beneficial, if not passing cursorily through our fancy, but deeply impressed upon our mind, should act proportionably, affect, and incline us towards him, with all that desire, that delight, that good will, which are proper to love."—Sermon, xxiii. vol. i.

They who might impute mysticism to Mr. Edwards, must

allow that Bishop Butler possessed what Seneca calls "subtile acumen ingenii in imam penetrans veritatem." "That," says he, "which we more strictly call piety, or the love of God, and which is an essential part of a right temper, some may, perhaps, imagine no way connected with benevolence; yet surely they must be connected, if there be indeed in being an object infinitely good. Human nature is so constituted, that every good affection implies the love of itself, i. e. becomes the object of a new affection in the same person. Thus, to be righteous, implies in it the love of righteousness; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be good, the love of goodness; whether this righteousness, benevolence, or goodness, be viewed as in our own mind, or in another's, and the love of God as a being perfectly good, is the love of perfect goodness contemplated in a being or person." Sermon xi. p. 259.

Butler was never slovenly nor lavish in the use of words. I must therefore warn my readers, that when he speaks of "the love of perfect goodness as contemplated in a being or person," he shews, even in those familiar words, his profound insight into the constitution and operations of the human mind. My observation shall be supported by the testimony of no contemptible philosopher. "In tracing our emotions and passions to their origin, my first thought was, that qualities and actions are the primary causes of emotions; and that these emotions are afterwards expanded upon the being to which these qualities and actions belong. But I am now convinced that this opinion is erroneous: an attribute is not, even in imagination, separable from the being to which it belongs; and, for that reason, cannot itself be the cause of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or substance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agreeable to us as otherwise than by their means. But still, when an emotion is raised, it is the being itself, as we apprehend the matter, that raises the emotion; and it raises it by means of one or other of its attributes."—Elements of Criticism, vol. i. p. 36 note.

At the conclusion of this long note, I am refreshed to see that, without any abrupt transition, my mind has been carried on, from the singular opinions of a modern writer about the gratitude

which we owe to man, to the just and luminous representations given by other writers of the love which we owe to God.

NOTE 57, p. 381.

"The apathy the Stoics talk is accompanied with somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind. Those who formerly aimed at this upon the foot of philosophy, appear to have had better success, in eradicating the effects of tenderness and compassion, than they had with the passions of envy, pride, and resentment."—Butler, Sermon vi. p. 96.

NOTE 58, p. 382.

The cause of this remark, and the whole extent to which I wish it to be carried, will be seen by the learned reader in the words I am about to produce from Epistles ascribed to Plato: *Ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀνθρώποις ἡγοῦμαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν περὶ αὐτῶν λεγομένην ἀγαθὸν, εἰ μὴ τισὶν ὀλίγοις, ὁπόσοι δυνατοὶ ἀνευρεῖν αὐτοὶ διὰ μικρᾶς ἀνδείξεως· τῶν γε δὴ ἄλλων, τοὺς μὲν καταφρονήσεως οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐμπλήσειεν ἀν οὐδαμῇ ἐμμελοῦς· τοὺς δὲ, ὑψήλης καὶ χαύνης ἐλπίδος, ὡς σέμν' ἄττα μεμαθηκότας.*—Platonis, Op. edit. Serran. vol. iii. p. 341. A salutary admonition, indeed, is here conveyed, both to rash and incompetent teachers, and to their misguided and conceited disciples.

NOTE 59, p. 382.

See vol. i. p. 388, of the Miscellaneous Works of Mr. Gibbon.

I cannot refuse myself the gratification of setting before the reader, the opinion and words of Mr. Fellowes, in his instructive and elegant work, called, "A Picture of Christian Philosophy." "Patriotism, like extension, must begin at a point; but may be increased by gradual diffusion, till it becomes a philanthropy, that knows no other limits than the limits of nature. But as the circulation near the heart is more warm, fresh, and vigorous, than at the extremities, so, every man's affection for his native country ought to be more fervent and vivid than that philan-

thropic heart which may interest him in the happiness of distant regions.

"A good Christian will be a citizen of his own country, before he will claim the too often affected appellation of a citizen of the world; a name frequently abused to disguise a base insensibility to the best affections of the human heart.

"But though a good Christian will glory in a partial fondness for his own country, still he will feel a lively interest for the happiness of other nations. He will love justice and benevolence more than his country; and he will never consent to violate these sacred principles, though, by the violation he might increase her opulence or her grandeur."—Page 102, 3.

My own benevolence and sense of duty impel me irresistibly to continue this note.

Mr. Fellowes has written several books both upon political and theological subjects, and, in my opinion, the ablest of them is the "Picture of Christian Philosophy" above mentioned, a third edition of which was published at the beginning of this year. He is curate of Harbury in Warwickshire, where I have often seen him employed among a well-chosen collection of books, and have been much pleased with his conversation upon many interesting points of ethics, literature, and divinity. Now, in consequence of some reproaches that have been lately thrown upon his intellectual and moral character, I am bounden to say that I am acquainted with no clergyman in this or any neighbouring county who is more respectable than Mr Fellowes for diligence in his studies, for acuteness in his understanding, for purity in his principles, for regularity and earnestness in the discharge of his clerical duties, or integrity in the whole tenor of his life. He possesses only a scanty income, and has no prospect, I believe, of ecclesiastical preferment. But he administers medicine to the sick, he gives alms to the needy, he offers instruction to the ignorant, he "visits the fatherless and the widow in their affliction," and keeps "himself," in no common degree, "unspotted from the world." What, therefore, must have been my surprise, and my sorrow, when I found the author of the book on Christian Philosophy described in one of our periodical publications as a man "presumptuous, idolizing his own conceptions, fancying his own reason infallible, withheld by no sense of prudence from

introducing speculations not necessary to his subject, and often highly dangerous; already a latitudinarian in the widest sense of the word, descending by a natural progress from the character of a latitudinarian to that of a fanciful, self-willed, and merely nominal Christian, differing very little, except in name, from a deist," and exposed in the course of his enquiries "even to atheism?" In the annals of modern polemics there never was a fouler charge against any book or any author. Mr. Fellowes, I know, is not unacquainted with the writings of Grotius, and perhaps, when he read the critique to which I allude, it called to his mind what Grotius said of Calvin: "Qua vero humanitate solitus fuerit Calvinus excipere a se dissentientes, ex scriptis liquet. Castellionem, qui illam, quam Calvinus docebat, prædestinationem oppugnabat, nebulonem et satanam vocat. Cornhertium, et nebulonem et canem. Scriptorem de officio pii viri in hoc religionis dissidio, qui erat Cassander, ipsi autem putabatur esse Balduinus, appellat frontis ferreæ hominem, pietatis expertem, profanum, impudicum, impostorem, ἄστοργον, petulantiæ deditum. Ei scripto cum se opposuisset Balduinus, vocat eum hominem nihili, obscœnum canem, improbum, falsarium, multa scelerate ac nequiter cogitantem, et conspirantem cum improbis nebulonibus, cynicum, scurram, perfidum, fatuum belluina rabie, satanæ addictum. Quid quod Bucerum ita vexavit, ut virum mitem coegerit hæc scribere longe verissima" "judicas, prout amas, vel odisti; amas autem et odisti, prout libet."—Votum pro Pace Ecclesiastica, p. 655. Grot. Op. v. iii.

But whether or no Mr. Fellowes would apply to his reviewer what Bucer said of Calvin, he may with justice speak of himself in the words of his favourite writer Grotius: "Pacem amavi semper amoque, et ad eam labores meos dirigo; pacem autem intelligo, illæsa ea veritate, quam nobis sacra scriptura et perpetua traditio consignant. Hanc qui amant, fieri non potest quin in odia incurrant eorum, qui dissidiis frui volunt, qualium nimis ferax est hæc ætas. Tales pacis hostes in me insurrecturos satis prævidi, ac facile patior, solorque me conscientia honestissimi propositi."—Vid. Grot. Animadver. in Animadver. Riveti, p. 649, towards the conclusion.

I have the honour to be personally acquainted with two respectable men, to whose counsels and exertions must be in a

great degree ascribed the celebrity of the publication in which I read the accumulated and unfounded invectives against Mr. Fellowes just now cited. I esteem both of them for their literary attainments, and I applaud them for their unwearied activity in the defence of our constitution, ecclesiastical and civil. But I know Mr. Fellowes to be as determined an enemy to real impiety, to be as sincere a believer in the Gospel, to be as laborious a student, as sound a scholar, as masterly a writer, and as honest a man, as either of those gentlemen; and surely this is no ordinary praise. The "Picture of Christian Philosophy," even according to the concession of the reviewer, contains many passages favourable to virtue and religion, and much that is well conceived and well written," though, in his estimation, "it is one of the last books that should be recommended to the general reader." May I then be permitted to ask, whether the passages which received, and perhaps extorted so much commendation, might not have induced the critic to be more temperate in his censures, more candid in his suspicions, and more wary in his predictions?

If a writer, who, according to our critic, "warmly and skilfully recommends benevolence," should admire the talents, and sometimes even adopt the opinions of Dr. Darwin, is it a necessary, or even a probable consequence, that his veneration for Dr. Darwin is "next only to that which he feels for himself; that he is "an arrogant speculator," and that, "without any regard to consequences, he plunges, or would incite his readers to plunge, into "wanton and hasty disputation?" It is a mark of the reviewer's own benevolence, that he represents Mr. Fellowes as "bending the gospel to his own whims," as looking with "an unfavourable eye upon the writings of the Apostles," as having "it in view to make the doctrines of genuine Christianity resemble the tenets of modern philosophy?" μὴ γένοιτο. Mr. Fellowes does not handle the word of God thus sottishly, nor thus deceitfully. He has not so learned Christ as to confound the truths of the gospel with the impious effusions of writers who revile the precepts of their Redeemer, or deny the existence of their Maker. He has sense enough to be a Christian without bigotry, and virtue enough to be a philosopher without profaneness. He professes Christianity from conviction, he explains it with perspicuity, he defends it with ardour, and he comments

upon the temper and actions of its blessed author with reverence the most profound, and eloquence the most impressive.

After all, it must be confessed that Mr. Fellowes does not assent to some positions of Mr. Wilberforce about original sin. But for the attempt to refute Mr. Wilberforce, some enlightened believers may applaud, and some orthodox churchmen, I believe, would pardon him. As to the state of my mind about the book which gave rise to the Strictures of Mr. Fellowes, the description of it lies in a narrow compass—*τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐ μέμνημαι, τὰ δὲ μέσα οὐ συνίημι, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὐ δοκιμάζω.* —M. A. P. C. xvii. N. 111 C.

To the authority of a writer who conceals his name, I may, without the imputation of "fancying my own reason infallible," oppose my calm and serious opinion. Upon two or three points of controversial divinity I dissent from Mr. Fellowes; and had I assumed the office of a reviewer, I should have specified them. But the general merits of his work are very great indeed; and if I am not strangely mistaken, few persons, however extensive may be their knowledge, however rooted their faith, however exalted their piety, have perused it without increase of that knowledge, without confirmation of that faith, or without the most active and delightful exercise of that piety. Many of the observations are judicious, and some of them profound. The style is clear, animated, and elegant. The spirit of the writer is, as it ought to be, tolerant towards Christians of every sect, but indignant against those wretches who would undermine the principles of morality, or who scoff at the evidences of religion, natural and revealed. I have lately conversed with some intelligent persons, whose sentiments about Mr. Fellowes's book are similar to mine, and in the honour of their impartial suffrages, as well as the consciousness of his own meritorious exertions, he will find ample compensation for the injustice which has been done to him by some unknown accuser.

Note 60, p. 382.

"Defiez-vous de ses cosmopolites qui vont chercher au loin dans leurs livres des devoirs qu'ils dédaignent de remplir autour d'eux. Tel Philosophe aime les Tartares pour être dispensé d'aimer ses voisins.

"L'homme naturel est tout pour lui; il est l'unite numérique, l'entier absolu, qui n'a de rapport qu'à lui-même ou à son semblable. L'homme civil n'est qu'une unite fractionnaire qui tient au dénominateur, et dont la valeur est dans son rapport avec l'entier, qui est le corps social."—Rousseau, Æmilius, book i.

NOTE 61, p. 383.

Ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης βέλτιον, οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος, οὐδε Ἕλλην, ἀλλὰ Κόσμιος εἶναι φήσας.—Plutarch Περὶ φυγῆς, page 600. edit. Xylan. The title of "Citizen of the World" was assumed by other philosophers, to gratify, it should seem, their vanity or spleen. Thus Diogenes, ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη; Κοσμοπολίτης, ἔφη. —D. Laertius, vol. i. page 345. edit. of Amsterdam 1692. It is recorded of Aristippus, that he said εἶναι πατρίδα τὸν κόσμον.—Page 138.—This is not the only instance in which I have seen a resemblance between Aristippus and some modern writers upon ethics.

NOTE 62, p. 383.

"Jam vero exsilium, si rei naturam, non ignominiam nominis quærimus, quantum demum a perpetua peregrinatione differt? In qua ætates suas philosophi noblissimi consumpserunt, Xenocrates, Crantor, et innumerabiles alii, qui semel egressi, nunquam domum reverterunt.

"Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, mundanum inquit; totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur."—Cicer. edit. Grut. vol. ii. p. 402, 3.

NOTE 63, p. 383.

See the Crito of Plato, where Socrates supposes himself addressed by the laws—καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ παντα-χοῦ ποιητέον ᾧ ἂν κελεύοι ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡ πατρίς.—P. 145, of Plato's Dialogue, by Forster.

NOTE 64, p. 383.

These are instances—ἐστρατεύσατο ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν, καὶ Ξενο-

φῶντα ἀφ' ἵππου πεσόντα ἐν τῇ κατὰ Δήλιον μάχῃ; διέσωσεν ὑπολαβών.—ἐστρατεύσατο δὲ καὶ εἰς Ποτίδαιαν διὰ θαλάττης—D. Laertius, vol. i. page 93.

NOTE 65, p. 383.

Various are the instruments which the Deity has employed for securing the interests of virtue. We have reason, we have affections, we have, what Adam Smith calls, "a sense of propriety, a sense of merit and demerit, and a sense of duty," influenced by the authority of commands and prohibitions, and by the sanctions of reward and punishment. Each of them has its proper office in the course of our agency, and all of them are subservient to one common end, our improvement, and our happiness, as moral beings. There are, indeed, philosophers who leave us no other guides than omnipotent truth, inflexible justice, and reason, which, according to their representations, will, at last, be placed beyond the reach of error. Yet, "reason alone," as says Butler, "whatever any one may wish, is not, in reality, a sufficient motive of virtue, in such a creature as man; but this reason, joined with those affections which God has impressed on his heart."—See Butler, page 88.

But as to that constant and direct regard to general good, which justice, truth, and reason, are said to exact from all men at all times, and under all circumstances, the philosophy which thus exalts them may be found, upon a near inspection, to incur the charge which a great writer has brought against the dogmas of the Stoics, and "to be ultimately only a more refined system of selfishness, by which we may reason ourselves out of all virtue."—Vol. ii. page 49. On the other hand, there are well-meaning but mistaken religionists, who seem to think that we ought not to be "grateful from gratitude, to be charitable from humanity, to protect the helplessness of our children, and support the infirmities of our parents, from natural affection, to be generous and just, from the love of mankind, but to perform all these different duties solely because God has commanded us to perform them."—Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. page 429.

Now, when I spoke of what we as Christians are bounden to be, I grant with Adam Smith, that "there is no precept in Chris-

tianity which pronounces the sense of our duty to be the only principle of our conduct;" but that revelation conspires with "philosophy and common sense, in representing it as the ruling and the governing principle." The second precept of the Gospel is, to love our neighbour as we love ourselves, and we love ourselves surely," as the same philosopher well observes, "for our own sakes, and not merely because we are commanded to do so." The same observation may be applied to all the directions of religion about prudence, temperance, and every other virtue, which moralists describe as included in the duty we owe to ourselves.

Thus, by the constitution of our nature, we are capable both of general and particular benevolence; and by the authority of religion we are commanded to exercise both, "in loving our neighbour as ourselves."

Note 66, p. 384.

In justice to Barrow, Taylor, and some other of the older and more celebrated divines who have adorned the Church of England, I will once for all make a remark, which may not be very congenial to the temper and prejudices of these times, but which long, and I hope impartial, observation will justify me in making with great affiance in the truth of it. Without any attempt to preserve the peculiar forms of philosophical investigation, without any habit of employing the technical language of it, without any immediate consciousness of intention to exhibit their opinions in what is called a philosophical point of view, their incidental representations of man in all the varieties of his moral powers and his social relations, have so much depth, so much precision, and so much comprehension, as would have procured them the name of philosophers, if they had not borne the different and not less honourable name of Christian teachers. In their professional writings I have often seen the germ of thoughts which have been expanded into fuller luxuriance, and decked with brighter colours, in the more popular productions of later times. The passages quoted from their works in these notes, will abundantly illustrate my observation; and of eloquence combined with philosophy, a nobler instance can scarcely be found than in the words of Barrow, where he describes the spirit of benevolence,

sometimes diffusing itself over the collective interests of man, and sometimes emanating in the sweet and lovely charities of private life.

"Charity," says he, "is a right noble and worthy thing; greatly perfective of our nature; much dignifying and beautifying our soul. It rendereth a man truly great, enlarging his mind into a vast circumference, and to a capacity near infinite; so that it by a general care doth reach all things; by an universal affection doth embrace and grace the world. By it our reason obtaineth a field or scope of employment worthy of it, not confined to the slender interests of one person or one place, but extending to the concerns of all men. Charity is the imitation and copy of that immense love, which is the fountain of all being and all good; which made all things, which preserveth the world, which sustaineth every creature.

"Charity rendereth us as angels, or peers to those glorious and blessed creatures, who, without receiving or expecting any requital from us, do heartily desire and delight in our good, are ready to promote it, do willingly serve and labour for it. Nothing is more amiable, more admirable, more venerable, even in the common eye and opinion of men; it hath in it a beauty and a majesty apt to ravish every heart: even a spark of it in generosity of dealing, breedeth admiration; a glimpse of it in formal courtesy of behaviour procureth much esteem, being deemed to accomplish and adorn a man; how lovely therefore, and truly gallant is an entire, sincere, constant, and uniform practice thereof, issuing from pure good-will and affection!"—Barrow's Sermons, vol. i. p. 375.

They who read these notes will have no reason to suspect that I am wholly insensible to the charms of just thinking and beautiful composition in other writers, whose opinions upon speculative topics of religion are widely different from my own, but whose talents have been most laudably employed in supporting the cause of virtue according to the common apprehensions, and for the common benefit of the civilized world.

One of the happiest illustrations I have ever seen, both of the more enlarged, and the more limited benevolence, is in Hutcheson, and it well deserves to be quoted: "This universal benevolence towards all men we may compare to that principle of gra-

vitation, which perhaps extends to all bodies in the universe; but like the love of benevolence, increases as the distance is diminished, and is strongest when bodies come to touch each other. Now this increase of attraction, upon nearer approach, is as necessary to the frame of the universe, as that there should be any attraction at all; for a general attraction, equal in all distances, would, by the contrariety of such multitudes of equal forces, put an end to all its regularity of motion, and perhaps stop it altogether."—Inquiry, p. 222. In the foregoing words there is a complete description of philanthropy, so far as man, by his nature, is capable of feeling, or by reason or religion is required to practise it; and there is a complete refutation, too, of the strange notions that have gone abroad, under the imposing name of philosophy.

In No. 45 of the Adventurer, written by Dr. Johnson, imagery nearly the same as that of Hutcheson is applied to the same subject:

"The reigning philosophy informs us, that the vast bodies which constitute the universe, are regulated in their progress, through the etherial spaces, by the perpetual agency of contrary forces; by one of which they are restrained from deserting their orbits, and losing themselves in the immensity of heaven, and held off by the other from rushing together, and clustering round their center with everlasting cohesion. The same contrariety of impulse, may be, perhaps, discovered in the motions of men; we are formed for society, not for combination; we are equally unqualified to live in a close connection with our fellow-beings, and in total separation from them: we are attracted towards each other by general sympathy, but kept back from contact by private interests."

Mr. Green, whose penetration, whose taste, whose large views in philosophy, and whose great talents for composition, entitle him to my respect, has quoted some admirable lines from Pope, in order to illustrate the progress of our affections:

"God acts from whole to parts, the human soul
Must rise from individual to the whole.
Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake:

The centre mov'd, a circle straight succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads.
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace,
Its country next, and next all human race."

I will give the reader an opportunity of comparing these lines with a passage which they resemble strongly, but which Mr. Pope in all probability had not seen: "*ὅλως γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, οἷον κύκλοις πολλοῖς περιγέγραπται. τοῖς μὲν, σμικροτέροις, τοῖς δὲ μείζοσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν περιέχουσι, τοῖς δὲ περιεχομένοις, κατὰ τὰς διοφόρους καὶ ἀνίσους πρὸς ἀλλήλους σχέσεις. πρῶτος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ κύκλος καὶ προσεχέστατος, ὃν αὐτός τις καθάπερ περὶ κέντρον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γέγραπται διανοίαν, ἐν ᾧ κύκλῳ τό τε σῶμα περιέχεται, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα παρειλημμένα, σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ βραχύτατος καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν αὐτοῦ προσαπτόμενος τοῦ κέντρου κύκλος οὗτος. δεύτερος δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου, καὶ πλέον μὲν ἀφεστῶς τοῦ κέντρου, περιέχων δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ τετάχαται γονεῖς, ἀδελφοὶ, γυνὴ, παῖδες· ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων τρίτος, ἐν ᾧ θεῖοι, καὶ τιτθίδες, πάπποι τε καὶ τίτθαι, καὶ ἀδελφῶν παῖδες, ἔτι δὲ ἀνέψιοι· μεθ' ὃν ὁ τοὺς ἄλλους περιέχων συγγενεῖς· τούτῳ δὲ ἀφεξῆς, ὁ τῶν δημοτῶν καὶ μετ' ἀυτὸν ὁ τῶν φυλετῶν, εἶθ ὁπλιτῶν· καὶ λοιπὸν οὕτως ὁ μὲν ἀστυγειτόνων· ὁ δε ὁμοεθνῶν· ὁ δὲ ἐξωτάτω καὶ μέγιστος, περιέχων τε πάντας τοὺς κύκλους, ὁ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνθρώπων γένους.*" —Stob. Serm. 82, page 481.

Note 67, p. 385.

"Quid si vero gravior sit error, et qui apud æquos judices facile possit sacra autoritate, aut veterum consensu revinci? Cogitandum hic quoque quanta sit vis inclitæ opinionis, et quantum libertatem judicii minuat in suam cujusque sectam studium, Malum, in Gallenus ait, quavis scabie insanabilius. Apposite ad hanc rem Origenes—*ἐυχερέστερόν γε ἄνθρώπος τὰς περὶ ἄλλα συνηθείας, κἂν δυσαποσπάστως αὐτῶν ἔχῃ, καταλείψαι ἂν, ἢ τὰς περὶ τὰ Δόγματα.*"—Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. ii. cap. xx.

In his note Grotius adds, to the same purpose, the following words from Chrysostom—*ὅταν δὲ καὶ ἐν δόγμασιν ἡ συνήθεια ᾖ, βεβαιότερα γίνεται· πάντα γὰρ τις εὐκολώτερον ἀμείψειε, ἢ τὰ περὶ τὰς θρησκείας.*—Chrysostom in 1 Cor. ii.

NOTE 63, p. 386.

I have chosen to speak of that sympathy which arises from the participation of religious duties in the sanctuary, rather than of that which proceeds from similarity of opinion upon abstruse and polemical questions of divinity. The moral effects of the latter, I fear, are too often unfavourable to benevolence; and with the highest respect for the talents and erudition of those persons who are most capable of examining such questions, I will venture to express my most fixed and solemn judgment, that they ought to be very rarely introduced, and very temperately discussed in discourses from the pulpit. *ἐριδαντέων δὲ καὶ ἱμαντελικτέων λόγους ἀφετέον, οἱ αὐτούς τε καταστείνουσιν ἐν πράγμασι γλίσχροις καὶ δυσθεωρήτοις, τούς τε παρατυγχάνοντας οὐδαμῶς οἰκοδομοῦσι.* The foregoing passage is taken from Plutarch, edit. Xylan. vol. ii. p. 614., and for obvious reasons I have omitted the last word in Plutarch, and substituted for it the better phraseology of an inspired writer, who more than once has condemned *διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν.*—Rom. xiv. 1.

I know not that philosophy, either ancient or modern, has ever described the beauty of true holiness in colours so correct and so glowing as the great apostle of the Gentiles in his Epistle to the Colossians. My soul is always enraptured when I read "*ὁ λόγος τοῦ Χρίστου ἐνοικείτω ἐν ὑμῖν πλουσίως, ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ· διδάσκοντες καὶ νουθετοῦντες ἑαυτοῦς, ψαλμοῖς καὶ ὕμνοις καὶ ᾠδαῖς πνευματικαῖς, ἐν χάριτι ᾄδοντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν τῷ Κυρίῳ.*"—Coloss. cap. iii. v. 16.

When devotion is thus made the indirect, but powerful instrument of instruction,—when prayer and thanksgiving are offered up to the throne of heaven, both "with the spirit and with the understanding,"—when the duties of external religion are performed with "singleness of heart" towards God, and with "love unfeigned" towards men,—then, indeed, and then only, may Christian worshippers be said "*τὰ τῆς Εἰρήνης διώκειν, καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους.*"—Rom. cap. xiv. ver. 19.

If the opinions seriously delivered in my sermon, and unfolded more fully in this note, should unfortunately give offence to the fiery zealot or the captious bigot, be it remembered that

I have the authority of a sincere believer, and most profound philosopher, in my favour. "As for the fruit towards those that are within it is peace; which containeth infinite blessings; it establisheth faith; it kindleth charity; the outward peace of the church distilleth into peace of conscience; and it turneth the labours of writing and reading of controversies, into treatises of mortification and devotion."—Bacon's Works. London, 1730. vol. iii. p. 304.

NOTE 69, p. 386.

The sober and sincere Christian will find that an "enlightened conscience" is necessary to produce in his actions and his opinions, too, all the salutary effects which Socrates ascribes to *φρόνησις*. "This," says he, "is not the true way to virtue, if we exchange pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, add the greater for the less, like pieces of money—*ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθὸν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ παντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις. καὶ τοῦτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ᾖ, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθὼς ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ περγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ τοιάντη ἀρετὴ, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ανδραποδώδης τε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ.*"—Plato, Phædo, ed. Forster, p. 185, 6.

NOTE 70, p. 387.

"The other part of spiritual worship is a fervor, and a holy zeal of God's glory, greatness of desire, and quietness of action. Of all this the Jews were not careful at all, excepting the zealous among them; and they were not only fervent but inflamed: and they had the earnestness of passion for the holy warmth of religion; and instead of an earnest charity, they had a cruel discipline."—Taylor's Sermons, 112.

NOTE 71, p. 386.

"The animosity of hostile factions, whether civil or ecclesias-

tical, is often still more furious than that of hostile nations, and their conduct towards one another is often more atrocious.

"The real, revered, and impartial spectator, therefore, is upon no occasion, at a greater distance than amidst the violence and rage of contending parties. To them it may be said, that such a spectator scarce exists any where in the universe. Even to the great Judge of the universe they impute all their own prejudices, and often view that divine Being as animated by all their own vindictive and implacable passions. Of all the corrupters of moral sentiments, therefore, faction and fanaticism have always been by far the greatest."—A. Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 386.

The preceding observations of A. Smith are very judicious; but those which follow from Mr. Hutcheson are far more interesting. Lord Shaftesbury, says he, in his Essay on Wit and Humour, observes, "that the various sects, parties, factions, cabals of mankind in larger societies, are all influenced by a public spirit: that some generous notions of public good, some strong friendly dispositions, raise them at first, and excite men of the same faction or cabal to the most disinterested mutual succour and aid: that all the contentions of the different factions, and even the fiercest wars against each other, are influenced by a sociable public spirit in a limited system." "But certain it is, that men are little obliged to those who often artfully raise and ferment this party spirit, or cantonize them into several sects for the defence of very trifling causes. When men's heads are filled with some trifling opinions; when designing men raise in their minds some unaccountable notion of sanctity and religion, in tenets or practices, which neither increase our love to God, or our own species; when the several factions are taught to look upon each other as odious, contemptible, profane, because of their different tenets or opinions; even when these tenets, whether true or false, are perhaps perfectly useless to the public good; when the keenest passions are raised about such trifles; and men begin to hate each other for what, of itself, has no evil in it; and to love the zealots of their own sect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their fury, rage, and malice against opposite sects (which is what all parties commonly call zeal), 'tis then no wonder if our moral sense be

much impaired, and our natural notions of good and evil almost lost; when our admiration, and love, or contempt, and hatred, are thus perverted from their natural objects."—Inquiry, pp. 209, 210.

For the wise and virtuous Hutcheson I feel the same veneration which Dr. Reid and Dr. A. Smith have frequently expressed. But from my conversation with men of letters, I have reason to fear that his writings are too much neglected. If, therefore, the frequent, and, I trust, the pertinent quotations I have made from them, should be instrumental in bringing them back to the notice of my countrymen, I shall have rendered no inconsiderable service to the cause of virtue.

Note 72, p. 387.

In following the Apostle's injunction, we should always "keep it in aim to bring ourselves, by practicable gradations, to universal benevolence, even to the worst of men, so as to shew them all the kindness that may not prove an encouragement to vice, or endanger mischief to ourselves: in imitation of that power who causeth his sun to shine upon the good and upon the evil, and sendeth his rain upon the just and the unjust; and we trust will turn every evil permitted, to answer some good and holy purpose."—Tucker upon Holiness, vol. iii. part ii. p. 173.

Note 73, p. 387.

"There are people who seem to have placed the corner stone of their faith in that text—"He that is not with us, is against us; and he that gathereth not with us, scattereth." "With such there is no medium to be preserved; a favourable word spoken of any they do not like, is taken for a declaration of hostility against themselves. They are more eager to run down an adversary than to labour at their own improvement, as being the less troublesome task; and more afraid lest another should attain any good thing than that themselves should miss it. For seeking their credit rather by differing from others than by their intrinsic merit, they cannot hear with patience whatever tends to lessen that difference, which they strive to widen as far as pos-

sible; so that he who presumes to doubt of a single truth must be a heretic, and infidel, a man of no principles; and he that believes a single point without sufficient warrant to their liking, must be a bigot, an enthusiast, a crafty designer upon the liberties of mankind."—Light of Nature, vol. iii. part ii. chap. vii. on Religion, pp. 256, 7. The reader will remember, that I make frequent and large quotations from Tucker because his works are scarce.

The two proverbial sayings, "He that is not with us is against us, and he that is not against us is with us," are most judiciously explained by Jeremy Taylor, in the Ductor Dubitantium, p. 762.

NOTE 74, p. 388.

A free thinker of this kind "hates trouble, thinks all painful investigation needless, as tending only to perplex, and makes his decisions easily, without scruple or diffidence."

"His delight is wholly in opposition. If men believe what is taught them, it is enough, no matter what else they believe. Ridicule is his trusty weapon, as doing its work much quicker or cleverer than argument, for what cannot stand that touchstone must needs be absurd. He affects to appear mighty full of doubts, but in reality never doubted of any thing; for what he pretends to doubt of he is absolutely sure must be false, because he discerns the character of absurdity in it by his moral sense.

"He takes his idea of Christianity sometimes from the extravagances of the Methodists, sometimes from the tyrannical policy of the Papists, and perceives no inconsistency in making it either the delusion of silly enthusiasts or the deep-laid schemes of crafty deceivers, to raise immense riches and power, according as serves his present purpose. He runs down charity and cries up benevolence, but grossly mistakes both the one and the other; for he places charity solely in building churches or giving money to beggars, and benevolence in easiness of carriage and a cheerful conversation, or in doing any obliging office for a friend or acquaintance that may be done without much trouble to yourself. He abhors persecution as an invasion of the rights of mankind; but he criticises and teases, derides and runs

down, with his contemptuous sneer, whatever he does not like, the only means of persecution in his power; as if mankind had not a right to candid and equitable judgment with respect to their good name as well as to their liberties and properties." These observations make a part of the admirable comparison which Tucker has drawn between a bigot and a free-thinker, and are to be found in vol. iii. part ii. pp. 312, 13, of the Light of Nature.

I fear that in a neighbouring state the cause of infidelity has, in far too many instances, been supported by a worse kind of persecution. But of my own countrymen in general I am happy to say——

> "The baleful dregs
> Of these late ages, this inglorious draught
> Of wickedness and folly, have not yet,
> Blest be the eternal Ruler of the world!
> Defil'd to such a depth of sordid shame
> The native honours of the human soul,
> Nor so effac'd the image of its Sire."
>
> Akenside's Pleasures of Imagination, book ii.

NOTE 75, p. 388.

I have met with several persons who were ready enough to confess, and even eager to avow and defend their infidelity. I must, however, acknowledge that their language, in my presence at least, was decorous; and that their aim, as it appeared to me, was rather to vanquish by disputation than to insult by profaneness. The yell of blasphemy never assailed my ears from more than one human voice, and that voice has for these eleven years been silenced by death. Firmly, but not in the gall of bitterness, I bestowed upon the offender the discipline he deserved for a most unprovoked outrage, and I have often expressed my joy that a table stood between us, for he had the grim visage of a ruffian, and his hands I knew had been imbrued in the blood of a fellow-creature; *εἰδὼς αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄνομα*, says an old writer, *οὐκ ἐπιμνησθήσομαι*; but I am glad that he was not an Englishman.

NOTE 76, p. 388.

"Is the idea," exclaims the pious and eloquent Mr. Hall, "of an Almighty and perfect Ruler unfriendly to any passion which is consistent with innocence, or an obstruction to any design which it is not shameful to avow? Eternal God! on what are thine enemies intent? What are those enterprises of guilt and horror that, for the safety of their performers, require to be enveloped in a darkness which the eye of Heaven must not pierce? Miserable men! proud of being the offspring of chance, in love with universal disorder; whose happiness is involved in the belief of there being no witness to their designs, and who are at ease only because they suppose themselves inhabitants of a forsaken and fatherless world!"—P. 71, 2.

Am I told that Mr. Hall is a professed teacher of religion, and that his imagination is disturbed by the frightful scenes that have been passing before him? Let us hear, then, the words of a philosopher, calmly investigating the characters of true benevolence. "Though our effectual good offices can very seldom be extended to any wider society than that of our own country, our good will is circumscribed by no boundary, but may embrace the immensity of the universe. We cannot form the idea of any innocent and sensible being whose happiness we should not desire, or to whose misery, when distinctly brought home to the imagination, we should not have some degree of aversion.

****** "This universal benevolence, how noble and generous soever, can be the source of no solid happiness to any man who is not thoroughly convinced that all the inhabitants of the universe, the meanest as well as the greatest, are under the immediate care and protection of that great, benevolent, and all-wise Being, who directs all the movements of nature; and who is determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to maintain in it, at all times, the greatest possible quantity of happiness. To this universal benevolence, on the contrary, the very suspicion of a fatherless world must be the most melancholy of all reflections, from the thought that all the unknown regions of infinite and incomprehensible space may be filled

with nothing but endless misery and wretchedness."—A. Smith's Moral Sent. vol. ii. pp. 113, 14.

Upon the inference which ought to be drawn from superstition, as it affects the truth of natural religion, the sentiments of another great philosopher are so just, so important, and so original, that my readers will thank me for producing the whole.

"Examine," says Mr. Hume, "the religious principles which have prevailed in the world—you will scarcely be persuaded that they are any thing but sick men's dreams; or perhaps, will regard them more as the playsome whimsies of monkies in human shape, than the serious, positive, dogmatical asseverations of a being who dignifies himself with the name of rational. To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims as these, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; that the whole is greater than a part; that two and three make five; is pretending to stop the ocean with a bulrush."—"But what is the inference," says the sagacious and temperate Dugald Stewart, "to which we are led by these observations? Is it (to use the words of this ingenious writer, i. e. Mr. Hume), that the whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery; and that doubt, uncertainty, and suspense, appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject? Or should not rather the melancholy histories which he has exhibited of the follies and caprices of superstition, direct our attention to those sacred and indelible characters on the human mind, which all these perversions of reason are unable to obliterate; like that image of himself which Phidias wished to perpetuate, by stamping it so deeply on the buckler of his Minerva, 'ut nemo delere posset aut divellere, qui totam statuam non imminuerit.' In truth, the more striking the contradictions, the more ludicrous the ceremonies, to which the pride of human reason has thus been reconciled; the stronger is our evidence that religion has a foundation in the nature of man. When the greatest of modern philosophers declares, that 'he would rather believe all the fables in the Legend and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without mind;" he has expressed the same feeling, which in all ages and nations has led good men, unaccustomed to reasoning, to an implicit faith in the creed of their infancy; a feeling which affords an evidence of the exist-

ence of the Deity, incomparably more striking, than if, unmixed with error, and undebased by superstition, this most important of all principles had commanded the universal assent of mankind. Where are the other truths in the whole circle of the sciences, which are so essential to human happiness, as to procure an easy access, not only for themselves, but for whatever opinions may happen to be blended with them? Where are the truths so venerable and commanding, as to impart their own sublimity to every trifling memorial which recals them to our remembrance; to bestow solemnity and elevation on every mode of expression by which they are conveyed; and which, in whatever scene they have habitually occupied the thoughts, consecrate every object which it presents to our senses, and the very ground we have been accustomed to tread? To attempt to weaken the authority of such impressions, by a detail of the endless variety of forms which they derive from casual associations, is surely an employment unsuitable to the dignity of philosophy. To the vulgar it may be amusing, in this, as in other instances, to indulge their wonder at what is new or uncommon; but to the philosopher it belongs to perceive, under all these various disguises, the workings of the same common nature; and in the superstitions of Egypt, no less than in the lofty visions of Plato, to recognize the existence of those moral ties which unite the heart of man to the author of his being."—Stewart's Elements, 359. Animated with the enthusiasm with which this eloquent passage must inspire a true religionist, will he not instantly repeat Pope's Universal Prayer, "meekly kneeling upon his knees?"

Upon a subject which the words prefixed to this note suggest to my mind, I must detain the reader's attention somewhat longer than usual.

Lord Bacon says (Essay xvii.) that "a little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to Atheism, but that depth in philosophy bringeth it about to religion." Sir Matthew Hale, in his admirable work De Homine, quotes these words with high approbation, and I think that, with the latitude which must always be allowed to general positions, Bacon is very right. He has made, also, another remark, the propriety of which has again and again struck my mind, in the course of my own observations upon the dispositions and characters of men. "Atheists," says he, "will

ever be talking of that their opinion, as if they fainted in it within themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened by the consent of others: nay more, you shall have Atheists striving to get disciples, as it fareth with other sects."—Essay 17.

"To the great Searcher of all hearts—to him who espieth our thoughts afar off, and who knoweth of what we are made," would I leave the sacred prerogative of deciding how far the opinions of men are necessarily, or in some cases, actually produced by vicious habits, and the propagation of them secretly accompanied by malignant motives. I must, however, take the liberty of saying, that one class of unbelievers in this country confirm, beyond all other men, to my mind, the justness of Mr. Hume's remark, that, "It is almost impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment against the universal consent of every one with whom we have any fellowship or correspondence: that, of all our opinions, those which we form in our own favour, however lofty or presuming, are at bottom the frailest, and the most easily shaken by the contradiction and opposition of others; and that, our great concern in the case makes us soon alarmed, and keeps our passions upon the watch."—Essays, vol. ii. p. 202. More, or less, this remark may be applied to every man who is actuated even by the most honest love of fame. But I think it peculiarly applicable to those persons who have reached the greatest extremes of infidelity; and in whom I have observed a strange mixture of outward positiveness and inward distrust—a watchful, captious, and fretful turn of mind, amidst the smoothest professions of moderation and candour—an unceasing solicitude to obtain, not merely triumph from the praise, but support from the assent of others—a latent proneness to measure the probability of their own tenets by the zeal and increase of their followers, at the very moment when they ascribe the permanency of established opinions, not to the solidity of the reasonings by which they are defended, but to the influence of the numbers by whom they are professed.

"Parum favet," says Mosheim, "memoriæ magni Baconi Cudworthus, quem inter occultos impietatis erga Deum patronos numerasse videtur."—Note on Cudworth's Works, 4to. vol. ii. p. 109.

Let me not be suspected of entertaining any such unjust pre-

judice against Lord Bacon, when I examine, and would restrain another proposition of the same great man, which in my hearing has been sometimes repeated with exultation, and opposed to the celebrated passage in Plutarch, where he says of superstition—*δεῖ μὲν ἀμέλει τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης, ὥσπερ ὄψεως λῆμην ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, μὴ συνεκκόπτειν, μηδὲ τυφλοῦν τὴν πίστιν ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσι.*—Vol. ii. p. 109.

"Atheism," says Bacon, "leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all which may be guides to an outward morality, even though religion were not. But, superstition dismounteth all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men. Therefore atheism did never perturb States." *—Essay 18.

Would not Bacon have qualified this proposition, if he had lived in our own days? In order to determine whether atheistical tenets were compatible with virtuous conduct, has it not hitherto been usual to appeal to the example of Atticus and some other amiable Epicureans, and to the good qualities and good habits of a few particular men who have lived in later ages? But it was reserved for these times to survey the practical effects of Atheism upon a wider scale. Bacon's observation may be very just, so far as it concerns a few solitary individuals removed

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* I believe, that when Bacon made this observation upon the pacific temper of Atheism, he had chiefly in view the Epicureans of antiquity, from whose tenets and whose practice we know very well, that many of them, in pursuit of their favourite *εὐθυμία*, professedly stood at a distance from the bustle of political life. Their successors, however, in the present age, have not in this respect followed the example of their predecessors. Some of them remind us of Jortin's remark, "that the learned age of Augustus, with all its polite advantages, was sadly corrupted in matters of religion; that the Epicurean doctrine had spread itself through the Roman empire, and that persons of the brightest abilities and highest stations being unhappily infected with it, were men of that First Philosophy, which in a Christian country, and in the eighteenth century, hath been publicly recommended to us by patriots and geniuses, compared with whom Epicurus was a gentleman, a philosopher, a reasoner, and a scholar."—Jortin's 6th Dissertation, towards the conclusion.

from the bustle of the world, preserving, as it were, in the garden of Epicurus, the natural calmness and serenity of their own minds; enjoying the conversation of speculative and literary friends, endowed with a constitutional suavity of temper, and furnished by education or example with a delicate sense of honour and decorum. But will there be no difference, when Atheism passes from the few to the many—from men of leisure and reflection, to men whose understandings are chiefly employed in the busy scenes of life, whose pursuits are often directed to low and sordid objects, and whose appetites seek for gratification in the foulest dregs of sensuality? From men disciplined by erudition, and exalted by genius, to men of moderate talents and scanty attainments, to forward sciolists, to beardless striplings, and unlettered mechanics? Will there be no difference when, in the propagation of atheism, the stratagems of confederacy lend their aid to the efforts of individuals; when many of those who act, involuntarily forward the purposes of those who project, and when parts, the most discordant in their elementary principles, and the most destructive of each other by immediate collision, are directed by powers unresisted, because unseen, and become subservient to a common system by their number, by their extent, by the regularity of their separate force, and by the concentration of their ultimate tendencies? Will there be no difference, when atheism mingles with the secular interests of men, both in private and in public life? will there be no difference when it is admitted as a leading principle into systems of ethics or politics? When, from external circumstances it has an opportunity of waging undisguised and unceasing war against its real or imaginary foes! When, like its antagonist, superstition, it forms alliances with prejudice, or pride, or fanaticism? When it is able either to gratify the inclinations of its votaries, or to incite the passions of other men, in the subversion of old governments and the erection of new? When it becomes giddy and flippant, from the countenance of fashion? When it has grown fearless from the authority of public favour? When it is seized with the ambition of distinguishing itself by romantic adventure? When it has soared to high rank, wrested the sceptre from kings, and wields the collective force of mighty nations? Does the philoso-

pher appeal to experience for the decision of these awful questions? To experience let us go.

Far be it from me to plead directly or indirectly the cause of superstition, to palliate its absurdities, errors, and extravagancies —to varnish over the crimes with which it has stained the page of history, sullied the lustre of Christianity, and debased the nature of man created in God's own image, by domestic animosities, by seditious tumults, by "chains and stripes, and arbitrary punishment" inflicted upon the weak, or the wise, or the virtuous, by massacres, by assassinations, and "by grim and piercing fires blown into seven fold rage."

These are the dreadful effects of superstition. They are so frequent too, that in certain seasons of public affairs, and certain dispositions of the public mind, a religionist might venture to pause, ere he pronounced them quite incidental. But to those effects, frequent as they have been, and dreadful as they were, may be opposed other and good effects, not, I grant, proceeding immediately from superstition itself, but from virtues which will grow with it—from sentiments which it cannot eradicate—from kind affections and honest intentions, which even mistaken piety will sometimes foster. Of atheism itself, it cannot be said that the direct tendency of it is to sweeten natural piety, to increase our reverence for laws, or to animate our love of that reputation which is founded upon virtuous habits and virtuous propensities. But if atheism be compatible with any such habits, or any such propensities, be it remembered, that superstition is equally compatible with them.

Charron, as I find him quoted by Bayle, tells us that, "an habitual and universal kind of atheism, cannot lodge but in a very strong and bold soul—

"Illi robur et æs triplex
Circa pectus erat, ——

it must be furious and maniac."

At some distance from the foregoing words, Charron thus proceeds, "to get loose from, and cast off the sense and fear of the Deity, a thing interwoven in our nature, requires a monstrous and furious strength of the soul; and is hardly to be found, although those great and notorious atheists, who through an ex-

treme and furious insolence had a mind to withdraw their allegiance to the Deity, and to shake off a superior being, did what they could to acquire it."

If Mr. Charron had contemplated the characters of modern atheists, he would have found that the measures of some were indeed strongly marked by maniacal fury; but that the number of even determined atheists* was much greater than he supposed it likely to be—that their unremitted endeavours to shake off the idea of a Deity were not wholly unsuccessful, and that their tenets may be lodged in cold and phlegmatic, as well as in fiery and intrepid spirits. To some secret misgivings of soul, to some painful, though temporary, distrust in the truth of those doctrines which they avow with confidence, and propagate with activity, to that sense of the Deity which is attended, not perhaps by a direct dread of his displeasure as a moral governor, but by a confused and overwhelming apprehension of his possible existence and his power, almost all atheists are, I believe, more or less subject. Neither the solemnity of their professions, nor the levity of their raillery, is a proof to the contrary. Yet, after they have declared for atheistical principles openly, clung to them eagerly, and argued for them stoutly, I suspect that they are rarely brought over to a sincere and firm conviction on the side of theism. It is therefore extremely difficult to determine to what extent such a conviction might operate in the improvement of their moral conduct. General habits, and general dispositions acquired under the influence of atheism, might be too

* Falster belongs not to the class of determined atheists. To a reader of sensibility, what can be more acceptable than this simple and impressive tale?

"De Deo semel in vita dubitavi, juvenis undeviginti annorum, quum institutionibus theologicis operam darem; non diu post, Deo bene juvante, in viam reductus per Balduinum, qui ad Stellas, divinæ Mentis Testes et Præcones, me ablegaverat hoc versu: Sidera qui spectat, juret is esse Deum.

"A quo quidem tempore, animus ita flamma cælesti mihi ardet, ut (quod cum immortali honore nominis divini dixerim certus sim, *ὅτι οὔτε θάνατος, οὔτε ζωὴ, οὔτε ἄγγελοι, οὔτε ἀρχαὶ, οὔτε δυνάμεις, οὔτε ἐνεστῶτα, οὔτε μέλλοντα, οὔτε ὕψωμα, οὔτε βάθος, οὔτε τις κτίσις ἑτέρα δυνήσεταί με χώρισαι ἀπο τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.*—Amœnitates Philologicæ, tom. i. page 46.

stubborn to yield to the authority of mere opinion. There are, however, frequent instances of men who have been converted from lower degrees of infidelity; and if that conviction proceeded, not from the sudden alarms of their conscience, but the sober exercise of their judgment, the salutary effects of it were visible in their actions as well as their tenets. On the other hand, we see in too many instances the transition of the human mind from superstitious terrors to impious defiance, where the change is wrought hastily, where it is displayed ostentatiously, and followed by a rapid progress from pitiable or ridiculous imbecillity to the most odious and incorrigible depravity. The infidel transformed into the devotee may have more weaknesses, but he is in danger of fewer crimes, than the devotee transformed into the infidel.

Whatsoever may be the comparative merits or demerits of superstition, the utmost care, I grant, should be used in every stage of education to prevent its first approaches, and where it has unfortunately taken possession of the mind, great exertions, accompanied with great circumspection and tenderness, are necessary to efface its impressions from the imagination, and to slacken its hold upon the affections and passions. So fearfully, however, and so wonderfully are we made, so intricate are the associations of our ideas, such is the latent force of habit, and such, too, is sometimes the close connection between our virtues and our infirmities, that by attempting to remove all the errors of superstition indiscriminately and hastily, we may chance to loosen from their roots the best principles of the heart, and to check their fairest fruits ere they have arrived at maturity.

But, if a contrary experiment were made to destroy by argument the attachment of a man to atheism, and if, during the process, caution were used, neither to scare his imagination with superstition, nor to agitate his spirits with fanaticism, can it be supposed that the virtues which really accompanied his former conviction would be diminished; that his good sense would be crippled, that his philosophy would be shackled, that "his natural piety" would be relaxed, or that the "outward morality" produced by his obedience to laws, and his regard to reputation, would be impeded?

What, I would ask, are the general effects of superstition and atheism upon the happiness and the conduct of mankind? Superstition, it is granted, has many direct sorrows, but atheism has no direct joys. Superstition admits fear mingled with hope, but atheism, while it excludes hope, affords a very imperfect security against fear. Superstition is never exposed to the dreary vacuities in the soul, over which atheism is wont to brood in solitude and silence; but atheism is sometimes haunted by forebodings scarcely less confused, or less unquiet, than those by which superstition is annoyed. Superstition stands aghast at the punishments reserved for wicked men in another state; but atheism cannot disprove the possibility of such a state to all men, accompanied by consciousness, and fraught with evils equally dreadful in degree, and even in duration, with those punishments. Superstition has often preserved men from crimes; but atheism tends to protect them from weaknesses only. Superstition imposes fresh restraints upon the sensual appetites, though it may often let loose the malignant passions; but atheism takes away many restraints from those appetites, without throwing equal checks upon those passions, under many circumstances which may excite them in the minds of its votaries. Superstition is eager from a vicious excess of credulity, but atheism is often obstinate from an excess of incredulity, equally vicious. Superstition is sometimes docile from conscious weakness; but atheism is always haughty from real or supposed strength. Superstition errs, and perverts only in consequence of error; but atheism rejects, and, for the most part, disdains to examine after rejection. Superstition catches at appearances, but atheism starts back from realities. Superstition may, in some favourable moment, be awakened to the call of truth; but atheism is generally deaf to the voice of that "charmer, charm she ever so wisely."

When I read the Ἀμαξιαῖα ῥήματα of Lucretius and other antient atheists,—when I see them σαλακίζοντας καὶ ἀλαζονευομένους upon their superiority to popular prepossessions and vulgar terrors, I am sometimes led to suspect, that, like heroes who laugh at spectres by daylight, and shudder at them in the dark, they were struggling with inquietude, which they wished to conceal as well as to assuage, and endeavouring to collect that courage from the bustle of their words which they did not habitually feel

within the recesses of their hearts. My present concern, I am aware, is not with the speculative proofs, but with the moral effects of atheism. Yet, upon a question which, in the abstruser parts of it, is by a very wise man called "perdifficilis* et perobscura," and to the consideration of which, "omnes duce natura vehimur," we may, without the imputation of folly, venture to ask, whether the arguments against theism be such as usually to produce a steady assent and to warrant an unlimited affiance. Without the imputation of perverseness we may not be in haste to apply to the judgment of every atheist, what Taylor † says of the will, that, "like the magnetic needle, it was full of trembling and uncertainty ere it became fixed at its beloved point, wavered at first, because at first it doubted, and then was at rest, because it could doubt no more." After reaching that state of rest, atheism, indeed, may have the credit of rescuing a man from the agitations of delusive hopes, and the torments of groundless fears. But may it not destroy, at the same time, other fears which are very salutary in checking our fantastic desires, and in calming our turbulent resentments; and may it not extinguish other hopes too, which seem necessary to support the bulk of mankind in their passage through this vale of tears?

The mischiefs of superstition arise from the abuses of religion, which in the absence of those abuses is indisputably productive of good, in addition to all the other advantages we derive from our moral faculties. But atheism, however used, cannot on the whole be so good as religion, either to individuals or to communities; and in a being, subject, as man is, to so many starts of fancy, so many caprices of humour, so many wrong biasses from opinion, and so many blind impulses from passion, it leaves him defenceless against many evils. Compared with sound, clear, and enlarged notions of religion, can atheism be said to present to our minds so many delightful and magnificent views of nature? to furnish the poet with such a profusion of imagery, or the orator with so many topics of persuasion? to consecrate the social virtues by so many endearments to our affections, or to exalt our spirits to so many arduous atchievements of self-de-

* See Cicero De Natura Deum, lib. i.
† See Ductor Dubitant. p. 754.

nial, self-command, magnanimity, and forgiveness? Compared even with superstition under its milder aspects, does it supply so many incentives to virtue, so many restraints from vice, so many consolations under sorrow, or so many sources of reflection to heighten the very purest and most exquisite joys which terrestrial objects can bestow? The atheist, indeed, may cease to tremble at the idea of an invisible, irresistible, vindictive deity, in the howling storm, or the convulsive earthquake, or "when the moon, in dim eclipse, sheds disastrous twilight on half the nations." But he has, also, ceased to rely for protection upon that benevolent power which may shelter him "from the arrow that flieth by day, and from the pestilence that walketh in darkness." In truth, the tranquillity of which atheism boasts so loudly, and so lavishly, amounts only to exemption from pain, and that exemption is to be obtained by the loss of many pleasures.

According to the various temperament of men's minds, and the various events of their life, atheism is marked by various effects. Shall indifference be stated as the result of it? That indifference, as might easily be shewn from the hints of one celebrated author, and the sarcasms of another, will sometimes pass onward from speculation to action: it will loosen principles as well as prejudices, and reconcile its votaries to nameless impurities, from which the natural sentiments of mankind recoil, and of which the indirect but invariable tendency is, to obstruct the most useful duties, and to contaminate the sweetest comforts, of domestic life. Measuring its own high exploits with the credulity and weakness of the herd, has atheism produced contempt? Such, at least, is the present constitution of the human mind, that we are not apt to be very scrupulously just, nor very actively benevolent, in behalf of those whom we despise unfeignedly; and if the negligent or scornful disposition by which we are governed in our private transactions with other men should communicate itself to laws, and laws in their turn should re-act upon that disposition, precarious indeed is the protection which they would afford to the feeble against the strong, or to the honest against the cunning. This, however, is not the only instance in which atheism may be unfavourable to philanthrophy. Possible it is, as we know from recent facts, that atheism in some

cases may generate hatred; and where hatred has been so generated, there, in the conflicts of opinion against opinion, and interest against interest—in competition for power or fame—in appeals to the prepossessions or the pride of contending parties, the consequence of atheism would be a jealous, domineering, savage spirit of intolerance. Atheism thus would end where superstition has been said to begin; and in the tenets of atheism will be found not one of those correctives, which usually accompany the tenets of superstition. There is no eye to detect specious hypocrisy—no hand to curb successful wickednesses—no refuge from the partial or erroneous decisions of man, in the sentence of a judge, who is disinterested and infallible—no tribunal, before which the weak and unoffending may hereafter be permitted to plead "trumpet-tongued," against the oppressor—no avenger of calumniated innocence, insulted wisdom, and persecuted integrity.

In the ordinary course of human affairs, superstition, though it should pervade the mass of a people, has been experimentally found consistent with a state of society, not quite intolerable—with a wise and upright administration of laws—with the gradual improvement of individuals in rational religion—and with a gentle exercise even of absolute power. Where, indeed, superstition is not moved to and fro by the hidden springs of statecraft; where it is not united with a saturnine and revengeful temper; where it is not irritated by the acrimony of disputants; where it is not seduced by the inflammatory harangues of zealots, nor made infuriate by the contagion of popular rage, under such circumstances, I should grant that Plutarch's representation of it is not too favourable—*ἡ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀμαθῶν οὐ πάνυ μοχθηρῶν διάθεσις πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, ἔχει μὲν ἀμέλει τῷ σεβομένῳ καὶ τιμῶντι μεμιγμένον τινὰ σφυγμὸν καὶ φόβον, ᾗ καὶ δεισιδαιμονία κέκληται· μυριάκις δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι καὶ πλέον αὐτῇ τὸ εὔελπι καὶ περιχαρὲς, καὶ πᾶσαν εὐπραξίας ὄνησιν ὡς ἐκ θεῶν οὖσαν εὐχόμενον καὶ δεχόμενον.*—Vol. ii. page 1100. It should be observed, that in the passage which, in page 94, is quoted from Plutarch, he professedly speaks of that superstition which in the sentence immediately following he describes as *οὐ φοβεράν τινα, οὐδὲ σκυθρωπήν.*

They who attend to the distinction I would make between

moderate and excessive superstition will not be long perplexed by the seeming contradiction between the opinions of Plutarch, as delivered in his famous Treatise upon Superstition, and those which occur in the passages I have quoted from another part of his works. In the former, Plutarch sometimes assumes the strong language of the Stoics about the passions, and sometimes indulges himself in rhetorical exaggeration. But in the latter he preserves a more temperate and argumentative form of writing; and if his observations upon the practical effects of the Epicurean system be just, they may, with great propriety, and greater force, be applied to the malignant influence of modern atheism upon the morals and the welfare of mankind.

In the opening of the Treatise above-mentioned, Plutarch says, *ἅπασα μὲν ψευδὴς κρίσις ἀλλώς τε κἂν ᾖ περὶ ταῦτα*, (i. e. what relate to the Deity,) *μοχθηρὸν· τῇ δε*, (i. e. a wrong judgment accompanied by superstition,) *καὶ πάθος πρόσεστι μοχθηρότατον*.—Page 164. Afterwards he defines atheism and superstition according to the view which he was going to take of them respectively—*ἡ μὲν ἀθεότης λόγος ἐστὶ διεψευσμένος, ἡ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία, πάθος ἐκ λόγου ψευδοῦς ἐγγεγενημένον*.—Page 165. But the superstition * against which he inveighs as more odious and more pernicious than atheism, is a superstition rarely found even in kind, and yet more rarely in degree, among Christians; for it is a superstition which *ἀτόποις ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασι βαρβαρικοῖς καταισχύνει καὶ παρανομεῖ τὸ θεῖον καὶ πάτριον ἀξίωμα τῆς εὐσεβείας*, page 166; which *τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρχὴν ὡς τυραννίδα φοβεῖται σκυθρωπὴν καὶ ἀπαραίτητον*, page 166; which *οὐδὲ τολμᾷ βοηθεῖν οὐδὲ διαλύειν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς, οὐδὲ θεραπεύειν, οὐδὲ ἀντιτάττεθαι, μὴ δόξῃ θεομαχεῖν καὶ ἀντιτείνειν κολαζομένῃ·* page 168; which *ἐκταπεινοῖ καὶ συντρίβει τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἰόμενον εἶναι θεὸν, εἶναι δὲ βλαβερὸν, λυπηρὸν, ἔμπληκτον, ἄπιστον, εὐμετάβολον, τιμωρητικὸν, ὠμὸν, μικρόλυπον*, page 165, and 170. The atheism also, of which Plutarch speaks as less degrading to the human character, and less destructive of human happiness, than that superstition, is not the atheism of our own days, but an atheism which is merely *ψευδὴς ὑπόληψις, ἀλλ' ἕλκος οὐ*

* Plutarch in several passages seems to allude to Oriental superstitions, and sometimes to Jewish.

ποιοῦσα, οὐδὲ σφυγμὸν, οὐδὲ ὀδύνην παράττουσαν· page 164; that which is merely ἀκίνητος πρὸς τὸ θεῖον· page 170; that in which τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν τὸν θεὸν, τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, page 165. Adverting, probably, to such superstition in its most hideous form, and to such atheism in its least offensive, Lord Bacon tells us, "It were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of him; for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely, and certainly superstition is a reproach of the Deity."—Essay xiii. in which Bacon often refers to the Treatise of Plutarch. Yet the same great philosopher informs us in Essay xvii. "I had rather believe all the follies in the Legends, the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind."

The remarks of Fabricius upon Plutarch are very judicious: Sane atheismum quemlibet in se superstitione quacunque meliorem esse, nemo sanus dixerit: neque hoc usquam facit Plutarchus, qui contrarium disertis verbis docet libro, "quod non suaviter possit vivi secundum Epicurum."—P. 1101 and 1104. Cum enim et superstitio et atheismus ambo res sint pessimæ et turpissimæ, et superstitionis præsertim quodam modo innumerabiles sint gradus, saltem non fert Plutarchus eos qui atheismum faciunt ἀπολόγημα δεισιδαιμονίας, ut loquitur libro "de discrimine amici et adulatoris."—P. 66. Dantur etiam genera quædam superstitionis tam flagitiosa, ut in Deum æque injuria sint quam atheismus ipse, et gravius bellum etiam indicant honestati, virtuti, et societati humanæ, non quam atheismus universe ex principiis suis deducens consecutiones omnes, malitiamque illam exserens, sed, quam atheismus nonnullorum hominum in sola speculatione falsissime acquiescentium, et naturæ bonitate non admittentium errorem hunc in actiones suas integrum influere.—Vide Bib. Græca, lib. iv. p. 351. edit. Hamburg. 1708.

As to the passage which Fabricius has cited from Bodinus, a good man may hesitate before he gives unqualified assent to the first position, Superstitio quantacunque sit, quovis atheismo tolerabilior est. Experience, however, to a very great degree confirms the justness of the next observation, Nam qui superstitione aliqua obligatur, hunc numinis metu in officio quodam modo, et naturæ legibus continet. Atheum vero, qui nihil nisi restim

metuit aut judicem, ad omnia scelera proclivi lapsu ruere oportet. The following remark is founded upon the principles of the soundest philosophy: At tametsi actionum humanarum præstantiam sapientissimus quisque non solum finibus ipsis metitur, verumetiam omnibus partibus et causis, scilicet, efficienti formâ, subjecto fine, summam tamen et præcipuam causam omnium actionum ipso fine dijudicat.—Bodin. Colloq. Heptaplomere MS. Libro v.

Happy were it for the advocates of modern atheism, if they seriously considered the conclusion of that Treatise which has been supposed to favour their cause: *φευκτέον οὖν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἀσφαλώς τε καὶ συμφερόντως, οὐχ ὅσπερ οἱ λῃστῶν καὶ θηρίων ἔφοδον, ἢ πῦρ ἀπεριοσκέπτως καὶ ἀλογίστως περιφεύγοντες, ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς ἀνοδίας βάραθρα καὶ κρημνοὺς ἐχούσας· οὕτως γὰρ ἔνιοι φεύγοντες τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς ἀθεότητα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπηδήσαντες ἐν μέσῳ κειμένην τὴν εὐσέβειαν.*—Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 171.

Upon the various effects of superstition, where it has spread widely and thriven long, we can reason from facts. But in the original frame of the human mind, and in the operations of all those moral causes which regulate our conduct, or affect our happiness, there seems to be a most active, constant, and invincible principle of resistance to the encroachments of atheism. "All nature cries aloud" against them, "through all her works," not in speculation only, but in practice.

Much, I know, has been said ingeniously by Bayle; and, in opposition to Bayle, much has been said yet more ingeniously by Warburton, about the comparative mischiefs of atheism and superstition. But I bless Heaven, that by the moral constitution of our nature, no experiments ever have been made, which may enable us to calculate precisely the aggregate of evils, that would arise from the permanent influence of atheism. Enough have we seen of its activity, of its subtlety, of its malignity, as a temporary, a concurrent, perhaps a predominant cause, in the crimes and miseries of mankind; enough, I say, have we seen, to shrink with horror from the possible repetition of such events; and to execrate that innovator who, in the blindness of infatuation, or the hardihood of wickedness, should exclaim of a national constitution, facilitated by such events, "esto perpetua."

In a neighbouring country it has already sunk into decay. There it wanted alike the simplicity of nature and the graces of art. It was bulky without solidity, elaborate without symmetry, and lofty without magnificence. It seized, indeed, the attention of a spectator, by the vastness of its dimensions and the novelty of its form; and it impressed him with momentary awe, because it stood upon ruins. But it had no foundation in the common sense of men, no superstructure from their general habits, no cement from their nobler affections, no embellishments from their unperverted imaginations, nor pillars from their social virtues. It started up, but to vanish—it towered, but to fall—and it has fallen, I sincerely hope, to rise no more.

Atheism, thus brought from theory to the test of experiment, has exposed to the world the brittleness of its materials and the clumsiness of its workmanship. It may deface, but cannot adorn—it may mutilate, but cannot even repair—it may pluck down the labours of others, but cannot preserve its own. Under such an architect, even "the pillared firmament would be rottenness, and earth's base built on stubble."—Milton's Comus.

The want of durability, about which I am now speaking, is doubtless a circumstance highly favourable to the happiness of mankind. So far, however, as we can argue to the future from the past, it were not difficult to conjecture some of the consesequences that would issue from the very wide dissemination and the very long continuance of atheism. What then are those consequences? I answer, without hesitation—they are unblushing profligacy, unprincipled selfishness, and unrelenting cruelty.

These are the consequences which I should forebode in private life; and, in public, I should look for conspiracy without unanimity, energy without constancy, success without security, and popularity without glory, to be quickly followed by irretrievable ruin and indelible disgrace.

Are not the scenes in which such evils have existed partially, but glaringly, intended for our admonition? Yes, surely. Those scenes may teach individuals to suspect the soundness, and the innocence, too, of every theory which aims at the destruction of all the received opinions, and all the established usages, which mankind have been accustomed to respect. They may farther animate the members of religious societies to clear

away those impurities which flow from superstition, and furnish occasions for cavil and misrepresentation to the champions of infidelity—to renounce, in their actions as well as in their professions, every claim of spiritual domination over the consciences of men; to remove every palpable error from their doctrines; to rectify every grosser abuse in their discipline; and thus to exhibit religion under that pure and lovely form in which we trace at once the characters of cultivated reason and of heavenly inspiration.

In this earthly state, where happiness as well as virtue will always be imperfect, shocks will now and then be felt, by the force of which both civil and religious establishments may be shaken to their centre. Amidst the fury of those storms, which in all ages have been permitted to disturb the political sky, and of which the ultimate effects, under the providence of God, may be as beneficial in the moral world as those of earthquakes and hurricanes are thought to be in the natural, the stately palace, the lofty throne, the hallowed temple itself, may be "laid low, even to the ground." But though "the rains should descend," though "the floods should roll," and though "the winds should blow," the Word which came down from heaven can never fail.

When such is my conviction as to the security and final success of Christianity against its most formidable assailants, must I not feel at least an equal degree of confidence for the ultimate prevalence of those proofs which relate to the existence of a God? Most assuredly I do.

Attempts have, indeed, been made by philosophers to undermine those proofs, by scoffers to debase them, and by political upstarts to overthrow them. Through the artifices and violences of these innovators, the law of natural religion has been opposed, but not destroyed; and the light of it, too, has for a season been darkened, but not, I trust, extinguished for ever.

Upon the philosophical merits of those opinions which have lately gone abroad to the prejudice of theism, my conviction has been strengthened by the observations of that sound and judicious philosopher whose writings have been already mentioned in this note. "It is not merely," says he, "in order to free the mind from the influence of error, that it is useful to examine the foundation of established opinions. It is such an examination

alone that, in an inquisitive age like the present, can secure a philosopher from the danger of unlimited scepticism. To this extreme, indeed, the complexion of the times is more likely to give him a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the former ages of ignorance and superstition, the intimate association which had been formed, in the prevailing systems of education, between truth and error, had given an ascendant over the minds of men, which it never could have acquired if divested of such an alliance. The case has of late years been most remarkably reversed: the common sense of mankind, in consequence of the growth of a more liberal spirit of inquiry, has revolted against many of those absurdities which had so long held human reason in captivity; and it was, perhaps, more than could be reasonably expected, that in the first moments of their emancipation philosophers should have stopped short at the precise boundary which cooler reflection and more moderate views would have prescribed. The fact is, that they have passed far beyond it; and that, in their zeal to eradicate prejudices, they have attempted to tear up by the roots many of the best and happiest and essential principles of our nature. Having remarked the wonderful influence of education over the mind, they have concluded that man is wholly a factitious being; not recollecting that this very susceptibility of education presupposes certain original principles which are common to the whole species; and that, as error can only take a permanent hold of a candid mind by being grafted on truths which it is unwilling or unable to eradicate, even the influence which false and absurd opinions occasionally acquire over the belief, instead of being an argument for universal scepticism, is the most decisive argument against it; inasmuch as it shews that there are some truths so incorporated and identified with our nature, that they can reconcile us even to the absurdities and contradictions with which we suppose them to be inseparably connected. The sceptical philosophers, for example, of the present age, have frequently attempted to hold up to ridicule those contemptible and puerile superstitions which have disgraced the creeds of some of the most enlightened nations, and which have not only commanded the assent but the reverence of men of the most accomplished understandings. But these histories of human imbecillity are

in truth, the strongest testimonies which can be produced to prove how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental principles of morality over the belief, when they are able to sanctify, in the apprehensions of mankind, every extravagant opinion, and every unmeaning ceremony, which early education has taught us to associate with them."

If then the belief of a Deity be, as perhaps it is, one of those κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι* which are said to be engraven on the heart of

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* "I come now to consider of those rational instincts, as I call them, the innate principles engraven in the human soul; which, though they are truths acquirable and deducible by rational consequence and argumentation, yet they seem to be inscribed in the very *crasis* and texture of the soul, antecedent to any acquisition by the industry or the exercise of the discursive faculty in man; and therefore they may be well called anticipations, pre-notions, or sentiments characterized and engraven in the soul, born with it, and growing up with it, till they receive a check by ill customs or educations, or an improvement and advancement by the due exercise of the faculties. I shall shew first what they are; secondly, what moves me to think that such are connatural.

1. "Touching the former, I think those implanted and connatural anticipations are these; namely, that there is a God, that he is of greatest power, wisdom, goodness, and perfection; that he is pleased with good and displeased with evil; that he is placable; that he is to be feared, honoured, loved, worshipped, and obeyed; that he will reward the good and punish the evil; a secret sentiment of the immortality of the soul, or that it survives the body to be capable of rewards and punishments according to its deportment in this life; certain common notions of moral good and evil, of decorum and turpe; that faith and promises are to be kept; that a man must do as he would be done by; that a man must be grateful for benefit received. These and some such common notions, or intimate propensions, seem to be connaturally engraven in the soul, antecedently to any discursive ratiocination; and though they are not so distinct and explicit, yet they are secret biasses inclining the humane nature primarily to what is useful and convenient for it, in proportion to the state of an intellectual nature."—Hale, De Homine, p. 60.

Mr. Locke probably would have refused his assent to Lord Hale's position. "The name of God," says Mr. Locke, "being once mentioned in any part of the world to express a superior,

man; if (to change the metaphor) it be a sentiment, which, though it does not always produce a full harvest of virtue, seldom fails at least to check the ranker weeds of vice; if it be a sentiment which superstition by its foulest infections cannot quite corrupt, nor infidelity by its mightiest efforts can quite extirpate; a sentiment which recurs to our minds upon every survey we take of the operations of nature, and every reflection we employ upon the only cause which can sustain and regulate them; a senti-

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powerful, wise, invisible being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide, and continue it down to all generations; though yet the general reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady notions, conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they who made the discovery, had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other less considering people, having once received so important a notion, it could not easily be lost again." —See Locke upon the Understanding, book first, chap. iv. paragraph 10.

Though we should grant to Mr. Locke, "That the Deity has stamped no original characters on our minds," and though it ought to be granted to him, "That our idea of a most perfect being is not the sole proof of God," yet we must remember what he says in book iv. chap. x. "It is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God than there is anything else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that as we do to several other enquiries."

As to Mr. Locke's opinion about the origin of our ideas, I would refer the reader to chapter the first, section the fourth, of Stewart's Elements. And in respect to the dispute about the source of our notions of a God, I am inclined to say with Mosheim, "Crediderim fere, si diligenter discutiantur omnia quæ de notione Dei, utrùm adventitia sit, an verò innata, inter viros doctos disputantur, resque potius quàm verba et vocabula, ponderentur, minùs de hac re dissentionis fore, quàm videtur multis."—Mosheim's Notes upon Cudworth, vol. ii. p. 137.

ment which rushes upon us irresistibly, when we gaze upon the goodly face of the earth, explore the depths of the ocean, and look up to the firmament of heaven; then, doubtless, the artifices of crafty sophists, the recantations of apostate priests, the rhapsodies of rhetorical babblers, and all the clamours of ruffians loaded with pillage and reeking with blood, never have been nor ever will be of sufficient efficacy to obliterate such a sentiment from the minds of a whole people. Disgusted we may have been with so much arrogance as we have lately witnessed; we may have been provoked at so much profligacy; we may stand amazed and confounded at so much audacity, combined with so much ferocity; but the wisdom of God, we should remember, often finds the instruments of his righteous though unsearchable purposes in the follies and in the crimes of man.

So imperfect is our acquaintance with the symbols which savages employ to express their ideas, that, without impeaching the veracity, we may sometimes doubt the correctness, of travellers, whose wish, it may be, was rather to surprise than to deceive their readers. Nations, however, I would grant, there may have been a few,* so immersed in barbarism and ignorance as not to have invented or adopted any rites, however uncouth, for the duties of religion; or to have formed any notions, however indistinct, of an invisible and most powerful Being, to whom adoration is to be paid.

But wheresoever a Deity has been once known, where his existence and his attributes have been explored by philosophical researches into causes and effects, where his will has been collected, however imperfectly, from the moral constitution of the world,

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* See Mr. Locke's book i. chap. iv. paragraph 9, of his Essay on the Human Understanding, where he speaks of barbarous nations that have no idea of a God. It were easy to produce instances of other nations from later travellers than Sir Thomas Roe. The idea of a God, of which Mr. Locke speaks, is very different from the notion of one God, which has been historically and philosophically investigated with great erudition and great judgment by Meiners, in his work De Vero Deo. "The Indians of the West," says Bacon, "have names for their particular Gods, but they have no name for God."—Essay 17.

or announced authoritatively by his sacred word, where the worship of him has been recognised by traditions, customs, and laws, where his name has been pronounced with reverence, where his altars have been adorned with the free-will offerings of a grateful and an humble spirit, where his temples have resounded with hymns of praise, where his wrath has been deprecated, his favour implored, and his agency felt, as it were, in prosperity or adversity—among such a people, there never has been a complete, universal, instantaneous bound from habitual belief and habitual piety into unbelief and impiety upon principle; nor among such a people will there ever be an unlimited range of action, and a continued succession of triumphs, to the dark and chilling subtleties of scepticism, or to the wild and daring dogmas of atheism. Why then should we be dismayed?

"Mighty are the waves of the sea, and rage horribly."—But in Heaven above and in the earth beneath, and in the water under the earth, a voice there is FAR MIGHTIER.

NOTE 77, p. 388.

"The consequent of this discourse," says Jeremy Taylor, "in order to conscience is, that no man lose his peace concerning the controverted articles and disputes of Christendom. If he inquires after truth earnestly, as after things of great concernment; if he prays to God to assist, and uses those means which are in his hand, and are his best for the finding it; if he be indifferent to any proposition, and loves it not for any consideration but because he thinks it true; if he will quit any interest rather than lose a truth; if he dares own what he hath found and believed; and if he loves it so much the more, by how much he believes it more conducing to piety and the honour of God; he hath done what a good and a wise man should do; he needs not regard what any man threatens, nor fear God's anger, when a man of another sect threatens him with damnation; for, he that heartily endeavours to please God, and searches what his will is that he may obey it, certainly loves God, and nothing that loves God can perish.—Ductor Dubitantium, p. 755, 4th edit.

NOTE 78, p. 388.

"Presque partout," says even M. Helvetius, (p. 167, de l'Esprit,) "l'Evangile, les Apôtres, et les Pères prêchent la Douceur et la Tolérance." He then gives instances from St. Paul, St. Chrysostom, St. Basil, and St. Augustin. But where should we find a nobler lesson for the candour which is truly Christian, than in the language in which St. Augustin addresses the Manicheans, in whose errors he had himself been once involved! I will give the whole passage, as I find it quoted by Grotius de Jure Bell. et Pac. lib. ii. cap. xx. "Illi sæviant in vos, qui nesciunt quo cum labore verum inveniatur, et quàm difficile caveantur errores. Illi in vos sæviant, qui nesciunt quàm rarum et arduum sit carnalia phantasmata piæ mentis serenitate superare. Illi in vos sæviant, qui nesciunt quantâ difficultate sanetur oculus interioris hominis, ut possit intueri solem suum. Illi in vos sæviant, qui nesciunt quantis gemitibus et suspiriis fiat ut ex quantulacunque parte possit intelligi Deus. Postremo illi in vos sæviant qui nullo tali errore decepti sunt, quali vos deceptos vident. Ego autem sævire in vos omnino non possum, quos sicut me ipsum illo tempore, ita nunc debeo sustinere, et tantâ patientiâ vobiscum agere, quantâ mecum egerunt proximi mei, cùm in vestro dogmate rabiosus et cæcus errarem."

Oh! that "these words were written on the tablet" of every Christian heart!—That "they were printed" in every book of religious controversy, "that they were graven with an iron pen and lead in the rock for ever!"—Job xix. 23, 24.

NOTE 79, p. 389.

"It was an old trick of the Jewish zeal,"

> "Non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti,
> Quæsitum ad fontem solos deducere verpos."
>
> Juvenal, xiv. 104.

"They would not shew the way to a Samaritan, nor give a cup of cold water but to a circumcised brother. That was their zeal." —Taylor, Sermon xiv. p. 136.

NOTE 80, p. 389.

I am now very near the conclusion of my notes on the first head, and I shall be glad to convince the reader how much the opinions defended in it resemble those of Barrow.

"The good man doth not plant his bounty in one small hole, or spout it on one narrow spot; but with an open hand disseminates it; with an impartial regard distils it all about. He stints it not to his own family or relations; to his neighbours, or friends, or benefactors; to those of his own sect and opinion, or of his humour and disposition; to such as serve him or oblige him, or please him; whom some private interest ties, or some particular affection endears him to; but scatters it indifferently and continually towards all men that need it, towards mere strangers; yea, towards known enemies, towards such as never did him any good, or can be able to do him any; yea, towards those who have done evil to him, and, may be presumed, ready to do more; nothing in his neighbour but absence of need, nothing in himself but defect of ability, doth exist or live in his obedience! In that *προθυμία*, that proclivity and promptitude of mind which St. Paul speaketh of, he doeth good every where; wherever a man is, there is room for his wishing well, and doing good, if he can: he observes that rule of the Apostle, as we have opportunity, let us do good unto all men."—Vol. i. p. 423.

NOTE 81, p. 390.

In Barrow's Sermon, just now quoted, there is a passage quoted from Chrysostom, which is exactly to my purpose: *εἂν ἴδῃς τινὰ κακῶς πάσχοντα μηδὲν περιεργάζου λοιπὸν· ἔχει τὸ δικαίωμα τῆς βοηθείας, τὸ κακῶς παθεῖν αὐτὸν.* ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ *ἐστὶ κᾷν Ἕλλην, κᾷν Ἰουδαῖος.*—Chrysostom in Hebrews, Orat x.

NOTE 82, p. 390.

Aristotle, I remember, in his Topics, gravely recommends the argument from authority, and, in truth, there are circumstances in which authority must be allowed to supply the place of doubt-

ful and imperfect reasoning. The reader may, if he pleases, pass by what Aristotle says upon so trite a subject. But, as the passage occurred to me, I shall produce it without laying any great stress upon it. "Παρασημαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἑκάστων δόξας, οἷον ὅτι Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τέτταρά φησι τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα. εἶναι θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ ὑπό τινος εἰρημένον ἐνδόξον."—Top. lib. i. p. 189.

NOTE 83, p. 390.

The passages I have quoted from M. Turgot may be found in article I. of the Appendix to his Life, containing a translation of the article Foundation, which had been inserted before by M. Turgot, in the French Encyclopedia. The Life was written by M. Condorcet. I have only the translation of it, which was published in London in the year 1787. My opinion about M. Turgot, and his more judicious and temperate associates, corresponds in kind and degree with that of Mr. Dugald Stewart, as it may be found occasionally, in chapters 4th, 5th, and 6th, of his Elements of Philosophy.

NOTE 84, p. 390.

While I was writing these notes, a subject of no ordinary importance struck me unexpectedly; and if I drop some remarks upon it, the reader, who looks attentively and seriously on these eventful times, will, I hope, pardon the digression. With a small expenditure of ingenuity in the vulgar and mischievous arts of exaggeration and perversion, several of M. Turgot's arguments may be applied to the prejudice of our English Universities. This, I am aware, is not precisely the fittest opportunity for me to enter into a formal defence of them, or to expatiate upon their peculiar and indisputable advantages,—upon those powerful correctives of singularity and frowardness which are found in the attrition of mind against mind on a spot where different classes live together under a system of general discipline,—upon the force of established rules in producing early habits of regularity and decorum,—upon the strong though easy yoke that is thrown over the impetuosity of youth,—upon the salutary influence among well-informed and well-disposed young men, of that

ὁμηλικία which is so beautifully described, and so frequently extolled by the writers of antiquity,—upon the propensity of the heart unassailed by care, and untainted by selfishness, to form the best friendships from the best motives,—upon the generous sense of shame that must prevail among enlightened equals observing the conduct of equals, and cultivating honour, not as a showy and artificial fashion, but as a natural sentiment, and even as an indispensable duty,—upon the goodly effects that are wrought on the temper as well as taste, by the daily and hourly view of edifices, agreeable from convenience, or striking from magnificence, or venerable from antiquity,—upon the desire which pictures, statues, inscriptions, public harangues, and other local circumstances, may excite in men of vivid conceptions and glowing ambition, not merely to admire but to perpetuate and to share in the celebrity of places adorned through many successive ages by many bright luminaries of the schools, the pulpit, the bar, and the senate,—upon the tendency of well-regulated amusements, and well-directed studies, to plant within our bosoms those attachments to the seat of our education, which may afterwards expand into the love of our country,—upon the facility of access to well-stored libraries,—upon the efficacy of oral instruction, judiciously and diligently communicated,—upon the competitions that will arise among numbers, whose judgments on the qualifications of each other are too frequent to be eluded, too impartial to be resisted, and too weighty to be slighted,—upon the institution of prizes for compositions to be recited in the Halls of Colleges, or the Theatres of the Universities,—upon the distribution of literary distinctions in seasons of general examination,—or, upon the connection of other academical rewards, lucrative or honorary, with moral and intellectual excellence. Waving, therefore all such pertinent and interesting topics, I would only request that the usefulness of these seminaries, like that of every human institution, may be judged by their fruits.

If any intelligent admirer of M. Turgot had met, as on a tour to Cambridge it was my good fortune last year to meet, with so many persons of various condition, of polished taste, of profound science, of masculine sense, of unaffected manners, and of spirits elevated without haughtiness, independent without turbulence, and liberal without latitudinarianism, he might have felt, as I did,

a momentary relief from that inquietude which the present condition of the civilized world must inflict upon every man of reflection, and perhaps he would have joined with me in exclaiming,—

> Dii patrii, quorum semper sub numine Troja est,
> Non tamen omnino Teucros delere paratis,
> Cum tales animos juvenum, et tam certa tulistis
> Pectora. Æneid 9th.

Let me add, that I have often experienced a similar effect in conversation with many wise and worthy members of the Sister University.

But why should a point of such magnitude as the credit of Oxford and Cambridge stand only on the testimony of an individual to the facts which he has seen within the circle of his own immediate acquaintance? As to the merits of men, ingenious, learned, eminently great, or exemplarily good, who in past ages have gone forth from these retreats into the bosom of society, "pleni sunt omnes libri, plena exemplorum vetustas." But even in later times the torpor of old age has not crept upon them, the sorceries of indolence have not enfeebled them, the poison of luxury has not corrupted them, the foul mists of barbarism have not gathered over them, the dim and baleful light of superstition has not glimmered around them, the portentous meteors of infidelity have not glared upon them, the merciless tempest of desolation has not yet swept them away. No. For among the academics who, during my own life, have been distinguished by classical, oriental, theological, or mathematical knowledge, by professional skill, or by parliamentary abilities, I with triumph recollect the names of

Archbishops Herring, Secker, Newcome, and Markham; of Bishops Hoadley, Sherlock, Lowth, Hurd, Pearce, Newton, Edmund Law, Philip Yonge, Ross, Squire, Ellys, Shipley, Horne, Bagot, Moss, Douglas, Watson, Halifax, Porteus, Horsley, Cleaver, Randolph, Pretyman, Beadon, Pococke, John Law, Bennett, and Percy; of Dr. S. Johnson, *τοῦ τῇ ῥώμῃ, καὶ ἰσχυι, καὶ τόνῳ "αἰὲν ἀριστεύσαντος"* of the late Dr. Warton, Mr. Thomas Warton, Mr. Spence, Dr. Farmer, Mr. G. Steevens, Mr. Upton, Mr. Uvedale Price, Dr. Zachary Gray, Mr. Jackson of Leicester,

Dr. Clarke of Chichester, Mr. Bowyer the printer, Dr. Charles Ashton, of Jesus College, Cambridge; Dr. Taylor, editor of Demosthenes; Dr. Jortin, Mr. Mudge, Dr. Galley, Dr. Adam Askew, Dr. Jurin, Dr. Salter, and Mr. Mann, of the Charter-house, Dr. Hartley, Dr. Conyers Middleton, Orator Tunstall; of Sir William Jones, a man who was raised far above his contemporaries, et naturâ admirabili, et exquisitâ doctrinâ, et singulari industriâ, (vide Cic. in Brut. p. 138.) Mr. Bryant, Mr. Halhed, Mr. Costard, Mr. Swinton, Mr. Richardson the oriental Lexicographer, Dr. Joseph White, Dr. Hunt, late of Christ Church; Mr. Carlyle, Dr. Kennicott, Dr. Sandford, of Baliol; Dr. Thomas Shaw; of Richard Dawes, Richard Porson, *τοῦ πάνυ θαυμαστοῦ·* of Dr. Musgrave, Mr. Tyrwhit, Mr. Toup, Mr. Merrick, Dr. N. Forster, editor of Plato's Dialogues; Dr. Charles Burney, *τοῦ κριτικωτάτου καὶ πολυμαθεστάτου·* Dr. Rowth, *τοῦ ἑταίρου ἐμοῦ φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου·* Dr. Winstanley, Dr. Huntingford, Mr. Wakefield *τοῦ θιλοπόνου, φιλολόγου, καὶ φιλελευθέρου·* Mr. Burgess, Mr. George Glasse, Mr. Whiter, Mr. Harris of Salisbury, Mr. Horne Tooke, Mr. Weston, author of Hermesianax, Mr. R. P. Joddrell, Mr. E. Poore, Mr. W. Seward, Dr. Edwards late of Coventry, Dr. Edwards, jun. of Jesus College, Cambridge; Mr. Parkhurst, Dr. Sharpe, late of the Temple; Dr. Rennell, Dr. Blaney, Dr. Holmes, Dr. Wheeler, late of Christ Church; Dr. Cyril Jackson, Dr. William Jackson, Mr. Sawkins, Mr. Lowth, and Mr. Rennell of Winchester; Mr. Howes of Norwich, *τοῦ Δηλίου κολυμβητοῦ·* of Mr. Rowth of Beccles, Mr. Twining of Colchester, *τοῦ Ἀττικωτάτου·* of Dr. Philip Barton, Mr. Falconer, Mr. Abraham Tucker of Merton, Archdeacon Chapman, Mr. Robert Parr, my revered uncle, Dr. Morell, Dr. Battie, Dr. Barford, Dr. John Burton of Eton, Dr. Ashton and Dr. Lyne of ditto, Dr. Hallam, the late Mr. E. Chamberlayne, Sir J. Macdonald and Mr. G. Balley, of Mr. Daniel Gaches, the late Messrs. David and G. Graham; of Mr. Hare, the late Drs. Barnard and Roberts of Eton, Dr. Davies, Dr. Benjamin and Dr. George Heath, Mr. Goodall of Eton, the late Dr. John Sumner and Dr. Cooke, Provosts of King's, Mr. William Cooke of ditto; the late Dr. Sumner of Harrow, my beloved instructor, guide, and friend; the late Dr. Burton of Winchester, Mr. Woodison of Kingston, Dr. Bateman of Sedborough, Mr. Templeman of Richmond, Mr. P. Whalley of Christ's Hospital,

London; of Dr. Vincent of Westminster; the late Dr. Crusius, Drs. Beardmore and Raine of the Charterhouse, Mr. Butler of Shrewsbury, Dr. V. Knox of Tunbridge, Dr. James, late Master of Rugby, Dr. Valpy of Reading; of Mr. Bennett Langton, Dr. Shaw of the Museum, Drs. Chandler and Shaw of Magdalen * College, Oxford; Mr. Orator Crowe of Oxford, Dr. Parsons of Baliol, Mr. Hollwell and Mr. Pett of Christ Church; Mr. Mitford, the elegant and learned Historian of the History of Greece, Professor Martyn, Dr. Symonds, Professor of Modern History, Cambridge; Dr. Seale, the late Dr. Zouch, Mr. Robert Smith of King's, τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ, καὶ δεινότητι, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ εὐδοκιμοῦντος; of Mr. Freer and the late Mr. Brundish of Caius College; the late Messrs. Cowper and Tyson of Bennet College, the late Henry Horner of Emanuel, the late John Tweddel of Trinity College, Cambridge:

"Multis ille bonis flebilis occidit,
Nulli flebilior quàm mihi."

Of Messrs. Losche, Lambert, Ramsden, Matthias, and the late John Baynes of ditto, Mr. Malthus of Jesus College, Cambridge: Mr. Green of Ipswich, Mr. Guard and Dr. Williams of Corpus, Mr. Fellowes of Oriel, Messrs. Hooley, Phillip Smith, and Hamley of New College, the late Mr. Benwell, of Trinity College, Oxford, Mr. Nares of the Museum; of Messrs. William Beloe, Thomas Maurice, Henry Headly, Edward Maltby, Thomas Monroe, Dr. Martin Davy, and Sir Thomas Rivers, my worthy and accomplished pupils; of Mr. Wise, Mr. Swinton, Mr. Watson, Dr. Pettingale, Mr. Whitaker, Mr. Gough, Mr. Gale, Mr. Cole, Mr. J. Brand, Dr. G. King, Dr. Lort, Mr. Borlace, Mr. Edward King, Dean Milles, Dr. Pegge, Mr. Watson, Dr. Stukeley, Mr. E. Lye, Mr. D. Barrington, Bishop Lyttelton, the learned Antiquaries; of the late Dr. Stephen Hales, Mr. G. Harvest, Dr. G. Fothergill, Mr. Seed, Archdeacons Sharpe and Ibbetson, Dr. Balguy, Dr. Brown of Newcastle, Dr. Owen, Dr. Randolph of Corpus College, Dr. Richard Grey, Dr. Townson, Archdeacon Totty, Dr. Gloster Ridley, Dr. Hall, Chaplain to Archbishop Secker, Dr. Adams and Mr. Griffiths of Pembroke College, Oxford; Dean Tucker, Mr.

* I have not intentionally omitted any name which appeared to me worthy of being inserted: but I am aware, that the better memory, or the fuller information of other men, may enable them to enlarge the list.

Town, Mr. Jones of Nayland, Samuel and John Wesley, Mr. Harvey, Drs. Powell, Ogden, and Rutherforth, of St. John's, Cambridge, Mr. Hubbard of Emanuel, my venerable tutor, Archdeacon Blackburne, Dr. John Jebb; of Dr. Sturges of Winchester, Mr. Wintle of Pembroke College, Oxford; Dr. Manwaring, Margaret Professor, Cambridge; Dr. Bell of Westminster, Dr. Hay of Sidney College, Dr. Craven and Mr. Gisburne of St. John's, Cambridge; Dr. Paley, *τοῦ καθαροῦ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, καὶ σαφοῦς, καὶ συνετοῦ*; Mr. Marsh, the very learned editor of Michaelis, Messrs. Hall, Kett, Grey, and Richards, Bampton Lecturers; of the late Mr. Gray, Mr. West, Mr. Neville, Mr. Mason, Mr. Shenstone, Dr. Edward Young, Lord G. Lyttleton, Messrs. Churchill, Lloyd, Anstie, Bowles, Coleridge, Sotherby, Hotter, Woodhull, Pye, Duncombe, Francis, Franklin, Fawkes, Hole, Dunster, Christopher Pitt, William Whitehead, and Giffard; of the late Dr. Smith and Mr. Jones, of Trinity College, Cambridge; Professors Waring, Vince, and Mr. Manning, of Cambridge; Dr. Milner, of Queen's College, Cambridge; Mr. Robinson, Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford; of Sir George Baker, Dr. Heberden, the late Sir Clifton Wintringham, Dr. Warren, Dr. Beddoes, Dr. Plumptree, Dr. Lawrence, the learned friend of Dr. Samuel Johnson; of the late Lord Mansfield, Lord Thurlow, Judge Blackstone; the late Mr. Charles Yorke, the late Judge Wilson, Lord Eldon, Sir William Scott, *τοῦ βαθύφρονος καὶ σώφρονος*, Sir William Wynne, Dr. Lawrence, of the Commons, Mr. Bentham, Professor Woddeson, Mr. Erskine, *τοῦ ἀφόδρα ἐναργοῦς, καὶ ἡδέος, καὶ αὐξητικοῦ, καὶ πιστικοῦ*; of Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Gibbs, Serjeant Lens, the late Felix Vaughan; of the late Lords Chesterfield, Chatham, Guildford, and Orford; the Duke of Grafton, Lord Holland, the Marquis Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, the late Charles Townsend, Mr. Windham, Mr. Canning, Mr. Addington, the Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Grey, Mr. Pitt, and my illustrious and amiable friend Mr. Fox.

Surely, in such men we have "a cloud of witnesses," when we are pleading for "the excellency of our strength, and the joy of our glory." Their pursuits, indeed, are not similar, nor their talents equal. Some instruct, and others please. Some excel in solidity of judgment, and others in splendour of imagination.

Some are known by their eloquence, others by their writings, and a few, perhaps, have been content to exercise their powers only in academical contests, or literary conversation. But they have all obtained distinction among their contemporaries, and many of them will attract the admiration of posterity.

I have thrown together the foregoing names of academical worthies as they occurred to me, *per lancem saturam*, and yet they have enough of the *εὐσύνοπτον* to warrant me in applying, with a small alteration, to the places where they were educated, much of that distinct and appropriate praise which Cicero bestowed upon Athens, as "omnium fere doctrinarum inventrices, ubi dicendi vis scribendique, vel reperta est, vel perfecta."

From the sincere, the ardent, the anxious regard which I bear to both Universities, I have sometimes wished to see a few alterations admitted into our academical studies, and perhaps in both of them might be pointed out academical men who are capable of planning those alterations with wisdom, and of conducting them with full and visible effect. Such men will not be wholly inattentive to the profound and comprehensive observations which Lord Bacon has made in his second book upon the Advancement of Learning (vide vol. ii. of his Works, p. 452), and probably they will have the satisfaction to find in many instances, that the objections of this great man have been removed, either by the improvements which have been happily adopted since his time in our Universities, or by the studies which are successfully prosecuted in the Capital, in Manchester, and several other large towns of this kingdom. They will pardon me, however, for saying with Bacon, that "Learning would be much advanced if there were more intelligence mutual between the Universities of Europe than there now is." Upon other points, as Bacon says, from Cæsar's letter to Oppius, "nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt, de quibus rogo eos, ut cogitationem suscipiant." I disdain to countenance the trite and frivolous objections of superficial observers. But I think myself authorized, and even bound, to state my meaning a little more particularly, and for this purpose I will employ the words of Morhoff—"Studium philosophiæ moralis non possumus, quin serio commendemus. Jejuna est hujus studii in nostris academiis tractatio, cùm hæc tamen faciat ad viros bonos formandos.

Scilicet sunt, quæ inflant, scientiæ, ut quæ circa notiones intemperantius versantur; quædam etiam pectus saturant, ut rerum naturalium cognitio. Ut boni verè aimus, uni huic disciplinæ, et post illam, Theologiæ, debemus." Vid. Polyhist. vol. ii. p. 483. edit. Lubec, 1732.)

Be the imperfections of these seminaries what they may, I am acquainted with no other situations, where young men can have so many opportunities for contemplating either religion under an aspect, which is solemn without gloominess, or morality with features, which have exactness without austerity;—where they can be so successfully trained up to habits which may for a while detain, and afterwards preserve them, from the contagious example of crowded and dissipated cities;—where they can be so largely stored with principles that may enable them to detect the fallacy and to escape the contamination of those metaphysical novelties, which are said to have gained a wide and dangerous ascendancy in some places of education upon the Continent.* Even in a comparative point of view, our Universities hold a very high rank among ἁπάσης τῆς Ἐυρώπης ὀφθαλμούς. But in the opinion of English scholars, who, it should seem, are not wholly unqualified to decide upon a question of English experience, they are entitled to more direct and ample commendation.

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* In this charge I do not include the University of Göttingen, which has long and deservedly flourished under the auspices of Mr. Heyne, a man whose taste, judgment, erudition, and candour, are almost unparalleled. Decidedly as I should prefer an English University for the youth of England, I should be ashamed of throwing out the slightest insinuation to the discredit of the Universities in Scotland. I have derived from Scotch writers great information upon some of the greatest subjects that can interest human curiosity, or exercise the human understanding. I feel a most sincere respect for Dr. Beattie, Dr. Campbell, Dr. Dunbar, Mr. Dalzell, Mr. Millar, and other Scotch Professors; and, so far as the improvement of a young man's head or heart may depend upon the exertions and example of an individual, I should gladly entrust a child of my own to the sagacious, the enlightened, and the virtuous Dugald Stewart. In the writings of this excellent man, I find the perspicuity of Dr. Reid, the acuteness of Adam Smith, and the precision of David Hume.

After the recent downfall, and amidst the rapid decay of similar institutions in foreign countries, our Universities are the main pillars, not only of the learning, and perhaps the science, but of the virtue and piety, whether seen or unseen, which yet remain among us, and therefore, woe be to every frantic visionary and every ruffian vandal, who would raze them from their old and sacred foundations.

I have been led into the foregoing reflections by the unusual circumstances which characterise our own times; and, with a deep and fearful sense of the danger that accompanies them, I have endeavoured to speak of them without adopting the uncouth language of party, and without alluding very pointedly to the more transient politics of the day. But the cause of morality, which has a right to be protected from the caprices of paradox and the artifices of sophistry, the cause of religion, which I revere as the most faithful guide and the most powerful guardian of morality—the cause of both, while both are adapted to the nature, and both are conducive to the happiness of mortal and immortal man—these causes, I trust, will never cease to employ my understanding and to interest my heart. Must I not look, then, with anguish upon the situation of the ingenious and well-disposed young men, whose reverence for the Deity has been extinguished by a misguided and extravagant concern for the interests of mankind,—whose love of mankind, considered as a species, is made ineffectual to every good purpose by the opinions they are taught to hold of individuals as inevitably and almost irremediably depraved by their connection with society,—whose ardour in the pursuit of some useful or honourable employment, having been once chilled by hyperbolical representation of its abuses, can never be rekindled to the performance of its duties,—whose pride, having been wounded by their own detection of their own errors, infuses a distrust of every principle, speculative or practical, maintained by other men,—whose benevolence, having been dissipated upon the exaggerated or supposed miseries of life, retains no sympathy with its joys,—whose understandings, having been early and imperceptily warped from the directions of common sense, do not always recover their proper tone for study or action,—whose conscience, having lost the restraints of fear, and the encourage-

ments of hope, from a judgment to come, is secretly annoyed by strange and irregular paroxysms of inquietude, which scepticism can neither account for nor assuage,—and finally, to whose imagination the past exhibits a wild and hideous scenery of woe, the present is a cheerless void, and the future seems a dark and dreary maze? Amidst the possibility of such effects from such causes, *αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν*.

If, therefore, among the readers of this discourse there be any academic who, in the giddiness of youth or the rashness of conceit, should have endeavoured to "compose himself* into a Heteroclite who is not to be tried by ordinary measures,"—if, decoyed by the authoritative air, or the singular phraseology of any favourite writers, he should have given them an undue share of credit for originality and correctness of thinking,—if he should suppose that any one man, by any series of reasoning, can lay open the laws of the moral world with the clearness and fullness of Newton when he unfolded those of the natural,—if, from the uniformity which is ascribed to the active and passive properties of matter, he should have transferred any precarious or fantastic analogies to the complex operations of mind,—if he should have drawn his notions of duty, not from general rules, but from particular, improbable, extreme cases, which, if they ever occur, must be treated as exceptions to those rules,—if he should have founded his opinions of human nature, not upon facts, nor deductions from facts, but upon arbitrary assumptions and chimerical suppositions,—if, upon questions the most abstruse and important, he should have ventured to decide in direct opposition to the principles or modifications of principle, admitted by men of the most enlarged and cultivated understandings,—if he should have been induced to measure truth by its want of conformity to general opinion, and justice by the contrariety of its dictates to the notices of our experience and the impulses of our affections,—let me appeal to that docility which is so useful, to that ingenuousness which is so becoming and so amiable in the character of a young man. Let me intreat him, not indeed to repress his curiosity, but to gratify it

* See Hooker's Sermon upon Pride.

by extending and diversifying his enquiries. From dazzling coruscations of paradox, which will only lead him into error, into singularity, or into artificial sensibility, let me turn his attention to that pure and steady light which has been thrown upon moral truth in the pages of Abraham Tucker, Dr. Hartley, Paley, Locke, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Hutcheson, Archbishop King, Bishop Cumberland, Hooker, Taylor, Cudworth, Barrow,* and Butler. In order to avert the imputation of unmanly prejudice, let me send him, when previously disciplined by reading and reflection, to the writings of Shaftsbury, Adam Smith, and Hume, who, upon the nice and intricate texture, the resemblances and sympathies of our social affections, upon the virtues of justice and benevolence, and upon many other interesting parts of ethics, are instructive and profound. Let me beseech him now and then to suspend his judgment, till he has an opportunity for perusing a work which ere long will be published by Mr. Mackintosh, a man whom I am proud to call my friend, because he has explored the deepest recesses, the most complex qualities, and the remotest tendencies of human action; because to the researches of philosophy he adds the graces of taste; because, with powers commensurate to the amplitude and dignity of his subject, he can, and he also will, state without obscurity, reason without perplexity, assert without dogmatism, instruct without pedantry, counsel without austerity, and even refute without acrimony. Let me assure him that, though the batteries of opposition have been hitherto opened only against parental affection and gratitude, the mine is laid for all the other affections by which we are endeared to each other as friends, as neighbours, or as countrymen; and that, unless the wise constitution of nature were such as to exclude the possibility of an explosion, all the boasted systems of perfectibility and of universal philanthropy would be shivered in the common wreck. Let me further inform him, that superstition is not the only venom which pollutes and cankers the natural sentiments of the heart; that philosophy, no less than religion, may be disgraced

* Πάντες μὲν σοφοί· ἐγὼ δὲ Ὤκηρον μὲν σέβω· θαυμάζω δὲ Βάῤῥουον, καὶ φιλῶ Ταίλωραν. See Lucian in Vitâ Dæmonact. vol. ii. p. 394.

by pharisaical votaries; and that, in the drudgeries which may be necessary to uphold the cause of metaphysical as well as of theological mysticism, self-delusion is often the vassal of zeal, hypocrisy, and pride. Above all, let me remind him, that as a social being he has an arduous part to sustain in the view, and for the sake, of society itself; that by his tenets and his habits he must become the object of praise or blame, of esteem or hatred, to the wise and good; and that a sentence far more awful awaits him hereafter, when he is summoned before the tribunal of his omniscient Maker.

In the foregoing parts of this note I have studiously avoided the insertion of Mr. Gibbon's name in the list of learned Academics, and my reasons for this caution will be obvious to every one who has read the account of his life and writings contained in his posthumous works.

Singular it is, that in our days both Cambridge and Oxford should have been treated disrespectfully by two eminent persons who belonged to them; Cambridge by Mr. Gray, and Oxford by Mr. Gibbon. Long, therefore, have I wished to make a public avowal of my dissent upon this subject, even from men whose claims upon my respect are large from the uncommon powers of their understandings, the splendid variety of their attainments, and the acknowledged merit of their writings. Hitherto I have entered my protest against a set of writers who are seldom indebted to our Schools for literature, or to our Universities for science, against self-appointed and self-deluded reformers, who, with little knowledge of character or fact, wrest, to the discredit of their countrymen, the strictures of foreign writers upon foreign institutions, and against the restless crew of innovators, who would have disgusted Mr. Gray by the wildness of their fancies, and dismayed Mr. Gibbon by the loudness of their clamours. In the same spirit of justice I now proceed to notice other animadversions, which are supported by the authority of two great names; and therefore may be supposed to have let loose upon our academical societies, the prattle of the ignorant, and the taunts of the superficial.

With a licence for exaggeration, which has always been granted to the enthusiasm of poetry, Pindar, I remember, compliments Demophilus and Arcesilāus for excellencies far surpass-

ing their time of life.—See Pyth. Ode iv. Strophe 13, and Ode v. Antistrophe iv.

When Lord Orford, however, said of Mr. Gray, that "he never was a boy," it may be doubted whether this observation had one property, which Cicero wished to find in the praise Cæsar bestowed on him "Modo sit hoc judicii non benevolentiæ testimonium."—Cicero in Bruto, p. 150, vol. i. edit. Gruter. But, upon comparing the materials which have been collected about Mr. Gray by his friends, with the representation which Mr. Gibbon has given of himself, I am inclined to think that the lad of Cambridge had a stronger claim than the lad of Oxford to be ranked among those who, ante annos mentemque gerunt, animumque virilem.

Be it remembered, at the same time, to the honour of both, that they surpassed rather than disappointed the expectations of their most partial friends; that their powers and their attainments encreased with their years; and that, with a felicity very uncommon they may defy the severest criticism to discover in them illud ingeniorum velut præcox genus, which, as Quinctilian says, non temere unquam pervenit ad frugem.—Lib. I. ch. 3. But let us attend to other circumstances in which the difference between these Censors of their respective universities is more striking.

Mr. Gray resided at Cambridge nearly four years before he began to travel, and Mr. Gibbon was at Oxford only fourteen months. Mr. Gray went to Cambridge with all the advantages, which a boy of ardent curiosity and intense application might be expected to derive from the noble seminary of Eton. Mr. Gibbon, after leaving Westminster school for the recovery of his health, and spending three years, partly with one master, who was not very learned, and partly with another, who was not very industrious, entered at Oxford.

Mr. Gray was out of humour with Cambridge because the most favoured studies of the place were dissimilar to his own. Mr. Gibbon was displeased with Oxford, because in his opinion no studies at all were generally encouraged, or systematically pursued.

Mr. Gray was the petulant satirist of Cambridge in confidential letters, which at first he did not intend, and which after-

wards he might not wish to see the light. Mr. Gibbon comes forth the grave accuser of Oxford, when preparing for the view of distant ages the various events of his life, and the final result of his observation; and when bestowing upon his narrative all the accuracy which could be obtained from the exercise of a tenacious memory, of a comprehensive understanding, and of talents for composition, disciplined by long practice, and invigorated by repeated success.

Without enquiring how far the delicacy of friendship was preserved at the expence of its discretion or its freedom, when the editor of Mr. Gray published some offensive passages in his letters, which "throw the blame on the mode of education rather than on the mode of the times," (vid. p. 12,) how far such a measure is justified by the plea of "necessity not to admit this picture of Mr. Gray's mind, when employed in drawing a general likeness of it, and to let his own forcible colours express its true light of shadow;" how far Bishop Sprat is to be censured for stifling some letters of Mr. Cowley, in which he had "expressed the native tenderness and innocent gaiety of his heart" (p. 4), or Mr. Mason is to be commended for not keeping back some epistolary effusions of Mr. Gray, who, "though a virtuous, a friendly, and an amiable man," was less distinguished by such tenderness and such gaiety than Mr. Cowley, I cannot pass over some other particulars in which Mr. Mason is entitled to high commendation. Mingling the feelings of a friend with the duty of a biographer, he endeavoured only to extenuate the singularities of which he manifestly did not quite approve. From the dislike which Mr. Gray had conceived against mathematics, from his confidence in the proficiency that he had made in classical knowledge, from the disgust which he had felt at the baneful influence of "jacobinism upon good manners as well as good letters," Mr. Mason would account for sarcasms, some of which, I readily allow, it might have been unfair for him to suppress. With equal judgment and liberality Mr. Mason takes care to inform his readers, that "whatever truth there might be in Mr. Gray's satire at the time it was written, it can by no means affect the present state of the university."

This assertion he wisely supports by a just and general principle. "There is usually," says he, "a much greater fluctuation

of taste and manners in an academical than a national body; occasioned (to use a scholastic metaphor) by that very quick succession of its component parts, which often goes near to destroy its personal identity. Whatever, therefore, may be true of such a society at one time, may be, and generally is, ten years after absolutely false."—P. 12. Mr. Mason properly compares the changes which happen in an university to those which sometimes arise in a nation, and doubtless each of those bodies may at different periods, and in different degrees, be affected by temporary causes, beneficial or injurious. But he does not mean to deny that, independently of those causes, they will be more or less marked by a permanent peculiarity of character, which distinguishes them from other communities. The constitution of a country gives a certain character to the people, and the discipline of an university gives a certain character to its members. Though the constitution be radically good, a government may, for a while, be less wise or just, and a people may be less free or happy, than the constitution is formed to make them respectively; and though the discipline of an university be good, the manners of academics may at one season be more relaxed than at another. But good principles in a constitution, and a good system of discipline in an university, will always produce some proportion of good effects, and must tend constantly, though gradually, to counteract the influence of causes less favourable to the welfare of a people or to the virtue and learning of an academical body. This, surely, is true of the English nation, and it is no less true of the English universities.

The frolics of fancy, and even the ebullitions of spleen, must not be treated with the rigour which we usually employ against the oblique insinuations of envy, or the virulent calumnies of malevolence. But truth ought to be vindicated alike from every kind and every degree of misrepresentation. At that very time, then, in which Mr. Gray spoke so contemptuously of Cambridge, that very university abounded in men of erudition and science, with whom the first scholars in Europe would not have disdained to converse; and who shall convict me of exaggeration when I bring forward the names of Bentley; Dawes; Ashton of Jesus; Provost Snape; Middleton; Tunstal, the public orator; Baker of St. John's; Edmund Law; John Taylor; Thomas John-

son; Waterland; Whaley, afterwards Regius Professor of Divinity; Smith, the nephew of Cotes, afterwards Master of Trinity; Roger Long; Coulson, the correspondent of Sir Isaac Newton; and Professor Saunderson?

After the opportunities which Mr. Gray enjoyed, and of which he, doubtless, had availed himself, for observing the state of literature and the characters of literary men upon the Continent, he did not merely visit the university, but fixed his chief residence there; and of a choice, to which he adhered so steadily and so long, the scantiness of his fortune, the love of books, and the easy access he had to them in many libraries, will hardly be considered as the sole motives.

At a later period, when experience had enabled him to correct the precipitation of youth, and the fastidiousness of pedantry; when prejudice had yielded to reflection, and flippant conceit had subsided into a calm and manly sense of dignity; "when the abbreviation of time," as Mr. Gibbon says in his Memoirs, "and the failure of hope, had begun to tinge with a browner shade the evening of life," the courtesy, the respect, the admiration, and the public honours of that university, were all employed to soothe the dejected spirits, and to gratify the honest pride, of this illustrious academic. The men of Cambridge gazed only upon the transcendental merits of Mr. Gray; and Mr. Gray had ceased to look with Lyncean eyes upon real or imaginary weaknesses in the men of Cambridge.

In regard to the noble editor of Mr. Gibbon's Posthumous Works, he, I believe, was not a member of either university; and therefore, it might not have been quite discreet in him to controvert the opinions of his friends upon the strength only of his own observation. He seems, indeed, to have gone out a little in quest of information; and of the little information with which he was fortunate enough to meet he has permitted his readers to partake.—See note p. 52, vol. i.

Readily do I assent to the favourable account he has given of Brazen-nose and Oriel Colleges, and as to another Society, which he believed deserving of fuller praises, and in which Mr. Gibbon justly supposes learning to have been made "a duty, a pleasure, and even a fashion," long have I thought, and often have I said, that the highest station in our ecclesiastical establishment would

not be more than an adequate recompense for the person who now presides over it. Upon petty and dubious questions of criticism, I may not always have the happiness to agree with that celebrated man. But I know that, with magnanimity enough to refuse two bishopricks, he has qualifications enow of head and heart to adorn the primacy of all England, and to protect all the substantial interests of the English Church. I will enumerate those qualifications in such terms as are most familiar to such a man: ἡ πολυμαθία, ἡ ἐμπειρία, ἡ εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγχίνοια, ἡ ἐλευθερίοτης, ἡ φιλπονία, τὸ σεμνὸν, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, τὸ φιλόφιλον, τὸ φιλόξενον, καὶ φιλόκαλον.

They who complain of what is omitted in this catalogue are not likely to approve of what is inserted in it. Let me, however, endeavour to propitiate them by stating, that I shall thank other men for supplying what I may have overlooked, and by observing, that the moral excellencies, for which heathen philosophy has found a name, may, by a Christian spirit, be easily exalted into Christian graces.

For communicating to the public all he had discovered about the present state of Oxford, Lord Sheffield is to be commended. Yet I could wish, that upon a subject so delicate to the feelings of academical men, and so important to the credit of our national learning and national virtue, his lordship had been pleased to enlarge his enquiries, to suspend for a while his judgment upon generalities, to imitate the example of Socrates in what he said about the writings of Heraclitus, and to display his wisdom, his modesty, and his candour, by inferring that what he did not know of Oxford might not be bad, because that which he did know was very good. If his Lordship had conversed with his accomplished and amiable friend, the late Chancellor of Oxford, he might have obtained, in that quarter, more copious and accurate information than from young gentlemen, who, with the very best intentions, seldom have much of that knowledge which was suited to the occasion, or from Mr. Gibbon, who, with the very worst prejudices, had little or no communication with the place when he wrote his Memoirs. If he had been anxious to discover whether the College of St. Mary Magdalen were a monastery for drones, or a seminary for scholars, he might have been informed that the examination for Demyships is quite as

strict and quite as judicious as the examination for almost any place of emolument or honour in any other society; that the candidates do not depend now, as they once did, upon the recommendation of friends, but upon their own literary attainments and moral character; that their exercises during term are examined by a President whose knowledge of the Greek philosophers, and Greek fathers, and of the Greek and Latin languages, is at least equal to that of Mr. Gibbon; and that among the young men who have been elected within these few years, there are many endowed with such a share of classical learning as would be highly esteemed by our best instructors in our best public schools. If he had further consulted such impartial and intelligent men, as surely may be met with in every other college, he would have found the exceptions to Mr. Gibbon's opinion so numerous, and so meritorious, as to constitute the general rule. But, as matters now stand, the noble editor has said too much, if he meant to compliment parts of the academical body without regard to the whole, and too little, if he meant to do justice to the whole, as well as parts. Academiæ alumnus cùm ipse non esset, hanc doctorum et vivorum hominum turbam effugere debuit, nequis se præteritum, aut non satis laudatum, queri posset. —Cicer. Brut. p. 151.

It can hardly have escaped the notice of an intelligent reader, that while the mind of Mr. Gibbon was turned towards the want of regularity and activity in the studies of Oxford, the attention of his editor has been very much bent on the want of restraint over its expences. The manner, too, in which this subject is treated, forms a very striking contrast with the diffidence and good sense of Isaac Casaubon in one of his letters to Daniel Heinsius.

Cupio in Græcis Latinis et Hebraicis literis filium meum seriò exerceri. Hoc in Angliâ posse fieri sperare non possum; nam hic locupletissima sunt collegia; sed quorum ratio toto genere diversa est ab institutis omnium aliorum collegiorum. Quo sumptu filium possim istic alere honestè, scire velim. Quod si res meæ ferunt ut par sim futurus illi impensæ, expecta me istic non multo post tuas acceptas.—Vid. No. 132, p. 111, in the 4to ed. published at the Hague, 1638, by S. T. Gronovius; and No. 962, p. 563, in the fol. ed. of Casaubon's Epistolæ et Præfationes,

published at Rotterdam, 1709, by Theodore Janson, ab Almeloveen.

The prudence and parental affection of Isaac Casaubon impelled him to make enquiries upon the spot; from enquiries he proceeded to experiment; and by experiment he found that the stateliness of the buildings, the largeness of the public revenues, the hospitable livings of the heads of houses, and the expences of the more opulent academics, were not incompatible with the economical plan which he had formed for his second son Meric. The eldest, as it appears from other letters, had, like Mr. Gibbon, gone over from protestantism to the church of Rome.

For the credit of Oxford, and with a view to the removal of vulgar prejudices, I will pursue this topic a little farther. Instead of being sent, as the father intended to send him, (if Oxford had been too expensive) to the care of that great scholar Daniel Heinsius, Meric entered at Christ Church; he soon became a student there; he took both his degrees in arts: he published several useful works in literature and theology: he was preferred by Archbishop Laud: he was created doctor of divinity by the order of Charles I.: though deprived of his livings, he refused to accept any employment under Cromwell, when an immediate present of nearly four hundred pounds, an annual pension of three hundred pounds, and the valuable books of his father, which had been purchased by James I. and then deposited in the royal library, were proffered to him at different times. He recovered his ecclesiastical preferment after the restoration: he lived prosperously and studied diligently, till he had reached his seventy-second year; and by his learning, affability, charity, and piety, he proved himself worthy of all the attentions which had been shewn to him, by the parent who loved him, the university which had educated him, and the princes who had succoured him. As to Isaac, the father, he had firmness enough not to be deterred by appearances from examining realities; he had sagacity enough to estimate all the aids and all the encouragements which Oxford then afforded to men of letters; and they who wish to know the respect and gratitude with which he speaks of the place, would do well to consult the following letters: No. 893, p. 535. No. 899. p. 537, in the fol. edit., and No. 198, p. 247, and No. 98, p. 825 in the quarto.

But, to return to Mr. Gibbon and his noble editor. Most undoubtedly I concur with Lord S. "that the general expences, or rather extravagancies, of our young men, might be more effectually restrained." But I do not allow the expences, "in which they are permitted to indulge, to be quite inconsistent with a necessary degree of study, or with those habits of morality which should be promoted by all means possible at so early a period of life." Of Scotch universities I have already spoken: but I have seen scarcely any one instance in which they, who, "from the apprehension of expence, dissipation, and other evil consequences, arising from the want of restraint in our universities," thought themselves "forced to send their sons" to other seminaries, have ultimately had reason to rejoice in the experiment, on account of more restraints on the prodigality of their children, less dissipation in their habits, or fewer evil consequences to their fortunes,—their morals, or their religion. And what right has a parent to be surprised at the disappointment of his hopes, or the irregularity of his son, when, if we may believe Mr. Gibbon, "in the most celebrated universities of Holland, Germany, and Italy, the students, who swarm from different countries, are loosely dispersed in the private lodgings at the houses of the burghers, when they dress according to their fancy and fortune, and their swords, though less frequently than of old, are sometimes stained with each other's blood?"—P. 32. vol. i. of Gibbon's Posth. Works. I do not acquiesce, then, in the representation which the noble Lord has given of the unavoidable and unparalleled expences which he imputes to our universities. Much less shall I admit the charge which his Lordship has insisted on, "that the heads of our colleges at Oxford and Cambridge are vain of having under their care chiefly men of opulence, who may be supposed exempt from the necessity of economical controul." Readily should I grant all the mischievous consequences which his Lordship describes so fully and so earnestly, if he had established the several facts. But to the ἐκμαρτυρία of his Lordship, founded, as he confesses, upon hearsay, let me oppose a more direct testimony. For thirty years it has been my lot to visit both universities, to converse with very well informed members of them, and to see many changes in governors, instructors, and customs. But with very few excep-

tions, indeed, I must pronounce this hearsay statement inaccurate, and, I would beg leave to add, that the tutors of colleges, who, if it were accurate, would be more concerned in it than heads of houses, are for the most parts as guiltless as I believe those heads to be

"Pluris est oculatus testis unus, quam auriti decem."

Plautus in Truculent.

"To the University of Oxford," says Mr. Gibbon, p. 34, vol. i. "I acknowledge no obligation, and she will as cheerfully renounce me for a son as I am willing to disclaim her for a mother." Be it so. Let me further grant, that Mr. Gibbon in his sixteenth year, was not "devoid of capacity and application:" that even "his childish reading had displayed an early though blind propensity for books: that in the discipline of a well-constituted academy, and under the guidance of skilful and vigilant professors, he would gradually have arisen from translations to originals, from the Latin to the Greek classics, from dead languages to living science." But must the whole system of Oxford be reprobated, and the conduct of other tutors in other Colleges arraigned, because in one College, and at one time, they to whom the office of instruction had been consigned, were defective in skill or vigilance?

Academical societies partake of those inequalities, and those vicissitudes, to which other human affairs are inevitably exposed. All Colleges have not the same advantages with each other at the same period, and the same College may be more fortunate in the talents and diligence of tutors at one time than at another. Of this general, this obvious, and very momentous truth, Mr. Gibbon himself was not insensible, when he told us, in page 51 of his Memoirs, that "many students had been attracted, at a more recent period, by the merit and the reputation of Sir William Scott, then tutor of University College."

But instead of condemning the University promiscuously and contemptuously, a man of good sense would adopt the distinction which Quintilian lays down upon a subject not wholly dissimilar—"Ut fugiendæ sint magnæ scholæ, (cui ne ipse quidem rei assentior, si ad aliquem merito concurritur) non tamen hoc eo valet ut fugiendæ sint omnino scholæ. Aliud est vitare eas, aliud eligere."—Lib. i. cap. ii. page 19, edit. Capperon.

Often has it fallen in my way to lament the inconveniences which young men have suffered from a wrong choice of Colleges; and for a wrong choice I have often been able to account by the partialities of parents, who have been at the Universities,—by the obstinacy of those who have not been there,—by the prevalence of political or personal, over literary or moral considerations,—by the desire of immediate, though temporary, emoluments,—by the recommendations of thoughtless, though well-meaning acquaintance,—by popular opinions, which had little foundation,—and by vagrant reports, which had none at all. The credulity of fathers may be pitied, but their inattention, or their rapacity cannot be justified, in a point of such high importance to the intellectual or moral improvement—to the temporal and eternal welfare of their children.

When Mr. Gibbon entered at Magdalen other Colleges were open to him, and in other Colleges he might have found no room for those complaints, which he has urged so strenuously, and which he has taught other men to apply so indiscriminately and so unjustly.

In 1779, Mr. Gibbon, in the vindication of some passages (vol. ii. p. 602) in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of his History, was pleased to say, "Far be it from me, or from any faithful historian, to impute to respectable societies the faults of some individual members."

Is the office, then, of him who writes Memoirs, less connected with fidelity than the office of him who writes History? "The general persuasion of mankind," as Mr. Gibbon elsewhere observes, upon another subject (see p. 555), "that when much has been positively asserted, something must be true, may contribute to encourage a secret suspicion which would naturally diffuse itself over the whole body" of the University. Is it possible, then, for any man of common sense to read the Memoirs of Mr. Gibbon, without suspecting that something more is meant, than immediately meets the ear; without feeling, that insinuation in one place is to be interpreted by statement in another, without carrying on his distrust from St. Mary Magdalen College to other Colleges, or without supposing, that in Mr. Gibbon's estimation, what Oxford was, when he wrote his Memoirs, bore no very faint or distant resemblance to what Oxford had been, in his sight,

when he first became an academic? Does not the conduct of his noble Editor, in looking out for particular societies that might be excepted, strongly shew the general impression that had been made upon his mind?

Had Mr. Gibbon so little discernment as not to foresee the conclusions that would be drawn from his narrative? Has he shewn any disposition, or made any effort, to prevent his readers from drawing them? Has he not attempted to counteract the effects of any important distinction that might be set up between actual defects, as he conceived them to be, when he was a boy, and possible improvements, which had taken place when he was a man? Do not Mr. Gibbon's own thoughts, as expressed in his own words, point directly to the University at large? I will repel contradiction and baffle evasion, by planting those words in the view of cavillers who, however they may murmur at me, cannot misunderstand Mr. Gibbon.

"In all the Universities of Europe, excepting our own, the languages and sciences are distributed among a numerous list of effective professors. The students, according to their taste, calling, and their diligence, apply themselves to their proper masters, and, in the annual repetition of public and private lectures, these masters are assiduously employed. Our curiosity may inquire, what number of professors has been instituted at Oxford; for I shall now confine myself to my own University, by whom are they appointed, and what may be the probable chances of merit or incapacity; how many are stationed to the three faculties, and how many are left for the liberal arts; what is the form, and what the substance of their lessons? But all these questions are silenced by one short and singular answer: The greater part of the public professors have, for these many years given up even the pretence of teaching."—P. 36.

To this answer, which is founded upon the evidence of Dr. Adam Smith, the members of the University may give a more detailed reply than I can do. But what I know, I will relate. Dr. Trapp, Mr. Hawkins, and Dr. Lowth, have published their lectures as Poetry professors. Mr. Wharton has inserted one lecture in his edition of Theocritus. The gentleman, who is now professor, reads lectures, and has published a part of them, I believe, in English. That the lectures of Sir William Scott upon

History, if given to the world, "would form a most valuable treatise," Mr. Gibbon himself had been assured.

In addition to this respectable testimony I would beg leave to say, that many years ago Sir William read to me a part of one lecture, which contained some curious matter on the revenues of the Grecian States, and which seemed to me perfectly worthy of the writer, from variety of learning, acuteness of observation, and elegance of style. The Commentaries of Dr. Blackstone, and a very excellent work of Professor Woodison, are proofs that the institution of the Vinerian Professorship is not wholly useless. Dr. Bentham formerly read lectures in the Divinity School, and the same office is now performed with great ability by Dr. Randolph, whose cares as a prelate have not made him inattentive to his duties as a Professor. In Chemistry and in Anatomy, lectures, I know, were for some years regularly given; and, I believe, they were largely attended. The lectures of the late Saxon Professor are much applauded, and his successor, I am persuaded, will justify the choice of the University by his knowledge, his activity, and his judgment. I have not heard whether Dr. Hunt or Dr. White read lectures in the Oriental languages, nor am I sure that such lectures would have been of great use, according to the method in which those languages are now learned. But I know that both the Professors just now mentioned, hold a very high rank in the estimation of foreign scholars. Dr. Hunt supplied many valuable notes to the Prælectiones Hebraicæ of Dr. Lowth; he read in the Schools, and then printed, one Oration de Antiquitate, elegantiâ, et utilitate linguæ Arabicæ, 1738; and another, De usu Dialectorum Orientalium et Præcipue Arabicæ, in Hebraico Codice interpretando, in 1748. He, in 1744, addressed to Oxford Students, "A Dissertation on Proverbs vii. 22, 23," and this Dissertation in 1775, was republished by Dr. Kennicott, who added to it critical observations of Dr. Hunt on other passages in Proverbs, and two very learned Sermons on two very difficult subjects.

Dr. White was always ready to assist young men who applied to him for instruction. He is author of a very judicious Sermon upon the Septuagint. He published an inaugural speech, which, in point of composition, far excels that which is usually found in the Clavis Pentateuch of Dr. Robertson. He translated

and edited, in two vols. 4to the Syriac Version of part of the New Testament, which belonged to Dr. Gloucester Ridley. He is said to be now engaged in preparing the Epistles. He long ago completed, and might with very little exertion publish, what Pocock junior left unfinished, in the translation of Abdollatiph's Egyptian History. He has lately done signal service to young clergymen, by an edition of the received Text of the New Testament, with the most important variations in Griesbach, and by a Diatessaron,* drawn up in conformity to the Chronology approved by Archbishop Newcome; and to his professional studies, he, in his Bampton Lectures, was much indebted for the happy choice of a subject, and for the very masterly manner in which it has been treated.

The foregoing statement is sufficient to shew the slenderness of Mr. Gibbon's information, and the rashness of his conclusions. I therefore leave it with the men of Oxford to adduce the particulars which I have omitted, and to expatiate upon those which I have merely enumerated.

In regard to Cambridge, the persons there appointed to Professorships have in few instances disgraced them by notorious incapacity, or criminal negligence. A late work of Dr. Hay furnishes us with a decisive proof of his abilities and his activity. Dr. Waring and Mr. Vince, in their writings, have done honour to the science, not only of their University, but of their age. The profound researches of Dr. Waring, I suppose, were not adapted to any form of communication by lectures. But Mr. Vince has, by private instructions, been very useful both to those who were novitiates, and to those who were proficients, in Mathematics. Dr. Halifax, Dr. Rutherforth, and Dr. Watson, very abundantly conveyed the information which belonged to their departments, sometimes in the disputes of the schools, and sometimes by the publication of their writings. Chemistry has been adorned, not

* I do not take upon myself to offer advice to English Bishops; but I should be very happy to hear that the candidates for orders were instructed to read the Greek Testament in Dr. White's Diatessaron, and to make use of Novum Lexicon Græco Latinum in Novum Testamentum, first prepared by Christian Schoettgenius, afterwards enlarged by Krebsius, and edited at Leipsic, 1790, by M. Gottlieb Lebereol Spohn.

by the labour only, but by the sagacity of Dr. Watson, and Dr. Milner. Mr. Porson, the Greek Professor, has not read more than one lecture, but that one was πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβάς. He has written, however, books, of utility far more extensive than lectures could be; and I speak from my own actual observation, when I state, that the Greek Plays edited by this wonderful man, have turned the attention of several academics towards philological learning, which, it must be confessed, has few and feeble attractions to the eagerness of curiosity, or the sprightliness of youth.

Whatsoever lectures may, or may not, have been given by other Professors, I am convinced that Mr. Gibbon, if he had visited Cambridge, would have been "almost," if not "altogether" a convert. Surprised he might have been to find, and ready, I trust, he would have been to embrace, many opportunities for congratulating other men upon the enjoyment of those advantages, which, during his own time, may not have been, in in his own College, accessible to himself. He would have seen many elegant scholars, and many deep mathematicians among the tutors. He would have seen the most generous emulation, and the most indefatigable diligence in the younger members of the University. He would have seen plans of study recommended for their use—exercises prescribed for the display of their ingenuity, or the exertions of their industry—rewards proposed for their merit in Mathematics, in Poetry, in Prose, in Greek Compositions, in Latin, and in English. In almost every College he would have seen young men who were able to understand "originals" without the dim and delusive light of "translation;" —who were well acquainted with "Greek, as well as Latin Classics;"—and who had improved their taste, while they enlarged their knowledge by the aid of the "dead languages." He would have seen days, and weeks, and years, employed in the most intense labour upon "living science." He would have seen amusements, exercise, society, health, and sometimes even life cheerfully sacrificed to the acquisition of that knowledge which no learned man ever despised who possessed it, and no candid man would depreciate who possesses it not. Such was the state of Cambridge when Mr. Gibbon wrote his Memoirs, and such it now is, perhaps to a greater extent, when Mr. Gibbon is num-

bered among the dead. Some of the foregoing facts, I allow, Mr. Gibbon could not know; but far the greater part of them were within his reach, and to search for them would have been creditable to his accuracy as a reporter, his delicacy as a gentleman, and his liberality as a scholar. That search, indeed, was a duty equally obvious and indispensable; and that duty ought to have been discharged deliberately and completely before Mr. Gibbon, rousing all his antipathy, and collecting all his might, had ventured to exaggerate real defects, to disregard real excellencies, or to throw before readers of all ages and in all nations, one glittering description, one vague suggestion, one invidious comparison, one contemptuous scoff, or one serious charge. If Mr. Gibbon, as was said of Dante, "intended Reformation, his censures were not wise: if he did not intend Reformation, his censures were not good."—Vide Adventurer, No. 87.

Ill would it become me tamely and silently to acquiesce in the strictures of this formidable accuser, upon a seminary to which I owe many obligations, though I left it, as must not be dissembled, before the usual time, and, in truth, had been almost compelled to leave it, not by the want of a proper education, for I had arrived at the first place in the first form of Harrow School, when I was not quite fourteen; not by the want of useful tutors, for mine were eminently able, and to me had been uniformly kind; not by the want of ambition, for I had begun to look up ardently and anxiously to academical distinctions; not by the want of attachment to the place, for I regarded it then, as I continue to regard it now, with the fondest and most unfeigned affection; but by another want, which it were unnecessary to name, and for the supply of which, after some hesitation, I determined to provide by patient toil and resolute self-denial, when I had not completed my twentieth year. I ceased, therefore, to reside with an aching heart: I looked back with mingled feelings of regret and humiliation to advantages of which I could no longer partake, and honours to which I could no longer aspire; I visited my companions, my rivals, and my instructors, when either my leisure or my circumstances permitted; I was assisted in the most gracious manner by the Chancellor and several Heads of Houses, when the degree of a Master had become requisite for me, in the pursuit of a most

precious object, which I was not fortunate enough to attain; and upon the access, with which I was honoured at a very early period, to the presence of men high in academical rank and conspicuous for literary excellence, often have I reflected with pleasure and with the pride of an ancient writer,* who has more than once recorded his own intimacy with the poets and the statesmen of the Augustan age. The unreserved conversation of scholars, the disinterested offices of friendship, the use of valuable books, and the example of good men, are endearments by which Cambridge will keep a strong hold upon my esteem, my respect, and my gratitude, to the latest moment of my life. Never shall I have the presumption to "disclaim her as a mother," and never may she have just occasion to "renounce me as a son;" *ἔστι δὲ οὐχ οὗτος ἀχάριστος μόνον, ὅστις οὐ δρᾷ κακῶς ἢ λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅστις σιωπᾷ καὶ ἀποκρύπτει, λήθῃ παραδίδους καὶ ἀφανίζων τὰς χάριτας.*—Julian, Orat. II. p. 172, edit. D. Petavius, 1614.†

Such are the seductions of Mr. Gibbon's style, and the contagion of his scorn; such is the skilfulness with which his observations are engrafted upon his narrative; such is the air of plausibility, and even authority, which his acknowledged veneration for learning diffuses over his severe animadversions upon two learned societies, that the use of generalities is not to be slighted, where they can be pertinently opposed to generalities, and may fortify the evidence from detail. There is a very numerous and a very officious class of censors, who find it much easier to assume the importance of pronouncing decisions, than to endure the drudgery of examining facts. Among such per-

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* See Horace, Sat. x. lib. i. Sat. i. lib. ii. Epist. xx. lib. i.

† When Julian wrote this Oration he had received some important favours from Constantine and Eusebia. Whatever motives might afterwards induce him to apostatize from Christianity, he probably would not have been a proselyte to some modern notions about gratitude. For in the sentence immediately preceding he writes—*Οὐδενὸς γαρ, οἶμαι, τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων ἔλαττον μισοῦμεν ἀχαριστίαν, καὶ ὀνειδίζομεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅταν εὖ παθόντες πρὸς τοὺς εὐεργέτας ὦσιν ἄχάριστοι.*

sons one very fruitful source of error is their voluntary or accidental inattention to the peculiar constitution of foreign Universities and that of our own. Cambridge and Oxford, unlike the former, are composed of Colleges, founded in different ages, endowed with distinct revenues, subject to different statutes, governed by different heads, independent of each other in many points of internal regulation, yet united under a general code of laws, which have not only appointed restraints upon foppery, laziness, and vice, but provided encouragements for various degrees of effort and talent in various branches of science and erudition.

Other mistakes arise from the want of due consideration that English Universities, being filled with the sons of English parents, must, in some measure, sympathize with the general state of England itself, and share, more or less, in the gradual and successive changes of manners, customs, opinions, and intellectual pursuits. Hence their streets are no longer crowded with striplings of twelve or fourteen. Their discipline no longer requires those punishments which are retained in schools. Their undergraduates, upon admission, are usually presumed to have made a greater proficiency than Mr. Gibbon claims to himself. The elements of the learned languages are no longer taught, as in the days of Cheke and Smith, by professors; nor does there seem to be much propriety in thus teaching them, when students are to be employed in the works of Aristotle, of Plato, of Longinus, of Quintilian, and other writers of antiquity, for the perusal of which it is expected that they have been sufficiently prepared by their school-masters. Rhetoric, with all its tawdry appendages and tedious incumbrances of tropes and figures, is no longer made an essential part of education, because composition, and criticism upon composition, are regulated by laws more favourable to perspicuity and elegance, to ease and vigour, to uniformity without sameness, and variety without incongruity, to the emancipation of good sense from pedantry, and the dominion of genius over art. The uncouth jargon and the frivolous distinctions of Logic are no longer considered as instruments indispensibly necessary for the detection of errors or the expression and arrangement of truths, because the understandings of men have happily escaped from the fetters of forms and

words, and are accustomed to explore, through a clearer medium and over a wider range, the properties and relations of things. The noisy jarrings of Thomists and Scotists, of Nominalists and Realists, have long been hushed. The labours of individuals, residing upon the same spot, and prosecuting the same enquiries, are invigorated by competition rather than relaxed by co-operation. Their opinions, instead of being cramped by systems, are enlarged by principles; and in their pretensions to literary fame their appeals must be made, not to the sufferings of the wrangling partisan, or the solitary recluse, but before the tribunal of an unprejudiced and enlightened public.

The multiplication of books, the facility of procuring them, and the custom of reading them, may be considered as additional reasons for the diminished usefulness of lectures upon the abstruser parts of science, and upon various subjects of classical and even oriental literature.

Under these circumstances, which Mr. Gibbon was well qualified to appreciate, if he had been disposed to examine them, the instruction, which formerly was conveyed by Professors to a promiscuous multitude of the young, the old, the trifling loiterer, and the attentive student assembled in schools, is now consigned with happier effect to private and public tutors within the walls of colleges. The plans for such instruction admit sufficient comprehension and sufficient regularity for use. The divisions are easily adapted to the capacities of those who understand what they have heard, and retain what they have understood. The tutor can interrogate, where the lecturer perhaps would only dictate, and therefore, in his intercourse with learners he has more opportunities for ascertaining their proficiency, correcting their misapprehensions, and relieving their embarrassments. Doubtless, when the present condition of academical affairs is compared with that of which we read in the last century, and those which preceded it, appearances are much changed, but the substance remains unimpaired. A conceited and superficial spectator may easily deceive himself; but a dispassionate and judicious observer will understand and often approve. A witling may glean materials for raillery; but a scholar will find ample room for reflection and commendation. Reports may sometimes misguide those who are content to hear only;

but facts will interest, and upon the whole, satisfy those who frequently and carefully inspect.

"The Schools of Oxford and Cambridge (says Mr. Gibbon), were founded in the dark age of false and barbarous science, and they are still tainted with the vices of their origin. The legal incorporation of these societies by the charters of Popes and Kings, had given them a monopoly of the public instruction, and the spirit of monopolists is narrow, lazy, and oppressive: their work is more costly and less productive than that of independant artists; and the new improvements, so eagerly grasped by the competition of freedom, are admitted, with slow and sullen reluctance in those proud corporations, above the fear of a rival and below the confession of an error."—P. 35. After reading the foregoing passages, shall I be told that Mr. Gibbon had not in view other Colleges besides his own, another University besides his own, and other times besides his own? In speaking of his own College, p. 37, he enumerates particulars; and, if particulars of other Colleges were known, why were they not produced to illustrate general hints or to establish general positions? Real improvements in science are admitted cautiously, but not reluctantly; and such caution upon such subjects is more becoming in a learned body than eagerness.

"Our Colleges (says Mr. Gibbon, p. 37), are supposed to be schools of science as well as of education:* nor is it unreasonable to expect, that a body of literary men, devoted to a life of celibacy, exempt from the care of their own subsistence, and amply provided with books, should devote their leisure to the prosecution of study, and that some effects of their studies should be manifested to the world." I admit the premises but deny the inference, which by implication is to be drawn from them. The University Presses of Oxford and Cambridge, in Mr. Gibbon's life-time, and since his death, have produced nu-

* In the catalogue I have given of distinguished academics may be found the names of persons who published while they resided in the University, as well as of others who became authors after leaving them. To that catalogue I would add the names of the late Archdeacon Ibbetson, of Mr. Collins the poet, of Mr. Cumberland, Dr. Ford, Dr. Tateham, Mr. Scarlet, Mr. Jekyl, Dr. R. Shepherd, Sir G. Shuckburgh, Dr. Maskelyne, and, if I have not been misinformed, Baron Maseres.

merous effects of those studies, which are equally honourable to the writers and to the Universities. Mr. Gibbon thus proceeds: "The shelves of their library groan under the weight of Benedictine folios; of the editions of the Fathers, and the collections of the middle ages, which have issued from the single Abbey of St. Germain des près at Paris." Are there no books, then, in science, criticism, natural philosophy, history, and polite literature? Are there no manuscripts in Greek, Latin, and the Oriental languages? Has Mr. Gibbon never visited the libraries of Corpus, All Souls, Queen's, New College, Worcester, and Christ-Church? Did he never deign to cast a glance on the Bodleian Catalogue, in two volumes folio? Did he never hear of additional books, sufficient perhaps to fill another folio? "A composition of genius," Mr. Gibbon says, "must be the offspring of one mind. But such works of industry as may be divided among many hands, and must be continued during many years, are the peculiar province of a laborious community." True. Nacti sunt hanc Spartam Oxonienses, et præclarissimè ornaverunt. So say I. But Mr. Gibbon says, p. 38, "If I enquire into the manufactures of the Monks of Magdalen, if I extend the enquiry to the other Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, a silent blush, or a scornful frown will be the only reply."

Were I to speak of the foregoing passage as it deserves, I should employ "those harsh epithets which might be interpreted as the expressions of resentment, though I should be constrained to use them as the only words in the English language which could accurately represent my cool and unprejudiced sentiments." Thus wrote Mr. Gibbon (vol. ii. p. 579), about Mr. Davis, and thus I should have written about Mr. Gibbon.

Dr. Horne was a Monk of Magdalen; but he composed several volumes of Sermons, to which Mr. Gibbon will not refuse the praise of ingenuity; and he also drew up a Commentary on the Psalms for nobler purposes than the amusement of scholars or the confutation of critics. Dr. Chandler is a Monk of Magdalen; but he has published Travels into Greece and Asia Minor, which have been well received in the learned world, and, with great credit to himself, he has re-published the Marmora Oxoniensia. Dr. Routh is a Monk of Magdalen; but he is now engaged in a work of great difficulty and of great use, for

which he is peculiarly qualified by his profound knowledge of the tenets and the language of the earlier fathers in the Christian Church; and long before the death of Mr. Gibbon, this very Monk had sent forth an edition of two dialogues in Plato; an edition which, in common with many of my countrymen, I have myself read with instruction and with delight; an edition which the first scholars on the Continent have praised, which Charles Burney "loves," and which even Richard Porson "endures."

"It is the peculiar felicity of youth," says Mr. Gibbon, vol. i. p. 55, "that the most unpleasing objects and events seldom make a deep or lasting impression. It forgets the past, enjoys the present, and anticipates the future." The observation is well founded and well expressed. But he from whom it proceeds has exhibited a fresh instance of human infirmity in the variance which subsists between his opinion and his practice. May we not suspect that the tranquillity which Mr. Gibbon derived from his thoughtlessness as a boy was not granted to his hours of reflection when he became a full-grown man? While Mr. Gibbon was preparing the Memoirs of his own life and writings, he certainly had not "forgotten the past." The motives which enabled him to "enjoy the present," will not excite the envy of a wise or a good man, and "in the future," he had only to anticipate the pain he was about to inflict, and the reproaches he was about to call down upon a race of academics, by whose faults he had never been injured, and into whose virtues and studies he had very slightly enquired.

If Mr. Gibbon had intended only to convince the public that all the literary exploits, for which he was so justly celebrated, had been atchieved suo marte, he might have been content shortly and poignantly to notice the injudicious regulations of the Palæstra when he frequented it, and the ignorance or negligence of the Gymnasiarchs, who were appointed to instruct him. But why are eight or nine pages employed in doing that which might have been done as effectually and more decorously in four or five sentences?

I have sometimes been inclined to think that Mr. Gibbon had received, or fancied himself to have received, provocations more recent than any which he has stated in his Memoirs. What they

were must be left to conjecture, and for conjecture there are some grounds.

That Mr. Gibbon was not inattentive to the reports at Oxford relative to himself is apparent from the forty-seventh page of his Memoirs. "The good sense of my father was astonished at my strange departure from the religion of my country. In the first sally of passion he divulged the secret, which prudence might have suppressed, and the gates of Magdalen College were for ever shut against my return. Many years afterwards, when the name of Gibbon was become as notorious as that of Middleton, it was industriously whispered at Oxford that the Historian had formerly turned Papist. My character stood exposed to the reproach of inconstancy, and this invidious topic would have been handled without mercy by my opponents, could they have separated my cause from that of the University."

As to the secret, if it had been kept, did Mr. Gibbon, the convert, mingle so little sincerity with his zeal, as to be capable of returning to Magdalen, even if he had not been forbidden to return? When the secret had been told, what other inconvenience, or I should rather say effect, can we suppose Mr. Gibbon to have experienced, according to Mr. Gibbon's own account, except that of being removed from a society in which he had never been instructed, and from a religion of which he had no longer approved. The men of Magdalen were faithful to their oaths, when they did not permit a Papist to reside in a Protestant Society. The men of Oxford spoke truth when they said that "the Historian had formerly turned Papist." In regard to the opponents of Mr. Gibbon, who were not men of Magdalen; their compassion, their candour, their inability to determine whether his conversion to the Church of Rome was an act of inconstancy, or "an honest sacrifice of interest to conscience;" their good sense in discerning that such conversion, under either supposion, was wholly unconnected with the points in dispute between themselves and Mr. Gibbon; all or any of these reasons may have produced their silence. But as to the one reason, which alone Mr. Gibbon has assigned for what they did do, and from which he has inferred what under other circumstances they would have done, it is utterly inadmissible. The cause of Mr. Gibbon, as a convert to Papacy, is separate in

all its principles, and all its circumstances, from the cause of the University to which his opponents belonged. If the men of Magdalen were right in preventing Mr. Gibbon's return, the University would have claimed no praise. If the men of Magdalen were wrong, the University would have deserved no blame.

It must be owned that Mr. Gibbon's opponents did not bestow any commendation upon his possible integrity. But, did they take any advantage of his actual delusion? Did they expatiate in any general harangues upon the proneness of the human mind to wander from one extreme to another; "to try all things" with equal eagerness; and ultimately "to hold fast" that which may not be good? Did they attempt any analysis of those mental idiosyncrasies, which seek for gratification in variety, and find it in singularity? Did they draw up any scale of gradation, according to which we may pass on from the exercise of subtlety to the love of sophistry, from impatience under doubt to captiousness amidst proofs, or from indiscriminate inquisitiveness with conscious ignorance, to excessive refinement with conscious knowledge? Did they produce any arguments or any examples to shew, that from the offensive and perilous obstinacy of dogmatism, there is a surer refuge in the wariness and moderation of academic philosophy, than in the versatility and indifference of the sceptical? They did not; and therefore, after noticing the ungracious terms in which this forbearance is mentioned, and the unsatisfactory manner in which it is explained, we must look for some other cause of Mr. Gibbon's dislike to the University.

Had, then, the oral traditions of Oxford preserved and disseminated any of those childish foibles and trifling infirmities, which mean and malicious adversaries often bring forward to insult the learned, or to degrade the virtuous? Was it the custom of Oxford to say, that the erudition of Mr. Gibbon was superficial, that his judgment was weak, that his taste was incorrect, and that his compositions were unworthy of that fame which he had acquired, and which, in his reply to Mr. Davis, he represents "as the motives and the rewards of his labours?" Did the members of Oxford, in their corporate capacity, pass any direct vote of censure upon a work which from its matter in some places could not be expected to please, and from its manner in other places may have been intended to provoke? Shrink-

ing from the danger of assailing Mr. Gibbon with the weapons of argument, did they endeavour to strike him down with the iron mace of the law? Did they raise against this mighty champion of infidelity the passions of a blind and infuriate rabble, just as upon another occasion, but without their concurrence, and, I trust, approbation, those passions have been since stirred up against a well-known Heresiarch? Did they hold him up to public abhorrence as a sly and malevolent enemy, who, instead of destroying the outworks of Christianity by the batteries of opposition, was attempting to sap the very citadel by the mines of insinuation? Nil horum. What, then, was the wrong? Two confederate Doctors, it seems, of this University, men "whose zeal (vol. ii. p. 603) was indeed enlightened by some rays of knowledge," but whose habits of study and conversation appeared to have left them in total ignorance of the principles which universally regulate the opinions and practice of mankind," (p. 615.) had ventured to write against Mr. Gibbon. The same offence had been committed by Mr. Davis, who was a Batchelor of Arts in Oxford, and who had undertaken, as Mr Gibbon informs us, "to write before he had read." They who have perused Mr. Gibbon's Vindication, can have no doubt of his talents to convert defensive war into that which is offensive; and they may be supposed to believe, that the correction which had been formerly inflicted on the two Doctors and the Bachelor of Arts was quite equal to the crimes of which they had been guilty. How far, then, is the University responsible for those crimes? I have never been told that a vote of thanks was passed in favour of the two Doctors; though I have somewhere heard that the Bachelor of Arts was honoured with the degree of Master.

But if this was the enormity which roused Mr. Gibbon's indignation, and inflicted so deep, so lasting, so venomous a wound upon his feelings, we may surely apply to him what he had observed of Mr. Davis, "that in his philosophy all sins are of equal magnitude."—Vol. ii. p. 542.

It were unnecessary for me to vindicate either the propriety of the general usage or the conduct of Oxford, in bestowing a mark of distinction upon Mr. Davis, whose purpose it was to elucidate questions which Oxford could not slight; and whose

exertions, though not completely successful, do credit to the education which Oxford furnished. Academical degrees, I am aware, may sometimes be lavished with intemperate zeal, and sometimes refused by churlish bigotry. The cabals of interested or prejudiced individuals may overrule the good sense and defeat the good nature of a learned body. Great, however, is the aggregate of wisdom and liberality, for which our Universities are indebted to the influence of literature, philosophy, and religion; and where, let me ask, are we to look for a community, numerous in its members, and fluctuating in its component parts, so exempt from human frailty, as never to be blinded by prepossession, never beguiled by suspicion, never warped by party, never, even with right intention, led astray into measures which a calm and sagacious bye-stander would pronounce wrong? Suffice it then to say, that the practice of conferring degrees upon authors has from time immemorial been adopted in foreign as well as in our own Universities; and that, on many important occasions, it has been employed in favour of many celebrated men, who, being engaged in the best causes, and actuated by the best motives, have put forth the greatest abilities with the greatest effect.

When a writer has spoken so frequently, and, in truth, so handsomely of himself, as Mr. Gibbon, and so acrimoniously of almost all his antagonists, it is no violation either of charity or decorum, to examine the soundness of his pretensions, not to veracity, indeed, but to impartiality and candour. Willing I am to make all due allowances for the soreness of a controversialist, for the irritability of a valetudinarian, for indolence, impatient of being disturbed in that sweet repose which succeeds exertion, and for conscious merit, indignant at rude interruption in the career of its triumphs. I must, however, take the liberty of saying, that Mr. Gibbon retained his resentments more stedfastly, and felt them more painfully, than his discretion or his pride would suffer him to acknowledge. The softness of his expressions often gave a sharper edge to the severity of his invectives, and the gaiety of ridicule is often employed by him, not as a check but as a disguise to the fierceness of anger. The haughtiness of defiance itself had few charms for his mind, unless it were accompanied by the poignancy of sarcasm; and, instead of crushing

his opponents with confutation only, he chose rather to pierce them again and again with sneers, exulting, it should seem, in the abilities which he possessed, ita ferire, ut, ii quos vicisset, crebris et minutis ictibus se mori sentirent.—Suetonius, in Vit. Calig. par. 30.

A man of his various, extensive, and recondite learning, must have known morem fuisse Graiis, cùm inter se bellum gessissent, ut ii qui vicissent, tropæum aliquod in finibus statuerent, victoriæ modo in præsentiâ declarandæ causâ, non ut in perpetuum* belli memoria maneret.—Cicero de Inventione, lib. ii. p. 79. Vide Grut. edit.

But the literary hostilities in which Mr. Gibbon was engaged were, it seems, not to be conducted on the equitable and humane conditions Graiorum cum Graiis concertantium. His adversaries were for the most part βάρβαροι, ἢ ὅτι ἂν εἴποι τις.—Vide Dem. Olynph. iii. p. 33. edit. Reiske. In the war upon their part ἄτακτα, ἀόριστα, ἀδιόρθωτα ἅπαντα.—Vide Demosth. Phil. i. vol. i. p. 50. And on the part of Mr. Gibbon πόλεμος ἦν ἄσπονδος, ἀκήρυκτος, ἄπαυστος. Orat. de Cor. vol. i. p. 314. Thucyd. lib. ii. par. 1. Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 1095. Julian, Orat. iii. p. 368.

Where he professed to despise only, he attacked, or repelled attacks, like one who hated odio Vatiniano. Not content with disarming and vanquishing his antagonists, he trampled them under foot. As if dissatisfied with the proud eminence of his own fame, unless it rested on the base of other men's infamy, he has endeavoured to perpetuate the remembrance of his enmity when the causes of hostility had ceased, and when, according to his own belief (not mine), and his own wishes, his foes were sinking apace into that gulph where bigots, sciolists, and dunces are forgotten. Æternum inimicitiarum monumentum, æneum statuit tropæum.—Cic. de Inv. lib. ii.

This charge is not adduced rashly, and it shall be supported strongly.

Mr. Gibbon, in the opening of his answer to Mr. Davis and other opponents, says, "That he might have acted in strict

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* Οὐδε παρ' Ἕλλησιν οἱ πρῶτοι λίθινον καὶ χαλκοῦν στήσαντες τρόπαιον εὐδοκιμοῦσι.—Plutarch, Quæst. Roman. vol. ii. p. 273.

conformity to the rule of prudence, if he had persevered in patient silence; but that the defence of his own honour urged him to repel with vigour an unjust and unprovoked attack. His adversary, indeed, (Mr. D.) does not appear to have recollected that modesty is an amiable and useful qualification, till he had arrived at the last page of his work;" nor did he find, till Mr. Gibbon politely informed him of it, that a "mature judgment was indispensably requisite for the successful execution of any work of literature, and more especially of criticism." Mr. Gibbon, however, "could not" remain cold and indifferent with regard to the attempts which were made "to deprive him of the most valuable object of his possessions, or at least of his hopes." With strong marks, therefore, or I should rather say with strong professions, of reluctance, "he proceeded upon his hostile march over a dreary desert, where thirst, hunger, and intolerable weariness, were much more to be dreaded than the arrows of the enemy," and in my opinion, as well as his own, he was lucky enough "to pick up something curious and useful, even in the barren waste of controversy." Now, let us attend to the concluding paragraph: "It is not without some mixture of mortification and regret, that I now look back upon the number of hours which I have consumed, and the number of pages which I have filled, in vindicating my literary and moral character from the charge of wilful misrepresentations, gross errors, and servile prejudices. I cannot derive any triumph or consolation from the occasional advantages which I have gained over three adversaries, whom it is impossible for me to consider as objects either of terror or esteem. The spirit of resentment, and every other lively sensation, have long been extinguished, and the pen would long since have dropped from my weary hand, had I not been supported in the execution of this ungrateful task by the consciousness, or at least the opinion, that I was discharging a debt of honour to the public and to myself. I am impatient to dismiss, and to dismiss for ever, this odious controversy, with the success of which I cannot surely be elated, and I have only to request, that, as soon as my readers are convinced of my innocence, they will forget my vindication."—Vol. ii. p. 628.

Why then, let me ask, was that vindication republished by the noble Editor? Why was any discretionary power of repub-

lishing it granted to a gentleman who was surrounded by so many incentives to republish it, whose judgment, so far as the contents of it were unfavourable to our Universities, was under no guidance from his personal experience, whose habitual reverence for Mr. Gibbon might have produced habitual and implicit confidence, and whose attachment to him, sincere and rooted as it was, might have exposed him to the keenest sympathy, even in the supposed wrongs of a friend so beloved and so admired? Why was not the republication of it explicitly, peremptorily, and solemnly forbidden by the learned author? Did he mean a second time to vindicate himself? No, surely; for his vindication was, in his own view at least, complete before. As to his adversaries, they "were no objects of terror or esteem:" and after having said concerning one of them, "that his book is hastening to oblivion, and will cease to be read," he apprehends "that grammarians may already reproach him for the use of an improper tense." Was it his purpose, then, to protect the characters of other men from adversaries who were lurking in ambuscade, and lying on the watch for a favourable opportunity to rush upon their prey, whether among the living or among the dead. This doubtless were an important and honourable purpose; but it was not, nor could it be, the purpose of Mr. Gibbon. So far then as I can explain the fact from circumstances, the vindication was republished because it had been written with effort; because it had been published with success; because, from the dexterity of the reasoning, the nicety of the distinctions, the clearness of the explanations, the occasional felicity of the retorts, and the general splendour of the style, it might increase the fame of Mr. Gibbon for ability as a writer, even at the expence of his reputation for consistency as a moralist; because, having been inserted in a work which must attract the attention of posterity, it will stand as a lofty and lasting memorial of Mr. Gibbon's opinion, that "the champions who are enlisted in the service of authority commonly wear the uniform of the regiment; that, oppressed by the same yoke, and covered by the same trappings, they heavily move along, perhaps not with an equal pace, in the same beaten track of prejudice and preferments;" and that "our two Universities most undoubtedly contain the same mixture, and most probably the

same proportion of zeal and moderation, of reason and superstition."—Vide the Vindication, vol. ii. p. 602, 603.. If the last observation be just, the fate both of the persons to whom it is applied, and of the writer by whom it was made, seems remarkable. Cambridge, upon this one occasion, displayed all her excellencies, and Oxford, in a luckless hour, exposed all her faults. In the Cambridge Professor Mr. Gibbon found only reason and moderation; so much reason, that he "would not have blushed (vol. ii. p. 599 and 600) to call Dr. Watson his antagonist;" and so much moderation that, "supposing the only question which remained between them to relate to the degree of the weight and effect of those secondary causes which established Christianity," and "being persuaded that the Doctor's philosophy, like his own, was not of the dogmatic kind, he would have been happy to call him his friend." But, in the Oxford Doctors, and the Oxford B. A. he had found only the impetuosity of zeal, and the blindness of superstition. He therefore "enjoyed the present and anticipated the future," when he confuted and insulted them; and that he "did not forget the past;" when he spoke of the place in which they were educated.

Hinc, or as some will choose to read with Bentley, Hæc illæ lacrymæ.

When Aristotle had occasion to express his dissent from the opinions of his master Plato, about ideas, he thought it incumbent upon him to make one apology: *Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φιλοῖν, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀληθείαν.* But Mr. Gibbon was tied by no bonds of friendship to the University of Oxford, and therefore he was incumbered with no obligations to contend, or even to search for the whole truth, when he spoke of its defects. Aristotle, however, in spite of his smooth professions, has been charged by others, as well as by Plato, with jealousy and ingratitude; and my own charity, I confess, restrained as it is by my conviction, will not permit me to lavish on Mr. Gibbon unqualified praise for delicacy, justice, or placability.

Let me, however, commend him where commendation is due. Mr. Gibbon, in his Memoirs, acknowledges "Mr. Viner's benefaction to the University of Oxford, not to have been unprofitable, since it had produced the excellent Commentaries of Sir W. Blackstone."—Vol. i. p. 63.

He observes, too, "with pleasure, that, in the University of Oxford, Dr. Lowth, with equal eloquence and erudition, had executed his task as a Professor, in his incomparable Prælections on the Poetry of the Hebrews."—Vol. i. p. 37. In reality, when the merits of Dr. Lowth occurred to the mind of Mr. Gibbon, he cannot be said laudare malignè; for in the heat of his controversy, or in the pride of his triumph over his Oxford antagonists, he pauses for a moment, to quote with approbation a passage in Isaiah which had "been elegantly translated by Dr. Lowth, and to mention with pleasure the labours of the respectable prelate, who, in that translation, as well as in a former work, had very happily united the most critical judgment with the taste and spirit of poetry."—Vol. ii. p. 561.

In one part of his Memoirs he supposes other men likely "to assert that in the course of forty years many improvements had taken place in Magdalen College and in the University, and he acknowledges himself not unwilling to believe that some tutors might have been found more active than one, and less contemptible than another, of his own instructors."—P. 51. After admitting, however, what was possible, he does not claim the merit of having enquired what was true; and in many instances he has spoken of Oxford with a severity which could be justified only by his conviction that the improvements, which might have taken place in some degree, had not taken place in any degree whatsoever.

In the same page, he mentions Dr. John Burton as a man of whom it is recorded, "that he knew some Latin, some Greek, some Ethics and Metaphysics; that he taught his pupils what he knew; that he referred them to proper masters for the languages and sciences of which he was ignorant, and that another man like Burton, (for another man there was,) might, according to the measure of his capacity, be diligent and useful."

These concessions are quite as remarkable for their wariness, as for their courtesy. The commendation of Burton rests, not upon Mr. Gibbon's own knowledge, but upon the vague and general testimony of other persons. The commendation of that other man, Bentham, does not rise into panegyric, because, we are told, "that he preferred the school-knowledge to the new philosophy, Bergursdicius to Locke." Nay, the commendation

granted to Dr. Burton, as a tutor, is sullied a little by the account that is given of his imperfections in another character; for "this hero (Dr. Burton) appears," says Mr. Gibbon, "in his own writings a stiff and conceited pedant." In this cautious and frugal spirit has Mr. Gibbon been pleased τῇ χειρὶ σπείρειν his civilities upon Dr. Burton.

But upon Sir William Scott and Archbishop Markham he bravely pours them forth ὅλῳ τῷ θυλάκῳ, and with all which he says of these very excellent men I was delighted, because it is said elegantly and deservedly. Indeed, if it had been Mr. Gibbon's fortune to be placed under the tuition of Dr. Burton, he would in all probability have been a much better Greek scholar; and under the auspices of such teachers as a Scott and a Markham, he certainly would not have been a worse writer, a worse historian, a worse philosopher, or a worse man.

"The expression of gratitude," says Mr. Gibbon, "is a virtue and a pleasure: a liberal mind will delight to cherish and celebrate the memory of its parents, and the teachers of science are the parents of the mind."

"Applauding the filial piety which it was impossible for him to imitate," but for the purpose, as it afterwards appears, of giving fuller effect to that filial impiety which it was both possible and proper for him to restrain, Mr. Gibbon produces the celebrated words of a celebrated prelate, in which he had told an antagonist, who was equally celebrated, that "he (Dr. Lowth) had been educated in the University of Oxford; that he had enjoyed all the advantages, both public and private, which that famous seat of learning so largely affords; that he had spent many years in that illustrious society, in a well-regulated course of discipline and studies; and in the agreeable and improving commerce of gentlemen and scholars; in a society where emulation without envy, ambition without jealousy, contention without animosity, incited industry and awakened genius; where a liberal pursuit of knowledge, and a genuine freedom of thought, was raised, encouraged, and pushed forward, by example, by commendation, and by authority: that he had breathed there the same atmosphere which the Hookers, the Chillingworths, and the Lockes had breathed before," &c. &c. This "eloquent passage" I have read again and again, with the same glow of

enthusiasm which Mr. Gibbon, or any other human being, ever felt upon reading it. I transcribe it now, as Mr. Gibbon professed to transcribe it before, "with pleasure;" and, after perusing it, after sympathising with it, after reflecting upon it, after considering the authority of the writer, his sagacity, his learning, his opportunities for obtaining information, his ability to use information when obtained, his respect for those who had instructed him, and his gratitude to those who had encouraged him, after contrasting his opinion, his situation, and his words, with the opinion, situation, and words of Mr. Gibbon, I cannot help exclaiming with confidence, Utri credere debetis, Academici?

I will "forbear to enquire," as Mr. Gibbon has forborne, "what benefits or what rewards were derived by Hooker, or Chillingworth, or Locke, from their academical institution."

Yet, these three men, be it remembered, were sagacious without refinement, and delicate without fastidiousness. They were calm but not cold: they had sensibility with self-command rather than querulousness with self-conceit. One of them was orthodox but not credulous; another was in some respects sceptical but not licentious; and a third was moderate but not irreverent or indifferent. Their views were extensive, their situation was interesting, and their writings were not barren of allusion to the events and characters of their own days. But, in what part of their large and useful works do these venerable men speak of Oxford, in that insidious, that affrontive, I had almost said, that vindictive spirit, which Mr. Gibbon has indulged?

What would they have said of Mr. Gibbon's philosophy, if they had found him not only retaining and even cherishing his resentments for the space of forty years, but endeavouring to perpetuate in his last, perhaps his most deliberate and most elaborate work, all the rash conclusions of his youth, all the hasty assumptions of his very boyhood, all the unkind suggestions of his prejudice, and all the unmanly complaints of his wrath?

What would they have said of his logic, when, from his own case, with a weakly frame of body, with a coldness of temperament which made him stand aloof from the gaiety of companions, and from the generous sympathy of friends, with peculiarities not very pliant, it should seem, to persuasion, nor obedient to authority; with an education which can hardly be allowed to

have prepared him for the lectures of a very learned tutor upon books generally esteemed to be above the ordinary reach of school boys; with impatience to learn, which is sometimes mistaken for willingness to be taught; with a waywardness of curiosity which might have impelled him to dispute where he should have been contented to observe, and discuss principles before he had collected facts; with a passion for "desultory reading," which, having been pampered by indulgence, might have resisted every attempt to direct its course or to contract its range; he thought himself authorized to argue to the case of other young men, whose educations, habits, and dispositions, were not similar to his own? When from his own College, with which, I confess, he was reasonably enough disgusted, he argued to other Colleges with which he was very imperfectly acquainted; when, from his own want of proficiency, during a short and interrupted residence of fourteen months, he argued to the proficiency made by other young men, who resided there regularly for the space of four years; when, from the general state of the University, if such it were, about his own time, he argued to the general state of it at a very distant period, and under instructors who might be very different in their attainments, their skill, and their diligence?

Non sat commodè
Divisa sunt temporibus tibi, Dave, hæc.

Mr. Gibbon, in some of the foregoing strictures, includes Cambridge as well as Oxford; and this circumstance enables me to resume more directly the vindication of both Universities from other objectors as well as Mr. Gibbon,

Mr. Gibbon, it should seem, considered the colourings in Dr. Lowth's description of Oxford as overcharged, and the outline too bold. Would he have assented then to the measured language of another great author, who resided more than fourteen months, or even four years, in the sister University; and who, as Mr. Gibbon himself tells upon another occasion, "to a great degree of well-digested reading adds a clearness of judgement and a niceness of penetration, capable of taking things from their first principles, and observing their most minute differences?"—Vol. ii. p. 27, Post. Works.

"Ingenious men," says Bishop Hurd, "delight in dreams of reformation. In comparing this proposition of Cowley (for the advancement of experimental philosophy) with that of Milton addressed to Mr. Hartlib, we find that these great poets had amused themselves with some exalted, and in the main, congenial fancies, on the subject of education. That of the two plans proposed, this of Mr. Cowley was better digested and is the less fanciful, if a preference in this respect can be given to either, when both are manifestly Utopian; and that our Universities, in their present form, are well enough calculated to answer all the reasonable ends of such institutions, provided we allow for the unavoidable defects of them when drawn out into practice."—Vol. i. p. 219, Hurd's edit. of Cowley's Works.

If the question had hung, as it were in scales, between the zeal of Bishop Lowth and the sobriety of Bishop Hurd, the evidence of Sir William Jones might have turned the balance. "There is no branch of literature," says this great scholar, of whom we shall all exclaim in his own words immediately preceding, it is happy for us that this man was born—"there is no liberal art, no sublime or useful science, which may not here be learned to perfection, without having recourse to any foreign instructor. All nature lies open to our inspection. The surprising fabric of this visible world has been explained to us, not by conjectures or opinions, but by demonstration; the works of poets, critics, rhetoricians, historians, philosopers, the accumulated wisdom of all nations and all ages, are here made accessible and familiar to the students of every class, in whose minds they are preserved as in a curious repository, whence they may at any time be extracted for the honour and benefit of the human species."—P. 8 of an Oration intended to have been spoken in the Theatre of the University of Oxford, 9th of July, 1773.

Mr. Gibbon probably spoke the truth, when he said, "that his three antagonists from Oxford inspired him with no terror." But Bishop Lowth, Bishop Hurd, and Sir W. Jones, are three men who might have excited his esteem; and the opinions of these three men, upon the merits of the English Universities differ, toto cœlo, from the opinion of Mr. Gibbon.

There are men (I know not whether Mr. Gibbon was of the number) to whom such an opponent as Dr. Johnson, upon such

a topic, as the honour of Cambridge and Oxford, might have been an object both of "terror and esteem." Now, in a paper of the Idler, Johnson has employed quite as good sense, in quite as good English, for the credit of our Universities, as Mr. Gibbon has since misemployed for their discredit.

"If literature," says he, "is not the essential requisite of the modern academic, I am yet persuaded that Cambridge and Oxford, however degenerated, surpass the fashionable academies of our metropolis, and the gymnasia of foreign countries. The number of learned persons in these celebrated seats is still considerable; and more conveniences and opportunities for study still subsist in them than in any other place.

"There is at least one very powerful incentive to learning—I mean the genius of the place. This is a sort of inspiring deity, which every youth of quick sensibility and ingenuous disposition creates to himself, by reflecting that he is placed under those venerable walls where a Hooker and a Hammond, a Bacon and a Newton, once pursued the same course of science, and from whence they soared to the most elevated heights of literary fame. This is that incitement, which Tully, according to his own testimony, experienced at Athens, when he contemplated the portico where Socrates sat, and the laurel-groves where Plato disputed. But there are other circumstances, and of the highest importance, which make our colleges superior to all places of education. These institutions, though somewhat fallen from their primary simplicity, are such as influence in a particular manner the moral conduct of their youths; and, in this general depravity of manners and laxity of principles, pure religion is no where more strongly inculcated. * * * *

"English Universities render their students virtuous, at least by excluding all opportunities of vice; and by teaching them the principles of the Church of England, confirm them in those of true Christianity."

I had finished the first division of this note, before I began the second about Mr. Gibbon; and I had reached nearly the end of that second division, before the sentiments of Dr. Johnson, as they may be found in the Idler, occurred to my mind. I am too discreet, too honest, and perhaps too proud, to be intentionally guilty of plagiarism from any writer whatsoever. But, I am too

ingenuous to dissemble the sincere, and exquisite satisfaction that I feel, upon finding that my own opinions, and even my own words, on the encouragement of learning, the preservation of morals, and the influence of religion, correspond so nearly with the opinions and the words of such an observer as Dr. Johnson, upon such a question as the merits of the English Univessities.

"For the time I have spent," and the efforts I have made, in this note, I with great sincerity, and great confidence, urge the plea of Mr. Gibbon, that "I am conscious of having discharged a momentous duty to the interests of the public, and to my own feelings." I do not, however, like Mr. Gibbon, desire the reader to forget the contents of that note when he is "convinced of their truth." On the contrary, I would exhort him to remember them when he is sensible of their importance, as well as truth; and, for the freedom of some parts, the seriousness of others, and the length of the whole, no vindication will be required by the considerate, as no apology would be accepted by the froward. Possible it is, however, that some readers may be a little wearied with the agonistical manner in which I have been now and then compelled to write about the strictures of Mr. Gibbon, and therefore, I will endeavour to refresh, to entertain, and even to instruct them, by adverting to his style.

The most accurate and masterly observations which I have ever seen from the pen of my contemporaries, either upon the beauties or the faults of Mr. Gibbon's language, appeared in the English Review, and were written, I believe, by Mr. Whitaker, a man, whose variety of knowledge, keenness of discernment, brilliancy of imagination, and vigour of diction, qualified him most eminently for the task which he has executed most successfully. But this very powerful writer, and very honest man, will I hope excuse me for observing, that in the Bibliotheca of Photius, p. 354, there is a critique upon the declamations of Himerius the Sophist, which, with one or two exceptions that I have ventured to omit, may be applied with the strictest justice to the historical writings of Mr. Gibbon.

*Ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ πᾶσι τὸν μὲν τῆς λέξεως τύπον καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα φυλάττων, τῇ τε περιβολῇ καὶ τῇ τροπῇ χρώμενος· * * * * * **

Παραδείγμασι δὲ ἐξ ἱστορίας τε καὶ ἐκ μύθων παντοδαπῶν μεστὰ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει τὰ γράμματα, ἢ πρὸς ἀπίδειξιν, ἢ πρὸς

ὁμοιότητα, ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ὧν λέγει, τούτοις ἀπευθύνων τὸν λόγον καὶ ποικιλλόμενος· καὶ τὰ προοίμια δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπίλογοι, ἔστι δὲ οὗ καὶ οἱ οἷον ἀγῶνες ἀπὸ τούτων αὐτῷ διασκευάζονται· πολλῇ δε κεχρῆται καὶ τῇ προδιατυπώσει· ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀσεβῆς (ὡς δῆλον ἐστὶ) τὴν θρησκείαν, εἰ καὶ τοὺς λαθραίους μιμεῖται τῶν κυνῶν, καθ' ἡμῶν ὑλακτῶν. — Photius, edit. Hoeschelius, p. 354.

Note 85, p. 397.

Mr. Peter Whalley, the learned editor of Ben Jonson's Works, was master of the school of Christchurch Hospital. Among the scholars educated there, I will just mention the name of Joshua Barnes, the well-known editor of Homer; of Mr. Jeremiah Markland, whose works are enumerated in the 19th page of Nichols's Anecdotes of Bowyer, and Mr. Richards, of Oriel College, Oxford, now living, who gained a prize or two in the University, who has lately published some very elegant Sermons for the Bampton Lectureship, and is author of several poems, in which the nervousness of Dryden is united with the ease of Goldsmith. I respect Mr. Richards as a truly good man; yet more than as a good writer. Mr. Coleridge the Poet was of the same school.*

Note 86, p. 397.

I have seen two or three instances of awkward and mutilated experiments to realize the plan of education proposed by M. Rousseau; and with sorrow, but not surprise, I have been a witness of their unhappy consequences. My consolation, however, was, that if the trial had been more correct and more complete, consistency must have been purchased at the expence of common

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* I just now recollect the names of Provost George, of Mr. Cracherode and Mr. Sawkins of Christ Church, of Dr. Langhorne, Mr. L. Sterne, Mr. Russel of Corpus, Oxford; of Mr. Maty and Dr. Scott of Trinity, Cambridge; of Dr. Hay of Magdalen, Cambridge; of Dr. Apthorpe, and (I believe) Mr. Dutens, as worthy of being inserted in the list of distinguished academics.

discretion, and success itself would have been more pernicious than failure—

"Quæ res
"Nec modum habet neque consilium, ratione modoque
"Tractari non vult."

By the incubation of modern philosophy upon modern philanthropy, other schemes have since been hatched by other experimentalists. I will not deprive them of the praise which may be due to indefatigable perseverance and occasional ingenuity. But their opinions, when compared with those of Rousseau, have fewer charms to the fancy, from the embroidery of description, and a feebler hold upon the judgment, from the regularity of system. On the first view, indeed, they produce the wildness of amazement rather than the vivacity of admiration. They afterwards perplex the understanding in a dark and barren wilderness of metaphysics, and they cramp the affections by confused representations of their contrariety to the dictates of reason, perfected by a long series of triumphs over education and custom. They beguile young and superficial readers by the witchery of new terms, and against their lapse from a state of illumination, they supply them with no other security than the habit of despising, and a dexterity in controverting the familiar language of fellow-creatures, with whom it is their privilege to converse without being understood, and to act without being imitated. They instruct their disciples to try all things by the test of their theory alone, and they direct them, after trial, to hold fast that which is good, because it is singular, for singularity, it should seem from their exoterics, is a presumptive evidence of reason in what they think, truth in what they speak, and justice in what they do.

The projects of these reformers, even where they resemble that of Rousseau, are not wise; and where they differ from it, they are not good. As to religion, not content with thrusting to a distance every prejudice in its favour, they anxiously store the mind with every prejudice against the utility and the truth of it. The milder virtues they push aside to make way for the sterner; and, in speculation, at least, they carry the sterner to an extent which no efforts of frail humanity can, in practice, ever reach.

After inculcating the most enlarged love of mankind, they teach individuals to strip themselves of all the qualities for which alone they are now beloved, by the visible and unalterable constitution of our nature. After vague and magnificent promises of effecting progressive and indefinite improvement in social life, they would proceed to overturn every known institution, and to supersede almost every known principle to which society seems to be indebted for its preservation and existence.

Undoubtedly the reforms projected by our new school, reverse the order in which civilization has been hitherto supposed to proceed; and the substance of its tenets has been thrown together, not unsuccessfully I think, into a Cento, which lately was sent to a friend of mine, and in which the selection of the topics fully compensates for the diversity of the allusions, the inequality of the style, and the uncouthness of the versification. For reasons of delicacy, "celabitur auctor." But the Cento itself (for so it was properly called by the writer) shall be produced, and it runs thus—

Nostrorum quæ sit sententia Dia Catonum:
Quid velit, et possit, nova quæ sapientia fertur,
Quantaque sit virtus, alienâ vivere quadrâ,
Expediam: memori tu signa in mente teneto.

Qui genus humanum ingenio exsuperare videntur,
Et sese rationis inire elementa, viasque
Nullius ante solo tritas accedere jactant,
Res sibi conantur, non se submittere rebus:
Publica privatis miscent, et sacra profanis:
Concubitu dant fræna vago: nata esse maritis
Jura negant. Sua cuique Deus fit dira Cupido.

En, quæ tot peperit, scelerosa atque impia facta,
Religio passim obteritur, pietasque fidesque
Funditus eversæ ingentem traxere ruinam,
Contemptæque jacent. Non sancti judicis ora
Tristia formidant, nec verba minacia legum,
Felices sine re, et tuti sine vindice, cives.

Quamvis limite humum multo signavit arator
Communem priùs, et multo sudore subegit,
Magnus ab integro rerum jam nascitur ordo:
Terra iterum communis erit, ne in commoda peccet
Publica neu priscæ subeant vestigia fraudis.

Aude igitur contemnere opes, et te quoque dignum
Finge novis rebus, placido cum viderit orbem
Lumine Libertas, et Justitia omnibus omnia
Annuerit, faustèque æquaverit omnibus omnes.

Hæc tibi si quando surgit felicior ætas,
Et nova signa novis præceptis ponere fas est,
Obscurata diu, et speciosa vocabula rerum
E tenebris retrahes studio expromesque fideli
Plurima, quæ nunquam genitor produxerat usus.

Neglectis propriis, aliena negotia solum
Curabis, sumesque animum censoris amici:
Ignosces vitiis: morum ambitiosa recides
Ornamenta: parum claris dabis undique lucem.
Nam si cultor eris veri, securus amoris
Atque odii, pariter narranda tacendaque dices,
Vulgabis commissa fide, positoque pudore,
Vivere nec voto metues nec crimine aperto.

Has inter curas, tibi ne labor improbus artus
Membraque conficiat paulatim, inhiansque lucello
Mentem affigat humo non hæc in munera natam.

Non uxor salvum te vult, non filia. Qui te
Pascit ager, tuus est, et, deficiente crumenâ,
Hinc nummos atque hinc tibi convectare licebit,
Arreptisque frui. Facit hæc meliora probatque
Utilitas,* justi quæ soli est mater et æqui.

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* What Aristotle says of old age in the present course of human affairs, might be applied to youth formed according to the new school: μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λόγισμον, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μεν

Quid mores sensusque velint, quid prosit amicis,
Ne tibi sit curæ. Toti te credere mundo,
Non patriæ, genitum fingas. Scelera ipsa nefasque
Hac mercede placent, famamque merentur honestam.

Lenire armatos, pacisque imponere morem
Ante tubæ sonitum: Naturæ jura volentes
Per populos serere, et natorum fœda patrumque
Sanguine purpureis sceptra extorquere Tyrannis,
Hæ tibi erunt artes. Sine regibus et sine bellis
Vivendi simul hæc fuerint fundamina jacta,
Materiem superabit opus, Ratione Magistrâ.

Quid quòd ab humanis rebus semotus, et extra
Sejunctus longè flammantia mœnia mundi,
Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur irâ,
Quem perhibent regnare, Deus. Natura beatis
Omnibus esse dedit, sua si bona, numine freti
Non ullo, norint; ipsi sibi fortiter æquam
Si mentem, precibus spretis et thure, parârint.
Scilicet in cœlo vita haud peritura piorum,
Culparumque graves pœnæ quas nescia veri
Religio quondam intonuit, sunt fabula vulgi.
Nox manet una omnes, et in omnia sæcula somnus.

Amidst the ease, the freedom, and the vigour of conversation as it is conducted in this country, few are the minds which can be long seduced from their allegiance to the authority of common sense; and, if I am not deceived as to the present state of public opinion, we may apply to some modern theories what Chrysippus said about the boasted Μεγαρικὰ ἐρωτήματα of Stilpo and Manedemus, σφοδρὰ ἐπὶ σοφία γενομένων αὐτῶν ἐνδόξων, νῦν εἰς ὄνειδος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος περιτέτραπται, ὡς τῶν μὲν παχύ-

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γὰρ λόγισμος τοῦ συμφέροντος, τὸ δὲ ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ. And again: ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοὶ, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος, ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν. —Arist. Rhetoric, lib. ii. cap. 15. edit. Cantab. 1728.

τερον, τῶν δὲ ἐκφανῶς σοφιζομένων ἔργα.—Plutarch, de Stoicorum Repugnantiis, vol. ii. p. 1036.

Whatsoever disapprobation I may have expressed of certain opinions, and whatsoever consequences I may apprehend from them to the innocence of individuals, and the welfare of society, I sincerely and anxiously disclaim all contempt for the abilities, and all hatred to the persons of the writers by whom those opinions are maintained. On the contrary, I think with a very judicious writer, "that professing to neglect their opinions," we may encourage them to overrate "the size of their own understandings, and the comprehensiveness of their views, and to impute our neglect to poverty and narrowness of intellect: but that a candid examination of the subjects which they discuss may tend to convince them that, in favouring improbable and unfounded hypotheses, so far from enlarging the bounds of human science, they are contracting it; that so far from promoting the improvements of the human mind, they are contracting it, and throwing us back again into the infancy of knowledge."—See p. 154. of an Essay on Population,* with remarks on the speculation of Mr. Condorcet, Mr. Godwin, and other writers, published in 1798.

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* The reader may compare the last chapter of this work with Aristotle's representation of *νοῦς* and *θεωρια*, in cap. vii. and viii. lib. x. edit. Oxon. of the Ethics, and with the hypothesis of Dr. Hutton: "That this life, instead of being considered as a state of probation for moral agents, should rather be considered as a state of information for beings capable of intellectual knowledge."—Vide Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. iii. p. 172.

To me it seems more probable, from analogy and from revelation, that intellect, under whatsoever modifications it may hereafter exist, upon whatsoever objects it may be employed, and to whatsoever degree it may be improved, will be connected with virtuous action; and that happiness, indefinitely increasing, will be the result of indefinite progression in both. Of what high importance, then, must be the moral habits which we acquire, and even the moral principles which we adopt, in this preparatory state? "In my Father's house," said Christ, "there are many mansions," and who shall assign limits to the wisdom of the Deity in appointing means of improvement, and through improvement of happiness, not only to the philosopher and the

Gladly do I bestow the tribute of my commendation on the general merits of this work, in soundness of matter, accuracy of reasoning, elegance of diction, and usefulness of effect. I admit unequivocally the fundamental principle of the writer, that by those general laws of nature, which constitute all experience, and therefore should regulate all our enquiries, "population, under certain circumstances, will increase in a geometrical proportion, and the produce of the earth in an arithmetical only." I admit the justness of his remark upon the resolute and extraordinary "adherence of Mr. Condorcet to his favourite principles," while he was "surrounded by so many facts" which glaringly "contradicted them," and lived among an "enlightened people, debased by such a fermentation of disgusting passions, fear, cruelty, revenge, ambition, madness, and folly, as would have disgraced the most barbarous nation in the most barbarous age, and must have given a most tremendous shock to his ideas about the necessary and irresistible progress of the human mind." —See p. 144 of the above-mentioned Essay.

I assent, in a very great degree, to his praise "on the spirit and energy of Mr. Godwin's stile, the force and precision of some of his reasonings, and the ardent tone of his thoughts."—P. 173.

I allow, not the truth only, but the importance of his observation, that "man is a rational, and, yet at the same time, a compound being, in whom the passions will act, as disturbing forces to the decisions of his understanding."

More particularly I am pleased with the conclusion of cap. vii. where he presents his readers with a most luminous description "of the vices of mankind as the great precursors in the army of destruction; of sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, advancing in dreadful array, and sweeping off their thousands and tens of thousands; and gigantic famine stalking in the rear,

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Christian, but to the wild barbarian and the "ignorant savage?" Whether or no the term "probationary" be applicable to the situation of man, considered as an intellectual as well as a moral being in this life, the "evidence for a future state of felicity" appears to me quite as conclusive from his present condition under the one character as under the other.

and levelling with one mighty blow the population, with the food of mankind;" with chapter viii. where he examines Mr. Condorcet's "sketch of the history of the human mind;" with chapter ix. where he refutes the "conjectures of the same philosopher on the organic perfectability of man, and the indefinite prolongation of human life;" and with chapter x. where he demonstrates, that "Mr. Godwin's scheme of equality never can be realized, and that were it realized it would soon cease, and drive us back from the transient blessings of an ill-directed and overstrained benevolence to all the terrible evils of the most corrupt and ferocious selfishness."

Viewed on the fairer side of his character, Mr. Condorcet seems to have been worthy of happier times than those in which he lived, of better colleagues than those with whom he acted, and of enemies far nobler than those by whom he was destroyed. His knowledge was various and recondite, his genius was vigorous and comprehensive, and upon one atrocious deed, to which he was impelled by the frenzy of political resentment, and the waywardness of philosophical fanaticism, who does not wish that "the accusing angel may drop a tear?" *Κύριε, μὴ στήσῃς αὐτῷ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ταύτην· ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς κατακρίνοντας αὐτὸν μῦσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ.*

Note 87, p. 400.

In the Ductor Dubitantium, p. 1706, where Taylor is speaking of the parental authority, when it may appear to clash with that of God, he mentions an excellent maxim of the lawyers: "In comparatione personarum, inest læsio et injuria." This very sensible maxim may be applied to many cases of morality: to the distinctions, for instance, that might be set up between one distressed person and another, upon account of their religious tenets; to the claims of a native and a foreigner upon our compassion; to the comparative rights of a good man and a benefactor to our assistance, &c. &c.

The decisions which a man of fertile imagination or polemical acuteness, might make upon such cases, are plausible rather than instructive in theory; and the general rules drawn from them, would, in practice, be often fallacious. In the mere statement of

such distinctions, for the purpose of wholly excluding the pleas of one claimant, and establishing those of the other, "inest læsio et injuria."

NOTE 88, p. 401.

For my knowledge of the suit presented to the King and his Council, by the Citizens of London, in 1552, and of the preamble to the Ordinances and Rules drawn out for the good government of the house of Bridewell, as it is supposed by Sir Martin Bowes, and addressed to the Governors, or rather Almoners of Bridewell, in 1557; I am indebted to the Postscript to some Considerations on the original and proper Objects of the Royal Hospital of Bridewell, printed at London in 1798. The pamphlet is well written, and seems to have been well intended. But upon making some inquiries about the actual state of that Hospital, I had lately the satisfaction to hear that it is very judiciously governed. A short account of the Royal Hospitals may be found in pages 34 and 35 of Mr. Entick's Survey of London, Westminster, and Southwark, vol. ii. Henry VIII. in the last year of his reign, gave the Priory of St. Bartholomew to the City, for the relief of the poor. He founded two religious houses, Christ Church out of the Grey Friars, and little St. Bartholomew's out of St. Bartholomew's Hospital. But King Edward VI. by the advice of Bishop Ridley, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council, founded Christ's Hospital in the Grey Friars' Convent, for the relief and education of young and helpless children. By the advice of Bishop Ridley, he gave the old palace of Bridewell to the City, for the lodging of poor way-faring persons, the correction of vagabonds, strumpets, and idle persons, and for finding them work; and as the City had appointed Christ's Hospital for the education of poor children, and St. Bartholomew's, and St. Thomas's in Southwark, for the maimed and diseased, Edward, in the seventh year of his reign, by a charter, dated June 6th, formed the Governors of these Foundations into a Corporation. The Priory of Bethlehem was suppressed by King Henry VIII. and in the year 1546, the Mayor and Commonalty purchased the said Priory from the Crown; and it was by them converted into an Hospital for the use of lunatics, at a certain expence to be paid weekly by the relations or parish of the patient admitted.—Entick, iii. 406.

NOTE 89, p. 401.

These words convince me that thievery, actually committed, though not proved by legal process, and presumed only from the temptations to which vagrants are exposed, was within the view of the Founders and Governors of Bridewell. When they speak directly of prisoners, they describe them as persons who were "quit at the Sessions;" but it appears to me that they meant to afford protection to other unhappy beings who had lost their credit in consequence of the suspicions to which they lay open for want of honesty; and even of the prisoners acquitted, it may be supposed that their moral innocence was often doubtful, whatever circumstances might produce their legal exemption from punishment.

NOTE 90, p. 402.

I found this speech of the King in a note to p. 11 of the above-mentioned Considerations on Bridewell Hospital.

NOTE 91, p. 402.

"Quoties audisset, cito ac nullo cruciatu defunctum quempiam, sibi et suis εὐθανασίαν similem (hoc enim verbo uti solebat) precabatur."—Suet. in vitâ Aug. par. 99, p. 285, edit. Grævii.

NOTE 92, p. 402.

"I have understood concerning divers vicious persons, that none have been so free in their donatives and offerings to religion and the priest, as they; and the hospitals that have been built, and the highways mended at the price of souls, are too many for Christendom to boast of in behalf of charity."—Jeremy Taylor's 12th Sermon, p. 117.

[The contents of the printed Sermon, from p. 403, l. 5, to p. 409, l. 5, were not preached.]

NOTE 93, p. 403.

I quote from the old translation retained in our Prayer-book. The later translation, printed in our Bibles, says, "but a moment."

NOTE 94, p. 404.

"Robbery," says Beccaria, "is commonly the effect of misery and despair, the crime of that unhappy part of mankind to whom the right of exclusive property has left but a bare existence."—Essay on Crimes and Punishments, chap xxii. p. 83. I agree with Beccaria about the mitigation of punishment for robbery, unaccompanied by violence, and about the increased severity of punishment when violence does accompany it. But I totally dissent from him where, in the sentence just now quoted, he calls exclusive property a "terrible, and perhaps unnecessary right;" and I have separated his words from the context, for the purpose of opposing to them the wiser opinion of Plutarch: "*Ἀλλ' ὅπου τὸ ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ἀπόλλυται τὸ κοινὸν, ὅπου μὲν οὖν μὴ ἴσον ἐστίν. Οὐ γὰρ οἰκείου κτῆσις, ἀλλ' ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου, καὶ πλεονεξία περὶ τὸ κοινὸν, ἀδικίας ἦρξε καὶ διαφορᾶς· ἣν ὅρῳ καὶ μέτρῳ τοῦ ἰδίου καταπαύοντες οἱ νόμοι τῆς ἴσα νεμούσης εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπώνυμοι γεγόνασιν.*"—Plutarch, vol. ii. page 644. The learned reader, without any warning from me, will attend to the legal and moral sense of *ἴσον* as used by the Greek writers.

NOTE 95, p. 405.

When I apply the word evil here to punishment as well as to crime, I speak only of physical evil. For the application of the word to punishment I have very high authority in Mr. Bentham: "The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to subtract from that happiness: in other words, to exclude mischief. But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as

far as it promises to exclude some greater evil."—Introduction to the Principles of Morals, chap. xiii. p. 166.

NOTE 96, p. 405.

"If the passions, or the necessity of war, have taught men to shed the blood of their fellow-creatures, the laws, which are intended to moderate the ferocity of mankind, should not increase it by examples of barbarity, the more horrible, as this punishment is usually attended with formal pageantry. What are the true and most useful laws? Those compacts and conditions which all would propose and observe, in those moments when private interest is silent, or combined with that of the public. What are the natural sentiments of every person concerning the punishment of death? We may read them in the contempt and indignation with which every one looks on the executioner, who is nevertheless an innocent executor of the public will; a good citizen, who contributes to the advantage of society; the instrument of the general security within, as good soldiers are without. What then is the origin of this contradiction? Why is this sentiment of mankind indelible, to the scandal of reason? It is, that in a secret corner of the mind, in which the original impressions of nature are still preserved, men discover a sentiment which tells them that their lives are not lawfully in the power of any one; but of that necessity only, which with its iron sceptre rules the universe."—Beccaria on Crimes and Punishments, edit. 4, chap. xviii. p. 112. See Sir William Temple, on Popular Discontents, vol. iii. page 55.

NOTE 97, p. 405.

In Julian's first Oration there is a passage which no benevolent man can read without heaving a sigh, and imploring the pity of legislators, judges, and magistrates, upon the poor, in this melancholy and awful season of scarcity: Πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τρυφὴ μόνον ἦθος διαφθείρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεὴς δίαιτα, ἐφ' ὧν οὔπω τὸ κρίνειν ὁ λόγος προσλαβὼν ἕπεται ταῖς χρείαις ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀναπειθόμενος.—Page 46.

NOTE 98, p. 406.

Τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος αὖ, πολλῶν μὲν λόγων καὶ καλῶν μάλα ἔμπειρον ἥγημαι· φοβοῦμαι δὲ μήπως ἄστοχον ἅμα καὶ φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν ᾖ καὶ πολιτικῶν.—Plat. Timæus, vol. iii. page 19.

NOTE 99, p. 406.

I think that in our moral, and perhaps our legal treatment of offenders, sufficient attention is not shown to the feeling of shame. The reader, if he pleases, may consult Beccaria in the 23d chapter, where he treats of infamy considered as a punishment, and says that "it should not be too frequent, because the power of opinion grows weaker by repetition, nor inflicted on a number of persons at the same time, because the infamy of many resolves itself into the infamy of none." Mr. Howard,* in his admirable book upon prisons, states, in several instances, the wisdom and the humanity of the laws in some foreign countries, where punishments are infamous rather than painful. The most remarkable instance of which I have ever read occurs in Stobæus. I would not gravely recommend it as an example worthy of imitation; but I will produce it as a fact which is very singular, and which shows the great stress laid by the laws upon the efficacy of shame. Παρ' Ἰνδοῖς ἐάν τις ἀποστερηθῇ δανείου, ἢ παρακαταθήκης, οὐκ ἔστι κρίσις· ἀλλ' αὐτὸν αἰτιᾶται ὁ πιστεύσας· ὁ δὲ τεχνίτου πηρώσας χεῖρα ἢ ὀφθαλμὸν θανάτῳ ζημιοῦται· τὸν δὲ μέγιστα ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ βασιλεὺς κελεύει κείρασθαι, ὡς ἐσχάτης οὔσης ταύτης ἀτιμίας.—Stob. p. 293.

NOTE 100, p. 406.

The effects of remorse, as it relates to the opinion of mankind, are most luminously described by Adam Smith: "The violator of the more sacred laws of justice can never reflect on the sentiments which mankind must entertain with regard to him, without feeling all the agonies of shame, and horror, and consterna-

* See his Account of the "Spanish Mantle," page 76.

tion. When his passion is gratified, and he begins coolly to reflect on his past conduct. he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it. They appear now as detestable to him as they did always to other people. By sympathizing with the hatred and abhorrence which other men must entertain for him, he becomes in some measure the object of his own hatred and abhorrence." "The remembrance of his crimes has shut out all fellow-feeling with him from the hearts of his fellow-creatures. The sentiments which they entertain with regard to him are the very thing which he is most afraid of. Every thing seems hostile, and he would be glad to fly to some inhospitable desert, where he might never more behold the face of a human creature, nor read in the countenance of mankind the condemnation of his crimes. But solitude is still more dreadful than society. His own thoughts can present him with nothing but what is black, unfortunate, and disastrous, the melancholy forebodings of incomprehensible misery and ruin. The horror of solitude drives him back into society, and he comes again into the presence of mankind, astonished to appear before them loaded with shame and distracted with fear, in order to supplicate some little protection from the countenance of those very judges who he knows have already unanimously condemned him. Such is the nature of that sentiment which is properly called remorse; of all the sentiments which can enter the human breast the most dreadful. It is made up of shame from the sense of impropriety of past conduct, of grief for the effects of it, and of the dread and terror of punishment from the consciousness of the justly provoked resentment of all rational creatures."—Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. pp. 209—211, 7th edition.

NOTE 101, p. 407.

"The all-wise Author of nature has made man, if I may say so, the immediate judge of mankind; and has in this respect, as in many others, created him after his own image, and appointed him his vice-gerent upon earth, to superintend the behaviour of his brethren. They are taught by nature to acknowledge that power and jurisdiction which has thus been conferred upon him, to be more or less humbled or mortified when they have incurred

his censure, and to be more or less elated when they have obtained his applause."—Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. page 320-1.

NOTE 102, p. 408.

"I do not pretend to lessen that just abhorrence which crimes deserve, but to discover the sources from whence they spring, and I think I may draw the following conclusion: That the punishment of a crime cannot be just (that is necessary) if the laws have not endeavoured to prevent that crime by the best means which times and circumstances would allow."—Beccaria on Crimes and Punishments, page 131.

NOTE 103, p. 410.

I have often had occasion to observe both the justness and the importance of a remark in Mosheim's notes upon Cudworth: "Qui Theologorum scita et dogmata vituperare volunt, eos ante omnia decet, et sententiam eorum investigare, et sermonis, quo utuntur illi, generi adsuescere. Sed, ut hodie vivitur, nulli sunt audaciores et vehementiores in communibus sententiis et opinionibus vellicandis et reprehendendis, quàm illi, qui ne vocabulorum quidem, quibus utimur, veras potestates et notiones perspectas habent."—Vol. ii. page 589.

"In later times," says Mr. Hume, "philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, have been more closely united with theology than ever they were observed among the heathens; and as this latter science admits of no terms of composition, but bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose, without much regard to the phenomena of nature, or to the unbiassed sentiments of the mind, hence reasoning, and even language, have been warped from their natural course, and distinctions have been endeavoured to be established, where the difference of the object was, in a manner, imperceptible. Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise, treating all morals as on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the sanctions of reward and punishment, were necessarily led to render this circumstance of voluntary or involuntary the foundation of their whole theory."—Essays, p. 391, vol. ii. edit. 1767.

Whatsoever may have been the errors of philosophers under the disguise of theologians, Adam Smith seems to have thought that between the belief of futurity and the moral sentiments of mankind, there is not any necessary or invincible contrariety; and I suppose that he would not have refused to the doctrines of revelation among those who acknowledge its authority that efficacy, which he granted to the dictates of natural religion. "Our reverence for general rules of conduct, says he, is still further enhanced by an opinion, which is first impressed by nature, and afterwards confirmed by reason and philosophy, that these important rules of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will finally reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors of their duty."—Theory, vol. i. p. 407.

But though a philosopher would regard the operations of our moral faculties, and the influence of future rewards conjointly, it may yet be true that theologians slight the former and attend to the latter only. Let us then examine the fact, keeping in view Mr. Hume's observation upon the difference between the antient and the modern way of treating ethics.

Mr. Hume, it is apparent, speaks of writers who have some claim to philosophical acuteness, and therefore the point in dispute will not be at all affected by the extravagant decrees of councils, the gloomy visions of fanatics, or the frantic ravings of evangelical itinerants.

That among Christians ethics should be more frequently connected with theology than they were among heathens, is a fact for which we may easily account, when we consider, not only that the evidences by which Christianity is accompanied are far brighter and more numerous than those which belong to the religions of antiquity; but that the doctrines of it have a closer and more direct connection with the principles of virtue; and as one peculiar and professed design of the Gospel was to establish the belief of a future life, it were strange if the teachers of it overlooked a consideration upon which the author of it so much insisted. They would show, indeed, a very imperfect knowledge of human nature itself, if, in restraining men from vice, or encouraging them to virtue, they were not to avail themselves of the influence which the prospect of futurity must have upon the generality of mankind. But they are not inattentive to other

considerations which may excite their hearers or their readers to a virtuous conduct from other motives. They dwell upon the reasonableness, as well as the authority of their Lord's commands. They shew the tendency of those commands to promote our present as well as our future welfare. In recommending virtue from a regard to temporal concerns, they insist upon the benefits of health, of reputation, serenity of mind, and the public as well as the private good of their fellow-creatures.

Mr. Hume in the same essay tells us that "every man may employ terms as he pleases." But whatever innovations may have been made by theologians in language, they certainly are not greater than those which he has himself employed, when, in conformity to the genius of the Latin rather than the English tongue, he transfers the word virtue to endowments of the mind, merely intellectual, and when he extends the word approbation and disapprobation, to blemishes, defects, and their contraries, which, in the common judgment of the world, are loosely connected with the idea of morality. Though Christian divines unquestionably have treated morals as guarded by the sanctions of rewards and punishments, they have not ceased to "regard the phænomena of nature and the unbiassed sentiments of the mind," nor have "they warped reasoning and language from their natural course." Consistent they certainly were in assuming the distinction of voluntary and involuntary, when they speak of laws: "for, as Taylor says, we cannot be under a law, and promises and threatenings, if we cannot chuse, and, whether we affirm or deny the liberty of the will, there must be in every action, good or bad, the action of the will."—Ductor Dubitantium, p. 794.

"The goodness or badness of actions," says Butler, "does not arise from hence, that the epithets interested or disinterested may be applied to them, any more than any other indifferent epithet, suppose inquisitive or jealous, may or may not be applied to them; not from their being attended with present or future pleasure or pain, but from their being what they are; namely, what becomes such creatures as we are, what the state of the case requires, or the contrary."—Pref. to Sermons, p. 27.

Here then morality is founded upon human nature, considered as a system or constitution, and not immediately or solely upon a law, with the sanction of rewards and punishments.

Again, having shown that this "human nature consists in reason, appetites, passions, and affections, considered as having a natural respect to each other, and being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of reflection or conscience," and thus showing that man hath the rule of right within himself, Butler puts this question: "What obligations are we under to attend to and follow it? I answer, says he, It has been proved that man by his nature is a law to himself, without the particular distinct consideration of the positive sanctions of that law, the rewards and punishments which we feel, and those which from the light of reason we have ground to believe are annexed to it. The question then carries its own answer along with it. Your obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action is itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature."—Sermons, p. 49. The will then acts in obedience to the dictates of conscience. It chuses what conscience pronounces right; but the choice is often made without reference to the sanctions of an external law.

Jeremy Taylor seems to have caught a glimpse of the principle, which is so largely and so perspicuously unfolded by Butler, when he says, "Since the order and perfection of every creature is to do actions agreeable to the end and perfection of his nature, it is a pursuance of the end of God and of his own felicity. Although to do so is not virtue in beasts, because they are directed by an external principle, and themselves chuse it not; yet in men it is virtue, and it is obedience: and although it is natural to do so, and it is unnatural to do otherwise, yet because it is also chosen in many instances, in them it is a virtue or a vice respectively: and though it be no eminent virtue to do so, yet it is a prodigious sin to do otherwise; for sins against nature are ordinarily and in most instances the worst; which does demonstrate that even things of nature and the actions of our prime appetites, when they can be considered and chosen, never can be indifferent."—Ductor Dubitantium, p. 759.

The first and great commandment is the love of God: but to

love God is right, and from the very constitution of the mind it is natural, independently of the command, and of the rewards annexed to it. "In respect to the love of God, says Butler, in the strictest and most confined sense, we only offer and represent the happiest object of an affection, supposed already in our mind. Some degree of goodness must be previously supposed. This always implies the love of itself, an affection to goodness. The highest, the adequate object of this affection is perfect goodness; which therefore we are to love with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our strength. Must we then, forgetting our own interest, as it were go out of ourselves, and love God for his own sake? No more forget your own interest, no more go out of yourselves, than when you prefer one place, one prospect, the conversation of one man to that of another. Does not every affection necessarily imply that the object of it be itself loved? If it be not, 'tis not the object of the affection. You may and ought if you can, but it is a great mistake to think you can, love or fear or hate any thing, from consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the question, whether we ought to love God for his sake or for our own, being a mere mistake in language; the real question which this is mistaken for, will, I suppose, be answered by observing that the goodness of God already exercised towards us, our present dependence upon him, and our expectation of future benefits, ought and have a natural tendency to beget in us the affection of gratitude and greater love towards Him, than the same goodness exercised towards others, were it only for this reason, that every affection is moved in proportion to the sense we have of the object of it: and we cannot but have a more lively sense of goodness when exercised towards ourselves, than when exercised towards others. I added expectation of future benefits, because the ground of that expectation is present goodness."—Sermons, p. 277.

Upon this important subject, the sentiments of so great a writer as Butler are of the highest moment, and therefore I shall point out another instance in which his mode of reasoning does not lie open to the objection of Mr. Hume: "If," says he, "we are constituted such sort of creatures, as from our very nature, to feel certain affections or movements of mind, upon the sight

or contemplation of the meanest inanimate part of the creation, for the flowers of the field have their beauty; certainly there must be somewhat due to Him himself, who is the author and cause of all things; who is more intimately present to us than any thing else can be, and with whom we have a nearer and more constant intercourse than we can have with any creature; there must be some movements of mind and heart which correspond to His perfections, or of which those perfections are the natural object. And thus, when we are commanded to love the Lord our God with all our heart, and with all our mind, and with all our soul; somewhat more must be meant, than merely that we live in the hope of rewards, or fear of punishments from Him; somewhat more than this must be intended; though these regards themselves are most just and reasonable, and absolutely necessary to be recollected, in such a world as this."—Pref. to Sermons, p. 31.

Similar, though not entirely the same, is the language of Jeremy Taylor: "No man can be loved for himself; our perfections in this world cannot reach so high; it is well if we would love God at that rate, and I very much fear, that if God did us no good, we might admire His beauties, but we should have but a small proportion of love towards Him; and therefore it is, that God, to endear the obedience, that is, the love of his servants, signifies what benefits he gives us, what great good things he does for us. I am the Lord God that brought thee out of the land of Egypt: and, does Job serve God for nought? And he that comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder; all his other greatnesses are objects of fear and wonder, it is his goodness that makes him lovely."—Sermons, p. 646.

In the view of both these writers, not only the absolute and general, but the relative and particular goodness of God, and the effects of the latter too, in that which we receive from him here, as well as that which we expect from him hereafter, in that which we know, as well as believe, in that which we experience in his works, as well as learn from his word, are represented as being in part the foundation of our love to him. Here then it may be objected so far as a course of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love." The answer which Butler

makes to this question, deserves to be weighed most seriously, for it is not at variance either with the language, or the sentiments, or the experience of mankind, and has no less tendency to make them virtuous and happy, than any principles inculcated in any system of philosophy which has fallen within my notice. "Doing what God commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues; and will certainly form habits of self-government and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all religion, proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, and charity, regard to God's authority and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident, but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. And he who begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more of that character, which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral: and to the relation which God stands in to us as moral governor of it, nor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character."—Analogy, p. 147.

Mr. Hume, as I infer from several striking marks of coincidence between his opinion and Butler's, in the Essay upon Benevolence, was not unacquainted with the writings of our Prelate. If he had adverted to the passages just now quoted, he would either have qualified his propositions upon the exclusive regard which theologians are said to pay to the sanctions of reward and punishment, or he would have spoken of Butler as a splendid exception to their practice. If his reading had been extended to Barrow, Taylor, and many other English divines, he would have found more exceptions; and even without feeling any conviction from their arguments upon questions of faith, he would not have spoken so unhandsomely of their knowledge in the science of Ethics.

Many of my readers will be glad to contrast the temperate and

serious opinions of Dr. Ferguson, with the harsh and exaggerated statement of Mr. Hume.

"Power employed to determine the will of a free-agent must operate in presenting motives of choice; in presenting happiness as the reward of fidelity, and misery as the punishment of neglect; and, whether this be done by so ordering the nature of things, that virtue shall be its own reward, and vice its own punishment; or whether it be done by a subsequent act of will and discretion, in rewarding the good and punishing the wicked, in a way not previously connected with the part they have acted, the reality of the obligation and the sanction is the same: for if, in the nature of things moral good be constituent of happiness, and moral evil of misery, what can Almighty power do more to determine the choice of the one, and the rejection of the other? If we conceive any sanction of moral law as different from this, it must, however, terminate in the same effect. * * *

"If it should be thought necessary to consider moral law as the command of a superior, this may be done without departing from that original doctrine of nature we have stated—that moral good is the specific excellence and felicity of human nature, and moral depravity its specific defect and wretchedness. * * *

"The Sovereign of the universe, by having made things as they are, has given his command, and promulgated his law in behalf of morality; and in every instance of conformity to his law, and in every infraction of it, continues to apply the sanction of happiness and misery. * * * *

"In choosing what is morally good, it is happy to know that we obey our Creator; and in obeying our Creator, it is happy to know that what he commands is the specific good and felicity of our nature. To separate these considerations were doubtless of ill effect, and the sanctions of morality would be less powerful upon either principle apart, than they are upon the foundation of both united. Merely to obey without a sense of goodness and rectitude in the command, would be greatly short of that duty which we owe to our beneficent Maker; and the love of virtue is no doubt greatly encouraged by the consideration, that Almighty power, in the established order of things, is exerted in its favour."—Ferguson's Principles of Moral and Political Science, pp. 170, 171.

"Man is formed for religion, as well as society. He is capable of perceiving universal intelligence in the fabric of the universe. He perceives in the predilection for justice and innocence, in the horrors at guilt which are impressed on his own mind, the will of that sovereign authority which reigns in the system of nature. To him the consciousness of integrity and goodness is peace and amity with God. The consciousness of depravity and wickedness is rebellion and enmity; the one rendering existence itself a blessing in the confidence of present and future protection; the other rendering life itself a curse, under the horrors of present remorse, and the fear or apprehension of future and impending evils. Such is religion in the form of mere reflection as it operates in the mind; in the form of a public establishment it operates in the manner of compulsory law, with the denunciations of future punishment, and the hopes of future reward."—P. 176.

Numerous and weighty indeed are the reasons, which induce far the greater part of enlightened Christians to believe that the scriptural passages in which ἡ τῆς κρίσεως ἡμέρα, or, what is sometimes* equivalent, ἡ ἡμέρα is mentioned, should be interpreted literally, and that the rewards and punishments of another life will be dispensed judicially. There are, however, some persons, who, with equal solicitude for the interests of virtue, and equal reverence for the authority of Scripture, contend, that the well-known principle of ἀνθρωποπάθεια may be applied to such passages, and that the justice of the Deity will be administered by a regular series of causes and effects, producing happiness to the righteous, and misery to the wicked.

But, knowing the force of imagination upon opinion, and of custom upon practice, I should myself deprecate any change† in

* 2 Cor. i. 14. Phil. i. 6, 10. 1 Thess. v. 2. Vid. Schleusner and Schwartz in voce.

† A similar caution upon another subject is shewn by the learned Author of the Treatise upon Obligation, prefixed to the Abridgement of Dr. Taylor's Elements of Civil Law. In p. 6 he describes "Reason as the faculty which enables us to perceive the various relations which ideas bear to each other." This doubtless is the most precise sense of the word, and in this sense it is used by Mr. Hume, as appears in a former note.

the language of public instruction; and leaving men of solid learning and profound reflection to their own views on the sub-

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But the author, of whom I am now speaking, further allows, what Mr. Hume omits, and Dr. Reid properly maintains, that "by reason many persons mean not only that faculty of the mind which enables us to perceive the relations between ideas, but also those rules of prudence which guide us to happiness, or that voice of conscience which points out our duty."—P. 22. In p. 55, also, he mentions the proper sense "according to which Reason enables us to perceive relations between ideas," and the improper but popular sense in which "it often stands for a sentiment of obligation, an approbation of virtue, or a desire of happiness." But in p. 28 he tells us, that "Divines and moralists who are to adapt their discourses to popular language, do well in ascribing a line of virtue to reason, and laying the blame of all the faults we commit on our passions; because those to whom they chiefly address themselves, as he had already observed, mean by reason a desire of happiness, or a sense of duty; and by passions, those appetites which cannot be gratified but at the expence of one of these. Nor does there arise any inconvenience from this misuse of these words; nay, as they can plead long prescription for having been received in these senses in common life, one would not choose in some cases to hazard the innovation of confining them to their strict philosophical meaning."

The distinction which this writer makes between Reason and Sensation, as the latter word is explained in p. 7, appears to me more exact in the terms than Mr. Hume's distinction between reason and sentiment. I further grant, that obligation, when first traced to its first principles, must be resolved into sensation, as the word is employed by this Author. I accede likewise to his distinction between the primary sense of the word Obligation, according to which we as social creatures, are influenced by benevolence, and as religious creatures by gratitude, and the secondary sense, according to which we in both characters are actuated by a regard to our own welfare. The conclusion of the Treatise is so connected with the subject of this note, and the purpose for which I have written it, that I shall produce the whole: "There is such an entire conformity between the laws of God, the happiness of each individual, and the common good, and so difficult is it for us to separate these sentiments of love and gratitude, which arise from contemplating the goodness of God, from that fear which his power occasions, that we cannot reflect upon the divine commands without being forcibly influenced by both these motives, and feel ourselves under an obligation in both senses of that word to practise them. But still, whether the Supreme Being, or a

ject, I would recommend to their serious attention the conclusion of Hutcheson's chapter De Intellectu Divino.

"Quum tanta pietate curaque religiosa, ne quid Dei virtutibus derogetur, moveri videantur, contrariarum in hac ardua questione sententiarum patroni; a maledictis, contumeliis, iracundis contentionibus, et odiis, abstineant, neque inter se convicia, philosophia indigna, jactent."—Synops. Metaphysic. p. 106.

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future state, is the object of our consideration, the province of reason is exactly the same as it is in any other matter; she only presents the different relations which ideas bear to each other, and connects together different propositions, how many steps soever there may be between them; for after having shewn, by a long deduction from our own existence, that there is a God, and what his will is, there she must give over, and leave it to the sensations of gratitude or fear, to induce every one to practise it, and the sermons of all our divines fully prove what I advance; for after they have shewn, either by the Christian revelation or the structure of man, and this material system, what are the divine commands; do they suppose they have done all that is incumbent on them? or, that by having convinced the understanding they have influenced the practice? No, they apply at least to these two sensations, and endeavour to make you virtuous, either by exciting your gratitude by displaying the goodness of God, or your fears by shewing you what you will suffer in consequence of being vicious."

All I have to observe on the foregoing passage is, that the goodness of the Deity, as it becomes the object of our gratitude, is manifested not only in the blessings which he has bestowed upon us in this life, but in the prospect which he has opened to us of a future state, whether by reason or by revelation. Hence, in the mind of a religionist the motives to action are complex; for with piety, with benevolence, with a general sense of duty, and a general love of rectitude, are mingled the suggestions of calm self-love in the desire of attaining, and the apprehension of losing that happiness which is reserved for the righteous. A Christian teacher ought, therefore, to avail himself from every quarter, of man as he is, and of things relative to man as they are; to employ every cause which is adapted to every moral faculty of our nature; to make every primary, and every secondary obligation, instrumental in promoting our moral improvement; to engage the judgment, the affections, and the imagination, upon the side of virtue; to draw forth topics of conviction and persuasion from the past, the present, and the future; to warm his hearers with gratitude, to animate them with hope, and to restrain them by fear.

Gassendi was not a divine. But upon the beauty and utility of virtue and piety he has delivered some opinions, to which the enlightened divines of the Church of England will not, I am sure, refuse their assent. And as those opinions are so closely connected with the subject which I am now considering, I will produce them at full. "Ne specialia plura consecter, id attingo solum, quòd reputant multi virtuti nimium detrahi, dum esse dicitur propter aliud. Inferunt enim exinde sequi, ut virtus sit in genere utilium quod ab honestorum genere est diversum; sicque fore, ut propriè ipsâ dicamur uti, non frui, quòd fruitio non sit, nisi earum rerum, quæ et propter se, et honestæ sunt, quo modo ait Cicero non parandam solum, sed etiam fruendam sapientiam esse; dicente aliunde B. Augustino, iniquum fieri hominem, cùm fruitur utendis, aut utitur fruendis. Veruntamen, ut concedatur quicquid est propter aliud, posse quodammodo dici utile; negatur tamen quicquid est utile, ad illiberale illud genus spectare in quo pecunia primas tenet, et honesto opponitur; quatenus ipsum quoque honestum suam utilitatem, verùm liberalem sortitur; cùm Cicero etiam aliique demonstrent nihil verè utile esse, nisi id, quod honestum est. Quare et cùm ex hoc genere habebitur virtus, nihil ipsi propterea decedet, neque aut dicemur eâ uti, eo modo, quo uti dicimur pecuniâ; neque non frui eo modo, quo quavis re honesta frui dicimur, dum ex ea capimus voluptatem. Favet certè idem S. Doctor, cùm verba ipsius alio loco hæc sunt: Frui dicimur ea re, de qua capimus voluptatem; utimur ea, quam referimus ad id, unde voluptas capienda est. Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quòd etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui. Et rursùs: omnis ordinatio, quæ virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti; fruendum est autem honestis, utendum verò utilibus, &c.

"At inquies, id, quod universè de virtute dicitur, dici-ne etiam potest de ipsa pietate in divinum numen? si quidem non videtur posse sincera esse pietas nisi Deus purè ac præcisè propter seipsum et ametur, quia infinitè bonus sit, et colatur, quia infinitè excellat; nullatenus verò qui amat, et colit, ad se suumve commodum suamque voluptatem respiciat. Ego verò absit pietati cujusquam detractum contendam. Cùm sint, qui non modò id faciendum suadeant (fierique adeò posse suppo-

nant) sed etiam, ut fidem quærant dogmati, objectionemque præoccupent, se id facere confidant, et jactent: ipse sanè neque invideo, neque contradico; quin etiam et probo, et exosculor eam beatitatem, quâ seu ipsi, seu alii tantam cœlitus gratiam consequuntur. Scilicet hoc divinum donum, ac supra naturam reputandum est, ut quis se ad Deum hac ratione amandum, colendumque accingere possit. Ast hic agitur de pietate, seu universè de virtute, quæ secundùm naturam est, juxta quam quicquid homo agit, quodam cum respectu ad seipsum agit. An liceat verò addere Deum ita sese huic naturæ infirmitati accommodasse, ut cum in sacris literis vix ullum exstet monumentum quo illud istorum dogma exprimatur, cereberrima tamen occurrant quibus commendantur, qui Deum ideo multum amant, quia multa peccata dimisit, multumve gratiæ contulit; qui et diligunt propter spem, quæ ipsis reposita in cœlis est; et officia varia charitatis exercent, et persequutionem patiuntur fidem servant, &c. ob regnum sibi præparatum ab ipsa mundi constitutione, ob mercedem copiosam, quæ in cœlis manet; ob coronam justitiæ, quam Deus diligentibus se repromisit, &c. Ex quibus, aliisque effici videtur, non improbari, si quis respiciat ad æternas illas delicias, quibus est futurum, ut olim, si Deum amârit, colueritque, fruatur.

"Nam et quod filium, potiusque servum in divina familia deceat agere; non obstat, quin dicere liceat, ideo filium amplius amare parentem, quam servus amet Dominum, quia et amplius ab eo accepit, et insuper hæreditatem accepturum se ab eo sperat. Alioquin certè si ab eo exhæredatum iri pernôsset, et servus se hæredem iri institutum confideret: quæso utrius amor futurus esset vehementior? Ac non testor quidem istorum conscientiam quid acturi essent, si Deus amari, et coli, contentus nihil prorsus ipsos amatores, cultoresque sui curaret; nihil beneficii, illis conferret; nullum tota æternitate sperandum bonum faceret? Nimirum quasi agnituri, responsurique bona fide sint, nihilo-ne minus amantes, venerantesque Dei forent. Velim solum grave non sit, si rogentur, id-ne saltem non faciant, quia Deum ea ratione amare, ipsique servire suavissimum sit; suavissimumque adeo ducant mentem sic habere in Deum comparatam; ut ob ipsum planè, nullo vero modo sui causâ faciant. Suavitas hæc certè ab EO non excluditur, qui suavè esse clamat

jugum suum, hoc est, legem suam, cujus caput est, ut ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, ex totis viribus diligamus Deum."—(Tom. ii. p. 710). It were an abuse of language to say, that the influence of Religion, as stated by Gassendi, that gratitude for favours personally received, and the hope of blessedness to be personally enjoyed hereafter, are proofs of selfishness. Unquestionably they point to objects related to self; to the gratifications of self, to calm self-love, or the general desire of happiness, to the particular affections of gratitude and hope excited by particular objects. But they are not instances of selfishness, or that vicious regard to our own good, which makes us neglect or oppose the good of others. For such a creature as man not to feel that gratitude would be an imperfection, and even a crime. Not to feel that hope would also be an imperfection, and in various circumstances would weaken those motives, which, by the very constitution of our nature incite us to right acts. Hope and gratitude are real parts of our nature, and they concur with other parts in moving us to fill up the measure of our duty, and to obtain the happiness of which we are capable by that nature.

Hitherto we have been speaking of the connection which the love of God has or has not with the consideration of rewards. In respect to the love of our neighbour, I shall endeavour to guide the reader to that which he ought to know, and though the words are not taken from a professed theologian, they were written by a man of distinguished piety, and they are founded upon principles of which the most learned and orthodox Christian will hardly disapprove. "That desire of the good of others which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alleged to be voluntarily raised from the prospect of any pleasure accompanying the affection itself, nay, it is often attended with pain when the object is in distress."—Hutcheson's Inquiry concerning moral Good and Evil, p. 139; see also p. 141, 2, and 149, 50.

"We do not by an act of our will raise in ourselves that benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a view to obtain future pleasures of self-approbation by our moral sense." What will most effectually convince us of the truth of this point, is reflection upon our own hearts, whether we have not a desire of the good of others, generally without any consideration or in-

tention of obtaining these pleasant reflections on our own virtue; nay, often this desire is strongest where we least imagine virtue, in natural affection toward offspring, and in gratitude to a great benefactor; the absence of which is, indeed, the greatest vice, but the affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same reflection will also convince us that these desires or affections are not produced by choice, with a view to obtain this private good. In like manner, if no volition of ours can directly raise affections from the former prospects of interest, no more can any volition raise them from prospects of eternal rewards, or to avoid eternal punishments. The former motives differ from these only as smaller from greater, shorter from more durable. If affections could be directly raised by volition, the same consideration would make us angry at the most innocent or virtuous character, and jealous of the most faithful and affectionate, or sorrowful for the prosperity of a friend; which we all find to be impossible. The prospect of a future state may, no doubt, have a greater indirect influence, by turning our affection to the qualities in the objects naturally apt to raise the acquired affection, than any other consideration."—Ib. p. 140—42. Again; "If any one should ask, since none of these motives of self-interest excite our benevolence, but we are in virtuous actions intending solely the good of others, to what purpose serves our moral sense, our sense of pleasures from the happiness of others? To what purpose serves the wise order of nature by which virtue is even made generally advantageous in this life? To what end are eternal rewards appointed and revealed? The answer to these questions was given partly already: all these motives may make up desire to have benevolent affections, and consequently turn our attention to those qualities in objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparently contrary motives, and all temptations to vice. But farther, I hope it will be still thought an end worthy of the Deity to make the virtuous happy by a wise constitution of nature, whether the virtues were in every action intending to obtain this happiness or not. Beneficent actions tend to the public good, it is therefore good and kind to give all possible additional motives to them; and to excite men who have some weak degrees of good affection to

promote the public good more vigorously by motives of self-interest; or even to excite those who have no virtue at all to external acts of beneficence, and to restrain them from vice."—Ib. 149, 150.

I have made these quotations very ample, because I wished to do justice to the opinions of the ingenious and amiable writer; and with great satisfaction I shall add from him the following note: "Let it be also remembered, that every consideration suggested in the Gospel, as an additional motive to beneficent actions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper motive to virtue, or what would engage our approbation of actions flowing from it alone. Whoever would appeal to the general strain of Christian exhortations, will find disinterested love more inculcated, and motives of gratitude more frequently suggested than any others."—Ib. pp. 150, 151.

It were sufficient to evince by one illustrious instance, the truth of Mr. Hutcheson's observation.

"Finally, brethren," says the Apostle, "whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report: if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."—Ep. to the Philippians, iv. 8.

My intention through this long note, is to vindicate from misrepresentation the doctrine of rewards and punishments, as it is really laid down in the Scriptures, and as it has been really explained by wise and learned Theologians. The result upon the whole is this: It is a part of our present condition to be the subjects of future rewards and punishments. It is a part of our present nature to be influenced, and very strongly too, by the hope of the one and the fear of the other: but that hope and that fear, however necessary they may be to regulate, do not obstruct the proper energies of other parts of the same nature. They leave us to be actuated by the love of God and the love of our neighbour, in consequence of regards quite distinct from the peculiar objects which they may themselves present to our mind. —They leave us to the complex feeling of admiration and love which we experience from the abstract consideration of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness manifested in His general

works—They leave us to an indirect feeling of gratitude, where we sympathise with our fellow-creatures whom we consider, together with ourselves, as the objects of that divine goodness—They leave us to the exercise of all those theopathetic affections, which are excited by our meditations upon the goodness of God, wheresoever, and howsoever it may have communicated happiness to other beings—They leave us to return acts of beneficence merely from gratitude, and to perform acts of kindness merely from compassion. To the original and direct force of these affections, they bring an additional and distinct force of their own. But, because man is designed for another life, his attention to the interest he has in that life is adapted to his actual situation here; and because the interest itself is so very precious, the attention he pays to it cannot be too frequent or too earnest.

In conformity to the principles which this note is intended to illustrate, I have, in the earlier parts of my discourse, not merely explained the commands of Christianity, but examined the tendencies both of our general and more limited affections, as they can be discovered in the constitution of our minds; and I have scarcely touched upon future rewards till the conclusion of my discourse. The thought of them, at this moment, makes a deep impression upon my soul—May every reader sympathise with me in that impression, and receive in the last day the recompence of the just!

NOTE 104, p. 410.

The duty of glorifying God has been misrepresented no less than the duty, which we considered in a former note, of acting from the expectation of reward. I will therefore lay before my readers what I think a very judicious statement of it, in the words of Le Clerc, translated by Mosheim in his notes upon Cudworth:—"Sacræ literæ nonnunquam Deum dicunt ob gloriam suam agere et egisse aliquid: quod non ita capi debet, ac si finis ejus primarius esset, rerum conditarum admirationem et laudes sibi acquirere; nam hoc illud est, quod inter homines gloriam Dei vocant: sed hoc sibi volunt sacri scriptores, Deum, quum finem suum ob oculos habet positum, seu, quod idem est, accommodatè ad perfectiones suas agit, necessario admirationem et laudes omnium naturarum intelligentium, quæ quidem rectè utuntur

ratione sua, sibi comparare. Quin etiam Deus hominibus laudes et gloriam suam, tanquam necessarium officium, imperat; non ideo, ac si laudibus eorum egeret, aut felicitas ejus alienis laudibus augeri posset, sed quo homines id agant, quod ratio, qua instruxit eos, postulat, et ista ratione ipsimet beati ac felices evadant. Nullus enim homo, nulla gens veram consequi potest felicitatem, nisi Deum illis, qui debentur ipsi, honoribus afficiat: quod quidem, si res ita posceret, facilè ostendi posset. Igitur ob gloriam agere, et ideo agere, ut bonitatis divinæ alii participes fiant, duo fines sunt, qui nullo modo sibi refragantur."—Vol. ii. p. 589.

After many interruptions from many causes, and with the obliging, but precarious, and irregular aid of five or six friends, when they were at leisure to write what I dictated to them, or what I set before them, I am now arrived at the end of a labour, which I must confess has been more irksome to me than any effort I ever made in original composition. My activity, however, and I may add, my patience, were supported through every stage of it, by the desire which I felt to place before my readers the decisions of the most approved authors on the most useful questions; and by the hope which I entertained, that the curiosity of some, and the industry of others, might be excited to a fuller perusal of the works to which I have referred them. Most of those authors have, indeed, been long familiar to me, and the coincidence of their sentiments with those of each other and with my own, was so frequent, that I sometimes found it more difficult to determine what I should omit, than what I should produce.

From the celebrity of Mr. Hume's name, the depth of his researches, the acuteness of his reasonings, the felicity of his illustrations, the captivating beauties of his style, and the amiable qualities of his heart, a suspicion has arisen, that his opinions about religion are very widely diffused among the more enlightened inhabitants of North Britain. With peculiar satisfaction, therefore, I have endeavoured to shew incidentally, from the writings of Adam Smith * and Dugald Stewart, that on the ques

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* Having frequently quoted Dr. Smith's Theory of Moral

tion concerning the Being of a God, those two great men are neither advocates for scepticism with their illustrious country-

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Sentiments, I am glad to state that Dr. Hutton allows sympathy "to be a principle, and to have been successfully employed as such in the formation of moral sentiments, though he doubts whether it be a first principle, endeavours to trace it up to those instinctive passions and actions which cannot be farther understood, and describes it as a rational progress of the human mind, proceeding upon conscious principles."—Vol. iii. p. 252.

For the fuller confirmation of my opinion about the philosophers of Scotland, I would refer the reader to Dr. Huttton's Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, in part iii. sec. i. chap. ii. iii. section iv. chap. i. ii. iii. iv.; and to Dr. Ferguson's Principles of Moral and Political Science, part ii. chap. ii.; and section viii. and chap. v. section iv. "where piety to Almighty God is represented as a modification of benevolence justly entitled to the first and the highest place." The writings of Dr. Gregory, senior, are extensively read in England, and do credit to the ingenuity, the sensibility, and the piety of the author. Though my mind was vigorously exercised, rather than ultimately convinced, by the elaborate work of Dr. Gregory, junior, upon Liberty and Necessity, I feel great respect for him as a very acute reasoner, and a very instructive moralist. Let me add, ἐν παροδῷ, that the style in his Conspectus Medicinæ Theoreticæ is perspicuous and elegant.

Among the Latin compositions which have come forth from the Universities of Scotland since the time of Dr. Hutcheson, I have seen none so distinguished by the best effects of early practice and well-formed taste, so accurate in the choice of phraseology, so easy in the structure of the sentences, and so harmonious in the cadence of the periods, as the writings of Dr. Gregory, junior, and Professor Dalziel.

While this sheet was in the press, I heard that the learned Dr. White had published Abdollatiph, of which I spoke in p. 563; and it occurred to me that my friend Mr. George Dyer was educated at Christ's Hospital, and that the names of Bishop Butler, the late Mr. H. Brown, Dr. Bever, the Civilian, Dr. Nowel of St. Mary Hall, the late Dr. Hutchins of Lincoln, Dr. Bandinel of Oxford, Mr. Cox of King's College, Mr. Wishart of Trinity, Cambridge, Dr. Peckard of Magdalen, and Mr. Frend of Jesus, ditto; Mr. Burdon and the late Messrs. Blackall and H. Homer of Emanuel; and Sir E. Law,* (now Attorney General), should have been inserted in the list of those persons who in my lifetime have done honour to our Universities. After all my efforts to do jus-

* Afterwards Lord Ellenborough.

man, nor zealots for infidelity with the later philosophers of France. On the contrary, they distinguish, as Mr. Hume rarely does, between the sober advances of Theologians in the broad and beaten road of common sense, and their hasty strides in the obscure and winding bye-paths of Metaphysics. They separate, as the French Philosophers seldom do, supersition, which must enfeeble and debase the mind, from religion, which ought to invigorate and exalt it. They seem to consider the belief of a Deity, not only as warranted in its proofs by the phenomena of nature, but as favourable in its effects to the happiness and moral improvement of mankind. They assign to theism, not only the truth of a doctrine, but the energy of a sentiment, and the comprehensiveness of a principle. They admit, not only the capacity of the human understanding to infer the existence of a God from his works, but the propensity of the human heart to view him as the Governor and Judge, as well as the Creator of the world, to do him homage by acts of reverential and grateful adoration, to look upon his will as a rule of action, to feel in his displeasure an object of most alarming, but salutary fear, and to rejoice in the hope of his favour, as animating our strongest affections and noblest faculties in the pursuit of virtue. As to the works of Dr. Reid, they, I suppose, like those of Dr. Beattie, are more generally known in this country, than Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments," or Stewart's "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," and I am sure that the greater part of my readers have long anticipated me in any testimony which I might be

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tice to my contemporaries, I must say of my catalogue of our academical worthies, what Fabricius said upon another occasion: "Plures aliorum industria facile adjiciet."—B. Graec. vol. i. p. 502. edit. Harles.

I ought to apologize to the learned reader, for not having stated, in p. 503, that the military services of Socrates, for which I have quoted the testimony of D. Laertius, are controverted by Athenæus, in chapter xiv. and xv. of book v. But the futility and injustice of Athenæus's objections will be obvious to any one who reads the notes of Menagius and Casaubon, upon sections 22 and 23, liber ii. of D. Laert. and Casaubon's animadversions upon Athenæus, liber v. chap. xv. where the subject is professedly and largely discussed.

disposed to pay, to their ingenuity, or their liberality, or their piety.

For the use which I have made of some authors, who are generally and perhaps justly believed not to look with a very favourable eye on the evidences of revelation, no apology can be necessary to the dispassionate, and to the uncandid none would be satisfactory. They who speak truth, howsoever discovered, have a right to be heard—they who assist others in discovering it, have the yet higher claim to be applauded; and surely, upon the propriety of any practice recommended by reason, as well as inculcated in the Scriptures, the testimony of supposed Deists is not less weighty among the impartial, nor less acceptable to the serious, than that of professed Christians. Passion, I am afraid, influences speculation as well as conduct, and the consequence is, that prejudices are transferred from persons to things; that discussion assumes the fierceness and the obstinacy of altercation; and that victory is pursued as more precious than truth. Such must ever be the case, while the infirmity or the malignity of men is permitted to turn their thoughts so eagerly, and to fix them so stiffly, on the points in which they differ — I rejoice, therefore, that the object I had in view was such as naturally led my attention towards a variety of topics, upon which the wiser and the greater part of the authors to whom I had recourse were fortunate enough to agree.

I disdain to avert any imputation of pedantry, which the illiterate or the petulant may throw upon the passages which I have occasionally introduced from the writers of antiquity. Conscious I am not of any unbecoming arrogance, in acknowledging that much of my time has been employed in the perusal of their works; and for the application of their opinions to a subject which is eminently interesting, I will assign a reason, the validity of which will hardly be disputed by the wise and good: "*Τὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιχείρηματα, τοὺς μὲν ἀργοὺς καὶ ἀφυεῖς οἷον ἀναπαύει καὶ ἀναπίμπλησι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοτίμοις καὶ φιλολόγοις, ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσιν οἰκείαν καὶ τόλμαν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ ἀνιχνεύειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.*"—Plut. Sympos. vol. ii. lib. vi. p. 694. edit. Xylan.

So far as the merit of mere expression is concerned, in the numerous and ample quotations which occur in these Notes,

tion, were directed to lay down their lives in the cause of their Master, still their attachment to that cause was, from the beginning, perfectly compatible with any other obligations that required them to make a similar sacrifice for any other purpose, by which the real good of mankind could have been promoted. For the frequency, and for the earnestness of those directions we may account, by the extraordinary difficulties which the primitive Christians were to overcome, and the extraordinary severities which they were to undergo. But before we allow the inconsistency of such directions with the general duties of man as a social being, it must be shown that any interdict against those duties was ever pronounced, that any dispensation from them was ever offered, or even any disapprobation of them was ever hinted, by Jesus Christ. The Roman might have fought in the ranks of Cæsar; the Athenian might have peaceably endeavoured to mitigate the servitude of Greece; the Jew might have employed the remains of civil power in his own country, for the advantage of his countrymen; and yet each might have lived a faithful disciple of Jesus, and each might have died an heroic martyr for the honour of his blessed name. If the author of our faith, when arraigned as Cæsar's enemy before the representative of Cæsar, declined all discussion upon the just or the unjust pretensions of earthly potentates, and declared "his own kingdom not to be of this world"—if, in the way of a direct moral answer to a direct political question, he shunned all dispute upon the right of

taxation, and ordered the Pharisees and Herodians "to render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's"—if John, his immediate precursor, when asked by his hearers what "they should do for the remission of sins," exhorted the publicans not, indeed, to throw up their office, but to discharge it faithfully, and "exact no more than that which was appointed to them;" and instructed the soldiers not to cast away their arms, nor to murmur against their leaders, but "to do no violence, to accuse no man falsely," and "to be content with their wages"—if his immediate followers, Saint Paul and Saint Peter, inculcated civil obedience from motives not only of prudence but of conscience, and founded civil authority not only upon the command of God but upon usefulness to mankind, which very usefulness is always the effect of causes adapted to that very purpose by the will of God—if they told us that "magistrates were ordained not only for a terror to evil works," which endanger and disgrace society, but "for the praise of those who by doing well" uphold and adorn it—if Saint Paul recommends "intercessions, prayers, and giving of thanks to be made for kings and all" subordinate governors, for the temporal as well as the spiritual end of "leading a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty"—if Saint Peter advises us not only "to fear God, and to love the brotherhood," but "to honour the king"—if all these social virtues, as the means of social happiness, were not only practicable, and therefore obligatory, under a pagan magis-

tracy, but more practicable, and therefore more obligatory in a Christian state, surely it were the hardiness of misrepresentation, rather than the dexterity of sophistry, to maintain that Christ, or John, or Peter or Paul, considered their followers as having no personal interest in the tranquillity and prosperity of the communities to which they belonged; as bounden by no personal ties to act, and even to suffer in conformity to the laws of those communities; as feeling no regard for the comforts, for the property, and for the lives of those very beings who had been described to them as the objects of their personal love and personal services, under the endearing and sacred relation of neighbours. When our blessed Lord, who "might have prayed his father to send legions of "angels to succour him," set an example of submission to established judicatures, and underwent an ignominious punishment upon the cross; and when his disciples endured, and encouraged others to endure, persecution, they, in these very instances, sustained the part of good patriots; for they employed their own patience and constancy, and those of other men, for instruments, which not only evinced the truth and efficacy of religion, but preserved, too, the peace and the order of society: they forbad to Christians the use of resistance under the plea of performing duties which might be sincerely and completely performed without it; and they at the same time left it with the judgment, or, I should rather say, with the conscience of men, to settle the right to resist, upon other subjects, and under other circumstances, which

had no connection whatsoever with the belief or the propagation of the Gospel.

If the extraordinary dispensations of the Deity were at variance with the ordinary, their usefulness would be less visible, and of course the evidence for them would be less credible. But the blessings of Revelation, we should remember, though conferred by such a being as God, are yet adapted to such a being as man. They are meant to improve human nature progressively, not to change it suddenly and totally; to correct, not destroy, the influence of national opinions, customs, and institutions; to mitigate, not annihilate, physical evils; and to forward their proper uses, as furnishing opportunities for moral good, among creatures whose industry, patience, fortitude, and benevolence, are to be exercised in a state of moral discipline. They are designed not to answer any curious questions, "why we were not placed in a situation where we should have no need of harsh and turbulent passions," * but to point out the real "purposes for which those passions were given us," while they are under the restraints of reason and religion, and to interest our hopes and fears in attaining that limited degree of excellence which our actual condition admits, and our actual duty, therefore, requires. Thus considered, the love of our country, as inciting us to repel injuries and to fight for our lives and our laws, is one among many other virtues which meliorate that condition, and constitute that duty; and if it necessarily forms

* See Butler's Ninth Sermon.

a part of natural religion, we may presume that some place is assigned to it even in revealed.

It so happens, however, that the conduct of the blessed Jesus upon the important subject of patriotism has been strangely misrepresented by one writer, who was the secret enemy, and by another who was the professed advocate of the gospel; and as both of them have acquired no common share of popularity by the plausibility of their arguments, and the elegance of their style, it cannot be improper, on the present occasion, to examine their showy and delusive sophisms.

Now one of them exults in the discovery that, while Christianity sets up the highest pretensions to a perfect code of ethics, it omits not only the praise, but the very mention of patriotism; and from this omission, which first is broadly assumed as a fact, and then is petulantly sneered at as an imperfection, the objector would induce us to doubt the divinity of its original: for patriotism, it is granted alike by the infidel and the believer, is necessary, always to the well being, and sometimes to the existence of society; and therefore the infidel may justly triumph over the credulity and inconsistency of the believer, when the one opposes and the other defends a religion which is silent, and by silence inefficient, upon a practice so essential to the dearest interests of mankind. The other writer expatiates upon the same fact as a singularity, but not as a defect; and from premises which he partly holds in common with his precursor in the bye-paths of paradox, he draws a conclusion quite opposite: that, because

the founder of Christianity did not inculcate patriotism, his religion thus far contains one internal evidence of having descended from heaven: for it disdains to make the prejudices of men the instrument of their faith; it overlooks, and by overlooking discountenances, what false religions have expressly noticed, and earnestly encouraged; and by these means it would eventually increase the sum of virtue and felicity among the sincere and consistent followers of Christ.

But, the misrepresentations of the former writer will be completely refuted by considering that Christianity, when it binds us to universal benevolence, must include patriotism as a part; for the obligation to do good must ever be co-extensive with the power of doing it; and therefore to act for the benefit of many when the opportunity occurs, is the office of a Christian, no less than to act for the benefit of a few.

Thus far, while we agree with one of the writers to whom I have alluded, about the solid advantages of true patriotism, we can at the same time protect our holy religion from the charge of not having recommended it; and, in the sequel, while we equally agree with the other writer on the mischievous tendencies of false patriotism, we shall not rest our defence of revelation upon the fantastic and hardy presumption, that because Christ was silent about the false, he consequently was indifferent about the true. One distinction, I am aware, pervades the whole controversy; and since it is very pertinent, as well as very intelligible, I shall now lay it before

you. If by silence be meant the absence of express, or, as dialecticians would say, formal approbation or disapprobation, we accede to the statement as it respects both kinds of patriotism. But if the word be employed to mean implicit or virtual approbation or disapprobation, we oppose the statement as it concerns both. For under certain circumstances, which the course of human affairs frequently realizes, the virtues which Christ enjoins, have in themselves the essential merit of true patriotism, and the vices which he forbids, contain in themselves the essential malignity of that which is false.

The error of the ingenious person whose opinions I am now going to examine, is perhaps the more dangerous, because it is accompanied with an ostentatious eagerness in the defence of the gospel; and therefore in the very threshold of that examination I think it proper for me to observe, that the whole difficulty which he has started may be solved by distinguishing between the right and the wrong application of terms, and between the use and abuse of principles.

If patriotism mean that well directed and well-measured love of our country which induces us to promote the welfare of it, both in preference to private advantage and in subordination to general good, we maintain that his assumption is false; we reject the aid which is offered to our cause by his inference from it, and we assert that in conformity to those restrictions which are imposed by the higher considerations of that general good, patriot-

ism, so far from being virtually prohibited by our heavenly Master, is substantially enjoined. But if patriotism be really and solely, as our panegyrist defines it, that "which commands us to oppress all countries, in order to advance the imaginary prosperity of our own; and to copy the mean partiality of an English parish officer, who thinks injustice and cruelty meritorious when they are useful to his village;" in this sense of the term we allow that the gospel does not, either in reality or appearance, give encouragement to such patriotism, and we assert, that upon one and the same ground of violated benevolence, it condemns both the officer who serves his village, and the citizen who would serve his country by such odious means, and from such narrow views. We contend, however, at the same time, that the definition is imperfect and fallacious—imperfect, because it does not discriminate the imaginary from the real interests of our country; and fallacious, because it would insinuate that the real can be forwarded only by the same injustice and cruelty which, according to the hypothesis we are now considering, are employed to promote the imaginary. Surely, if the language of this celebrated definition be correct, we may, as it has been well remarked, affirm with equal propriety, that "humility,"* which, by the general consent of mankind is praiseworthy, "should be called meanness; that generosity should be called profusion;" that all other actions supposed by the same consent, to be

* See Dr. Maclaine's Letter to Soame Jenyns, p. 183.

in alliance with virtue, whensoever they are not carried to pernicious excess, and when they are not prompted by unworthy motives, must be looked upon as similar to actions which are so carried and so prompted; that all philosophy when it professes to separate the excess from the mean, deludes us; and that all language when it supplied terms for the marks of that separation has contributed to the delusion.

What then is the result? If there be a genuine and salutary patriotism, the gospel has in effect recognised and approved it. If there be a spurious and dangerous patriotism, the same gospel neither directly nor indirectly favours it. But that there is such a spurious, and that there also is such a genuine patriotism, we readily admit; that the properties of the one, and the obligation to shun it, are equally intelligible with the properties of the other, and the obligation to practise it, we strenuously maintain; and we trust, moreover, firmly, that by an accurate use of words, and by a dispassionate attention to things, as the objects of those words, we shall be able to vindicate the honour of our holy Master against the scoffs of the unbeliever and the misconceptions of the visionary.

Harsh, indeed, as I have often thought, when communing with my own heart, and often lamented, when I have been instructing you, my brethren, who are committed to my charge—very harsh and very unfair is the treatment which revelation has experienced in the doctrines which it propounds for our belief, and in the rules which it prescribes for our

conduct. Those doctrines, though few and simple, have been multiplied by the misguided zeal of its followers, and encumbered with dark and mystical interpretations, which, under the venerable, the usurped, the prostituted name of orthodoxy, have confounded the judgment, and enflamed the passions of the christian world. Those rules, however agreeable to the common sense, and however conducive to the common interests of mankind, have been distorted by ingenious sophistry, by monastic gloominess, or by frantic enthusiasm; and instead of making us "wise unto salvation," they have sometimes degenerated into frivolous and unprofitable austerities, and sometimes been pleaded in vindication of the most desperate outrages. For purposes of superstition, or fanaticism; for the support of metaphysical reveries, or the disguise of spiritual domination, the believer appeals to the authority of Christ and his apostles for the truth of dogmas which they in reality never taught, or the necessity of observances which they never imposed. The unbeliever craftily admits the propriety of the appeal, and then charges upon the Christian law those absurdities which exist only in the extravagant conceits, or arbitrary practises, of Christian interpreters. But "the wisdom which is from above will ever be justified of her children," and this too, effectually and eminently, in the question which we are now discussing.

If valour, as an instrument of patriotism, be employed, as it too often has been, to carry into effect

those violences,* which distract the world with bloodshed ann "devastation;" if it be used "as an engine* by which the strong plunder the weak, the proud trample upon the humble, and the guilty oppress the innocent;" doubtless, in the view of religion, no less than of reason, such love of our country impelling us to the use of such an engine, is as a passion, "the offspring* of pride, avarice, and ambition:" and, as a habit, it is equally hateful in the eye of a righteous and benevolent Deity, and of every considerate and virtuous man. The Christian will acknowledge with the philosopher, that "an army of victorious warriors, returning triumphant on this vile principle, however graced with the flattering title of heroes, and ensigns of glory, are in truth no better than a band of public robbers; or as our great poet, a Christian and lover of mankind, finely expresses it,

"An impious crew
Of men conspiring to uphold their state,
By worse than hostile deeds; violating the ends
For which our country is a name so dear."†

On the other hand, if valour be useful in preventing unprovoked and destructive injuries; "if it be as requisite to repel an invader, as to invade a foe;" if it be ever "necessary to the defence and support of christian communities; if it enable a christian prince to oppose the assaults and devasta-

* See pages 53 and 57, of Jenyns's View of the internal Evidence of the Christian Religion.

† Brown on the Characteristics, p. 339, and Milton's Sampson Agonistes.

tions of a licentious usurper," if it be ever "employed in the cause of oppressed" individuals, "or oppressed nations, not from the mere impulse of interest, or thirst of fame, but from a generous regard to public good, then active courage must be as much a moral virtue as passive; it is blended with benevolence, and discovers the strength of that very divine principle,"* which Christianity has repeatedly and forcibly recommended. Thus, too, if patriotism be, as men of sense rightly understand it to be, "a zeal for the happiness of the country to which we belong; and where the most numerous, intimate, and affecting of our social relations are formed and cultivated;"† then, it is sound as a principle; then, it is precise as a term; then, it is lovely as a quality; then, it is indispensable even as a duty; for it connects our private with our public virtues; it leads us to protect immediately our governors and our fellow citizens, and eventually our neighbours, our friends, our venerable parents, and our beloved children. All, as members of the same community, are linked together by the ties of a common interest; all, as men, are related to us by the participation of a common nature; all are objects of our moral agency by the authority of a common religion, and by our common exertions all are to be defended. One part may be nobler in itself, or nearer to

* See Kenrick's Answer to S. Jenyns, pp. 51, 65, and Maclaine's Letters, pp. 175, 177, 178.

† Series of Letters addressed to Soame Jenyns, by Dr. Maclaine, p. 183.

us in our domestic situations, than another; but he that is anxious to save the whole, means well and acts well by every part, be it more or less distant, and be it inclusive of more or fewer objects.

It has been said, ingeniously perhaps, though in some instances rather incautiously, that Christianity lays down no rules, as the religions of Numa, of Mahomet, or Confucius seem to provide them, for the administration of public affairs—that it contains no specific code for the magistrate, the legislator, or the warrior; but effects all its peculiar and salutary purposes by the authority of its sanctions, and the influence of its precepts, over the hearts of individuals only. The observation is, I grant, defensible, when it is properly understood; for, let it not be imagined that magistrates, legislators, and warriors, as such, are unconcerned in those precepts here, or in those sanctions hereafter. They, too, are individuals; they are endowed with moral faculties; they are placed in a state of moral probation; they are invested with privileges which ever must be accompanied by correspondent and commensurate duties; and therefore they ought to remember that the observance and breach of those duties are subjects not only of applause or censure from man, but of reward or punishment from God.

That Christianity does not directly prescribe any rules for worldly policy, is indeed a circumstance which might lead us to some important reflections on the consistency of such conduct in its author, with the peremptory and explicit pretensions of his religion to be calculated for the universal benefit of

mankind. But if governors were actuated by the same benevolent spirit which Christianity was meant to infuse into the minds of those whom they are appointed to govern—if justice and mercy, which are recommended to all the followers of our blessed Redeemer, without regard to the infinitely varied and continually changing distinctions of climate, custom, laws, rank, and fortune, and the obligations to which are modified, but not suspended, by such distinctions, really pervaded the whole of a community, every corruption would be purified; every abuse would be corrected; every violence would be averted; and the blessings of public as well as private life would be more widely diffused, and more permamently secured. The honest magistrate, the wise legislator, the brave warrior, and the upright patriot might, each in his own province, claim to himself the appellation of a good Christian. In serving mankind he might deliberately obey God, and while he increases his fame he might save his soul.

It may be worth while to observe, that the objections of infidelity, if well founded, have scarcely been pushed to a proper extent on the subject now before us. They who have been actively employed in censuring the Mosaic economy, seem to have usually acknowledged the excellence of the decalogue, in which, as all parties appear to agree, is compressed the substance of the Jewish law. Yet, the absence of patriotism from that series of commands and prohibitions, has never given rise to any specific objections founded on such absence, against

the wisdom, or the virtue, or even the extraordinary claims of Moses. The practice of the Jews themselves is also a clear, prominent, and decisive proof that, in the decalogue, they were not sagacious enough to discern, as others have done in the gospel, any implied interdict against the love of our country.

In various periods of the Jewish history do we not read of valiant judges, captains, and kings, who repelled the incursions of neighbouring states, barbarous in manners, ferocious in spirit, and addicted to the most odious overt-acts of plunder and devastation? Was it not the love of their country which prompted Sampson, at the hazard of his own life, to crush the Philistines assembled in the temple of their idol, and excited David to go forth, without staff or sword, against a champion gigantic in stature, bold from conscious strength, and trained from his youth upwards, in the use of arms? Did not Nehemiah thus address the rulers, and the nobles, and the rest of the people, "Be not ye afraid of your adversaries; remember the Lord which is great and terrible, and fight for your brethren, your sons, and your daughters, your wives and your houses:" and in this generous call upon the bravery of his associates, are not public mingled with private considerations? the interests of the state with the safety of families? the impulses of patriotism with the instincts of nature? Did not Judas say to the men who were with him, "Fear ye not their multitude. Remember how our fathers were delivered in the Red Sea, when Pharaoh pur-

sued them with an army. Now, therefore, let us cry unto heaven, and remember the covenant of our fathers, and destroy this host before our face this day."

Upon a subsequent occasion, "when the battle was begun, and the cry of the city went up to heaven with trumpets and a great sound," did not the same patriot call aloud unto his host, "Fight this day for our brethren?"

Who can read without admiration and sympathy the heroic and pious words of Eleazer; when bowed down with age, and preparing to undergo a cruel death for the sake of his countrymen, he thus exclaims, "I will show myself such a man as mine age requireth, and leave a notable example to such as be young, to die willingly and courageously for the honourable and holy laws." "Thus," says the sacred historian, "this man died, leaving his death for an example of a noble courage, and a memorial of virtue, not only unto young men, but to all his nation."

Again, in the chapter whence my text is taken, when the forces of Samaria and Syria were collected against the Jews, and when, "being so few, they doubted how they should be able to fight against a multitude so great and so strong," did not their leader thus dispel their fears, and rouse at once their piety and their patriotism? "The victory of a battle standeth not in the multitude of an host; but strength cometh from heaven. They come against us in much pride and iniquity, to de-

stroy us and our wives and children, and to spoil us; but we fight for our lives and our laws."

The Jews, it is apparent, were not conscious of disobeying the decalogue, in its matter or its spirit, when they fought for their country; and yet the decalogue contains no instruction for them so to fight. Where then, let me ask, is the penetration, or rather where is the fairness of those writers, who, while they cavil at the omission of patriotism in the gospel of Christ, are silent as to that omission in the laws of Moses, announced as those laws were, with the utmost solemnity, and containing, one would imagine, the most important duties which the Jews were required to perform? Where, again, is the impartiality of a noble writer, who, when speaking of the Jewish dispensation, tells us "that under it the virtue of patriotism had illustrious examples; that in some manner it was recommended to us as honourable, and worthy of our imitation: that Saul himself, as ill a prince as he is represented, appears both living and dying, to have been respected and praised for the love he bore his country:"* but, when he comes to speak of the Christian dispensation, exchanges statement for sarcasm; finds only one solitary instance of attention to, what he calls, "heroic virtue;" degrades the value of that one by a sneer at a single word; overlooks the proper import of that word,† as con-

* See Lord Shaftesbury, at the conclusion of Part the Second of his Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour.

† See Lord Shaftesbury's note, in which he hath produced

nected with the reasoning of the apostle, and probably mistakes the meaning of the very term which is alone applicable to his contemptuous and insidious concession.

But to return to our argument on the decalogue. If it be said that Christianity professes to be a more perfect system of morality, we answer that such perfection is supposed to consist, not peculiarly in the instructions which it gives even implicitly for the love of our country; but in the precepts it contains for that general benevolence to our species, in all their moral and all their social relations, which by fair construction must include, and which in practice does include, such love. We add, too, that upon comparing the different situations of the two lawgivers, and the different characters of their laws, we should be naturally led to expect some exhortations to patriotism in a religion which, like that of Moses, professedly intermingled political with religious regulations; which was ushered in with preparations not only for preserving, but founding a government, and which was intended, avowedly, for the exclusive use of one people, rather than in a religion which, like that of Christ, was totally unconnected in its origin, and its progress too, with politics; which is equally de-

the words of St. Paul, in chap. v. verse 7, of the Epistle to the Romans. I differ from Lord Shaftesbury in his representation of the word *peradventure*, and in the sense affixed by him to the Greek term, which is translated a *good* man. At some future time I hope to publish my refutation of his Lordship's criticism.

signed for the use of all states, as well as of all private individuals, wheresoever it is known; which is perfectly silent about the forms of all government, be they regal or republican, but which, through the whole of its moral provisions, has an equal tendency to increase and to perpetuate the best possible effects of all possible forms. The plain fact is, that neither Moses nor Christ ever censured genuine patriotism; nor, be the actual conduct of Jews or Christians what they may, did they ever recommend the fictitious.

But farther. Has it ever been objected to Christianity, that the author of it has upon no occasion explicitly said, "love thyself?" Yet, the various duties of temperance, chastity, and even prudence, which the gospel enjoins, contain the virtues which are comprised in that love: and we may say the same patriotism, as implied in the duty of universal benevolence.

When our blessed Lord enforced the second and great commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," mark, I beseech you, how correct and how comprehensive, as well as intelligible, is the import of this injunction! Our Saviour not only recognizes self love as a part of our nature, and under some circumstances of our duty, but he makes it the very measure of our love to our neighbour. Nay farther, in the explanation which is immediately given of the principle upon which we are to love our neighbour, he virtually inculcates the love of our countrymen as well as of strangers. A traveller falls among thieves, is plundered by them,

and is left wounded on the spot. He is seen by two of his countrymen who neglect him, and by one Samaritan who relieves him. If the conduct of his countrymen heightens the merit of the Samaritan, the conduct of the Samaritan enhances the demerit of his countrymen, and probably for the purpose of elucidating both these points their characters are contrasted. In the christain acceptation of the word, both the Jew and the Samaritan were the neighbours of the sufferer, and by the christain rule both were obliged to relieve him. But the levite and the priest, as it is apparent from the fact, and as it is also designedly suggested to us by the story, were under a stronger obligation to afford that relief than the Samaritan. They were born in the same country; they worshipped in the same temple; and therefore their guilt in neglecting the sufferer was greater than would have been the guilt of the Samaritan. Here then in the very precept which directly commands us to love a stranger, we have an implied and forcible direction to love our countrymen more especially. The fact is, that the universal benevolence enjoined by Christianity, when judiciously and consistently explained, will always be found to imply the good of our country, as a great part of the great family of mankind.

I have elsewhere* had occasion to remark, that universal good, as an immediate object, is perhaps far too extensive for the efforts, and even the

* In my Spital Sermon, and the notes to it. Printed in this volume.

comprehension of any one moral agent. Why then, you may ask, is universal benevolence enjoined, and how can universal good be promoted? My brethren! the one is enjoined, because the other can be promoted by the active and sincere application of the principle to all the objects of our moral agency, infinitely diversified as they are, in number and in magnitude; because the very cultivation of the principle has a tendency to produce a virtuous disposition, and because that disposition will lead us to act according to our different powers and different duties, and sufficient opportunities for acting may arise in our different situations. To far the greater part of mankind, the country in which they live is the noblest object upon which their benevolence can be expanded; and he who in obedience to the commands of his Saviour, exerts his personal talents, or sacrifices his personal interests, for the benefit of that country, must in this world deserve the approbation of his fellow-creatures, and may be sure of an adequate reward in the world to come.

But here, my brethren! I must very seriously intreat you to observe, that patriotism, either as approved by reason or warranted by Christianity, must by no means be confined to that love of our country which consists in the endurance of pain or in the surrender of life itself. These doubtless are illustrious instances, and they are solid proofs too of patriotism, where the cause is good. But in the employments of peace as well as in the struggles of war, many are the opportunities which we

have for vigorous exertion, many are the uses to which we may apply our time and our abilities, many are the sacrifices which we may make of our fortune and our repose for the public advantage, and many are the blessings which we may thus confer on the country in which we live.

We may improve the moral as well as the political state of that country by assisting in the establishment or execution of salutary laws. We may show the sincerity of our patriotism by the general activity of our benevolence, and by our solicitude to promote alike the spiritual and the temporal welfare of those who are endeared to us by social intercourse. We may be industrious, and the encouragers of industry. We may be learned, and the patrons of learning. We may be innocent, and the protectors of innocence. By our counsels we may suggest, or by our contributions we may facilitate, extensive projects for the employment of the idle, the reformation of the dissolute, and the relief of the sick, the aged, and the indigent. We may enlighten ignorance, correct prejudices, restrain intolerance, assuage animosities, and diffuse around us the blessings of Christian charity. We may direct our neighbours, our families, and our countrymen to the knowledge of every Christian truth. We may animate them, at once by precept and example, to the practice of every Christian duty. In reality, every accession to national virtue brings with it an additional security for national prosperity: and surely he, who by the authority of his station, or the influence of his advice, accustoms a whole

people to the love of truth, justice, and mercy, to faith in Christ and piety towards God, has a splendid claim to be ranked among the most useful friends of his country, and the noblest benefactors of mankind.

There is another point of view in which I wish you to consider the subject. For the frequency with which some commands occur in the Scriptures; for the earnestness with which they are enforced, and for the phraseology in which they are expressed, satisfactory reasons may be assigned from the known and peculiar circumstances of the world, when our Lord appeared in it. Upon contemplating those circumstances you will, perhaps, find ample reason for admiring both the wisdom and the humanity of our blessed Saviour, when he abstained from any explicit and positive directions for the love of our country.

The passion, I am aware, is noble in itself: it takes a strong hold upon some of our best affections; it delights the imagination; it warms the heart; it gathers strength from the instantaneous and the instinctive sympathy of every spectator. But, upon all these accounts, it is liable to be abused very grossly and very perniciously, by hurrying us into eager co-operation with the ambitious, and into implicit confidence in the artful. Hence has often arisen the misapplication of a term which, in its original sense, was precise; and hence too has proceeded the perversion of a principle which, in its native character, is most meritorious.

Now, when our Lord was upon earth, the Roman

empire was stretching itself far and wide, and the Roman armies were leagued in a fell conspiracy against the tranquillity and the liberties of the world. The Jews also, among whom he lived, were bigoted to their own religious tenets, to their own ceremonial observances, to their traditions, to their temple, and to their false and proud notions of a Messiah, who was to erect for them a temporal kingdom. Under the influence of that bigotry, misguided by error, and infuriate from zeal, they would gladly "have bound all other nations in chains," and in thus exalting their own country to the disadvantage, and even with the subjugation of the whole human species, they would have looked upon themselves as instruments naturally, or, it may be, even preternaturally, appointed to accomplish the will, and to promote the glory of God among his favoured people. Amidst such propensities, then of the Jews, such practices of the Romans, and such wicked passions as were common to both, a precept immediately and earnestly directing men to love their country, would have been soon misunderstood, and soon misapplied. Through the glosses of interpreters, and the blindness of hearers, patriotism would have quickly mounted up to the highest class in the catalogue of virtues. In speculation it would have been so perverted as to debase the authority, and to counteract the influence of every obligation to universal benevolence. In practice it would have produced such ambition in governors, such impetuosity in leaders, and such frenzy among their followers, as would have plunged

them into undertakings wholly inconsistent with common prudence, common equity, and common humanity.

The argument which I am now enforcing may be pursued to a much greater extent. While a strong passion is striving for the mastery within us, perturbation of judgment always arises; and when the conflict ceases, the strength of every adverse passion, as a great philosopher * acutely remarks, is transferred to the predominant. Now a peremptory command from Christ, on the subject of patriotism, would, upon its first entrance into the minds of his followers, have been welcomed by their national prejudices and their national pride; and though reflection or humanity might, for a time, have preserved some of them from the abuse of it, yet, with the bulk of mankind, their influence, after a short and feeble resistance, would have been pushed into a contrary direction, by that agreeable feeling which often accompanies a brisk agitation of the spirits, by the blind impetuosity of intense action, by the fascinating desire of temporal and spiritual power, and by extravagant notions of advantage to their country, and glory to their religion. Experience, indeed, will assist us in conjecturing the probable effects of such a command upon the earlier believers in Revelation, as well as upon the Jews: and perhaps a sense of that probability, among other reasons, induced our Lord and his apostles to insist so largely and so frequently upon

* See Mr. Hume's Dissertation on the Passions.

the slender connection of the gospel on its first publication with secular concerns, and upon the duty of its followers to lay down their lives peaceably and patiently in the defence of their faith. If the benign tendencies of its spirit have, in later ages, been counteracted by the most absurd misconceptions of its letter; if metaphorical phrases have been transformed into absolute propositions—if solitary passages have been stretched on the rack of interpretation into general rules—if expressions picked up at random, or wrenched from the context have been pleaded as decisive warrants for the senseless enterprises of the crusader, and the merciless severities of the inquisitor; we may conclude that the duty of patriotism would not have been very accurately understood by the primitive Christians, especially at a time when their forefathers had been recently irritated by obloquy from the Jew, and by persecution from the Gentile. Under the circumstance just now mentioned of any positive direction to fight for their lives and their laws, Christianity, though ushered in with a solemn proclamation of "peace upon earth" and "good-will towards men," would, when Christians formed the majority of a nation, have soon been employed, as Mahometanism was, to disturb that peace, and to stifle that good-will. Rushing precipitately from the love of their Saviour to the contempt or hatred of their species; blending intolerance with ambition; fired at once with religious zeal and military enthusiasm, they would have appealed to the authority of their Master, not in his predictions of events, but in his

precepts for conduct, when, he spoke of "sending upon the earth not peace but a sword." They would have aspired to conquest from motives of mistaken piety, and with the approbation of misguided conscience they would have unsheathed their weapons indiscriminately against every puny sect of heretics, and every populous community of heathens. They would have disdained either to renounce, or to dissemble "that favourite maxim * which has so often been ill interpreted and ill applied, that 'whoever is found to be an enemy to God, ought also to be declared an enemy to his country'."

Multiform and irregular as may be the caprices of fanaticism, it steadily enough keeps in view the gratification of latent pride; nor is it ever insensible to the allurement of domination over the temporal possessions and social rights, as well as the religious opinions of mankind. Hence proselytemakers, when emboldened by numbers, and furnished with arms, fondly gaze upon the whole world as a land of promise, which they are themselves, like Abraham in the land of Canaan, to traverse "in the length † of it, and in the breadth of it," and not only to traverse but to subdue, and after subduing to reform, and after reforming to retain, and all this they will tell you for the honour of their country, the natives of which are appointed to

* See Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History of the Seventeenth Century, sec. ii. part 2.

† Gen. xiii. 17.

be "a light to lighten the Gentiles;" to march onward through difficulty and danger as the harbingers of a triumphant Redeemer, and to announce the proffer of immortal bliss in the willing or the unwilling ears of every near and every remote people. Enchanted with such illusions, they will measure duty by inclination, right by power, and the lawfulness of the means by the supposed importance of the end. They will cast away mercy as an obstacle to justice, and prudence as a reproach to godliness. They will listen to no distinctions between false and genuine patriotism. They will submit to no compromise between the errors which they have determined to extirpate, and the truths which they think themselves bounden to disseminate. They will be checked in their career by no suggestion that "the glory of celestial objects is one," and "the glory of terrestial is another." They will acknowledge no king but Jesus, and he that "is not with them" for the sake of Jesus, in every hardy enterprise, and every ferocious outrage, stands accursed as a recreant traitor who is secretly against them, who meanly shrinks from the crown of martyrdom, and basely truckles for his life by the forfeiture of his soul. If the history of man may be credited, such is the nature of man: and shall Christians boast of complete exemption from the common infirmities of that nature?

But if Christianity had been thus propagated with undisguised violence: if that violence had been owing to the rapid transition of the human mind, from the love of our own religion and our

own country, to the detestation of other religions, and other countries; if that transition had been occasioned by erroneous notions of any encouragements which the Scriptures afford to that love: what, I would ask, must have been the consequence? They who now amuse themselves with talking of Christians, as required to set their affections exclusively upon "heavenly things," would have been clamorous against their unseemly and baneful activity in earthly affairs; against the inflammatory language, as well as the unsocial genius of the Christian law—against the want of philanthrophy, or the want of discernment in Christ himself. But by leaving the duty of patriotism to be understood in the way of legitimate deduction from the principle of general benevolence, and by subjecting it to the control of equity and sound discretion, as necessary attendants upon that principle when applied to practice, our blessed Master has sufficiently guarded his religion from numerous objections which, if just, must have appeared very formidable even to the ablest of its defenders, and the warmest of its well-wishers.

While, however, we reflect upon the reasons which may be pertinently alleged for the silence of our Lord in his public ministry, about the regard we owe to our country, let us not forget that in his actions he felt and cherished it with the most glowing ardour, and in the most unspotted purity.

Did he not first announce to his countrymen the glad tidings of salvation? did he not, in his own native land, primarily and chiefly heal the sick,

cleanse the lepers, give sight to the blind, and command the deaf to hear? Did he not warn his countrymen again and again of the calamities which hung over them, and endeavour to calm that boisterous and factious disposition by the correction of which those calamities might have been averted? Did he not cast an affectionate eye of compassion upon the holy city, and in strains the most tender thus bewail its approaching ruin? "O! Jerusalem! Jerusalem! Thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not. Behold your house is left unto you desolate."

The sum of my reasoning is this: if from the national temper and political situation of the Jews and Romans, to whom our Lord more immediately addresses himself, any precept about the love of our country would, probably, have been misconceived by the rash, and abused by the crafty; if the duty itself, in all its essential points, is evidently implied in the injunctions of the Gospel about universal benevolence; if the affection itself is sanctioned by the example of our Saviour, surely we are furnished with a sufficient answer to the severe reproaches of infidels, and the wild misrepresentations of believers. The Gospel, in reality, separates the artificial from the genuine virtue. It omits all mention of false patriotism, and by such omission, as well as by the general spirit of its laws, may be said to discountenance it. It includes whatsoever is sound

and praiseworthy in true patriotism, under the more comprehensive and more noble duty of charity; and in the life of its blessed author it exhibits some particular and practical illustrations of that patriotism, which every head may understand, and every heart must feel.

Having thus endeavoured to rescue the character of our holy religion from the unjust cavils of its adversaries, and the injudicious panegyrics of its defenders, I must not decline the no less difficult and no less important task of impressing its real meaning upon the memory and conscience of you my hearers, who "bow the knee in the name of Jesus Christ."

The philosopher knows, that from the numerous and complicated relations of man in a state of moral discipline, every virtue must have its boundary. The religionist knows, that through the hypocrisy or the madness of God's creatures, the awful name of God has been profanely usurped in justification of the most ridiculous follies, the most palpable errors, and the most atrocious crimes. The calm and sagacious observer of human life must know, that while on the one hand, the duty of obeying our governors has been strained to an extent quite incompatible with the natural and social rights of his fellow subjects, the duty of loving our country on the other is also exposed to such misrepresentations as may be very injurious to the peace, the prosperity, and the independence of foreign states. Attend to me therefore, while I guard the application of what has been already said to you, by the

following well-meant, and I hope well-timed explanation.

The religionist then, be it observed, will ever separate genuine from spurious patriotism; that which interests the virtuous from that which decoys the thoughtless; that which is consistent with general good from that which is adverse to it. The religionist will distinguish anxiously and minutely between the effusions of prejudice, wrath, and self-interest, and the dictates of that well-founded and well-regulated principle which is mild without lukewarmness, earnest without temerity, firm without obstinacy; which respects loyalty as conducive to the good order, and sometimes even to the preservation of society; and which loves freedom as the source of all that is noble in our nature, or most desirable in our existence.

Upon questions which involve the happiness of thousands and tens of thousands, the religionist will pause before he approves, and explore before he decides. He looks to the latent as well as the avowed motives of every action; to the distant as well as the immediate consequences of every event; to the substantial as well as the brilliant qualities of every character; to the real as well as the ostensible merits of every cause, before he admits into his own grave and authoritative sentence the hallowed name of patriot. He listens with attention indeed, but sometimes with disgust or with anguish or with terror, to the music of courtly adulation; to the shouts of popular applause; to the specious harangues of unprincipled declaimers, and

the deceitful glosses of hireling panegyrists. Remembering the instability of human affairs, and the deceitfulness of the human heart, he often discerns a lust of domination in national prowess; a spirit of delusion in national vauntings; and a tendency to ultimate ruin even in national successes. Fixing his views upon the moral as well as the physical properties of things, and considering them under the awful and unalterable relation in which they are placed, to the government of an omniscient and righteous Deity, he finds no occasion for triumph when "the prophets prophecy falsely," when priests or "kings bear rule by their means," and when a misguided "people love to have it so." No approbation is to be expected from his suffrage by the factious incendiary, by the rapacious adventurer, by the ruthless oppressor, or by the ambitious and tyrannous conqueror, when bedecked with titles and loaden with spoils, and reeking with the blood of fellow-christians and fellow-men, he calls himself the saviour of his country. Upon the worthless, shameless, pitiless ruffain, who, plunging his weapon into the bosom of a disarmed, fallen, suppliant antagonist, would bring back the atrocities of savage hordes into the conflicts of Christian combatants, tarnish the annals of his country to the latest posterity, and agitate the whole civilized world with astonishment at the flagitious overt act, indignation at the dastardly excuse, and horror at the portentous example, upon the cool-headed and flinty-hearted sophist, who from motives of grovelling avarice or rampant ambition, deliberately puts

"evil for good, and good for evil,"—upon the perfidious counsellor, who would "fashion, wrest, and bow his reading in opening or sustaining titles miscreate, the right of which suits not in active colours with the truth;"* and this too when he "empawns the person or the honour of his royal master, and would awake the sleeping sword of war,"—upon all such wretches the religionist looks down as the betrayers of their sovereign, the corruptors of their fellow subjects, and the murderers of their species. Nay, what is more tremendous but most sure, he knows that upon the souls of such wretches will be fixed, at the last day, immediate and strict responsibility for all the accumulated and aggravated miseries of war, unjustly begun or unmercifully prosecuted. Yes, my brethren! before the tribunal of Almighty God these false patriots whom I have been describing to you, will be responsible for every sort of interruption and every degree of diminution in the happiness of sensitive, and in the improvement of moral creatures. They will be responsible for every rude check which they may have given to the delicacies of manners, to the tendernesses of humanity, and to all those agreeable or useful kinds of social intercourse which acquire facility from custom or regularity from law. They will be responsible for the gradual transition of the national character from a sense of security obtained with difficulty to a spirit of wanton annoyance; from the remembrance of injuries repeatedly suffered to

* See Shakspeare's Henry the Fifth, act i. scene 2.

a spirit of vindictive retaliation; and even from habits of courage long exercised to a spirit of brutal ferocity. They will be responsible for the tempestuous confusion of public affairs; for the diminished comforts of private life; for the increasing pressure of taxation; for the sudden decay of trade; for the violent interruptions of agriculture; for "the goodly fruits of the earth," which, having been cherished by the "former and the latter rain," are wantonly laid waste; for ancient temples prophaned by an impious soldiery; for gorgeous cities rased from their foundations; for kings driven from their lawful thrones, and peasants from their lowly cottages; for limbs crippled irreparably by disease, or mutilated by wounds; for constitutions exhausted by incessant fatigue, or sapped by pestilential climates; for combatants hurried from a field of slaughter to appear before the judgment-seat of God, with all their "secret faults" and all their "presumptuous sins," unexpiated by repentance; for the "cries of the orphan, for the tears of the widow,* for the blood of dead men, and for the groans of innocent virgins deploring the loss of husbands, fathers, and betrothed lovers, who have been swallowed up in the dreadful controversy." Since "the very hairs of our head are all numbered," and not "a sparrow falls to the ground" unnoticed in the sight of God, awful indeed is the account which must one day be rendered for the collective sufferings of a nation.

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* Shakspeare's Henry the Fifth, act ii. scene 5.

If the rulers of the earth would ponder these things they might be wise without craftiness, good without weakness, and great without guilt.

From the loathsome and terrific forms which lurk under the glare of false patriotism, I gladly turn to the contemplation of that purer lustre, in which the true love of our country is arrayed in the eye both of God and of man. To him, then, who goeth forth to the battle sincerely and seriously, in the well-applied name, and for the well-understood glory of the Lord of Hosts—to him who would deliver the "meek and humble" from the cruel "despitefulness" of the mighty and "the proud"—to him who "snappeth asunder the spear of the destroyers, and burneth their chariots in the fire"—to such a patriot, contending in such a cause, and for such ends, even religion holds forth encouragement in the "promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." His merits indeed will be rewarded by the ardent gratitude and the rapturous admiration of the people among whom he was born, and whom he has rescued from enemies abroad, or from oppressors at home. His name will be pronounced with reverence in the assemblies of princes and the festivities of nations. His feats are transmitted from generation to generation by the testimony of faithful and impartial historians; they are holden up to wonder and to imitation in the sublime and animated eloquence of statesmen and patriots; they are consecrated as it were by the calm and solemn applause of wise and virtuous sages; nay more, they are recorded in the infallible and

immutable registry of heaven, where "the spirits of just men made perfect" may even now be permitted to sympathize with kindred excellence: and where angels and archangels, upon such occasions as these, may not disdain to behold and to approve.

From these general, but I trust not unseasonable nor unprofitable observations, I should immediately proceed to the topics suggested to us by the peculiar solemnity of this day, if I had not very cogent reasons for laying before you some preparatory remarks, which cannot fail to be understood by those among you, who have been my attentive and well-disposed hearers.

The late war was marked by some unusual and deplorable circumstances, which led me from motives of prudence, of moderation, of sincerity and of piety, to abstain as much as possible from political discussion, and even political allusions, when I addressed you in the sanctuary. Looking as I did seriously to the peculiar character of "the times and the seasons," I contented myself with adverting only to such subjects as were closely connected with the interests of morality and religion, and such as had a direct tendency to preserve your minds from every licentious and every unholy tenet, which had been broached in a neighbouring country. I always wish to speak of my clerical brethren not with the affrontive smoothness of candour, but with the manly and respectful openness of justice. The zeal of many among them I am sure was accompanied by honest intention, though perhaps not always by profound knowledge; and their just abhor-

rence of the atrocities which were committed by our enemy led them astray, sometimes into interpretations of prophecy which have not been warranted by subsequent events, and sometimes into presages of divine judgments, about which the ignorance and wrath of man seldom harmonize with the righteous but unsearchable counsels of God. Certainly, however, it was not then my duty to dogmatize upon what was doubtful, or to exaggerate what might be true, when by so doing I was more likely, from the violent temper of men at that juncture, to inflame the partizan, than to instruct the Christian. It was not my fortune at the same time to discover much decorum or much usefulness in the different conduct of certain teachers, who seemed to be aiming, some at fleeting popularity, a few perhaps at secular advantage, and more I believe at the gratification of their own blind prejudices and impetuous passions upon obscure, intricate, and extraordinary questions, about which many enlightened men were accustomed to suspend their judgment in obedience to their conscience, and to chain up their speech from their desire of peace.

I would not, however, be understood to censure without any distinction or any limitation, the introduction of politics into a christian pulpit; though I could wish every topic so introduced to be well considered, every statement well founded, and every admonition well timed. I am aware that from the impulses of self-preservation, the influence of custom, and the dictates of common sense, we always carry about us a lively feeling for the inter-

ests of our country; and that in promoting those interests we are happy to find our opinions and our actions warranted, more or less, by the authority of that religion in the belief of which we profess to live, and hope to die. Whether the sphere of our agency be appointed to us in a high or a low station; whether we be endowed with an ample or a scanty portion of knowledge; whether we approve or disapprove of public measures, it were criminal, as perhaps it is nearly impossible, for us to be indifferent to the public safety. Indeed that safety itself is always the professed end both of our approbation and disapprobation; and our anxiety to preserve it most effectually is always the motive by which good men are actuated, howsoever they may differ in opinion about the means. Even the factious do homage to the principle of patriotism, by their reiterated though deceitful appeals to it; and the honest evince its usefulness and strengthen its efficacy, when they endeavour to accomplish the purposes which it seems to point out by those instruments which it is known to authorize. But, in proportion as this feeling of regard to our country recurs frequently and acts intensely, it becomes us to be upon the watch against self-delusion, self-conceit, and the excess of self-love. Besides, when the happiness and the merits of foreign nations, as well as that to which we belong, are deeply interested, we cannot be too wary in declaiming against the sins, and exulting over the misfortunes of others, nor too dispassionate in weighing the causes and consequences of our own.

The fact is, that in the terrible contests of nations, war is always to be ranked among the severest scourges of God; that it ought to be lamented unfeignedly even where it may be completely justified; that through the infirmities, the errors, the jarring interests, and the wayward affections of men, the opportunities for such justification are not very frequent; that during the dark and contentious negociations which precede hostilities, injuries, and loud complaints of injuries, are often reciprocal; that appeals are sometimes made to heaven by both parties with equal plausibility in words, and equal presumption in spirit; that moderation is not always found among the brave, nor sincerity among the eloquent; that amidst the hideous din of arms, the irregular agitations of hope and fear, the boisterous rage of multitudes, and the mischievous willingness of their leaders, it is extremely difficult for the wisest and best of men to separate truth from falsehood, or to ascertain the boundaries of right and wrong; and that for these numerous and weighty reasons, the merits of war as points of discussion merely political, are seldom admissible into the house of God, and generally even as subjects of moral investigation are better adapted to other times and other places. Yet upon the coolest and fullest consideration, I am convinced that in repelling the invader, "we are fighting for our lives and our laws," and therefore do not offend against the spirit of our benevolent religion, and the will of our heavenly Father.

Under this conviction I stand acquitted by my

own heart, in deviating for once from my usual practice. But you will take notice that while I urge the duty of "fighting for our lives and our laws," as recommended by the text, I shall very reluctantly advert to a preceding passage, so far as the contents of it may be employed with the poignancy of personal reproach, in representing the governors (I say not the armies) of another country as "coming against us with much pride and iniquity." The station to which they have risen, by whatsoever means; the power which they have recently acquired; the spirit which they have again and again manifested, are most unfavourable to the ordinary and peaceful intercourse of nations; and surely circumstances so novel and so prominent, are sufficient to justify the disapprobation of moralists, the vigilance of statesmen, the jealousy of rivals in every honourable branch of commerce, and the apprehensions of neighbouring communities for their ultimate and even their immediate security. With reasonable dissent, however, from some popular rumours, and with very slender or improbable evidence for the exactness of others, I will not in the house of God echo and re-echo personalities, to the asperity and perhaps in some points to the injustice of which we may in part impute "those perils and those calamities" which we have this day deplored upon our knees before the throne of God. Having some time ago endeavoured to prepare your minds for the service, which the wisdom of our ecclesiastical governors has appointed for the present solemnity; having this day joined you in the performance of

it, and having explained to you the principles of Christianity, upon duties intimately connected with the best purposes for which that solemnity could be intended, I will not presume to repeat what I do not believe, or to imitate what I do not approve. Whether to gain the praise or to shun the displeasure of mortal man, I will not dissemble my wishes that the acrimony of personal railing may never be permitted to find a place in supplications addressed to that Being, who "weigheth men in the balance, and who searcheth the hearts and reins." Sound policy is never at variance with substantial justice; and at such a juncture as this it stands in need of assistance, not from far-fetched surmises, or frivolous cavils, or virulent invectives, but from that caution which is able to appreciate the differences of real and apparent danger, and that firmness which alike disdains to have recourse to the meanness of submission and the insolence of defiance. If then the honest and generous zeal of the public has been stirred up without such inglorious expedients, can it be wise to disturb the calm and pious reflections of individuals assembled in the sanctuary? If upon the most momentous perhaps of all national questions, we are united in exertion and in sentiment, can it be virtuous to throw stumbling blocks in the way of good men by unnecessary and uncertain assumptions, which may for one moment divide them in their prayers? These plain but serious questions will be much better answered by the common sense of a re-

ligionist, than by the subtilties of a polemic, or the declamations of a zealot.

In conformity to the express language of the text, I will now call your attention to the peculiar and alarming situation of public affairs. I wish not to perplex your minds with the intricacies of political controversy, but to animate your zeal and to direct your conduct upon an occasion most important to you in all your various relations, as masters of families, as servants, as parents, as children, as Englishmen, and as Christians. We are threatened with invasion from a foreign enemy whose power is become enormous, whose views are most ambitious, whose spirit is most unquiet, whose armies are formidable from unexampled numbers and from recent success, and whose attempts against us are the more to be dreaded from the military skill, the political sagacity, and perhaps I should add the peculiar temper of their leader. The annals of our history scarcely present to us any period in which the danger of all that is dear to us was so extensive, or so imminent; and thankful I am to heaven, that at no crisis whatsoever were Englishmen equally prepared to encounter such danger, by the united good sense, loyalty, and courage of our countrymen.

In the reign of King John, when a French prince poured his legions into this kingdom, we were governed by a weak and a wicked sovereign, who had alienated from himself the hearts of his people: and the vassals of many proud and powerful English barons crowded to the same standard, and

fought in the same cause, with French invaders. But mark, I beseech you, the better condition in which you are placed, by the merciful providence of God. The progress of knowledge and civilization, the improved principles of government, the order and impartiality which pervade the administration of public justice, have secured this happy land both from the open and the secret tyranny of sovereigns; and proper it is for me to add, that he who now reigns over us, has a claim to our respect and our obedience, from the exemplary decorum, which common fame has uniformly and justly ascribed to him in private life, and from the general avoidance of those public measures which strike at the foundation of our free and venerable constitution. Whatsoever may have been the errors of a long and eventful reign, it were want of sagacity not to perceive, and want of candour not to acknowledge, that, in the course of it, strange occurrences have arisen in various parts of Europe, such, I am sure, as might embarrass the most discreet, irritate the most patient, and astound the most intrepid. Our sovereign, however, has not, like John, under the plea of exercising his own proper prerogative, trampled upon our rights; he has not, for the attainment of purposes, peculiarly and exclusively his own, seized upon our property; he has not deliberately violated the laws which he had sworn to defend; he has not arrogantly provoked the rich and the powerful; he has not inhumanly insulted and oppressed the poor. Thus far, in the conduct and character of our sovereign, we have a security for

that unanimity, and we have incitements to that ardour, which the folly and the crimes of the unhappy John had destroyed in the minds of his offended and injured subjects.

In the reign of Henry the Sixth, the French made on our coasts some predatory incursions, which, however mischievous for a season, do not appear to have left behind them any lasting consequences. But the intellectual faculties of the king, we should remember, were feeble from nature and torpid from superstition. His very innocence excited affection without inspiring reverence, and his misfortunes procured for him the tenderness of compassion rather than the steadiness of attachment. The management of foreign affairs was unsuccessful, and the administration of internal politics was unpopular. The mind of his queen was impatient of control, fertile in machinations, unwearied by difficulty, and unsubdued even by defeat. His title to royalty was disputed by a subtle, watchful, and high spirited competitor, who was neither to be awed by resistance nor soothed by concession. His nobles were fickle, turbulent, and perfidious; and his people were prone to revolt upon every delusion practised on their credulity, and every instigation applied to their fury. But from the inconveniences, and perils attendant upon such a state of things, we are fortunately exempt.

Doubtless ye have often heard of the mighty preparations that menaced the liberties of England in the days of Queen Elizabeth, when the Spanish Armada approached our shores. At that time, the

seeds of discord were widely scattered over the land. The naval power of Spain seemed to be quite as superior to that of England, as the disciplined hosts of France are now said to be to the regular force usually maintained in this kingdom. The character of the Spanish monarch was distinguished by unrelenting pride, by gloomy bigotry, and by ferocious revenge. The perils from within were, to calm and considerate observers, equally alarming. A great part of the people were yet attached to the doctrines and discipline of popery. The emissaries of the court of Rome were numerous and indefatigable. Their intrigues were deep, and their temper was vindictive. Their adherents were to be found ready for action in every crowded city and in every lonely village. Their priests had taught their followers to believe that rebellion was a duty, and that to rush into treason against their sovereign was an act of allegiance to their Saviour and their God. If providence had permitted the Spaniards to land among us thousands would have hastened to enlist under their banners, and the cross of Christ would have been raised aloft in the defence of desolation and murder, against every Englishman who obeyed a Protestant Queen, or who worshipped his Maker according to the pure and holy forms of a Protestant Church.

Be ye serious, my brethren, be faithful to your Country, be thankful to your God, when you reflect that, in the present day, the torch of religious discord will not be lighted up among us; that from our earliest infancy we have been trained in the

simple and salutary discipline of Protestantism; that no priests are at hand to persuade us to hurl our sovereign from the throne, or to imbrue our hands in the blood of our countrymen, under the penalties of everlasting damation; that no secret plots have been formed against that religion which we have been accustomed to venerate; that we are Protestants surrounded by Protestant brethren; that among those who yet adhere to the Church of Rome, the intolerant and malignant spirit of their forefathers has, in most of them, been corrected by the diffusion of useful knowledge, enlarged inquiry, and civilized manners among them, as well as ourselves; that by the more enlightened part of them, Catholicism is no longer confounded with Popery; that the obedience which Catholics profess to owe, or are accustomed to pay, to their spiritual head, is no longer incompatible with the rights of sovereigns, the observance of treaties, or the security of states; that the rival claims of aspirants to power, which engendered or embittered the disputes of polemics about religious doctrines, are no longer heard in this country, or remain matters of research only to the antiquary, the historian, and the philosopher; that the severities which were formerly inflicted upon Papists by the prudence, or the jealousy, or the vengeance of Protestants, have been gradually relaxed; that with mingled feelings of honest gratitude and reasonable hope, many learned and worthy persons among them are beginning to look forward to a complete, though perhaps distant, deliverance, from every galling restraint, and every in-

sulting suspicion; that all of them have a common interest with ourselves in repelling the common foe; that regulations in France are not a pledge for indulgences to England; that policy, though it has led our enemy to restore a National Church in the country, which, as he expects to govern it long, he may wish to propitiate, will suggest different measures under the different circumstances of another country, which, after conquering it, he may be compelled to abandon; and that his complete success, instead of procuring for sectaries any enlargement of protection, or even any mitigation of inconveniences, would involve the civil and religious rights both of Catholics and Protestants in equal, helpless, and hopeless ruin.

These are weighty considerations, and they will encourage you to repose the firmest confidence, not only in your own strength, but in the ready and vigorous co-operation of that party which, in the reign of Elizabeth, was so dangerous to the safety of the Sovereign, to the existence of the National Church, and to the property, liberty, and lives of your Protestant ancestors.

Will not the heart of Israel then be roused and warmed like "the heart of one man," in the support of that cause which you are summoned to defend? Are they not the words of sound and sober wisdom by which you were instructed, in the prayer just now read to you, to implore the protection of Heaven to the National Church? Has not that Church been adorned by the talents, the erudition, the virtues, and the piety of its teachers,

through many generations? Was it not consecrated at first by the blood of many learned and holy martyrs? Is not the stability of it experimentally found to be consistent with your intellectual improvement and your social welfare? Have not the doctrines of it, when heard by you in this sanctuary, inspired you with the love of God, and the love of your neighbour? Have they not consoled you within your own private families, in seasons of sickness, sorrow, and adversity? Will they not guide your feet through the paths of innocence and virtue in this life? Do they not open to your faith and to your hopes the glorious prospect of immortality in the life to come? And will you, then, tamely surrender these precious privileges to the fury of your enemies, flushed with victory, fearless of retaliation, or impelled by that blind antipathy which the scorner ever feels towards the virtuous and the devout? May not some of them be tempted to throw down your altars, and to slay your priests with the sword? Instigated by that rage for proselytism which is common to infidelity and to superstition, may they not teach you to make a mock of sin, to renounce your Redeemer, and perhaps to blaspheme even your Creator? How then are these multiplied and aggravated evils to be averted? I answer, by your union and concord; by your firmness and valour; by your well-founded affiance in the assistance of God, to repel the attacks of adversaries, many of whom are too likely to insult you for believing in that God,

and to persecute you for endeavouring to worship him in spirit and in truth.

These are the reasons that should induce you to be unaminous in preserving your religion. And now, my brethren, when we turn to the consideration of "our Laws" and our Government, we shall meet with arguments equally forcible to guide our judgments and to strengthen our resolution. It is not the vulgar and braggart prattle of national vanity—it is not the fond and empty jargon of visionary theorists, when we say that the civil constitution of England far surpasses that of every other country, either in antient or modern times. The principles of it lie deep in the opinions and customs of ages far remote from our own. But they have been gradually matured by the influence of many various causes, through many successive generations. They are to be classed, not among the effects which, as accident produces them at one time, may by accident be destroyed at another; nor among the contrivances which the ingenuity and enthusiasm of a single man would push at once to perfection, and the jealousy or the caprice of a successor might throw aside, upon the plea of defect; but, among the productions of human wisdom, calmly reflecting upon the collective evidence of human experience in the past, and warily adapting the result to the present exigences of human affairs, and to their probable capacities of admitting improvement or reformation. They have been recognized by the fears and the hopes, and they have been strengthened by the successes and the disap-

pointments, of kings, of nobles, and of priests, whose mutual contentions have imposed upon them the necessity of employing against their rivals those popular rights which they might otherwise have been unwilling to favour, or even to endure. They have been rescued from many perils by the sagacity of statesmen, the firmness of patriots, and the courage of heroes. They are diffused through our civil and our political code of laws. They mingle with the prejudices of our youth and the reflections of our manhood. They are endeared to us by long possession, by acknowledged right, and by enjoyment, which the inevitable fluctuations of public measures and public events have, in our own days, rarely disturbed. They bind our affections to the Throne, because it forms our surest safeguard from multiplied and petty tyrannies; to the Parliament, because it has the power of giving salutary checks, and aids no less salutary, to the Throne; and to both, because the stability and proper dignity of both are intimately connected with their duties and proper energies, in preserving constitutional freedom, and in promoting the common weal. They pervade all the classes of the community. They protect alike the palace of the monarch, the mansion of the nobleman, and the cottage of the labourer. They give security to the persons and the property, not only of the opulent and the powerful, but of the manufacturer and the husbandman. They, in a word, are equally beneficial to all, and by the counsels and the endeavours of all they are now to be defended.

At such a momentous crisis every impartial and intelligent observer of political events, as affected by the established customs and complicated interests of a people, will turn his attention towards other circumstances, which are peculiarly favourable to this kingdom.

Where property is very unequally divided, where the many toil by harsh compulsion for the advantage of the few, where the middle classes of the community bear a very small proportion in influence to the higher, or, in number, to the lower orders of citizens; where despotism inflicts without control, and imbecility suffers without redress; where dependence is abject without connection, and obedience is implicit without attachment; in such states military operations are usually confined to hosts of mercenaries; and in the absence of that fury which is inspired by religious fanaticism, or by personal revenge, nations are sometimes content to change their masters with little regret for the past and little solicitude about the future. But among a free people, that latent power which is diffused through society, and which is necessary for the preservation of freedom itself from encroachment, and those dormant energies of the mind which accompany that power, silently, but effectually, prepare men for great exertions upon great occasions. The materials of which that power is formed, may, indeed, be usually of too close and too subtle a texture to be easily discerned by an eye, which is intensely and almost exclusively fixed upon the coarse and complicated tactics of ordinary war. But their

firmness is seen and felt in the hour of trial, and though pierced, they are seldom rent asunder by external violence.

Now, without entering at large into the abuses which provoked, or the crimes which disgraced, a late revolution, I may be permitted to say that, in the course of it, striking instances were exhibited of that principle which concentrates the public opinion, the public will, and the public force, for the maintenance of a cause which every man supposed that he understood, because every man knew that he was interested in it. But we have long been in possession of that object, at which our enemies were doomed to aim injudiciously, and therefore unsuccessfully. We rank it among our political, but they found it only among their natural rights. From the influence of habit we are enlightened but not dazzled by liberty, even in its meridian splendour. But they, for a time, were compelled to gaze upon it only through the excessive and delusive glare of speculation, and in practice, after a dawn, which from the beginning was sometimes overspread with clouds, and which ended in dark and angry tempests, the light which they had been permitted to see so faintly, and with so many sudden and irregular interruptions, vanished from their view, perhaps not to re-appear through so many joyless ages.

Whatsoever then be the good, whether moral or physical, which rational freedom is capable of producing, our own experience will tell us, that our own share of such good has been most ample in-

deed. For, amidst all the follies, and all the vices, which luxury may have engendered among us, it may still be asked, where, among the nations of Europe, can be seen a whole people, less infected with those impious tenets, which have relaxed the tone of all social virtues, or with those loathsome impurities, which, from familiarity, have almost ceased to be infamous, in many parts of the continent? Where, among persons of every rank, are instances of fidelity, integrity, and benevolence, more numerous in private life? Or, where does the public spirit manifest itself with more promptitude and more perseverance, upon every opportunity which occurs for giving effect to enterprizes of great public utility? Amidst the remains of feudal manners or feudal rights, corrected, as they have been by progressive civilization, where is the peasant less exposed to insolent and vexatious oppression from the rich? Or, where has the noble less to apprehend from that envy and that malignity which conscious inferiority is too apt to inspire? Where is power lodged with individuals, more generally subservient to the purposes of protection; and where are the privileges conferred upon them more frequently connected with social duties? Where shall we find so many aids to strengthen the sinews of war, or to restore in a short time the springs of action, which war may have impeded or impaired? Where shall we meet with so many capitals, the acquisition of which sustains or increases so effectually the population of a country—employs so many persons usefully in the distribution of labour—

opens so many sources of advantage or pleasure to the artificer, the seller, and the consumer, and pours the productions of art and nature through so many near and so many distant channels? Where have men of genius arisen more frequently, or their merits been more readily acknowledged, while the general activity of that good sense which is embodied among the people seems to stand so little in need of assistance from splendid discoveries, or is so constantly at hand to separate the truths from the refinements contained in them, and quietly to incorporate every useful suggestion into our established code of politics and ethics? Where can be seen a greater diversity of interests supporting and supported by each other through a greater diversity of ranks—diffusing the comforts and conveniences adapted to various situations—more abundantly furnishing opportunities and incentives either to corporeal or mental exertion more extensively, and securing the fruits of both to every man with the consent and co-operation of all men more permanently? Where has civilization, improved by commerce, by agriculture, by knowledge, by religion, by laws, by popular habits and popular sentiments, displayed a more complex, and at the same time a more beautiful form of society, for the contemplation of the philosopher, for the satisfaction of the citizen, and for the exercise of talents and virtue in the legislator, the statesman, and the patriot?

By the very structure of the human mind, the sense of such blessings must accompany the enjoyment of them; and though from the constitution

of human affairs, they may be liable to temporary changes in excess or diminution, yet upon every fit occasion the manly character of our countrymen, and the principles of our mixed government, as illustrated by experience, will present to every understanding some rallying point of opinion and action; some corrective quality to speculative errors, or to practical abuses: some lenient and salutary expedients for accommodation to the advocates of every system, and the champions of every party. Even in times of peace and prosperity, that sense of our real situation though calm is not inert; for, in the view of the profound observer, it fixes a barrier almost impenetrable between obedience and servility; between the patience of subjects under the errors of their governors, and the apathy of vassals to their crimes; between the loftiness of free-born citizens, and the audacity of a licentious rabble; between the murmurs of transient discontent, and the enormities of inveterate faction; between the sober processes of improvement, and the tumultuous frolics of innovation; between the wisdom which repairs, and the rashness which subverts. But in seasons less auspicious to the tranquillity and happiness of the state, this general sympathy in general good is marked by stronger characters in the general conduct of the people. It points the best energies of self-love, and of social, to the same common and important purpose. It urges every man to depend on himself, and to act from himself, as "if the moment of victory should lie on his

single arm."* It prepares the minds of all men to awake on the approach of real danger, to guard their collective interests by their collective strength, and to preserve the unparalleled advantages which they are conscious of possessing by personal sacrifices and personal exertions, fully proportionate to the number and the magnitude of the objects for which they are called upon to contend.

You, my hearers, are not without your portion in the blessings which I have just now enumerated. In the present state of society, you go forth in the morning to your daily labours without fear, in the evening you return without inquietude to your homely meals, and through the stillness of the night you repose in your beds without alarm. But, if your enemies were long to prevail, would they not, like the Egyptian task-masters of old, command you to make brick and to supply yourselves with straw? Would they listen to your complaints when you "were hungry and thirsty," and your souls were fainting within you? Would they suffer you to rehearse in carols of joy all the mighty feats and all the glorious triumphs of your forefathers in defence of that liberty which is now your own? No. They would not permit your tongues to utter that word so familar to the ears, and so captivating to the hearts of Englishmen. They would put out every spark of the holy fire which now glows in your bosoms. They would force you to endure the

* See Paradise Lost, book vi. line 239.

scorching sun and the chilling frost, but without recompensing your toil. By compulsion you would till the land, and by violence they would reap your harvests, or they would plunder your barns. From the character of freemen and of Englishmen they would degrade you into vassals, too impotent to be dreaded, and too contemptible to be pitied. Day after day and year after year, they would condemn you to the most ignominious drudgery, as "hewers of wood and drawers of water;" and the agility of your youth, the vigour of your manhood, and even the last lingering remains of your strength, in tremulous and languid old age, would be exhausted at the will and for the benefit of your imperious and obdurate conquerors. Many of the evils here mentioned already impend over other countries which are unable to break their chains; and if the power of your enemy were equal to his fierceness, the same evils, attended by various circumstances of aggravation, would inevitably overtake yourselves and your posterity.

But from such a prospect a mind truly English must recoil with indignation. You, I am confident, would disdain to bow down your necks to that yoke, which has been thrown by your enemies on many other people whom their promises had cajoled, or their menaces had scared. Your spirit will never yield obedience to the commands of such oppressors. Your hands, instead of being cramped by the fetters which your enemies have forged for them, should rather be raised up in wielding the sword of

justice, and in pointing the sharpest edge of it against the invader.

Among men whose understandings have been darkened, whose courage has been stifled, and whose sensibility has been blunted by familiarity with slavery, a change of masters, as I have before observed, often is little more than a change of wretchedness. The difference, though seen for a while by the imagination, ceases gradually to be felt by the heart. Either the memory of it passes away like a shadow in the next generation, or the popular traditions which record it serve only to "point a moral, and to adorn a tale."* But, upon a people whose minds have been invigorated and disciplined by liberty such as yours—liberty, not the reluctant grant of humbled tyranny—not the precarious gift of caprice or ostentation—not the hard earned recompense of recent and bloody struggles—not the intricate and fantastic machinery of busy upstarts, or daring experimentalists; but liberty which is adapted to your condition, as intellectual, social, and religious beings; which seems venerable to you from hereditary claims, which is precious to you from personal enjoyment, and which would become yet more venerable and more precious from the consciousness of resolute, though unsuccessful endeavours to preserve it; upon such a people the most offensive and systematic severities must be employed to repress the frowns of just indignation,

* See Johnson's Translation of the Tenth Satire of Juvenal.

and the throbs of virtuous pride. The memories of such a people, their fancy, their reason, their feelings, their habits, and their very senses are enemies which must ever keep the jealousy of the oppressor upon the alert, and ever put his invention too upon the rack to defeat their influence by unceasing and unusual schemes of oppression. He must deface the appearance, or he must alter the uses of every external object which may be endeared to them by antiquity, by magnificence, by symmetry, by utility, by immediate creation, by long inheritance, by the bounty of nature, or by the ingenuity of art. He must rescind every law, abolish every custom, interdict every pursuit, and restrain or even punish every opinion, which may be associated with the remembrance of their better days, and of "the old time before them." He must bereave them of the power to drag out their miserable existence upon the same spot with their companions and their friends; to eat their daily bread under the same roof with their wives and their children; and to obtain the last solace of human wretchedness in resting from their labours under the same sod with their beloved fathers. He must hurry them into foreign climes; some to glut his rapacity in the accumulation of treasures, not a pittance of which they would be permitted to share; and more to pamper his ambition by shedding their blood in the purchase of laurels, destined, alas! for the brow of those leaders from whom they had again and again experienced the insolence of conquerors, and the malignity of persecutors.

The Cappadocians, we are told, rejected liberty, because they understood not the value of it. The Athenians abused liberty, and when deprived of it sunk rapidly into the meanest vices of slavery. But the Swiss loved their country while their country was free; and Englishmen have yet weightier reasons for attachment to their native land; because with equal freedom it enjoys the advantages of superior civilization; and because the loss of these proud distinctions will inevitably expose them to more galling coercion, and more ignominious subjection. Conscious that a spirit of discontent lurks in the bosom of almost every individual, and rankles through every class of the community, the oppressor will be equally upon his guard against secret and open resistance, and equally prepared to crush every rising confederacy, and every straggling insurrection. Even your sighs however involuntary, your murmurs however just, your interviews however harmless, will be watched, will be recorded, and must await their interpretation from his humours, or his fears, or his resentment. You may be thrust into dungeons upon the idlest pretences, and for the slightest delinquencies you may be condemned to the scaffold. If impatience of the yoke should madden at last into despair, and despair should incite you to take up arms; destitute of resources, and scattered over the land by the whim or the policy of your cruel masters, you will be compelled to plan without concert, to attack without effect, and to perish in the field of battle without the ordinary alleviations of your fall from

pity or from glory. How dreadful then would be the reverse of your fortune, when, from the enjoyment of security, order, and independence, you have been precipitated into a state of bondage, where innocence cannot avail for your safety, where virtue will increase your danger, and where bravery itself will accelerate your destruction.

Consider, I beseech you, some striking circumstances which mark the situation into which you are thrown by the mighty and unprecedented armaments of your enemies. The wealth, the strength, and above all the generous and high spirit of this country, form, I do not say the sole, but I do confidently affirm, the very strongest obstacle to the ambition of your foes. Against us, therefore, must be directed their utmost force. The bravest of their legions, and the most expert of their generals, must be employed in removing that obstacle, and by the removal of it in paving the way for the ruin and the subjugation of all Europe. Well is our adversary aware that the skill and the courage of his army are to be called forth, not against a band of cowardly slaves or reluctant hirelings, but against hosts of men, valiant from the very constitution of their minds, robust and vigorous from the frame of their bodies, and proud of sacred and ancient rights, which have often been endangered by the attacks of tyrants, but as often preserved by the magnanimity of patriots; of men who can recount with exultation the victories of their forefathers and their own over the best disciplined armies of France, and who therefore would blush to sully by treachery or timi-

dity, the well-earned reputation of their country; of men who by their activity or their ingenuity have acquired that personal opulence, and those personal enjoyments, which are utterly unknown to any other nation; of men who in every article of their commerce, in every produce of their soil, in every fleece of wool and in every blade of grass, behold the fruits of their own industry, the materials of their own happiness, and signals too for their own prowess in the day of battle.

To the collective might then of our adversaries, let us oppose our own without hesitation, and without dismay. We have much to defend, we have the means of defending it, and if our resolution be equal to our means, the splendour of our success will not be disproportionate to the justice of our cause.

On the other hand, it well behoves us to consider what we must suffer, should we by any disgraceful and disastrous infatuation be unfaithful to ourselves. If, indeed, the arms of our enemy were directed against some countries on the continent, he might cherish the hope of retaining them, and therefore in the midst of violence he might sometimes remember mercy, and even for his own sake he might try to conciliate a defeated and humbled foe. But, with all the giddiness of his pride, and all the fierceness of his rage, he has not yet arrived at that extravagant pitch of phrensy, which can inspire him with the faintest hope of keeping England for any long time as a conquered country. He may expect sometimes to put to flight our armies, and sometimes to gain possession of our towns. But of

complete and permanent conquest he cannot think even in his dreams. What then must be the real object of these tremendous preparations for war? My brethren! the answer lies in one word. Desolation. This undoubtedly is, and this alone can be the aim of our invaders.

To the immortal honour of this country be it spoken, no affront has, upon the present occasion, been offered to the good sense of it by those gaudy eulogies upon liberty, and those vehement invectives against despotism, which had been employed to beguile and to enslave other nations, less fortunate than our own. No attempt has been made to call into action the causes to which other invaders often have recourse for the accomplishment of their purposes; impatience, I mean, of subordination, fondness for change, discontent under grievances real or imaginary, and the preference of experiments for attaining that perfection which has been ostentatiously described in theory, to the enjoyment of that partial but progressive good, which is practically and visibly placed within our reach. No lure from the participation of power has been spread before the seditious, no incitement has been holden out to the profligate, from a share in the spoil, no promise of exclusive favour has been hinted even to the submissive. Persuasion seems to have been cast aside for once, as an incumbrance to action, and hypocrisy itself stands mute before the footstool of Usurpation.

Thus, the sagacity which puts you on your guard against artifice; the magnanimity which fortifies

you against danger; the fidelity with which you adhere to the cause of your Country, and the determination which you have made, not to exchange English freedom for any wily, or I should rather say, impudent offers of French equality, have been recognised by your very enemies, in the face of the whole Christian world. They may, in some instances, have wronged, but they do not insult you; they may hate, but they do not despise you; they may have alarmed, but they do not even try to deceive you; their proceedings, in every stage of the contest, have been consistent and intelligible. Invasion was threatened, from the first moment; and the threat remains, as it began, without disguise and without mitigation. Your forces, in the opinion of the enemy, may be encountered, but your goodwill, he is aware, cannot be conciliated. Men of sense and moderation have not forgotten the hardships cruelly imposed upon other countries; men of spirit can ill brook the challenge arrogantly given to our own; loyalists stand aghast at the ravages of a military chieftain; republicans are incensed at the pageantries of a perpetual dictator. By his measures in France, the expectations of visionary theorists have been disappointed, and the predictions of deep and dispassionate observers have been realized. From his success in England, the rich would be in danger of beggary, the poor must look for captivity, the peaceable have every thing to fear, and even the turbulent have nothing to hope.

Hence, no confederate bands of traitors lie in ambuscade, to hail the invader with their shouts,

and to second his unparalleled attempts for our destruction. The dark forest, the deep morass, the craggy rock, the steep and untrodden mountain, here afford no shelter to his flying legions. The elements will be deaf to his call, and the raging sea will lift up its opposing waves, when baffled efforts compel him to look for safety in retreat. If he lands, he must advance; if he advances, he must fight; if he fights he may perish; and even if he prevails to-day, he must negociate to-morrow. Conscious of these difficulties, he will let loose havoc upon the land; and shall we, then, be tame spectators of the scene? Shall we sit before him with folded arms, or crouch beneath him with bended knees, while all the fair works of art and nature are defaced by the detroyer? Shall we wait in stupid indifference, or with base timidity, 'till the evil reaches our own doors? 'Till the cries of the orphan and the widow assail our ears? 'Till the humble cottage shares the same fate with the stately palace, and dissolves in flames before our affrighted eyes? Doubtless, confusion and distress will be felt through many parts of the kingdom. Our fields in some places will be laid waste; our arsenals may be assailed; our metropolis itself may be exposed to pillage; and who among us can be so sottish or so headstrong, as to say, that national evils of such magnitude, when known to him only by report, will not alarm and afflict his soul?

But that which you hear of others, must also be seen and suffered by yourselves, unless you are true to your duty. Your own harvests will be plundered,

your own houses will be destroyed, your wives and your children will be inhumanly torn from the tender embraces of husbands and fathers, and brutally violated in the sight of you, their legal and natural protectors: your sons, to whom ye look forward for comfort and succour to your grey hairs, will perish in the bloom of their youth; masters, servants, friends, and neighbours, may alike fall a prey to the devouring sword, and does not the very mention, I would ask you, of such evils awaken within you an instantaneous, ardent, invincible determination to avert them, "with all your heart, and all your mind, and all your soul, and all your strength?"

Were your governors, indeed, employed in romantic and adventurous schemes of conquest, you might pause a little before you added approbation to obedience, and spontaneously tendered your aid to annoy those who had not offended you, to plunder those who had not injured you, and to crush those who cannot resist you. But when your country is invaded, there is no room for hesitation in your judgment, as there can be no plea for slackness in your actions. Every ear must be open to the general and awful summons; every heart must be inaccessible to fear; and ever hand must be uplifted for resistance. You are called upon to defend your liberties, your laws, and your religion. You are sharing a common danger, and promoting a common interest, with your governors, with your equals, and with your inferiors. You go forth to the combat, not as savage destroyers, not as ambitious conquerors, not as insatiable plunderers, but as

self-preservers, as Englishmen, and as Christians. You are encouraged, in the support of a just cause, by the example of the brave, the arguments of the wise, and the exhortations of the good. You are preparing to bequeath to your posterity those blessings, which the foresight, or the heroism, or the virtues of your great progenitors procured for them and for yourselves. You are contending, not for unsubstantial renown, but for solid security; not alone for national honour, which indeed may be often precarious, or merely ideal, but for national independence, which is always intelligible, and always must be inestimable. You are avenging the blood of the innocent, the honest, and the valiant. You are protecting your neighbours from oppression, your families from poverty, your sovereign from injury and insult, and your country from disgrace and perdition.

In the pursuit of ends so justifiable, by means so meritorious, you may without impiety look up for succour to Almighty God! and whether ye perish in the struggle, or survive it, the approbation of that God will be the sure and most ample reward of your loyalty, your patriotism, and your fortitude co-operating with your benevolence.

Far the greater part of the foregoing Discourse was delivered from the pulpit, and the whole of it would long ago have been sent to the press, if I had been able to procure the aid of a transcriber. My intention was to subjoin such Notes as appeared to be pertinent and useful. But the delay which my diligent and very sensible Printer unexpectedly found in getting the necessary types, determined me to abandon my design. So important, however, seems to me the matter which some of those Notes contain, and especially one in which I have endeavoured to vindicate the character of Moses, as a lover of his Country, from the most formidable objection which has ever been urged against it, that I shall rejoice to avail myself of a proper opportunity for submitting my thoughts to the consideration both of serious Christians and of candid unbelievers.

For obvious but weighty reasons of decorum, I am anxious to guard some expressions which occur in p. 672 of the Sermon, from misconception. Though I could wish that two or three passages in the late Fast Service had been omitted or softened; yet I shall not be content with saying that, according to my judgment, it is, upon the whole, far preferable to many others which have within my memory preceded it. In truth, I think the general spirit, and the general matter of that service highly honourable to the good sense, the taste, and the piety of the persons who composed it. My heart, I must confess, is always refreshed by the perusal of those supplications to Heaven, which are calculated at once to satisfy the enlightened and conscientious members of the Established Church, and to conciliate Christians who dissent from it peaceably and sincerely. Such supplications, are, I am sure, conformable to the benevolent genius of our holy religion; and for the best ends, they exhibit the best principles of that Church, which, among other excellent lessons conveyed to us, in its public forms of devotion, has instructed us to pray that "God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," who is "our only Saviour and the Prince of Peace, would take from us all hatred and prejudice, and whatsoever else may hinder us from godly union and concord; and that there is but one body and one spirit, and one hope of

our calling; one Lord, one faith, one Baptism, one God, and Father of us all; so we may henceforth be all of one heart and one soul, united in one holy bond of truth and peace, of faith and charity."

Be it observed, to the credit of the Church of England, that the prayer in which the foregoing words is contained, is annually read upon a state occasion; and to the honour of the present age be it remembered, that the heavenly spirit of that prayer is infused into the service for the late Fast, in that part where we are directed to "beseech Almighty God, to give us all grace, to put away from us all rancour of religious dissention, that they who agree in the essentials of our most holy faith, and look for pardon through the merits and intercession of the Saviour, may, notwithstanding their differences upon points of doubtful opinion, and in the forms of external worship, still be united in the bonds of Christian charity, and fulfil his blessed Son's commandment, of loving one another as God has loved us."

The authors to whom I allude in p. 636 of the Sermon are, Lord Shaftesbury, in part the Second of an Essay on the freedom of Wit and Humour, and Mr. Soame Jenyns, in his View of the Internal Evidence of the Christian Religion.

Upon particular passages in the works of those writers I had now and then made some observations, which it has not been my fortune to see in any book that has fallen in my way. But as their general reasoning has been fully examined by Dr. John Leland, Dr. Maclaine, Dr. Brown, and other writers, I have been content with pursuing the same track, and shall offer my apology nearly in the words of Torquatus: "Dicam de gravissimis rebus; nihil scilicet novi, ea tamen, quæ lectores probaturos esse confidam."—Cic. de finib. lib. i.

END OF VOL. II.

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